High Speed Rail Scotland

[cle]

Even just to Phase 2B would see a big shift. Anything further on the Scotland side would be even more so, plus likely better publicized north of the Border if a HS stretch is actually there. Carstairs for the Edinburgh leg would help a little, and some sections north of Carlisle might be enabled for speeds above 125mph, if the pathing could work, much like the traffic mix on sections in Germany with ICE.

The section through the Lakes is the biggest issue.

 

[gsnedders]

Given that the total number of passengers between Heathrow and Scotland averages less than 4000/ day each way I’d expect the total interlining to be between 20-40% of that.

At Heathrow, around 60% of domestic passengers are in transit; Gatwick is around 20%, the other London airports are all under 10%.

 

[Bald Rick]

At Heathrow, around 60% of domestic passengers are in transit; Gatwick is around 20%, the other London airports are all under 10%.

Wow, I didn’t realise it was that much, that surprises me, particularly for the Scotland routes. I could understand it for Manchester / Leeds / Newcastle.

 

[Noddy]

I think we’re saying the same thing, ie that HS2 will win a significant proportion of the air traffic, such that it is unlikely to be viable to try to get the remainder through the construction of high speed rail to Scotland. (Although I wouldn’t say HS2 was ‘free’)

I must admit I find this statement a bit odd. Are you saying that there’s no point in doing it from an air traffic point of view alone, or is this a more general point? Surely it’s worth doing anyway-the cross over from plane to train is a curve, not a cliff edge, so even 5min here, 10 min there, will result in transfers.

I would have thought that significant northern extensions would end the Birmingham-Central belt routes too. Much smaller market though, I accept, that’s not likely with just HS2 Ph2b. Northern extensions would also start to impact on the Bristol market too.

 

[Bald Rick]

I must admit I find this statement a bit odd. Are you saying that there’s no point in doing it from an air traffic point of view alone, or is this a more general point? Surely it’s worth doing anyway-the cross over from plane to train is a curve, not a cliff edge, so even 5min here, 10 min there, will result in transfers.

I would have thought that northern extensions would end the Birmingham-Central belt routes too. Much smaller market though, I accept.

Perhaps I should summarise.

Phase 2b, when it is built, is likely to capture (very roughly) half the existing London airports - Glasgow / Edinburgh airports air traffic, as well as provide significant additional capacity south of Wigan / Manchester on the WCML, and significantly reduced journey times for the considerable existing rail traffic between London and the NW / Merseyside / Manchester.

Building a high speed line between Wigan and Scotland, in full or part, could at best capture the other half of the air traffic (but more likely rather less), and provide some capacity on that section, and further journey time improvements for passengers heading to Scotland, and potentially for some of the intermediate stations too. However this market is much, much smaller than London to NW / Manchester Etc, and the benefits are therefore much lower.

Therefore while there clearly is some benefit of a new high speed line between Wigan and Scotland, it is of nowhere near the scale of the benefit of the line south of Wigan. Given that the cost is likely to be similar on a per mile basis, it is therefore unlikely that the benefits available will justify the cost.

 

[miami]

Free in the sense of "should we spend money continuing HS2 from Wigan to Scotland"

The options are
1) No, £0
2) Yes, £xxx

The gain from 2 would be those who would not switch from air if journey time dropped to 3h30, but would if it dropped to say 2h30

If there's 3 million potential air travellers, 1 third connecting at T5 (and thus won't transfer unless you get towards 1 hour and integrate tickets), 1 million switching on a drop to 3h30, that leaves 1m split between those who would take the train because it's cheaper (and don't really care about the time), those who would fly anyway (because they are going from Kirkliston to West Drayton industrial park and the airport is more convienient in both cases), and those who would transfer to the train if it was a little faster - 3h30 is still too slow, but maybe 3h15 is fast enough? Or 3h10?

That's a very small number of passengers for every extra minute gained.

 

[Noddy]

Perhaps I should summarise.

Phase 2b, when it is built, is likely to capture (very roughly) half the existing London airports - Glasgow / Edinburgh airports air traffic, as well as provide significant additional capacity south of Wigan / Manchester on the WCML, and significantly reduced journey times for the considerable existing rail traffic between London and the NW / Merseyside / Manchester.

Building a high speed line between Wigan and Scotland, in full or part, could at best capture the other half of the air traffic (but more likely rather less), and provide some capacity on that section, and further journey time improvements for passengers heading to Scotland, and potentially for some of the intermediate stations too. However this market is much, much smaller than London to NW / Manchester Etc, and the benefits are therefore much lower.

Therefore while there clearly is some benefit of a new high speed line between Wigan and Scotland, it is of nowhere near the scale of the benefit of the line south of Wigan. Given that the cost is likely to be similar on a per mile basis, it is therefore unlikely that the benefits available will justify the cost.

Gotcha and agree to a large extent, although perhaps not with your final statement. I think (apparently) basing your argument on only transferring the remaining London-Scotland air traffic market as justification is slightly flawed, as other markets are likely to transfer too, which wouldn’t happen with Ph2B. Birmingham is 500k per year, Bristol is 700k per year. Small markets I accept, but those figures don’t include the transfer from other modes of transport to a hypothetical Scottish HS2 line given the vastly superior travel time it would have from the West Midlands/Manchester. If the 45 min Edinburgh-Newcastle line (as outlined earlier but very unlikely I accept) was built those cities would be commutable which would be a paradigm shift.

 

[BayPaul]

HS2 could also capture some of the connecting air market, as it is likely to mean a reduced choice of connecting flights. If there are (normal world) say 10 BA flights per day from Edinburgh - Heathrow, and 33% of that capacity is used for connections, 33% is for people who transfer to rail, and 33% is for people who stick with air, then presumably BA would drop 3 of these flights from their schedule, so the average transfer time to the long-haul leg would increase, and potentially tips the balance towards HS2. Perhaps not for people who live near Edinburgh airport, but for people who live near a local station with easy connection to Waverley, it could tip it far enough.

 

[miami]

Probably not, because your connection by air is guarenteed. A train problem on HS2 means you miss your non-changable long haul flight ticket. A problem with the plane means BA have to put you up in a hotel and put you on the plane the next day

Again on the way back, unless walk up fares are at a sensible level, a delayed arrival means wasting your "advance fare"

 

[BayPaul]

Probably not, because your connection by air is guarenteed. A train problem on HS2 means you miss your non-changable long haul flight ticket. A problem with the plane means BA have to put you up in a hotel and put you on the plane the next day

Again on the way back, unless walk up fares are at a sensible level, a delayed arrival means wasting your "advance fare"

True, but its presumably all a balance. When there used to be Plymouth - London flights, I sometimes used them to connect at Gatwick, but when they were poorly timed I would get the train or drive.

