Tube Train Running With Doors Open.

[Bertiethebobby]

I can see why someone might film the doors for 'evidence' to report (plus the obvious 'need' to post on social media) but if someone could walk through and see ten sets of doors open then I'd have hoped they would have used the alarm to alert the driver long before then.

Unfortunately this is the modern world and all that people are capable of is getting their mobile out and filming it to make them look cool on Facebook. There was an incident last week where a policeman was knocked off his bike by a car, no-one went to help but plenty of people (morons) filmed it!

 

[bramling]

Twice now and yet continue to do so?!

I know, it’s a tough line between speculating and waiting for facts to emerge. I’m trying hard to strike a balance between offering plausible scenarios for how such an incident could happen without trying to implicate anyone or anything. I’d rather we had some informed discussion on this specialist forum than some of what has been posted on Twitter!

I’d certainly be interested to hear any other ideas for how this could happen. I do know what my money would be on, but I wouldn’t want to pin my flag to the mast on anything...

 

[bramling]

It's plausible that, if there was a door fault which affected the close/open function, the switch could have been operated as part of the troubleshooting procedure, leaving the train in a state of "open/close faulty" AND "interlock cut-out" at the same time.

The only time one would really operate the switch is as a last resort after being unable to get a pilot light. Even then it’s not the first action - the normal reaction is to try and ascertain why. The only exception being if between stations.

There are a few defect scenarios however. For example if a certain MCB trips then it will be necessary to cut out the interlocks in order to move the train.

None of this stops misguided use of the switch of course.

 

[district]

So a customer has said this.
The driver/TfL did not say this.

Two very different things

I did not suggest the driver nor TfL said this, I quoted something in an article that a member of the public said.

The use of sarcasm doesn't need to be explained here, surely?

I don’t think it was sarcasm, I think the original poster was actually stupid enough to think a driver would do that.

 

[Trackman]

what I've heard (from a union rep/drivers) it's looking like driver error, there was a fault and the driver cut out the door interlock.

 

[samuelmorris]

Unfortunately this is the modern world and all that people are capable of is getting their mobile out and filming it to make them look cool on Facebook. There was an incident last week where a policeman was knocked off his bike by a car, no-one went to help but plenty of people (morons) filmed it!

To be fair given how much the 96TS leaps around, not sure I'd want to get close to the doors to use the alarm, though I'd probably use it as the train approached the next station.

 

[saxsux]

It’s possible, although it would be a quite serious error to cut out the interlock and then depart with many doors open. Unfortunately these sorts of incidents do have a habit of being down to driver error, but we should remain open minded until more facts are known.

Mmmmm. It wouldn't be the first time a tube driver has switched off the interlock and departed with open doors.

https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/tra...arren-street-victoria-line-london-underground

 

[bramling]

Mmmmm. It wouldn't be the first time a tube driver has switched off the interlock and departed with open doors.

https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/tra...arren-street-victoria-line-london-underground

Indeed. As soon as that switch is operated it is absolutely vital to check every door on the train is closed before moving. This used to be without exception, however there’s now a relatively new procedure that allows an exception if the train is between stations.

There is definitely a potential pitfall should this check not be made, or if for any reason a door or doors open after the check has been made for whatever reason.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

I love the way LU say the average speed of a tube train is 20mph. That may or may not be factually true, however that train is doing rather more than 20 mph. Maximum speed on the Jubilee is 60 mph, although I’m not sure what the maximum safe speed is in the area concerned, nor what is actually attained in reality.

Take a ride in the peak on the surface lines in peak hours and you'd wish it was as high as 20, but yes, from what I can hear, that train is approaching 35-40 by the end of the clip, by no means full speed, but still an alarming speed to be travelling with a door open.

The 20 mph average speed will be end to end on each line, including the time spent standing still in the stations.

 

[bramling]

The 20 mph average speed will be end to end on each line, including the time spent standing still in the stations.

It seems a suspiciously round figure to me - but I’m not going to spend the time working it out! To be it smells of someone trying to find something PR friendly...

On a different note, it appears to now be confirmed there has been no defect found with the train involved.

 

[samuelmorris]

On average it's probably about right - my journeys on the Jubilee I think averaged around the 27mph mark, most of my journeys on Surface stock are around 15, so the tube as a whole? About 20 seems reasonable. Bear in mind that includes dwell times on a multi-stop journey. Even without considering dwells the fastest sections of the tube will only average in the 30s due to the short distances.

 

[philthetube]

It seems a suspiciously round figure to me - but I’m not going to spend the time working it out! To be it smells of someone trying to find something PR friendly...

