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Passengers abandon train at Lewisham with 3rd rails still live.

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Sorry, that's not true. Nobody (other than the Secretary of State) can appoint the RAIB to do anything.

What the BBC says is that SouthEastern and Network Rail have hired an independent investigator to review the matter. That will not be the RAIB. When there was a similar incident involving stranded Eurostars a few years back, a retired senior railway manager conducted an investigation for the company. I imagine the same sort of thing is contemplated here.

Any decision by the RAIB to investigate will be taken later, and will be announced by them.

AFAIK, the RAIB are not investigating yet.
See my e-mail from them on 5/3 (post 538)and it on the website it doesn't say that they are investigating this incident.
Imo they absolutely should be.
 
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Have you ever walked the cess of a railway line?
Even though we signallers no longer have to pass PTS we still occasionally have to go trackside, having first set up our own protection, and I can assure you it is not easy. I didn't work electric lines but even so there are signal wires, point rodding, electric wires, plus rough and uneven ballast. In the dark all are easy to miss, then add snow on top and think about the risks involved.

Totally agree. I have a PTS on a heritage line and have tripped over lots of times.
I'm guessing at Lewisham there wouldn't have been much point rodding or signal wires but still very hazardous in the dark and with snow on the ground. Just climbing down would be a mission in itself with the potential of a juice rail below.

Having said that I would have gone for it. My bladder alone would dictate that!
 
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Calling passengers crooks just reinforces the argument that the railways are not customer friendly, and does nothing to address the very serious issues which incidents such as this hightlight.


Much more appropriate would be for it to be taken from the profits of the company responsible for the problem, and not fare paying passengers who were simply trying to get away from the terrible situation they were in.


Trespassing means to enter upon the property unlawfully, whereas a fare paying passenger is lawfully where they are, and by exiting a broken down train, they are exercising their right to leave. A requirement for them to stay on a broken down or stranded train would be contrary to their right not to be unlawfully detained.


Or maybe he should get an award for taking the initiative. For all he and many other passengers knew, they could have been stuck in horrendous conditions all night.

This is a difficult one legally.
As has been said, how long does the TOC have a right to detain somebody against their will before it becomes false imprisonment. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 hours? A woman claimed it when a faulty lock on a public toilet door trapped her inside. In law, there is no length of time stated.
I'm sure that there is a defence against a charge of trespass if the person is getting away from a particular situation.
 
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Travel sooner rather than later was the initial advice (as was the case all week) but things got progressively worse throughout the day, even before the events at Lewisham kicked off.

The overriding point is that no one was left in any doubt that there was severe disruption to the network and people were told should avoid travelling (“please DO NOT TRAVEL” is unequivocal), and complete journeys as early as possible.

I really don’t really see how SE can be criticised for putting out this advice, or what it is people think they should have said instead.

SE should have heeded their own advice and not run the trains.
If a train is running, then the pax have a perfectly reasonable expectation of completing their journey. I would think that most would accept a certain amount of delay and disruption in the weather conditions. This was totally predictable and could/should have been prevented.
 
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Assuming this is an accurate picture of what happened, then firstly I've a lot of sympathy for those trying to manage the situation, from the no doubt cold NR supervisor on the ground to those in the remote Ops room with facts flying, multiple situations, rule books being thumbed, people trying to make decisions and the delay, rumours and change plus the need to coordinate with all the various agencies, all no doubt with higher up/external organisations demanding information and so on. As a military person I've a fair bit of experience with difficult and complex situations which depart from planned normality, both on the ground and in HQs, and even with the best will in the world and lots of training, it is only ever going to be semi-organised chaos at best. The quality of decisions in that environment comes down to training (thinking clearly under stress), knowledge and experience (what the rules are, how you can bend and break them) and sheer luck. The more of each, the more likely you are to make good judgements and the situation work out ok rather than a catastrophe.