 

[HSTEd]

I think the summary here is that we can probably think of several projects, even restricted to high speed, with better BCRs than building high speed lines through empty borders terrain.

I am sympathetic to the idea of building the line to try and cement Scotland into the union by more tightly economically integrating it, but it seems likely independence will be decided one way or the other before the line has a chance to make a difference.
If this was the 90s, then yes, but now I dont think it matters.

 

[Noddy]

I am sympathetic to the idea of building the line to try and cement Scotland into the union by more tightly economically integrating it, but it seems likely independence will be decided one way or the other before the line has a chance to make a difference.
If this was the 90s, then yes, but now I dont think it matters.

You only need to look as far as Madrid-Barcelona to see that that won’t one jot of difference, at least in the short to medium term. If any unionist or nationalist politician takes a view on it purely on those terms they are a bit of an idiot, and hopefully their voters would dump them at the next available opportunity.

 

[HSTEd]

You only need to look as far as Madrid-Barcelona to see that that won’t one jot of difference, at least in the short to medium term. If any unionist or nationalist politician takes a view on it purely on those terms they are a bit of an idiot, and hopefully their voters would dump them at the next available opportunity.

Such a thing is not a medium term project.
It would take a generation or more to have an impact.

 

[gsnedders]

Wow, I didn’t realise it was that much, that surprises me, particularly for the Scotland routes. I could understand it for Manchester / Leeds / Newcastle.

If you look at London from the eye of "square metre of office per square km" I think it becomes kinda clear why Heathrow ends up like that, even with the Heathrow Express: for much of London, it's not really much quicker to get to than Luton/Gatwick which both have direct trains to the City and low-cost carriers. It's frequently more expensive to fly into (even v. BA at Gatwick) which will deter the leisure market, and less practical for much of London which will deter the business market. It's pretty obvious how extreme it is when you walk off a plane from Glasgow or Edinburgh and watch how many people immediately turn towards Flight Connections and not Arrivals.

HS2 could also capture some of the connecting air market, as it is likely to mean a reduced choice of connecting flights. If there are (normal world) say 10 BA flights per day from Edinburgh - Heathrow, and 33% of that capacity is used for connections, 33% is for people who transfer to rail, and 33% is for people who stick with air, then presumably BA would drop 3 of these flights from their schedule, so the average transfer time to the long-haul leg would increase, and potentially tips the balance towards HS2. Perhaps not for people who live near Edinburgh airport, but for people who live near a local station with easy connection to Waverley, it could tip it far enough.

Alternatively it would push people towards other hubs which haven't had their links thus decreased, depending on connection quality to Heathrow (having to go over a bridge at OOC with luggage is the sort of hassle I don't have if I fly from Glasgow). If HS2 wants to take passengers transiting from domestics, they need to interline with a number of airlines (obviously BA, and at least ensure those fares are available for interlining with other Oneworld airlines) to provide guaranteed connections.

 

[cle]

Traditional rail and roads haven't cemented the union, and planes are still quicker - so I wouldn't worry about that. Brexit and indeed Covid show that Scotland has the beat of its own drum.

I still can't believe as many as 60% of passengers on LHR-EDI/GLA on BA (the main example really) are transiting. I'd think maybe 30% and that is high. It's still a lot of people, but way more Scots travel to London itself.

And let's not forget that the traffic is two ways - people visiting Scotland from London, for business and pleasure/VFR, year round. Again, surely more than folk connecting from XXX via LHR to Scotland.

 

[Noddy]

Such a thing is not a medium term project.
It would take a generation or more to have an impact.

A unionist should not be supporting a white elephant, and a nationalist should not be opposing an economically positive project, on the basis of what may or may not happen in 50 years time (basically after they’re dead).

And as cle says there’s no evidence it would make a difference in the long term anyway.

 

[FQTV]

At Heathrow, around 60% of domestic passengers are in transit; Gatwick is around 20%, the other London airports are all under 10%.

Wow, I didn’t realise it was that much, that surprises me, particularly for the Scotland routes. I could understand it for Manchester / Leeds / Newcastle.

Alternatively it would push people towards other hubs which haven't had their links thus decreased, depending on connection quality to Heathrow (having to go over a bridge at OOC with luggage is the sort of hassle I don't have if I fly from Glasgow). If HS2 wants to take passengers transiting from domestics, they need to interline with a number of airlines (obviously BA, and at least ensure those fares are available for interlining with other Oneworld airlines) to provide guaranteed connections.

Perhaps this is the time to dip my toe (up to my thigh) into this, and by default, other HS2 discussions.

Firstly, I should perhaps say that I’m firmly in favour of developing the U.K. rail network; both in terms of grand projets and incremental improvements. I also understand how funding of the former doesn’t necessarily have any connection with the latter.

However, in order to ensure that the successes of big projects such as HS2, and other investments, are assured as much as they can be, leading to a snowball effect of further projects and investments, I think that it’s critically important that proposals are promoted and judged as realistically as possible.

So, for example, this is also relevant to the other thread regarding incremental improvements to CrossCountry rail services that might mean that they compete more effectively with domestic aviation, as well as countless others.

As far as domestic aviation is concerned, then, it’s imperative that there’s a clear understanding of what drives people to choose a flight over another mode of travel. The reality is that it’s extremely complex and nuanced, and those who suggest that HS2 opening will mean that (for example) flights between Southampton and Manchester will be decimated seem not to appreciate who currently patronises those flights, nor why they do so.

Let’s put that to one side for a moment, as clearly the real volumes are into and out of London, and Heathrow at that. The reality then is that, currently, many of British Airways’ domestic flights convey in excess of 80% transfer traffic.

They do so because they provide protected connections to onward flights, and not just longhaul, but shorthaul also. The through ticket can even be priced on its own terms, because British Airways operates in an almost completely deregulated environment. So, BA may charge less for a ticket from Newcastle to Berlin than it does for the London to Berlin sector alone.

From Inverness, there may be no Air Passenger Duty due either.