On a different note, it appears to now be confirmed there has been no defect found with the train involved.

assuming it is somewhere between 18/22 there is a one in five chance of it being 20

 

[74A]

what I've heard (from a union rep/drivers) it's looking like driver error, there was a fault and the driver cut out the door interlock.

Has the door interlock switch not got some kind of seal on it ?

 

[Mojo]

Has the door interlock switch not got some kind of seal on it ?

Yes it does have a seal.

 

[oversteer]

RAIB involved
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/train-door-incident-jubilee-line

Seems the ‘interlock override’ was indeed used

 

[bramling]

RAIB involved
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/train-door-incident-jubilee-line

Seems the ‘interlock override’ was indeed used

Indeed one of the potential scenarios alluded to in this thread.

Operating the interlock cut-out switch as part of defect handling (in this case in error) and then not putting it back is a risk.

 

[Dstock7080]

RAIB Report published:
https://assets.publishing.service.g.../file/815733/R062019_190710_Finchley_Road.pdf

Shortly after 09:00 hrs on Saturday 1 September 2018, a London Underground Jubilee line train travelled between Finchley Road and West Hampstead stations with doors open at ten passenger doorways. The train, with approximately 30 passengers on board, reached a maximum speed of 62 km/h during the 56 second journey between the two stations. No-one fell out of the train and nobody was injured. When the train stopped at Finchley Road station, some of the doors on the train, which was operating in automatic train operation mode (ATO), opened without being commanded to do so by the train operator. The operator’s controls did not allow him to open any doors, nor close any doors. It is likely that the door behaviour was due to control system overload caused by faults elsewhere on the train. While dealing with the door issue, the train operator operated a switch, bypassing the door interlock circuit that was intended to prevent the train departing with doors open. He then did not notice that some doors remained open when departing from Finchley Road station and travelling to West Hampstead. The train operator’s actions were probably influenced by: l a sudden increase in his workload from the low level associated with automatic train operation; l fatigue from his sleeping pattern; and/or l low blood-sugar levels from a prolonged period without food.

 

[bramling]

RAIB Report published:
https://assets.publishing.service.g.../file/815733/R062019_190710_Finchley_Road.pdf

So essentially down to staff error. What with the wrong direction incident and the Peckham detrainment incident, TFL need to up their game IMO. The supply of luck will eventually run dry, as it already did on Tramlink.

 

[rebmcr]

It's plausible that, if there was a door fault which affected the close/open function, the switch could have been operated as part of the troubleshooting procedure, leaving the train in a state of "open/close faulty" AND "interlock cut-out" at the same time.

The only time one would really operate the switch is as a last resort after being unable to get a pilot light. Even then it’s not the first action - the normal reaction is to try and ascertain why. The only exception being if between stations.

There are a few defect scenarios however. For example if a certain MCB trips then it will be necessary to cut out the interlocks in order to move the train.

None of this stops misguided use of the switch of course.

It seems our predictions were indeed very close to reality.

 

[SamYeager]

Somewhat stunned to read

The large number of fault messages relating to defective ventilation fans and passenger information systems had been recorded by on-board equipment for two days before the incident, but LUL was unaware of this as there was no process for routinely downloading and reviewing fault records.

although hopefully implementation of recommendation 3 (below) will address what seems to be a glaring gap in their procedures.

3 The intent of this recommendation is to improve the reliability of the 1996 stock trains where such unreliability has the potential to have an adverse effect on safety.

London Underground should review options and, if appropriate, introduce procedures for routine downloading and review of data from Jubilee line train management systems, with the aim of better understanding, predicting, and preventing possible future failures with potential to impact adversely on safety (paragraph 120a).

 

[urbophile]

I'm old enough to remember being terrified as a child on one of my first journeys on the District Line, to see passengers quite insouciantly standing besides the open doors which were hand operated and clearly not interlocked with any safety systems. That must have been the early 1950s.

 

[jumble]

Interestingly 2 things happened with S Stocks yesterday
The first was that one set of exterior door warning lights stayed on at Bow Road
Although you could not see from the outside that anything was wrong at all it seems a bag strap was caught in the door
Excellent sensitive edge detection.
The other was returning on Met to Uxbridge the S8 suddenly announced that the destination had changed to being a circle line to High st Ken
Bizarre as I would expect an S8 will never go to High St Ken in Passenger service on the Circle.

 

[bramling]

Somewhat stunned to read

although hopefully implementation of recommendation 3 (below) will address what seems to be a glaring gap in their procedures.

This all sounds a bit overkill to me. Firstly, the doors on the 95 and 96 stocks are often doing strange things - whilst the basic function is hardwired, everything else like chimes, timings and the like is added through the TMS, so any failure of TMS components can cause strange (but not necessarily unsafe) door behaviour, in the worst case the doors on one car or the whole train closing of their own accord with no warning. Likewise trains always have minor warnings on the TMS, especially things like heat and vent faults, the TMS on these trains being quite slow (think mid 1990s computers!).