Having said that - reading the above I'm struck with the repetition of something that clearly wasn't working, and how we in the military world beast ourselves with "if the plan isn't working, change the plan". Now we don't necessarily have a great record of actually implementing it in the breach, but its underpinned every aspect of my training, and pretty much sums up what we do in situations. Have a plan, try and implement it, but crucially, keep evaluating it. If things aren't going right, then change the plan.

In this situation, the plan to clear the ice and get the trains moving was clearly a good plan at the outset, and would deliver the desired passenger (& operator) result (win-win). However, once it starts taking a bit longer than planned, and once you've had to widen your isolation area due to people getting off (which rightly or not, they did), then your plan is pretty much in tatters. Trying to keep to that plan, recovering the people, re-securing the trains to potentially re-apply power whilst de-icing, is an obviously losing battle. It would have been a major effort to coordinate working out what was going on and to respond to it in the way they did, and can only ever have taken time, measured in hours (which fits the timelines). In that time, people, having already seen an example of what they can do to "self help", will only ever do one thing: follow on sooner or later.

Criticise the people getting off if it makes you feel better, but its human factors coming up against a Rule Book. As a student of reality, human factors will win every time in terms of what happens. A rule book that doesn't account for human factors is a bad rule book. Or at least, if implementation of the rule book doesn't given scope for suitably experienced and qualified people to go "out of limits" then it is a bad system.

In this case, once they'd realised people had de-trained somewhere and the implication of an inability to regain the situation (especially after the first time round the loop trying to re-secure only to find others had detrained), I suspect a decision to abandon their attempts to recover train movement and focus entirely on a more controlled evacuation would have been the better option than trying to push the snowball back uphill.

Finally: a key part of our military process is communication. Keep communicating to people what you are doing, and more so, what you are trying to achieve. That way they are much, much less likely to strike off on things that they think will help them/everyone (but don't) and much more likely to have the patience to wait until you task them. This is a problem as we train people to use their initiative and that doing something is better than doing nothing. Except that often it isn't! hence keeping everyone informed of the what and the why helps avoid confusion and counter productive activities. Which given the situations are already extremely confusing and of course "the enemy has a voice too" makes life quite challenging. So as above - I've considerable sympathy for the operators here, but it does appear as if an earlier recognition that the situation was departing control (and a timeframe of 3-4 hours is a perfect example of how things can rapidly start to drag on as you have to wait for answers and coordinate with people who then need to physically move locations etc. and so start to lose your momentum and control of events) and a change was needed. Ultimately, the failure to recognise and adapt led to what I would say is an inevitable human factors outcome since people will always run out of patience and start to take control of their own destiny - their perception of risk at that point being very distorted by the natural drive to "take control" and the positive feelings that activity releases. Throwing criticism at them is unlikely to achieve anything, and rather masks a systemic failure to include the people aspect in the operator's planning. Which is reflected in the many comments that support the pax actions - ultimately this railway business is all about people, not things and rules. Forget its about people, forget they are essentially mental (we talk about making things "squaddie proof" for very good reasons borne of experience) and you are not going to have a happy outcome.

Err, sorry for waffling!

Excellent.
Best comment so far!
 

Antman

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SE should have heeded their own advice and not run the trains.
If a train is running, then the pax have a perfectly reasonable expectation of completing their journey. I would think that most would accept a certain amount of delay and disruption in the weather conditions. This was totally predictable and could/should have been prevented.


You can't seriously criticise a train operator for running trains, how were people supposed to get home from work?
 

fowler9

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You can't seriously criticise a train operator for running trains, how were people supposed to get home from work?
Employers should accept that there are rare occasions that they can't provide a full service, customers should accept this also. The problem is that neither employers nor customers will accept this. Not helped by the fact that this country falls apart at the slightest whiff of bad weather.
 