The average figures for connecting passengers through Heathrow to and from domestic flights are actually suppressed down to about the 60% level by the fact that some flights operate effectively to position in to place for the peak-demand balancing service - just as with the railways. British Airways manages its costs and income on those positioning services with the demand and yield of the peak services in mind.

Now, there are also a couple of regularly referenced data sets that are used to demonstrate how modal shift can be achieved in the railway’s favour as a result of developments in the past.

The first is the introduction of the 3tph service between Manchester and Euston.

There’s sometimes an allowance made for the fact that the WCML improvement works will have pushed some traffic away from rail to other modes, while ongoing, and that some of the bounce back once the works were over and the timetable settled will have been ‘natural’.

To really analyse the situation, however, it’s important to look at the detail of the aviation environment.

Prior to the new rail timetable and Pendolinos, Manchester to Heathrow was served by both bmi and British Airways. The real cull in air services came with the latter’s takeover of the former. Why? Yes, there was some overcapacity, and British Airways knew that it could better use some slots and airframes at Heathrow.

However, the other very relevant change was that bmi was a member of the Star Alliance. Accordingly, a very high proportion of its passengers were also interlining - connecting with protection at Heathrow - to services operated by United, Lufthansa, SWISS, South African, Singapore Airlines, ANA, Air New Zealand, Air Canada etc.

At a stroke, the British Airways takeover killed this traffic. No through pricing; no through-checking of bags; no missed-connection protection.

This is one of the reasons why the notion of remediation slots was mandated; it was to try and maintain customer choice from the likes of Manchester, and Aberdeen and Edinburgh to connect onto other carriers than BA and its oneworld partners at Heathrow.

Unfortunately, the slots ended up with Virgin (Little Red) and flybe, who had never shown the slightest understanding of how to drive yield from connections (the epitome of this art being KLM).

So, yes, the 3tph WCML timetable undoubtedly conquested some air traffic, but its success should be judged on its own merits only. South African subsequently reduced service from London; Air New Zealand did likewise, and SWISS and Lufthansa etc., increased frequency from Manchester themselves.

The measure then, has to be: how many passengers departing from and arriving back into Heathrow now prefer to connect via Heathrow Express and/or Underground to and from stations within the Manchester Airport catchment? I don’t have this data, but anecdotally I’d observe that it’s three fifths of not many at all.

There’s another factor take into account when judging pure market share, too, and that’s also particularly relevant when it comes to looking at the Central Belt of Scotland services.

That is how much extra capacity is injected into the market, and just how many seats are added with one additional rail service. And, unlike air traffic figures, which are fairly rigorously audited, rail passeneger traffic counting is a good deal less accurate.

Assume that the statistical rigour is comparable, however, and there’s no doubt that increased rail supply is met with an increased willingness to travel. So, rail grows the market, and assuming theat air doesn’t increase capacity likewise, the figures show rail achieving a greater market share. What it doesn’t do is establish a causal link between improved rail service and a drop in domestic demand for air travel.

You can then also dig down to see who the rail passengers are; the increase in rail ridership also coincides with the massive increase in the numbers in higher education, and the popularity of multiple annual weekend breaks, stag parties and the like.

This is a limited and not particularly focused-upon market for domestic BA flights, and wansn’t latterly for flybe ones either, so growing it overall doesn’t necessarily have a material effect on air travel.

This is why calculating the proportional reduction on flights between Edinburgh and Glasgow and Heathrow, based on the hypothetical number of seats available on HS2 services and ‘the Manchester effect’ is, as far as I can see, pure and unadulterated fantasy.

It’s exactly the same as property developers speculatively promoting ‘creating x000 jobs’ from their office block, based purely on the square footage and the notional allowance made for a single desk space.

Accordingly, if we want to drive real and demonstrable reductions in domestic aviation, it’s imperative that we fundamentally understand what drives it at the moment, and then regulate (force) the commercial operators into providing the same or better levels of service to the customer utilising a rail alternative.

That means connection protection between rail and air, baggage handling, seamless special assistance for those requiring it and, even, recognition of loyalty benefits which airlines use as fundamental tools in their battery of commercial considerations.

It also means understanding that if demand is reduced at Heathrow, then other unregulated entities such as Air France KLM, Lufthansa etc., will simply take up the slack from regional stations. All that means is that while air quality in Hounslow might be affected; it won’t make a blind bit of difference to that at Ringway or Turnhouse, or in the upper atmosphere.

It also has to be understood that, without domestic feed, some direct routes or frequencies from Heathrow might also be compromised. The economic and social effects of this to the country (or at least London) would need to be calculated as best they can.

It arguably goes back to the weakness in the PR case for HS2 Phase 1 being about speed. Trying to co-opt these other ‘guaranteed winning outcomes’ which are no such thing will, ultimately I fear, severely compromise the long term organic development of the rail network.

Using and promoting a ‘New Birmingham Main Line’ could have been the a better way to start things, and then inviting each adjacent region to develop and promote its own connection might have been another way to do it.

But, lurching from ‘speed’ to, no, no, it’s really all about ‘capacity’, erm, sorry, no, it’s about ‘killing off domestic flights’, or, sorry, oh it’s ‘Sheffield’s fault’ and we were ‘forced into Curzon Street and back out backwards’ and, well, it would have been fine if CrossCountry/Loganair/easyJet/British Airways just hadn’t been as capable doesn’t, overall, strike me as an absolutely guaranteed strategy for success.

Sorry for the essay.

 

[Bald Rick]

Perhaps this is the time to dip my toe (up to my thigh) into this, and by default, other HS2 discussions.

Firstly, I should perhaps say that I’m firmly in favour of developing the U.K. rail network; both in terms of grand projets and incremental improvements. I also understand how funding of the former doesn’t necessarily have any connection with the latter.

However, in order to ensure that the successes of big projects such as HS2, and other investments, are assured as much as they can be, leading to a snowball effect of further projects and investments, I think that it’s critically important that proposals are promoted and judged as realistically as possible.

So, for example, this is also relevant to the other thread regarding incremental improvements to CrossCountry rail services that might mean that they compete more effectively with domestic aviation, as well as countless others.

As far as domestic aviation is concerned, then, it’s imperative that there’s a clear understanding of what drives people to choose a flight over another mode of travel. The reality is that it’s extremely complex and nuanced, and those who suggest that HS2 opening will mean that (for example) flights between Southampton and Manchester will be decimated seem not to appreciate who currently patronises those flights, nor why they do so.

