Alternatives to the Beeching cuts

[DarloRich]

Trotting out the whitewash version of what happened with some embellishment about Fiennes?

The fact remains the closures failed to achieve their stated objectives and saved little money overall. This combined with the flaws/inconsistency's/half truths/misdirection in the report and the primary funding source of the party in Government at the time will always leave a huge question mark on the process.

The best description of what is popularly known as "Beeching" is that the closure programme was akin to a company whose late shift was always not achieving its production quota and working late thereby claiming overtime and increasing costs. The Management decides to deal with it by cutting the canteen staff jobs.

but was that more to do with not taking on the unions at the same time? - working practices don't seem to have changed that much on what remained as a result

The railways were not losing money because passengers had deserted the railway there had been an increase since nationalisation nor was the main problem loss making branch lines. Basically the railway had been run into the ground because of Government policy which forced it to carry goods and passengers at rates which weren't commercially viable. Combine this with the profitable coal traffic and other bulk movement goods being a lot less than in yesteryear UK coal production in 1960 was two thirds of 1913 for instance and then factor in that road completion had taken away most of the less than wagonload trade but Legislation forced the railways to maintain facilities for doing it.....

so your answer is what? KBO in the hope something changes? Do try and remove the rose tinted glasses...........

Things could not carry on as the had done. The railway was, to all practical purposes, bankrupt. Yes i know that was as a result of long term government inactivity in relation to infrastructure spending but that led to the position where Beeching was needed.

Expensive loco hauled stock continued into the 80s primarily because some of the first generation DMUs required expensive bodywork rectification, and there was a large surplus of diesel locomotives due to falling freight traffic. However, spending money on Mk1 rolling stock already 20 years old was probably not seen as worthwhile. There was no experience of diesel worked push/pull in the Beeching era [the SR experience only being gained from 1967 onward].

Beeching was obsessed with route mileage, and so he should have been. Especially unmodernised route mileage with lots of level crossings. He knew that the lion's share of passenger revenue came from travel between the cities/large towns. York-Hull passengers could be carried on other lines not proposed for closure. He knew how little the Pocklingtons and Market Weightons of this world contributed to the railways finances. He knew that for the railways to survive they needed to concentrate all their investment resources on Inter-City lines to get the fastest, most frequent services possible. It was a choice of upgrading lots of lines a little bit (jack of all trades) or upgrading the Inter City lines alot . Bearing in mind the circumstances of 1963 I think he got a lot right.

As a railway enthusiast of course I would like to have seen more lines remain open. But we keep looking back and vilifying those over 50 years ago who were operating in a completely different age and set of circumstances. Bonkers. The reasons for the Beeching Plan go back long before this.

I agree. Resources had to be concentrated on where the money was. The money wasn't in Pocklington and it wasn't where local alternatives or other lines existed.

That is harsh on the people of Pocklington (for example) but that very hard headed, business like approach is surely right. With spotters/enthusiasts that approach will always be missing. I don't like the fact so many lines and stations closed but I think many of them had to go.

If Beeching had been given a free hand to concentrate all investment on a few Inter Coty trunk routes as you suggest (and as his second report suggested) it would have been an even greater unmitigated disaster for the country than even the Beeching cuts were.

Or it would have created a profitable railway network unencumbered by the millstone of subsidy to rural routes.

Yes, I'm sure there was a lot of operational problems too.

I just wonder how long Beeching would have lasted at ICI if he had paid someone to rubbish it with the public.

Just find it very hard to accept that someone employed to run something would go out of the way to pull it to pieces.

Speaks volumes to me.

that is because you look at it through the prism of a romantic spotter/enthusiast and not a business person!

Turn it around: how long would he have lasted at ICI if, losing million upon millions a year he carried on doing what had always been done because it had always been done? How long would he have lasted making products from outdated plants that no one wanted to buy because they were to expensive?

 

[Gareth Marston]

but was that more to do with not taking on the unions at the same time? - working practices don't seem to have changed that much on what remained as a result



so your answer is what? KBO in the hope something changes? Do try and remove the rose tinted glasses...........

Things could not carry on as the had done. The railway was, to all practical purposes, bankrupt. Yes i know that was as a result of long term government inactivity in relation to infrastructure spending but that led to the position where Beeching was needed.



I agree. Resources had to be concentrated on where the money was. The money wasn't in Pocklington and it wasn't where local alternatives or other lines existed.