DarloRich

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Assuming this is an accurate picture of what happened, then firstly I've a lot of sympathy for those trying to manage the situation, from the no doubt cold NR supervisor on the ground to those in the remote Ops room with facts flying, multiple situations, rule books being thumbed, people trying to make decisions and the delay, rumours and change plus the need to coordinate with all the various agencies, all no doubt with higher up/external organisations demanding information and so on. As a military person I've a fair bit of experience with difficult and complex situations which depart from planned normality, both on the ground and in HQs, and even with the best will in the world and lots of training, it is only ever going to be semi-organised chaos at best. The quality of decisions in that environment comes down to training (thinking clearly under stress), knowledge and experience (what the rules are, how you can bend and break them) and sheer luck. The more of each, the more likely you are to make good judgements and the situation work out ok rather than a catastrophe.

Having said that - reading the above I'm struck with the repetition of something that clearly wasn't working, and how we in the military world beast ourselves with "if the plan isn't working, change the plan". Now we don't necessarily have a great record of actually implementing it in the breach, but its underpinned every aspect of my training, and pretty much sums up what we do in situations. Have a plan, try and implement it, but crucially, keep evaluating it. If things aren't going right, then change the plan.

In this situation, the plan to clear the ice and get the trains moving was clearly a good plan at the outset, and would deliver the desired passenger (& operator) result (win-win). However, once it starts taking a bit longer than planned, and once you've had to widen your isolation area due to people getting off (which rightly or not, they did), then your plan is pretty much in tatters. Trying to keep to that plan, recovering the people, re-securing the trains to potentially re-apply power whilst de-icing, is an obviously losing battle. It would have been a major effort to coordinate working out what was going on and to respond to it in the way they did, and can only ever have taken time, measured in hours (which fits the timelines). In that time, people, having already seen an example of what they can do to "self help", will only ever do one thing: follow on sooner or later.

Criticise the people getting off if it makes you feel better, but its human factors coming up against a Rule Book. As a student of reality, human factors will win every time in terms of what happens. A rule book that doesn't account for human factors is a bad rule book. Or at least, if implementation of the rule book doesn't given scope for suitably experienced and qualified people to go "out of limits" then it is a bad system.

In this case, once they'd realised people had de-trained somewhere and the implication of an inability to regain the situation (especially after the first time round the loop trying to re-secure only to find others had detrained), I suspect a decision to abandon their attempts to recover train movement and focus entirely on a more controlled evacuation would have been the better option than trying to push the snowball back uphill.

Finally: a key part of our military process is communication. Keep communicating to people what you are doing, and more so, what you are trying to achieve. That way they are much, much less likely to strike off on things that they think will help them/everyone (but don't) and much more likely to have the patience to wait until you task them. This is a problem as we train people to use their initiative and that doing something is better than doing nothing. Except that often it isn't! hence keeping everyone informed of the what and the why helps avoid confusion and counter productive activities. Which given the situations are already extremely confusing and of course "the enemy has a voice too" makes life quite challenging. So as above - I've considerable sympathy for the operators here, but it does appear as if an earlier recognition that the situation was departing control (and a timeframe of 3-4 hours is a perfect example of how things can rapidly start to drag on as you have to wait for answers and coordinate with people who then need to physically move locations etc. and so start to lose your momentum and control of events) and a change was needed. Ultimately, the failure to recognise and adapt led to what I would say is an inevitable human factors outcome since people will always run out of patience and start to take control of their own destiny - their perception of risk at that point being very distorted by the natural drive to "take control" and the positive feelings that activity releases. Throwing criticism at them is unlikely to achieve anything, and rather masks a systemic failure to include the people aspect in the operator's planning. Which is reflected in the many comments that support the pax actions - ultimately this railway business is all about people, not things and rules. Forget its about people, forget they are essentially mental (we talk about making things "squaddie proof" for very good reasons borne of experience) and you are not going to have a happy outcome.

Err, sorry for waffling!

I think that is a very good post ( especially about adapting plans/flexibility of action) and I hesitate to question or discuss further but the communication issue is one that needs consideration.