Let’s put that to one side for a moment, as clearly the real volumes are into and out of London, and Heathrow at that. The reality then is that, currently, many of British Airways’ domestic flights convey in excess of 80% transfer traffic.

They do so because they provide protected connections to onward flights, and not just longhaul, but shorthaul also. The through ticket can even be priced on its own terms, because British Airways operates in an almost completely deregulated environment. So, BA may charge less for a ticket from Newcastle to Berlin than it does for the London to Berlin sector alone.

From Inverness, there may be no Air Passenger Duty due either.

The average figures for connecting passengers through Heathrow to and from domestic flights are actually suppressed down to about the 60% level by the fact that some flights operate effectively to position in to place for the peak-demand balancing service - just as with the railways. British Airways manages its costs and income on those positioning services with the demand and yield of the peak services in mind.

Now, there are also a couple of regularly referenced data sets that are used to demonstrate how modal shift can be achieved in the railway’s favour as a result of developments in the past.

The first is the introduction of the 3tph service between Manchester and Euston.

There’s sometimes an allowance made for the fact that the WCML improvement works will have pushed some traffic away from rail to other modes, while ongoing, and that some of the bounce back once the works were over and the timetable settled will have been ‘natural’.

To really analyse the situation, however, it’s important to look at the detail of the aviation environment.

Prior to the new rail timetable and Pendolinos, Manchester to Heathrow was served by both bmi and British Airways. The real cull in air services came with the latter’s takeover of the former. Why? Yes, there was some overcapacity, and British Airways knew that it could better use some slots and airframes at Heathrow.

However, the other very relevant change was that bmi was a member of the Star Alliance. Accordingly, a very high proportion of its passengers were also interlining - connecting with protection at Heathrow - to services operated by United, Lufthansa, SWISS, South African, Singapore Airlines, ANA, Air New Zealand, Air Canada etc.

At a stroke, the British Airways takeover killed this traffic. No through pricing; no through-checking of bags; no missed-connection protection.

This is one of the reasons why the notion of remediation slots was mandated; it was to try and maintain customer choice from the likes of Manchester, and Aberdeen and Edinburgh to connect onto other carriers than BA and its oneworld partners at Heathrow.

Unfortunately, the slots ended up with Virgin (Little Red) and flybe, who had never shown the slightest understanding of how to drive yield from connections (the epitome of this art being KLM).

So, yes, the 3tph WCML timetable undoubtedly conquested some air traffic, but its success should be judged on its own merits only. South African subsequently reduced service from London; Air New Zealand did likewise, and SWISS and Lufthansa etc., increased frequency from Manchester themselves.

The measure then, has to be: how many passengers departing from and arriving back into Heathrow now prefer to connect via Heathrow Express and/or Underground to and from stations within the Manchester Airport catchment? I don’t have this data, but anecdotally I’d observe that it’s three fifths of not many at all.

There’s another factor take into account when judging pure market share, too, and that’s also particularly relevant when it comes to looking at the Central Belt of Scotland services.

That is how much extra capacity is injected into the market, and just how many seats are added with one additional rail service. And, unlike air traffic figures, which are fairly rigorously audited, rail passeneger traffic counting is a good deal less accurate.

Assume that the statistical rigour is comparable, however, and there’s no doubt that increased rail supply is met with an increased willingness to travel. So, rail grows the market, and assuming theat air doesn’t increase capacity likewise, the figures show rail achieving a greater market share. What it doesn’t do is establish a causal link between improved rail service and a drop in domestic demand for air travel.

You can then also dig down to see who the rail passengers are; the increase in rail ridership also coincides with the massive increase in the numbers in higher education, and the popularity of multiple annual weekend breaks, stag parties and the like.

This is a limited and not particularly focused-upon market for domestic BA flights, and wansn’t latterly for flybe ones either, so growing it overall doesn’t necessarily have a material effect on air travel.

This is why calculating the proportional reduction on flights between Edinburgh and Glasgow and Heathrow, based on the hypothetical number of seats available on HS2 services and ‘the Manchester effect’ is, as far as I can see, pure and unadulterated fantasy.

It’s exactly the same as property developers speculatively promoting ‘creating x000 jobs’ from their office block, based purely on the square footage and the notional allowance made for a single desk space.

Accordingly, if we want to drive real and demonstrable reductions in domestic aviation, it’s imperative that we fundamentally understand what drives it at the moment, and then regulate (force) the commercial operators into providing the same or better levels of service to the customer utilising a rail alternative.

That means connection protection between rail and air, baggage handling, seamless special assistance for those requiring it and, even, recognition of loyalty benefits which airlines use as fundamental tools in their battery of commercial considerations.

It also means understanding that if demand is reduced at Heathrow, then other unregulated entities such as Air France KLM, Lufthansa etc., will simply take up the slack from regional stations. All that means is that while air quality in Hounslow might be affected; it won’t make a blind bit of difference to that at Ringway or Turnhouse, or in the upper atmosphere.

It also has to be understood that, without domestic feed, some direct routes or frequencies from Heathrow might also be compromised. The economic and social effects of this to the country (or at least London) would need to be calculated as best they can.

It arguably goes back to the weakness in the PR case for HS2 Phase 1 being about speed. Trying to co-opt these other ‘guaranteed winning outcomes’ which are no such thing will, ultimately I fear, severely compromise the long term organic development of the rail network.

Using and promoting a ‘New Birmingham Main Line’ could have been the a better way to start things, and then inviting each adjacent region to develop and promote its own connection might have been another way to do it.

But, lurching from ‘speed’ to, no, no, it’s really all about ‘capacity’, erm, sorry, no, it’s about ‘killing off domestic flights’, or, sorry, oh it’s ‘Sheffield’s fault’ and we were ‘forced into Curzon Street and back out backwards’ and, well, it would have been fine if CrossCountry/Loganair/easyJet/British Airways just hadn’t been as capable doesn’t, overall, strike me as an absolutely guaranteed strategy for success.

Sorry for the essay.

All very good points. It has been a long time since I flew Heathrow - Scotland, so I am not in a position to argue about the scale of transfer passengers at Heathrow on such flights.

For the Manchester example - which I am happy to admit I use freely - another thing to bear in mind was the changes in airport security post the 2006 ‘liquids’ attempt and the 2007 car bombing at Glasgow. The former, in particular, made the departure experience more of a chore (although that has got better subsequently), effectively lengthening the journey time from arriving at the airport to take off. This unquestionably caused a transfer of some trips from air to rail, particularly for Manchester and Scotland to London routes (being the busiest).