That is harsh on the people of Pocklington (for example) but that very hard headed, business like approach is surely right. With spotters/enthusiasts that approach will always be missing. I don't like the fact so many lines and stations closed but I think many of them had to go.



Or it would have created a profitable railway network unencumbered by the millstone of subsidy to rural routes.



that is because you look at it through the prism of a romantic spotter/enthusiast and not a business person!

Turn it around: how long would he have lasted at ICI if, losing million upon millions a year he carried on doing what had always been done because it had always been done? How long would he have lasted making products from outdated plants that no one wanted to buy because they were to expensive?

Any business to be successful has to have a proper understanding of its costs/market and reasons for success/failure. The Reshaping Report failed to directly address the real reasons for the deficit - we've seen the same with McNulty. Certain areas become scapegoats for policy failure elsewhere.

No one is saying things should have stayed as they were. Theirs little romantic about a basic railway branch line for the enthusiast. Given the numbers of DMU's already delivered (none after 1961) and the number of trip working diesel locomotives and coaches knocking about there was probably no need to spend anymore apart the relatively minor costs associated with removing village/small town goods yards and surplus passing loops/double track sections and associated signalling changes. Level Crossings remain as a thorny issue as you need £ to replace crossing keepers but a large amount of other savings were low hanging fruit.

Sundry goods was dying by 1963 and no amount of cost saving could save it however a proper traffic analysis and cost reduction programme would have kept many lines open and not hung a label on the whole network saying "no longer wanted".

 

[DarloRich]

Any business to be successful has to have a proper understanding of its costs/market and reasons for success/failure. The Reshaping Report failed to directly address the real reasons for the deficit - we've seen the same with McNulty. Certain areas become scapegoats for policy failure elsewhere.

No one is saying things should have stayed as they were. Theirs little romantic about a basic railway branch line for the enthusiast. Given the numbers of DMU's already delivered (none after 1961) and the number of trip working diesel locomotives and coaches knocking about there was probably no need to spend anymore apart the relatively minor costs associated with removing village/small town goods yards and surplus passing loops/double track sections and associated signalling changes. Level Crossings remain as a thorny issue as you need £ to replace crossing keepers but a large amount of other savings were low hanging fruit.

Sundry goods was dying by 1963 and no amount of cost saving could save it however a proper traffic analysis and cost reduction programme would have kept many lines open and not hung a label on the whole network saying "no longer wanted".

While I don't disagree entirely I would go as far as COULD not would have kept lines open. I agree that not every option, in many cases, was exhausted before closure was implemented. However, I do wonder if things had gone too far and harsh surgery was what was really required to save the rest of the body.

 

[Taunton]

They put nothing in place to ensure that branch lines connection users would continue to travel by train. Through ticketing on dedicated bus links - entirely absent. People just didn't magically turn up at the railhead they disappeared.

Actually we are even more incapable of doing this nowadays. Paranoia about reporting what percentage of trains are late (at the expense of any passenger convenience) has led to the end of any sensible form of handling connections, which are now cheerily sent off just as passengers from the inbound train are making their way across. That never happened in Beeching's day. In fact the station inspector would probably get demoted for it.

 

[AY1975]

Interestingly with the Marshlink the DEMU's weren't specifically adapted for on train ticket vending until the early 1990's, when the 207's had their centre carriages removed and an inter-carriage vestibule installed. This was some time after the track rationalisation in around '79 I believe. Up until then,, passengers getting on at unstaffed stations were still expected to find the guard. There was the one-off refurbed 205 and the short Hastings set of course, but the line was mainly operated with standard 205's and 207's.

An example of a passenger service saved by pay-trains was the Tonbridge - Reading line. The great Ron Cotton (who went on to help save the Settle-Carlisle) put together spare EPB trailers and Hastings DEMU carriages to form the famous Tadpole units. Certainly BR could have done with a few more like him in the 1960's and 70's.

I seem to recall that on lines such as the Marshlink line which had unstaffed stations but were worked by non-gangwayed DEMUs, the guard or travelling ticket inspector would often issue and check tickets in one coach at a time.

 

[AY1975]

Whilst we all want the railways to succeed, to be fair I think some lines and stations genuinely did outlive their usefulness if they ever were of any use at all. After all, many remote rural stations were only built in the first place because local landowners insisted on a station being built on their land as a condition for allowing the railway to be built.