What does that better communication look like? How does the information get from the control room to the driver to the passenger? How does the driver ( working often alone on these SE routes) prioritise communication about trying to repair the train and passing information to the passenger? How does he do that if the power is out and the P/A dead?

I am all for better communication but would like to know how that can be delivered especially in times of disrupted working.
 

Bromley boy

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You can't seriously criticise a train operator for running trains, how were people supposed to get home from work?

Indeed. They’d already drastically reduced the timetable to try and make it more robust.

Difficult to see what they could have done differently to what they did:
- advise not to travel unless essential;
- warn of the risk of disruption;
- run the best service possible in the circumstances.

Freezing rain was forecast all over the south east so a decision not to run trains on this basis would have led to the shutdown of the whole third rail network, including several of the UK’s busiest stations.

Can you imagine the reaction to that on this board!!!?
 

John Bray

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Running their emergency timetable through the rush hour was one of the reasons for the crush loading that made the experience so unpleasant. A train without standing passengers would have allowed passengers to relax, access to the toilets, privacy for those peeing in bottles etc. The outside conditions were no worse on Friday evening than the rest of the week, when SE had managed to run a commuter service, if with disruption, it was just on the last day when the emergency timetable was introduced. The DO NOT TRAVEL seemed to refer to East Kent only, Live Departure Boards showed Orpington to London inbound trains running OK all day, as I was watching them. I didn't travel, but had no reason to think I couldn't.
 

Robertj21a

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I think that is a very good post ( especially about adapting plans/flexibility of action) and I hesitate to question or discuss further but the communication issue is one that needs consideration.

What does that better communication look like? How does the information get from the control room to the driver to the passenger? How does the driver ( working often alone on these SE routes) prioritise communication about trying to repair the train and passing information to the passenger? How does he do that if the power is out and the P/A dead?

I am all for better communication but would like to know how that can be delivered especially in times of disrupted working.

Some sensible queries there. Are there any examples (UK or elsewhere) of staff in a remote Control Room/Customer Service Centre having direct audio access to specific train carriages ?. It would be good to think that, in 2018, such things are already operational, somewhere.
Can the PA run off an 'emergency' battery ? - again any current (sorry !!) examples ?
 

theageofthetra

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Some sensible queries there. Are there any examples (UK or elsewhere) of staff in a remote Control Room/Customer Service Centre having direct audio access to specific train carriages ?. It would be good to think that, in 2018, such things are already operational, somewhere.
Can the PA run off an 'emergency' battery ? - again any current (sorry !!) examples ?
Latest GSMR upgrade allows that.
 

theageofthetra

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There is a tweet from Ian Prosser today that the blog and video that has been previously posted and all over the media from the trapped train has been forwarded to his investigation department.
 

Bromley boy

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Some sensible queries there. Are there any examples (UK or elsewhere) of staff in a remote Control Room/Customer Service Centre having direct audio access to specific train carriages ?. It would be good to think that, in 2018, such things are already operational, somewhere.
Can the PA run off an 'emergency' battery ? - again any current (sorry !!) examples ?

Signallers can broadcast over the PA in emergencies (generally used if the driver of a DOO train is unresponsive).

Once the batteries are exhausted (which can be as little as 30-45 mins after power is switched off) there’s no means of using the PA.
 
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Astradyne

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From reading this thread, I assume that 'Gold' is the NR Incident Management Control Centre.

Surely in an incident like this the 1st thing they should be asking, is from previous experience and modelling how long will it take before the 1st passengers start disembarking from the train.

Then establish how long it will likely be before the incident can be resolved.

If the answer to the 1st question is the shorter, put all efforts to ensure passengers leave the train in a supervised way. If the answer to the 2nd question is the shorter, place all efforts in resolving the incident. If it is to close to call ... do a controlled evacuation ... the consequences of not doing so could be catastrophic.

Rail authorities need to recognise people will self disembark at a certain point ... why they can not predict this to ensure it is not performed in a 'more' controlled way is unfathomable.
 