I’ll have to dig out my 2004 / 5 CAA starts to see the numbers of flights / passengers from Manchester to London, but as I mentioned upthread I think they have roughly fallen by 75% since then, and whilst some will. Undoubtedly due to the loss of the BMI flights, and some will be because the long haul Network from Manchester is vastly improved (eg Emirates and connections), I would argue that a fair proportion was genuine domestic traffic and that has now gone to rail.

Finally it’s not just Manchester - similar swings happen when much improved services are introduced elsewhere. Madrid - Barcelona is a good example (acknowledging that the air market from those cities respective airports is quite different to Heathrow vs Manchester), plus Paris - Marseille, Paris - Amsterdam, etc.

All told, I still believe that HS2 will take around half of the London - Glasgow / Edinburgh air traffic. Clearly it won’t take many of the transfer passengers via LHR, but it will take a lot of the rest.


Finally, finally; I wonder how many air passengers from London are transferring to other flights at Glasgow / Edinburgh?

 

[gsnedders]

Finally, finally; I wonder how many air passengers from London are transferring to other flights at Glasgow / Edinburgh?

< 2%. Whereas Aberdeen is up around 12%, but part of that is off-shore helicopter traffic, along with it being (by far!) the biggest connection point to Shetland (Orkney is relatively evenly split between Aberdeen and Edinburgh).

 

[Noddy]

Perhaps this is the time to dip my toe (up to my thigh) into this, and by default, other HS2 discussions.

Firstly, I should perhaps say that I’m firmly in favour of developing the U.K. rail network; both in terms of grand projets and incremental improvements. I also understand how funding of the former doesn’t necessarily have any connection with the latter.

However, in order to ensure that the successes of big projects such as HS2, and other investments, are assured as much as they can be, leading to a snowball effect of further projects and investments, I think that it’s critically important that proposals are promoted and judged as realistically as possible.

So, for example, this is also relevant to the other thread regarding incremental improvements to CrossCountry rail services that might mean that they compete more effectively with domestic aviation, as well as countless others.

As far as domestic aviation is concerned, then, it’s imperative that there’s a clear understanding of what drives people to choose a flight over another mode of travel. The reality is that it’s extremely complex and nuanced, and those who suggest that HS2 opening will mean that (for example) flights between Southampton and Manchester will be decimated seem not to appreciate who currently patronises those flights, nor why they do so.

Let’s put that to one side for a moment, as clearly the real volumes are into and out of London, and Heathrow at that. The reality then is that, currently, many of British Airways’ domestic flights convey in excess of 80% transfer traffic.

They do so because they provide protected connections to onward flights, and not just longhaul, but shorthaul also. The through ticket can even be priced on its own terms, because British Airways operates in an almost completely deregulated environment. So, BA may charge less for a ticket from Newcastle to Berlin than it does for the London to Berlin sector alone.

From Inverness, there may be no Air Passenger Duty due either.

The average figures for connecting passengers through Heathrow to and from domestic flights are actually suppressed down to about the 60% level by the fact that some flights operate effectively to position in to place for the peak-demand balancing service - just as with the railways. British Airways manages its costs and income on those positioning services with the demand and yield of the peak services in mind.

Now, there are also a couple of regularly referenced data sets that are used to demonstrate how modal shift can be achieved in the railway’s favour as a result of developments in the past.

The first is the introduction of the 3tph service between Manchester and Euston.

There’s sometimes an allowance made for the fact that the WCML improvement works will have pushed some traffic away from rail to other modes, while ongoing, and that some of the bounce back once the works were over and the timetable settled will have been ‘natural’.

To really analyse the situation, however, it’s important to look at the detail of the aviation environment.

Prior to the new rail timetable and Pendolinos, Manchester to Heathrow was served by both bmi and British Airways. The real cull in air services came with the latter’s takeover of the former. Why? Yes, there was some overcapacity, and British Airways knew that it could better use some slots and airframes at Heathrow.

However, the other very relevant change was that bmi was a member of the Star Alliance. Accordingly, a very high proportion of its passengers were also interlining - connecting with protection at Heathrow - to services operated by United, Lufthansa, SWISS, South African, Singapore Airlines, ANA, Air New Zealand, Air Canada etc.

At a stroke, the British Airways takeover killed this traffic. No through pricing; no through-checking of bags; no missed-connection protection.

This is one of the reasons why the notion of remediation slots was mandated; it was to try and maintain customer choice from the likes of Manchester, and Aberdeen and Edinburgh to connect onto other carriers than BA and its oneworld partners at Heathrow.

Unfortunately, the slots ended up with Virgin (Little Red) and flybe, who had never shown the slightest understanding of how to drive yield from connections (the epitome of this art being KLM).

So, yes, the 3tph WCML timetable undoubtedly conquested some air traffic, but its success should be judged on its own merits only. South African subsequently reduced service from London; Air New Zealand did likewise, and SWISS and Lufthansa etc., increased frequency from Manchester themselves.

The measure then, has to be: how many passengers departing from and arriving back into Heathrow now prefer to connect via Heathrow Express and/or Underground to and from stations within the Manchester Airport catchment? I don’t have this data, but anecdotally I’d observe that it’s three fifths of not many at all.

There’s another factor take into account when judging pure market share, too, and that’s also particularly relevant when it comes to looking at the Central Belt of Scotland services.

That is how much extra capacity is injected into the market, and just how many seats are added with one additional rail service. And, unlike air traffic figures, which are fairly rigorously audited, rail passeneger traffic counting is a good deal less accurate.

Assume that the statistical rigour is comparable, however, and there’s no doubt that increased rail supply is met with an increased willingness to travel. So, rail grows the market, and assuming theat air doesn’t increase capacity likewise, the figures show rail achieving a greater market share. What it doesn’t do is establish a causal link between improved rail service and a drop in domestic demand for air travel.

You can then also dig down to see who the rail passengers are; the increase in rail ridership also coincides with the massive increase in the numbers in higher education, and the popularity of multiple annual weekend breaks, stag parties and the like.

This is a limited and not particularly focused-upon market for domestic BA flights, and wansn’t latterly for flybe ones either, so growing it overall doesn’t necessarily have a material effect on air travel.

This is why calculating the proportional reduction on flights between Edinburgh and Glasgow and Heathrow, based on the hypothetical number of seats available on HS2 services and ‘the Manchester effect’ is, as far as I can see, pure and unadulterated fantasy.