The train operator is handsomely paid to deal with all this safely. A minor doors issue shouldn’t have caused him to become flustered. A seal was broken, part of the point of the seal on the switch is to say to the driver “think about what you are doing”. Clearly that didn’t happen, as otherwise the train wouldn’t have departed with the switch in that position.

To me this is wholly a staff competence issue, seemingly quite possibly either poor initial training and/or poor refresher training over time. As much as the ATO driver’s job is on autopilot, having to operate a sealed switch should snap someone out of autopilot quickly - this isn’t something which happens every day, indeed it’s quite rare.

 

[Chris M]

To me this is wholly a staff competence issue, seemingly quite possibly either poor initial training and/or poor refresher training over time.

My reading of the report seems to suggest the finger is pointed more towards the refresher training, particularly the practical use of the sealed but not unsealed switch.
It's also worth stressing that the effects of fatigue and lack of food should not be downplayed. In this instance I'd put responsibility for that happening as shared between employer and employee.

 

[Belperpete]

The train operator is handsomely paid to deal with all this safely. A minor doors issue shouldn’t have caused him to become flustered. A seal was broken, part of the point of the seal on the switch is to say to the driver “think about what you are doing”. Clearly that didn’t happen, as otherwise the train wouldn’t have departed with the switch in that position. To me this is wholly a staff competence issue

If there is an insistent audible alarm going off that is hard to ignore, it can easily put someone under added pressure and cause them to become flustered. There should be a way of silencing the alarm so that the driver can think clearly and without distraction. If I read the report correctly, the only way of silencing it was to start the train!

 

[bramling]

If there is an insistent audible alarm going off that is hard to ignore, it can easily put someone under added pressure and cause them to become flustered. There should be a way of silencing the alarm so that the driver can think clearly and without distraction. If I read the report correctly, the only way of silencing it was to start the train!

I’m not sure that interpretation is correct. There is a tone which sounds when the train gains limit of movement authority, however it only sounds momentarily, just an upward sounding chime which sounds once. I don’t think any other tones were sounding.

Personally I think a bit too much emphasis has been placed on the workload / stress of the situation - for a qualified driver doors failing to open on a lightly loaded train in a station simply shouldn’t be a stressful situation. If someone can’t handle that then how are they going to handle something more serious like a packed train breaking down with punters and control barking at them?

 

[Belperpete]

l The train control equipment included train management car controllers (TMCCs) which were designed to reboot during some fault conditions. It is likely that this happened as the train was arriving at Finchley Road station, due to the large number of fault messages associated with defective ventilation fans and passenger information systems.
l TMCCs were duplicated on the train with the intention that a hot standby unit (ie primed and ready to operate) would take over when a ‘live’ TMCC rebooted, but it is likely that this feature did not function as intended at Finchley Road.
l Train management remote terminals formed part of the door control system and were connected to the TMCCs. These remote terminals were designed to permit passengers to open doors using buttons at doorways if they lost communication with associated TMCCs (for example because the master and hot standby units were rebooting or not functioning).

Am I reading this correctly? If both TMCCs reboot together, then a passenger pressing a door open button will cause the door to open - and this can happen between stations!

 

[bramling]

Am I reading this correctly? If both TMCCs reboot together, then a passenger pressing a door open button will cause the door to open - and this can happen between stations!

I don’t think so. Having some idea how these trains work, I’d suggest that this would only be the case if they had been released by the driver pressing the open buttons. Without checking I’d also suspect there’s speed sensing which prevents the doors being released above slow speed.

 

[Belperpete]

I’m not sure that interpretation is correct. There is a tone which sounds when the train gains limit of movement authority, however it only sounds momentarily, just an upward sounding chime which sounds once. I don’t think any other tones were sounding.

Ah, para 15 states that the warning sounds and the display shows when it is 10s before departure, and para 16 states that the display goes out when the ATO start button is pressed. Para 15 doesn't say whether it is a momentary or continuous alarm, I incorrectly assumed it was continuous. Apologies.

 

[bramling]

Ah, para 15 states that the warning sounds and the display shows when it is 10s before departure, and para 16 states that the display goes out when the ATO start button is pressed. Para 15 doesn't say whether it is a momentary or continuous alarm, I incorrectly assumed it was continuous. Apologies.

To be fair the RAIB give this impression. I don’t doubt the driver was flustered, but he really shouldn’t have been.

Bit too much focus on customer service and a bit to little on good old-fashioned railway work?