Antman

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Employers should accept that there are rare occasions that they can't provide a full service, customers should accept this also. The problem is that neither employers nor customers will accept this. Not helped by the fact that this country falls apart at the slightest whiff of bad weather.

Not that myth again? Shock horror other European countries have exactly the same problems when it snows. Obviously Scandinavia, Russia, Canada etc have enough heavy snow fall to justify investing in heavy duty equipment.

Are you suggesting nobody should make any effort to get to work in the snow?
 

Antman

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Indeed. They’d already drastically reduced the timetable to try and make it more robust.

Difficult to see what they could have done differently to what they did:
- advise not to travel unless essential;
- warn of the risk of disruption;
- run the best service possible in the circumstances.

Freezing rain was forecast all over the south east so a decision not to run trains on this basis would have led to the shutdown of the whole third rail network, including several of the UK’s busiest stations.

Can you imagine the reaction to that on this board!!!?

Exactly, I can well imagine the outrage and ridicule if Southeastern decided to stop running trains at the drop of a hat leaving people stranded all because freezing rain had been forecast.
 

notverydeep

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I remember vividly a day I spent in a railway control room. My timetable project had been implemented on the Sunday and this was the first morning peak on the Monday, the timetable's first key test. It went well until just after 8 am, when a train became defective in a tunnel. I hadn't until this time witnessed a major operating incident unfold from the perspective of a control room, but it provided an interesting insight.

I was impressed by the calmness and matter of fact-ness of the controllers. I noted that (as in the Lewisham case) several things were tried - a technician sent to the train - and in each case there was an assumption that the attempt would succeed. However, each attempted fix failed and only after several was a second train sent to evacuate the (many hundreds of) passengers. Nevertheless, I was struck by how quickly the incident seemed to be dealt with - until I realised that it was already after 10 am!

The lesson I took was that from a warm, windowless control room, it is quite easy to be distracted from how much time was passing and be unaware of how much longer it would seem to passengers on a very hot stalled train (the opposite problem compared to the Lewisham passengers) with little information beyond a driver promising that they and the operator really were doing their best. This coupled with an apparent 'optimism bias' assumption that the normal solutions will work and work quickly is a human factors trap trap which leads rail industry staff into these self-detrainment incidents, before they have grasped how serious the risk of this has become.

As soon as an incident is identified as being a possible 30 minute plus wait away from a platform, then there should always be an evaluation of the risk of self-detrainment and of how the affected train(s) can be brought up to (or reversed back to) a platform or suitable point for detrainment if the first attempt at a fix does not succeed. This is particularly necessary where apparent escape routes that would enable passengers to progress their journey are nearby and obvious to passengers as in an urban area with short distances between stations.

The fact that this thread (and a few similar threads elsewhere such as on Londonreconnections) contain so many posts along the lines of, "I am a railway worker and I'm not sure I would have lasted 4 hours", makes it clear that the industry really does have some thinking to do on this issue!
 
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30907

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The outside conditions were no worse on Friday evening than the rest of the week, when SE had managed to run a commuter service, if with disruption, it was just on the last day when the emergency timetable was introduced.

Because the weather conditions were forecast to change considerably, and they did, with freezing rain rather than the powder snow of earlier in the week.
The problems Friday afternoon seem to have been localised, in that (a family member says) Victoria-Orpington stayed relatively OK till close, whereas the service through LBG began to fall apart suddenly and drastically mid-afternoon.

From observation in the Beckenham area:
On Monday there was advice to travel early.
Late evening trains were already cancelled on the Tuesday
The emergency timetable posters were displayed by the Wednesday (when I returned north).
 

DarloRich

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Some sensible queries there. Are there any examples (UK or elsewhere) of staff in a remote Control Room/Customer Service Centre having direct audio access to specific train carriages ?. It would be good to think that, in 2018, such things are already operational, somewhere.
Can the PA run off an 'emergency' battery ? - again any current (sorry !!) examples ?