It’s exactly the same as property developers speculatively promoting ‘creating x000 jobs’ from their office block, based purely on the square footage and the notional allowance made for a single desk space.

Accordingly, if we want to drive real and demonstrable reductions in domestic aviation, it’s imperative that we fundamentally understand what drives it at the moment, and then regulate (force) the commercial operators into providing the same or better levels of service to the customer utilising a rail alternative.

That means connection protection between rail and air, baggage handling, seamless special assistance for those requiring it and, even, recognition of loyalty benefits which airlines use as fundamental tools in their battery of commercial considerations.

It also means understanding that if demand is reduced at Heathrow, then other unregulated entities such as Air France KLM, Lufthansa etc., will simply take up the slack from regional stations. All that means is that while air quality in Hounslow might be affected; it won’t make a blind bit of difference to that at Ringway or Turnhouse, or in the upper atmosphere.

It also has to be understood that, without domestic feed, some direct routes or frequencies from Heathrow might also be compromised. The economic and social effects of this to the country (or at least London) would need to be calculated as best they can.

It arguably goes back to the weakness in the PR case for HS2 Phase 1 being about speed. Trying to co-opt these other ‘guaranteed winning outcomes’ which are no such thing will, ultimately I fear, severely compromise the long term organic development of the rail network.

Using and promoting a ‘New Birmingham Main Line’ could have been the a better way to start things, and then inviting each adjacent region to develop and promote its own connection might have been another way to do it.

But, lurching from ‘speed’ to, no, no, it’s really all about ‘capacity’, erm, sorry, no, it’s about ‘killing off domestic flights’, or, sorry, oh it’s ‘Sheffield’s fault’ and we were ‘forced into Curzon Street and back out backwards’ and, well, it would have been fine if CrossCountry/Loganair/easyJet/British Airways just hadn’t been as capable doesn’t, overall, strike me as an absolutely guaranteed strategy for success.

Sorry for the essay.

Very interesting post.

I do worry on here that folk seem to be very keen to promote (or oppose) on the new HS lines apparently based on air traffic potential alone, when the reasons why people travel and choose a particular mode of transport are much more nuanced. Folk are happy to build a HS line connecting the UKs 1st, 2nd and 3rd largest cities together but write off the 4th largest city on the basis of we’ll have grabbed all the air market we can so there’s little Benefit (to go in the BCR). That isn’t the only benefit.

Like you say, if this is all about eliminating air travel (which as far as I thought it wasn’t), especially to/from Heathrow, a much better job needs to be done regarding guaranteeing transfers, late flights/trains etc, and that to a large extent could be done without a new high speed line.

 

[si404]

Clearly it won’t take many of the transfer passengers via LHR, but it will take a lot of the rest.

I think if you have through ticketing with protected connections, it could. There's apparently quite a few stations / coach stops with IATA codes already - some shared with nearby airports (obviously) - though there's no reason why they can't be expanded to fill in the gaps. The French have implemented this a bit more than we have.

 

[Bald Rick]

I think if you have through ticketing with protected connections, it could. There's apparently quite a few stations / coach stops with IATA codes already - some shared with nearby airports (obviously) - though there's no reason why they can't be expanded to fill in the gaps. The French have implemented this a bit more than we have.

Agreed, and of course it depends where you are starting your original journey. If, say, you have a public transport journey (or two!) to get to Glasgow / Edinburgh airport in the first place, then taking a public transport journey (or two) to get to Heathrow might not be that different, conceptually, particularly if the timing suits.

 

[FQTV]

Finally it’s not just Manchester - similar swings happen when much improved services are introduced elsewhere. Madrid - Barcelona is a good example (acknowledging that the air market from those cities respective airports is quite different to Heathrow vs Manchester), plus Paris - Marseille, Paris - Amsterdam, etc.

All told, I still believe that HS2 will take around half of the London - Glasgow / Edinburgh air traffic. Clearly it won’t take many of the transfer passengers via LHR, but it will take a lot of the rest.

I quite cautiously didn't mention Madrid < > Barcelona as I knew by that point that I was getting firmly into 'TL;DR', and I also knew that it warranted a bit more research!

To pick up on it, though, now that I have had a further dig into things, I think that it's instructive to look at the history of that route in aviation terms.

In 1994, the regulated market provided 29 daily rotations between the two cities, 97% provided by Iberia using DC-9s (or iterations) and Boeing 727s. In 1995, the deregulated market saw 45 daily rotations, with Spanair and Air Europa taking about a third of the slots, and by 2000, the market was up to 71 rotations.

In 2001, of course, there was a global aviation downturn, which resulted in a significant reduction in demand and therefore supply. Spanair finally ceased operations in 2012, and at that point the interline feed to Star Alliance carriers at both ends of the route was lost.

The 2020 timetables (pre and post Covid) provide for about 32 daily rotations between the two cities, operated by Vueling, Iberia and Air Europa, using A320s, a lot of A321s and even at least one B787 daily rotation. Average seats per flight is higher than it was in 2000 and departures are roughly every thirty minutes during the operating hours.

Two of the airlines operating at the moment are part of the same company, and the third is in the process of being taken over. All do or will codeshare with each other, and all do or will interline between themselves and other alliance partner airlines.

So, there are a few ways of looking at it: current airline capacity between Madrid and Barcelona has only dropped by about 20% since 1995, or it has gown quite a bit since 1994, or that it has dropped by about 50% since 2000. Load factors have definitely increased (although I can't immediately find exact figures), so in real terms it may be closer to 15% since 1995 and 45% since 2000, with external factors unrelated to the availability of high speed rail having also had an affect.

I can't find much in the way of interline figures yet, pre Spanish AVE high speed operations, but this could well have been lower than the BA domestic proprtions through Heathrow at the moment. It would be difficult to envisage that they could have been higher pre-AVE.

It's also quite a 'clean' city pair in terms of routes; each city has only one airport with service to the other's. Girona (AKA Barcelona North!) doesn't connect with Madrid. Barcelona and Madrid Airports are both operated by AENA, the national airport operator, and the rail service is run by RENFE, the national rail operator.

This is quite siginificantly different to the domestic aviation picture in the UK with regard to services into and out of the 'London Airports'.