That said, in many ways the Beeching plan wasn't properly thought out. Beeching closed a lot of lines that duplicated other routes - for example, Matlock-Buxton was seen as a duplicate route between London and Manchester, but by closing it Beeching overlooked the fact that people might want to get from Derby to Manchester, and ignored its tourist potential. It seems that Beeching assumed that people only wanted to travel to or from London, not intermediately or cross-country.

 

[Taunton]

I seem to recall that on lines such as the Marshlink line which had unstaffed stations but were worked by non-gangwayed DEMUs, the guard or travelling ticket inspector would often issue and check tickets in one coach at a time.

\
Taunton area branches had the same issue. The last of these was the Minehead line, which although the busiest of them could be notably quiet through the winter. Every station was staffed. The issue was that although some of the DMUs were Cross-Country units with gangways, about half the services (so no more than one train in circuit) was a 3-car Derby Suburban unit, with no gangways. Instead of rearranging things to overcome this, stations remained staffed to the end - although for places like Crowcombe the passenger ticket receipts were certainly less than the staff wages.

 

[Gareth Marston]

\
Taunton area branches had the same issue. The last of these was the Minehead line, which although the busiest of them could be notably quiet through the winter. Every station was staffed. The issue was that although some of the DMUs were Cross-Country units with gangways, about half the services (so no more than one train in circuit) was a 3-car Derby Suburban unit, with no gangways. Instead of rearranging things to overcome this, stations remained staffed to the end - although for places like Crowcombe the passenger ticket receipts were certainly less than the staff wages.

The whole system was a mash up like this with some fairly obvious rationalization being easily obtainable if some thought was put inot it.

 

[Gareth Marston]

The Mid Wales line is a good case study first of all in how old ways were leading to high costs but secondly in how much you could cut costs if you tried. Now I'm not saying it could have survived or would be "profitable" but consider that in 1962 it had:

56 route miles , 11 shared with other lines.
200 staff in total worked on it.
15 manned stations and around half a dozen unmanned halts.
17 signalboxes (and passing loops)
15 locations allegedly open for freight
4 Engine sheds (Moat Lane Jnc, Llandiloes, Builth Rd and Brecon)
around 8/9 Ivatt 43xxx 2-6-0's to work it.
5 sets of stock (usually 2 Hawksworth ex GWR corridor coaches)
Moat Lane Jnc to Llanidloes had 9 passenger trains a day as did Builth Road to Builth Wells.
Only 4 trains a day ran south Llanidloes to Builth Rd.
a northbound and a southbound daily pick up goods was all that was left (operated by separate locos).

However you could have run it with.

Freight only to Llanidloes (accessed from North), Builth Road (accessed from Central Wales line) and Brecon (accessed from elsewhere) with lorry delverys/collections from these points. Thereby negating need to run freight trains on the bulk of the line keeping maintenance cost minimal.

Passing loops and signal boxes could certainly be cut in half (largely governed by intersection with other lines).
Manned stations reduced to a handful and some halts closed.
3 DMU diagrams would run a sufficient service cutting down on traincrew costs.
2 depots needed not 4.
less than 100 staff

You can see how easy it would be to strip out over half the costs on a line.

 

[Lankyline]

This is a somewhat over-abbreviated description of the process!

To be quite clear, Dr Beeching took the reins in March 1961 and there was a *full week* of data capture for both passenger and freight traffic in late April 1961.

There were then nearly two years of statistical and other analysis and writing up before the Reshaping report was published in March 1963. Any suggestion that the process was rushed through is ridiculous.

In understanding the "Route costs" of £110m it can clearly be seen (e.g. from Page 6 of the Report) that this covers "Track and signalling". There is no mystery about sidings, depots and so forth given other headings, such as "Terminal handling and facilities". At service level costs were commonly split into Movement, Terminals and Track & Signalling.

"Over abbreviated" it might be but I wasn't about to replicate complete tables from the report. As for the route costs, the table concerned (Route and Assessed costs by Main traffic for British Railways 1961 Table 1) is the one the comment was drawn from and does not show such areas as "Terminal handling and facilities"

It is well documented that the traffic flow survey was only conducted over the weekend of April 23, this process was evaluating actual usage eg passenger actually using the services, effectively a "glorified" time and motion survey. The establishing of base costs for the running, maintenance, etc was conducted over a longer period, as Beeching had identified that there was no basis for calculating route profit and loss in place before he was appointed.