Signallers can broadcast over the PA in emergencies (generally used if the driver of a DOO train is unresponsive).

Once the batteries are exhausted (which can be as little as 30-45 mins after power is switched off) there’s no means of using the PA.

that's sort of my point - even if we did have some form of wireless communication system ( and such a thing should be possible in 2018) it can only last as long as the batteries have juice. What do we do when the batteries run dry? Obviously someone can physically go out to the train and relay messages but that takes time to facilitate. Obviously we can use social media but not everyone has access. Obviously the driver can pass information on verbally but how does he get to coach 12 on a packed train? Even if the comms are: Hang on we are going to evacuate the train we have to be able to pass the message to the passengers.

If comms are crucial is the deciding factor the life expectancy of the back up batteries? Once they are dry you evacuate the train asap? It is much harder than simply saying there must be better communication!
 

bnm

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Excellent early analysis:

https://www.londonreconnections.com/2018/southeastern-detraining-investigation-assumption/

No threats of prosecution. No calling the passengers stupid, or crooks, or blaming them for the totally inadequate response from the operator and infraco. Written by a rail employee without a jerking knee or dictionary of hyperbole.

How different from the large amount of uninformed opinion in this thread. It's an all too frequent course of events. Not just here, but across rail related forums, blogs, and in messrooms and industry circles. Rail staff close ranks, circle the waggons. It's just too convenient to put the focus and blame on the pesky self loading (and unloading ;)) freight that sits and stands behind the driver. Rather than having the rail industry look in the mirror. Those fare paying folk are too often seen as an annoyance, who, if they weren't around, would allow the railway to run more effeciently.

Calling them crooks or hoping one of them gets fried to set an example just isn't on. Unless you want to perpetuate the "them and us" mimdset.

There were two natural leaders in the incident. The driver of the train stopped just short of Lewisham Station. He understood the situation, knew that a controlled evacuation was needed. Overruled by far too risk averse and remote management.

The second natural leader was the person who decided, rightly, that the rail industry wasn't coming to his aid anytime soon, so took matters into his/her own hands. Someone had to be first.
 

tsr

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Obviously the driver can pass information on verbally but how does he get to coach 12 on a packed train? Even if the comms are: Hang on we are going to evacuate the train we have to be able to pass the message to the passengers.

Interesting you mention that. What you say to the passengers regarding an evacuation can be quite risky. The advice given to me during my train evacuation training was that you do not announce simultaneously to all passengers that the train is to be evacuated - if it's a controlled evacuation. (Obviously there are very rare scenarios when you need everyone to get out via emergency egress at the nearest door, and you also somehow have time and a power supply to use the PA to instruct them to.)

There were several reasons given for this. In no particular order:
- it can make people impatient ("I want to go first!") and if they don't get their way, meaning they self-evacuate but not safely
- people can mis-hear or misunderstand words or phrases with words such as "evacuate", and then panic, causing an unnecessary stampede for random doors
- people tend to worry and have lots of questions even if they hear the full message, so it's best to help small groups face-to-face.

The last bit is quite pertinent but very hard on busy peak time services. Getting a smooth and relatively quick evacuation in poor conditions is challenging enough, but you also need to work out what to say in the mean time. It is often left up to the train crew to work out what to announce between the initial incident and any evacuation, which can vary hugely depending on other tasks such as fault finding or endless phone calls to Control, environmental factors, tiredness/frustration/morale, and their creativity to put a helpful spin on the situation.

Therefore you need to sort out a way to explain that all passengers will be escorted from the train, but you are working through the best option to help so many people. You can actually be explaining the situation to half the train whilst the other half is also some way through evacuation; to those leaving the service, they won't particularly care what's going on over the PA, but will be more worried about how the bloke in hi-vis is going to help you get your three-ton suitcase off the train. (Which they will now manage, by the way - in a controlled evacuation, you usually help passengers leave with their luggage unless it's hopelessly impractical, as it helps manage security and quite rightly prevents people fretting and panicking.)