As others have mentioned, between Southend, Stansted, Luton, City, Heathrow and Gatwick, all of which are, themselves, owned by different private operators, there are all sorts of different commercial pressures at play, and all sorts of different reasons why passengers currently support those flight operations. In the Central Belt of Scotland, there's quite a significant catchment overlap between Edinburgh and Glasgow. When it operates, there is between Prestwick and Glasgow, too.

So, if transport policy is to drive modal shift towards rail, trying to hit all those routes with a speed/fare/capacity alternative that's centred around HS2 and its later phases is going to be a challenge. If, in fact, all that HS2 and its connections does is conquest non-connecting traffic between Glasgow/Edinburgh and Heathrow, it has the potential to make a very small dent indeed in the overall London to Central Belt market.

And, even at c3 hours from Edinburgh or Glasgow to London Euston by high(er) speed rail, Edinburgh to London City or Heathrow by air in a little over an hour, with fixed costs that are a fraction of rail's and operational flexibility that's far higher, coupled with the locations of those airports and where the passengers actually live and need to get to, and (theoretically) without state-mandated fare suppression, and with competition law, it all looks very uncertain to me.

The French examples have their own nuances too, but again there are significant differences between 'there and here'. Witness the most recent sitiation with (part state-owned) Air France receiving state aid on the basis that it is restricted from competing against state-run SNCF, but also note that TGV serves Paris CDG directly. Would that governmental and commercial environment ever happen here?

All of which sets off my doubtometer and increases my feeling that much more should be done in the UK to decide what we want to achieve, how we're going to do it, what the realities of the challenges are and, when it comes to competing with aviation, private motoring and even bus travel, the rail 'industry' simply must start doing things faster, with a constant pipeline of works driving a constant extension of strategy and, hopefully, greater efficiency, and also aiming to ensure that every incremental improvement is 'open-ended' - that is to say that it can be added to or met by something coming in the other direction, which is generally the way that motorways have developed.

Obviously, it needs to be understood that that way of developing things will likely create over capacity to a dead end in the short term. A good example of not understanding this is probably the Ordsall Chord. Laying aside the rights and wrongs of it as a piece of standalone infrastructure, as part of a network it shows what happens when something is developed without due recognition to the fact that it is, itself a dead end as it stands. Trying to force it to something approaching maximum capacity with too many corked necks surrounding it just (IMHO) weakens the reputation of 'the industry' in being able to convince folks that it's achieving its potential.

Sorry that became Chapter Two rather than an addendum!

 

[route:oxford]

Alternatively it would push people towards other hubs which haven't had their links thus decreased, depending on connection quality to Heathrow (having to go over a bridge at OOC with luggage is the sort of hassle I don't have if I fly from Glasgow). If HS2 wants to take passengers transiting from domestics, they need to interline with a number of airlines (obviously BA, and at least ensure those fares are available for interlining with other Oneworld airlines) to provide guaranteed connections.

Sorry, but that's just silly.

If I want to fly after work from Edinburgh, the first thing I have to do is cross the "Bridge to Nowhere" from my office at Stirling, where the lifts either don't work or are used by local potheads to smoke or urinate.

Then once I drag my luggage over the car park entrance and into Stiring Station, I have to take 2 lifts or use the stairs to cross the Bridge to Platform 3.

Then at Edinburgh Park, I have to take 2 lifts or use the stairs to cross to the Tram platforms.

Three Bridges before I've set foot in the airport.

Absolutely no-one is going to say "I'm not going to travel from Heathrow because I have to cross a bridge at old oak common". Chances are they will have had to cross a Bridge at Edinburgh to reach a High Speed Platform!

 

[The Ham]

.

It arguably goes back to the weakness in the PR case for HS2 Phase 1 being about speed. Trying to co-opt these other ‘guaranteed winning outcomes’ which are no such thing will, ultimately I fear, severely compromise the long term organic development of the rail network.

Using and promoting a ‘New Birmingham Main Line’ could have been the a better way to start things, and then inviting each adjacent region to develop and promote its own connection might have been another way to do it.

But, lurching from ‘speed’ to, no, no, it’s really all about ‘capacity’, erm, sorry, no, it’s about ‘killing off domestic flights’, or, sorry, oh it’s ‘Sheffield’s fault’ and we were ‘forced into Curzon Street and back out backwards’ and, well, it would have been fine if CrossCountry/Loganair/easyJet/British Airways just hadn’t been as capable doesn’t, overall, strike me as an absolutely guaranteed strategy for success.

Whilst the PR may have shifted around, it is clear from a letter from February 2009 that HS2 understood that the building of HS2 was primarily about capacity, StopHS2 have kindly stored the letter in question (downloads a PDF) here:

http://stophs2.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/20090213_letter_to_lord_adonis_re_objectives_for_hs2.pdf

 

[FQTV]

Sorry, but that's just silly.

If I want to fly after work from Edinburgh, the first thing I have to do is cross the "Bridge to Nowhere" from my office at Stirling, where the lifts either don't work or are used by local potheads to smoke or urinate.

Then once I drag my luggage over the car park entrance and into Stiring Station, I have to take 2 lifts or use the stairs to cross the Bridge to Platform 3.

Then at Edinburgh Park, I have to take 2 lifts or use the stairs to cross to the Tram platforms.

Three Bridges before I've set foot in the airport.

Absolutely no-one is going to say "I'm not going to travel from Heathrow because I have to cross a bridge at old oak common". Chances are they will have had to cross a Bridge at Edinburgh to reach a High Speed Platform!

There’s always a danger of viewing a global picture through the prism of one’s own experience. I’m often reminded just how many people have never made a connection between flights, or who have never pushed a wheelchair, or who aren’t both elderly and active, or who have no friends and family living significant distance apart. Or who have any desire to see them. Or all of the above.

However, that doesn’t mean that there aren’t millions of folks who have and who are and who do. The key is understanding who they are, how they think and what prompts them to make certain choices.

On those terms, a ‘bridge at Old Oak Common’ isn’t a small physical barrier in an otherwise seamless, supported and protected process; it’s symptomatic of a planning, political and legislative process that compromises the ideal and delivers results that compare poorly with the alternative(s).

This is what I’m pointing towards above; denial of these realities compromises rail’s potential to achieve.

Whilst the PR may have shifted around, it is clear from a letter from February 2009 that HS2 understood that the building of HS2 was primarily about capacity, StopHS2 have kindly stored the letter in question (downloads a PDF) here:

http://stophs2.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/20090213_letter_to_lord_adonis_re_objectives_for_hs2.pdf

In context, that’s again just another example of what I’m focusing on, here. It doesn’t really matter what ‘HS2’ thinks or thought, now or eleven years ago. The ability to promote the first stages of a national programme of massive rail redevelopment - which has barely yet laid so much as a sleeper in those eleven years - has been compromised by poor or ‘shifting’ PR.