Everything about Beeching is done with hindsight, we know that the methodology was flawed, how revenue was allocated to a route was open to manipulation, routes under threat receiving either little or no modernisation, the lack of political / corporate will to cut staffing levels and/or enforce cost cutting measures before complete closure of a route and so it goes on.

 

[Taunton]

However you could have run it with....

The issue with this sort of analysis is that it is like the BR one of the 1960s, it looks at costs completely in isolation of revenue/usage.

Where were the passengers/scope for passengers? Were there significant flows into Llanidloes, or any intermediate point? How much long distance traffic, to London or Manchester, was actually generated? Did those headed for London actually prefer to drive to Hereford?

BR's ability at costing was also poor. These were in the days before computerised analysis of costs, so a more simplistic view was all that could be taken. How much did the PW department for a division cost, labour and materials, last year? £1 million. How many track miles? 500. Therefore it costs £2,000 per track mile. Remove 100 miles and you save £200,000 of costs. Such nonsense generalities were all they had.

 

[Gareth Marston]

The issue with this sort of analysis is that it is like the BR one of the 1960s, it looks at costs completely in isolation of revenue/usage.

Where were the passengers/scope for passengers? Were there significant flows into Llanidloes, or any intermediate point? How much long distance traffic, to London or Manchester, was actually generated? Did those headed for London actually prefer to drive to Hereford?

BR's ability at costing was also poor. These were in the days before computerised analysis of costs, so a more simplistic view was all that could be taken. How much did the PW department for a division cost, labour and materials, last year? £1 million. How many track miles? 500. Therefore it costs £2,000 per track mile. Remove 100 miles and you save £200,000 of costs. Such nonsense generalities were all they had.

I have a good handle on how the line was run not much info on usage/revenue I'm afraid. I used it as an example on the costs/ how rationalisation was possible. At the lines closure hearing the inquiry chairman read out BR's claim that the line made losses which were in excess of what the cost of running an hourly service over the line using the reshaping reports worked example would be! Many at the time suspected that BR told lies at the closure hearings.

 

[Taunton]

Having had a chance to have a look at BR cost (and revenue) analyses in the 1970s, I would think it was unlikely that they actively "told lies" about costs, more that they didn't have much of an idea below the overall figures, and were just guessing.

I seem to recall that there was a significant school traffic flow on the Cambrian Coast line from Harlech, where the major school of the area was, towards Pwllheli. This required 6 cars on a line where 2 car sets were the norm. The service train was reinforced by an additional 4 cars which were worked all the way from Shrewsbury, locked out of service, to provide the accommodation. Under one set of cost calculations this was grossly wasteful. Under another set it was the most efficient way to do it. Believe it or not, locking the cars out of service impacted the costings under the way it was calculated. In reality, it made no difference at all.

 

[RT4038]

I can see that might have been a source of opposition from Management and Unions. Ultimately misguided and futile as the closure programme helped to fuel the decline of the railway in the minds of the public which would have been more of a risk to jobs beyond just loss making lines.

That said, if it was trialled successfully in one place, I've no doubt an effective Chairman with the belief in the concept could have introduced it to others.

It was trialled successfully in one place [The East Suffolk line P114-6 of Fiennes's book 'I tried to run a railway'] in 1966 and then introduced it to others. But this was after the main cuts of the Beeching plan had already taken place. Probably conceived when both management and unions started getting frightened at the extent of the cuts. Most remaining secondary and branch lines of the Eastern/North Eastern Region were then dealt with very quickly. Saved a good many no doubt, but not the East Lincolnshire network with its many level crossings (shut in 1970 after being converted to 'Paytrain'). There was still a limit as to how much losses were going to be funded..

 

[yorksrob]

so your answer is what? KBO in the hope something changes? Do try and remove the rose tinted glasses...........

Things could not carry on as the had done. The railway was, to all practical purposes, bankrupt. Yes i know that was as a result of long term government inactivity in relation to infrastructure spending but that led to the position where Beeching was needed.

Well, perhaps instituting the sort of rationalisations mentioned on here would have been a start. I don't see how it is looking through "rose tinted glasses" to point out that it was a bad idea to cut passenger services that were already covering their revenue cost, in the hope of realising some poorly understood capital saving at some vague time in the future. That's pointing out lousy management. It's degrading your customer base and the customer experience for very little immediate benefit. In such a case, it would have made far more sense to bear down on costs instead.