The curious thing is that in a very crowded and rapidly deteriorating situation such as the one we're all talking about at Lewisham, the evacuation needs to be controlled but it is blatantly obvious that timing needs to be as swift as possible. The scenario was rapidly changing from needing a controlled evacuation to passengers performing an emergency evacuation. Whether this is trespass is, shall we say, unclear.

In terms of definitions, the rule of thumb I have always used for evacuations is this - if the train is immediately uninhabitable, such as through severe fire or smoke, then the crew need to stop any other train movements which may be affected, get the power switched off and perform an emergency evacuation to the nearest safe place. So this is an emergency evacuation.

If the train is not immediately uninhabitable, but the most (or only) practical way for people to continue their journey is to leave the train away from a station, you need to perform a controlled evacuation. Theoretically this can actually be done with just the train crew, but this would be in dire circumstances indeed. Normally you agree this with TOC Control, Network Rail and the signaller, and gather together as many resources as possible to assist. You then arrange for a safe perimeter by means of line blocks, get the power switched off or preferably properly isolated, and use staff resources to shepherd passengers from a limited number of controlled exits.

The Lewisham incident was something of a hybrid of these, in terms of what needed to be done and what the passengers evidently needed done (and which they basically did for themselves). The environment was initially very uncomfortable, but as the Victoria, Central or Northern Tube lines show, not immediately uninhabitable at first. In fact, if anything, it would have been a very controlled and safe space for most passengers for the first 20-30 minutes, in comparison only with circumstances which would clearly have been so difficult and dangerous outside. As the comments from the Buzzstream blogger indicated!

However, once the trains had been stationary for longer than this, and particularly when the power was turned off over a wider area, the conditions would have become their own bespoke "immediately uninhabitable" environment. This is very different from what the railway would normally consider an emergency - for example, a train accident encompasses things like a collision or a fire, but not a crush-loaded train of cold passengers soiling themselves, which is degrading and highly unpleasant from a human but not technical point of view.

At this point, I can understand people effectively trying to do an emergency evacuation, and by this point ideally it should have been realised that people should be leaving these trains. But as others have said, the focus may well have been far too closely tuned onto the task of fixing the original fault. This is not something you'd usually do straight away if you'd hit another train, and neither should it be if you have freezing passengers urinating down the aisles. This is, hopefully, a pertinent point.

So it's very difficult to know how the information should have been portrayed over the PA, and also extremely difficult to know how a driver working on their own should be asked to do that, too. The case is probably mounting for dedicated welfare checking roles using onboard CCTV, and with those personnel able to recommend an immediate change in tack when recovering passengers from stranded services. But there must be simpler solutions, and I'm sure these can come out with some creative thinking after the heads have perhaps been banged together by the ORR and RAIB (which I hope they will be).

It's also clearly a fine line as to when you need to change between "perhaps thinking about controlled evacuation as a last resort" and "we must retrieve everyone to a station or access point right now". Fleet Controllers use timers to time-out fault finding, and have procedures known as "Cut and Run" and "Fix or Fail" to ensure action after a set period of time. I sense a marginally more complex timer solution is needed for those controlling the overall service recovery and incident response, able to time-out recovery attempts, based on a maximum time on a stranded train based on whether power is turned on or off, the outside conditions, likely or confirmed passenger numbers per coach, and the local area. We'll see, I suppose, if something like this is ever implemented!
 

Bromley boy

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Excellent early analysis:

https://www.londonreconnections.com/2018/southeastern-detraining-investigation-assumption/

No threats of prosecution. No calling the passengers stupid, or crooks, or blaming them for the totally inadequate response from the operator and infraco. Written by a rail employee without a jerking knee or dictionary of hyperbole.