 

[yorksrob]

It was trialled successfully in one place [The East Suffolk line P114-6 of Fiennes's book 'I tried to run a railway'] in 1966 and then introduced it to others. But this was after the main cuts of the Beeching plan had already taken place. Probably conceived when both management and unions started getting frightened at the extent of the cuts. Most remaining secondary and branch lines of the Eastern/North Eastern Region were then dealt with very quickly. Saved a good many no doubt, but not the East Lincolnshire network with its many level crossings (shut in 1970 after being converted to 'Paytrain'). There was still a limit as to how much losses were going to be funded..

True, but if Beeching had been a decent Chairman he would have been asking for his managers to come up with such solutions. Even if indifferent, he would have been open to his managers experimenting with them. As you say yourself, such innovations had to wait until he'd gone.

 

[yorksrob]

I seem to recall that on lines such as the Marshlink line which had unstaffed stations but were worked by non-gangwayed DEMUs, the guard or travelling ticket inspector would often issue and check tickets in one coach at a time.

I remember seeing that on London suburban sevices in the South East.

 

[yorksrob]

\
Taunton area branches had the same issue. The last of these was the Minehead line, which although the busiest of them could be notably quiet through the winter. Every station was staffed. The issue was that although some of the DMUs were Cross-Country units with gangways, about half the services (so no more than one train in circuit) was a 3-car Derby Suburban unit, with no gangways. Instead of rearranging things to overcome this, stations remained staffed to the end - although for places like Crowcombe the passenger ticket receipts were certainly less than the staff wages.

During the 90's, the class 207 thumpers had their centre carriage removed. The remaining outer carriages then had an internal partition removed from one of the carriages and a second hand gangway installed between them to produce a train accessible to the guard throughout.

 

[RT4038]

True, but if Beeching had been a decent Chairman he would have been asking for his managers to come up with such solutions. Even if indifferent, he would have been open to his managers experimenting with them. As you say yourself, such innovations had to wait until he'd gone.

But his managers had the previous decade to come up with, and implement, such solutions. And they didn't. Well that is not quite true - they introduced DMUs, built new halts [Banbury-Buckingham line], closed whole swathes of hopeless railway (M&GN, Cheltenham-Andover etc.). but it was not enough to stop the losses mounting. Introducing the 'Paytrain' concept on what would have been thought as quite main lines would not have been in the frame in 1963. A few years later, shock at the effect of the initial wave of more closures of hopeless lines and necessity became the mother of invention.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Having had a chance to have a look at BR cost (and revenue) analyses in the 1970s, I would think it was unlikely that they actively "told lies" about costs, more that they didn't have much of an idea below the overall figures, and were just guessing.

I seem to recall that there was a significant school traffic flow on the Cambrian Coast line from Harlech, where the major school of the area was, towards Pwllheli. This required 6 cars on a line where 2 car sets were the norm. The service train was reinforced by an additional 4 cars which were worked all the way from Shrewsbury, locked out of service, to provide the accommodation. Under one set of cost calculations this was grossly wasteful. Under another set it was the most efficient way to do it. Believe it or not, locking the cars out of service impacted the costings under the way it was calculated. In reality, it made no difference at all.

The LnWR Buxton line closure inquiry chairman let the objectors question the costs/ losses presented by BR they used the reshaping report cost model as a benchmark. The reports methodology and costs couldn't square with the figures being given by BR as to the lines cost. The obvious question was if the figures presented as to costs on the line werecorect then the reshaping report was wrong, if the costs in the reshaping report were right then the figures given for the line were wrong or perhaps both were. The chairman asked for guidance from the ministry the inquiry was halted and never delivered a verdict as a decsion either way would question the the accuracy of BR's figures. The Minstry then instructed that TUCC could not hear any objections regarding costs and must only address hardship.

 

[yorksrob]

But his managers had the previous decade to come up with, and implement, such solutions. And they didn't. Well that is not quite true - they introduced DMUs, built new halts [Banbury-Buckingham line], closed whole swathes of hopeless railway (M&GN, Cheltenham-Andover etc.). but it was not enough to stop the losses mounting. Introducing the 'Paytrain' concept on what would have been thought as quite main lines would not have been in the frame in 1963. A few years later, shock at the effect of the initial wave of more closures of hopeless lines and necessity became the mother of invention.