How different from the large amount of uninformed opinion in this thread. It's an all too frequent course of events. Not just here, but across rail related forums, blogs, and in messrooms and industry circles. Rail staff close ranks, circle the waggons. It's just too convenient to put the focus and blame on the pesky self loading (and unloading ;)) freight that sits and stands behind the driver. Rather than having the rail industry look in the mirror. Those fare paying folk are too often seen as an annoyance, who, if they weren't around, would allow the railway to run more effeciently.

Calling them crooks or hoping one of them gets fried to set an example just isn't on. Unless you want to perpetuate the "them and us" mimdset.

There were two natural leaders in the incident. The driver of the train stopped just short of Lewisham Station. He understood the situation, knew that a controlled evacuation was needed. Overruled by far too risk averse and remote management.

The second natural leader was the person who decided, rightly, that the rail industry wasn't coming to his aid anytime soon, so took matters into his/her own hands. Someone had to be first.

What was that about uninformed opinion?!

You’ve either not read the article you’ve linked to, or you’ve failed to understand it. It provides no analysis whatsoever of the Lewisham incident. Rather it talks about issues that sometimes arise in these cases and highlights the need for a thorough investigation.

As is our practice, we will avoid commenting extensively on the incident (and its causes) until those have been released.
 

bnm

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What was that about uninformed opinion?!

You’ve either not read the article you’ve linked to, or you’ve failed to understand it. It provides no analysis whatsoever of the Lewisham incident. Rather it talks about issues that sometimes arise in these cases and highlights the need for a thorough investigation.

Read it and understood it, thanks. And I also understand the definition of 'extensively', which you presumably don't.* Some analysis of the Lewisham incident has occurred in the article, just not to a detailed degree.


*See. I can cast aspersions about comprehension too. :p
 

al78

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Not that myth again? Shock horror other European countries have exactly the same problems when it snows. Obviously Scandinavia, Russia, Canada etc have enough heavy snow fall to justify investing in heavy duty equipment.

Are you suggesting nobody should make any effort to get to work in the snow?

Not another strawman again. No-one has said that nobody should make any effort to get to work. Some people will be able to get to work, others who are dependent on a fragile rail network with a lack of robustness built into the system will have a significant risk of getting into difficulties. Those in the latter group arguably should decide to chance it (and take the consequences), work from home or take a day off. Unless human lives are literally dependent on you getting to work, it is not a humanitarian disaster just because you decide not to risk it for a day or two, in this country very disruptive snow very rarely lasts more than 2-3 days. If employers and their staff can't accept that very occasionally, even in the temperate UK, major deviations from climatology can significantly intervene with normal life, then they need to take a trip down reality street. It is not like it happens very often.
 

Bromley boy

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Read it and understood it, thanks. And I also understand the definition of 'extensively', which you presumably don't.* Some analysis of the Lewisham incident has occurred in the article, just not to a detailed degree.


*See. I can cast aspersions about comprehension too. :p

I’ve just read it again to make sure. As I thought, there’s absolutely no analysis of the Lewisham incident in that article. It provides background to factors that have contributed to this kind of incident in the past. As it explicitly states at the outset (my emphasis added):

"A number of official reports into the incident are currently being commissioned or discussed within the industry and government. As is our practice, we will avoid commenting extensively on the incident (and its causes) until those have been released. Given the extended debate online, however, it seemed best to provide some background on detraining incidents in general, and points worth considering in the context of any current discussion (such as at our own upcoming meet up later this week)."

I’ll leave you to quote the bits of the article which you think provide analysis of the Lewisham incident.

Over to you.
 

PermitToTravel

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Are the windows on class 375 trains normally left unlocked? Would they have been openable on the trains in this incident?
 

Bromley boy

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Are the windows on class 375 trains normally left unlocked? Would they have been openable on the trains in this incident?

The most badly affected trains were networkers and 376s These have no air conditioning and feature opening hopper windows. I don’t believe any 375s were involved (unless further up the line towards London Bridge)? They don’t tend to run through Lewisham in passenger service.

375s also have hopper windows which are normally locked shut and require a T key to open.
 
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