His managers weren't the Chairman in the previous decade. It was Beeching's job to generate the company ethos that would enable such innovation.

 

[Gareth Marston]

But his managers had the previous decade to come up with, and implement, such solutions. And they didn't. Well that is not quite true - they introduced DMUs, built new halts [Banbury-Buckingham line], closed whole swathes of hopeless railway (M&GN, Cheltenham-Andover etc.). but it was not enough to stop the losses mounting. Introducing the 'Paytrain' concept on what would have been thought as quite main lines would not have been in the frame in 1963. A few years later, shock at the effect of the initial wave of more closures of hopeless lines and necessity became the mother of invention.

The officiallinefrom BTC and BR Board was that the modernisation plan investments were the mechanism that would reverse the losses and improve the finances therefore there was no need for individual Managers to implement innovative cost cutting.

 

[Taunton]

I remember seeing that on London suburban sevices in the South East.

The WR in the West Country never got round to that.

To give you some idea of the approach, when the steam locos were withdrawn from the former Southern lines west of Salisbury, a motley bunch of spare WR dmus were drafted in, some Cross-Country units (toilets in two of the three cars), and some gangwayless and toiletless Derby Suburban units from South Wales. There were complaints about these latter ones being indiscriminately assigned to lengthy runs, such as Salisbury to Ilfracombe all stations, and this got up to area MPs and then down through the BR Chairman (probably Stanley Raymond). Almost in a fit of spite, the WR reformed them all one weekend, switching the centre cars between the Cross-Country units and the Suburbans. This put one toilet and 2+2 seats in at least one car of all, but also stopped any through communication in any of the cars at all, which all now comprised a mish-mash of different types, and so prevented any attempt at conductor guard operation.

You have to say that a management that could come up with that are never going to be skilled with understanding costs and revenues.

The official line from BTC and BR Board was that the modernisation plan investments were the mechanism that would reverse the losses and improve the finances therefore there was no need for individual Managers to implement innovative cost cutting.

Quite so. Fiennes wrote that when in about 1962 he asked what were the main areas for future cost reduction, all that senior management could come up with was the elimination of the remaining steam locomotives.

 

[yorksrob]

The WR in the West Country never got round to that.

To give you some idea of the approach, when the steam locos were withdrawn from the former Southern lines west of Salisbury, a motley bunch of spare WR dmus were drafted in, some Cross-Country units (toilets in two of the three cars), and some gangwayless and toiletless Derby Suburban units from South Wales. There were complaints about these latter ones being indiscriminately assigned to lengthy runs, such as Salisbury to Ilfracombe all stations, and this got up to area MPs and then down through the BR Chairman (probably Stanley Raymond). Almost in a fit of spite, the WR reformed them all one weekend, switching the centre cars between the Cross-Country units and the Suburbans. This put one toilet and 2+2 seats in at least one car of all, but also stopped any through communication in any of the cars at all, which all now comprised a mish-mash of different types, and so prevented any attempt at conductor guard operation.

You have to say that a management that could come up with that are never going to be skilled with understanding costs and revenues.

To be honest, it sounds like a bit of a botch job but perhaps a reasonable stopgap for the passenger. All units lost through communication but all passengers had access to a toilet, either by choosing the correct carriage or switching carriages at a stop en route. (On the Southern we had a long history of units which were built with partial access to a lavatory, including 205's and HAP's which were contemporary at the time).

It's a shame they didn't come up with using second hand gangways to enable conductor-guard operation though.

 

[DarloRich]

Well, perhaps instituting the sort of rationalisations mentioned on here would have been a start. I don't see how it is looking through "rose tinted glasses" to point out that it was a bad idea to cut passenger services that were already covering their revenue cost, in the hope of realising some poorly understood capital saving at some vague time in the future. That's pointing out lousy management. It's degrading your customer base and the customer experience for very little immediate benefit. In such a case, it would have made far more sense to bear down on costs instead.

And I have said i agree with that - to a point - but as enthusiasts we tend to look at only the good or take an overly "pro" viewpoint to defend our interests.

Beeching took/was ordered to take a cold, hard, business and finance orientated look at the system and delivered what the was asked to deliver. That was a rationalisation of the system and a reduction in cost. That governments didn't have the balls to do further work on T&C and working practices, for example, cant be blamed on him. I still maintain that harsh as the cuts were they provided the structure for the railways to survive and develop into a more modern system.

 

[Dr Hoo]

It was also very difficult to 'bear down on the costs' in an era when railway wages were being significantly increased in real terms to address recruitment problems in many cities and implement the findings of the (then recent) Guillebaud studies into railway pay.

 

[yorksrob]

And I have said i agree with that - to a point - but as enthusiasts we tend to look at only the good or take an overly "pro" viewpoint to defend our interests.

Beeching took/was ordered to take a cold, hard, business and finance orientated look at the system and delivered what the was asked to deliver. That was a rationalisation of the system and a reduction in cost. That governments didn't have the balls to do further work on T&C and working practices, for example, cant be blamed on him. I still maintain that harsh as the cuts were they provided the structure for the railways to survive and develop into a more modern system.

Arguably those cuts didn't realise the reductions in cost expected, and there seemed to have been no attempt to scrutinise this. I'd also argue that the obsession for cutting "duplicate" routes, regardless of whether they served settlements en route has had a disastrous effect on the functioning of the railways in terms of resilience (one need look no further than the continuing issues at Dawlish, or the lack of resilience between London and the Sussex coast to illustrate this) and capacity (the resurrection of the GW route to Birmingham as an example). The railway had only just seen how vital alternative routes were during the electrification of the West Coast Mainline, yet these lessons were quickly forgotten.

 

[Gareth Marston]

And I have said i agree with that - to a point - but as enthusiasts we tend to look at only the good or take an overly "pro" viewpoint to defend our interests.

Beeching took/was ordered to take a cold, hard, business and finance orientated look at the system and delivered what the was asked to deliver. That was a rationalisation of the system and a reduction in cost. That governments didn't have the balls to do further work on T&C and working practices, for example, cant be blamed on him. I still maintain that harsh as the cuts were they provided the structure for the railways to survive and develop into a more modern system.

"business and finance orientated" - but not a very good business or finance person. Just because a dog is from a certain Kennel it doesn't make him perfect dog. Beeching may have been from the world of business - the implication being this world is better than the railway world and thereby anyone from it was somehow better and knows more and wouldn't make mistakes.. its pure fantasy.

The cast iron fundamental is there were no provable savings from the closure programme. If they had been such a success then BR would have been providing the evidence! Look at Beechings official remit - he failed! Therefore every decision he made is questionable purely on business and financial grounds.

 

[HSTEd]

It would have been very interesting if the innovations of the later BR era had been around and had been applied to many of these lines.

For example conversion to simple DMU only operation with a "minimum railway" - single track with dynamic or other loops and pay-on-train using the guard.

That might have been enough to have saved various lines - possibly including the Grand Central.

 

[DarloRich]

"business and finance orientated" - but not a very good business or finance person. Just because a dog is from a certain Kennel it doesn't make him perfect dog. Beeching may have been from the world of business - the implication being this world is better than the railway world and thereby anyone from it was somehow better and knows more and wouldn't make mistakes.. its pure fantasy.

The cast iron fundamental is there were no provable savings from the closure programme. If they had been such a success then BR would have been providing the evidence! Look at Beechings official remit - he failed! Therefore every decision he made is questionable purely on business and financial grounds.

There are clearly provable savings. To suggest otherwise is silly. There are obviously reductions in staff costs, pension contributions, reductions in maintenance spend, reductions in capital spend, higher & more efficient usage of equipment, reductions in stock maintenance etc etc.

BTW at no point do I say Beeching was perfect, just that he looked at railways from a point of view alien to the spotter or enthusiast. His point of view was not half remembered nostalgia or pretend halcyon days or a position of romance or KBO or we have always done it that way. He looked at it from a position of hard headed business as he was instructed to do.

He was asked to cut costs and route miles. He did that, perhaps offhandedly (even cack handedly!) at times, but the network was cut back to something more sensible than the sprawling web of often duplicated lines left by the railway booms of earlier ages. The key, however, is that at the time the future of the railway looked bleak. The car and motorway and the jet plane were the future not the dirty old train. it is to easy to project backwards what we know now. With our wonderful position of hindsight several closures are maddening BUT stood in 1963 looking forward the view looked very different.