So, also in this specific context, I’m talking about high speed rail and its potential natural competitive impact on domestic aviation. I’m arguing that much of the evidence is that there will be next to no direct effect, at all, on the basis of currently published plans.

To repeat: I’m not arguing against HS2 Phase 1 here or, to put it another way, I’m not arguing that a Birmingham Relief Main Line isn’t desirable or even necessary.

I’m saying that trying to co-opt specious collateral benefits that are only potentially and consequentially possible, and then only with fundamental changes to political, legislative, competitive and governmental circumstances, and assuming that all other considerations remain constant (Covid-19 being a case in point) is, to paraphrase Sir Humphrey, ‘bravely hopeful’ at best.....

 

[edwin_m]

On those terms, a ‘bridge at Old Oak Common’ isn’t a small physical barrier in an otherwise seamless, supported and protected process; it’s symptomatic of a planning, political and legislative process that compromises the ideal and delivers results that compare poorly with the alternative(s).

Going by the artists impressions the bridge will be a walk across a station concourse between two lifts/escalators.

Given the difficulty of providing HS2 service to Heathrow itself, and the small numbers you expect to use HS2 to get there, I'm curious about what you would suggest instead. The Midlands has no connecting flights to Heathrow whatsoever, so for an international destination that can't easily be accessed via another airport our choices are train to London and a slow tube, or tube then Hex, or driving or coach round the M25. Even with the complication of getting to Toton and changing at OOC, HS2 provides a far better route.

 

[The Ham]

There’s always a danger of viewing a global picture through the prism of one’s own experience. I’m often reminded just how many people have never made a connection between flights, or who have never pushed a wheelchair, or who aren’t both elderly and active, or who have no friends and family living significant distance apart. Or who have any desire to see them. Or all of the above.

However, that doesn’t mean that there aren’t millions of folks who have and who are and who do. The key is understanding who they are, how they think and what prompts them to make certain choices.

On those terms, a ‘bridge at Old Oak Common’ isn’t a small physical barrier in an otherwise seamless, supported and protected process; it’s symptomatic of a planning, political and legislative process that compromises the ideal and delivers results that compare poorly with the alternative(s).

This is what I’m pointing towards above; denial of these realities compromises rail’s potential to achieve.



In context, that’s again just another example of what I’m focusing on, here. It doesn’t really matter what ‘HS2’ thinks or thought, now or eleven years ago. The ability to promote the first stages of a national programme of massive rail redevelopment - which has barely yet laid so much as a sleeper in those eleven years - has been compromised by poor or ‘shifting’ PR.

So, also in this specific context, I’m talking about high speed rail and its potential natural competitive impact on domestic aviation. I’m arguing that much of the evidence is that there will be next to no direct effect, at all, on the basis of currently published plans.

To repeat: I’m not arguing against HS2 Phase 1 here or, to put it another way, I’m not arguing that a Birmingham Relief Main Line isn’t desirable or even necessary.

I’m saying that trying to co-opt specious collateral benefits that are only potentially and consequentially possible, and then only with fundamental changes to political, legislative, competitive and governmental circumstances, and assuming that all other considerations remain constant (Covid-19 being a case in point) is, to paraphrase Sir Humphrey, ‘bravely hopeful’ at best.....

I agree that a lot of people view the world through their own prism, however there's also a lot of "what about....." arguments, so as to keep the status quo. For example, we need roads for delivery vehicles/shift workers/rural areas. Well the current crisis has shown that much of that traffic can still exist and traffic volumes can fall sufficiently. On the rural areas needing cars, the rural population is something like 15% of the total, however by rural the government means outside of settlements or within settlements with a population of less than 10,000. That's getting in for a small town at the upper end of that population size, probably with enough work and facilities for quite a few people not to need to leave it daily, or even weekly.

Where I live, it's 8,000 people (due to reach ~9,500 in the next few years due to housebuilding) and it's for a train station, several pubs, post office, supermarket (with a second much larger planned), a few churches, several takeaways/restaurants/cafes, industrial estate, business park, 2 community buildings with 7 rooms for hire (2 of which are sports haha big enough to easily facilitate at least one badminton court) a few hotels (one with a pool that the community can use) and so on. Whilst there's a need to go to the nearest large town (which is less than 10 miles away, actually there's a choice of 2, so it's not even that it's serving as the focus point for a large rural area in terms provision of services). To the point that, other than my wife's work, the vast majority of activities we undertake are done within a few miles of home. Including my work, children's school/childcare, youth group, swimming, church, dentist, doctors, most food shopping and the like. Now I'm aware that this wouldn't always be the case as it's an area which is fairly well off so have better than average provision, however the point is that rural doesn't always mean 25 houses and a pub (and not always a pub).

On the second area of discussion, if anything the case for HS2 had reduced is reliance on modal shift from other forms of transport over its lifespan (as an example early on it was 7% from road, now it's 4%). The change in PR is probably more to do with the prevailing wind in the national mindset.

The green agenda has been growing significantly for some time now and has certainly been significantly changed by the subject of micro plastics in the last two years. As such it's not overly surprising that there's been more made of how green HS2 is.

Now whilst there's been a significant amount of complaints about it's impact on ancient woodland, it's also been highlighted that actual rail is always better than road when it comes to environmental impact.

For example petrol/diesel cars produce 1.8 tonnes of CO2e /10,000 passenger miles whilst EV cars the figure is 0.6 tonnes, however this compares to rail (average for all traction types) of 0.59 tonnes. Even at the point where there's 90% EV use (which is probably 20-25 years away) the average for road would be 0.72.

Now whilst EV's figure will improve due to having more green energy in the generation mix, this is also true of rail, however rail will also remove a lot of diesel running by the use of bimodal trains, battery trains and electrification over that timeframe. As such rail is likely to be even better than EV by the time we get there, having had several years of already being a lot better than road transport.

That's before you consider that if people own a car they'll make lots of short trips because they can, if they don't need a car for work then those trips have to stop, or at least are made on foot or by cycling.

One final point, on the issue of flights between regional cities (such as Manchester/Southampton), there's often travel to/from Southampton Airport from a fairly large area (for example, due to its small size and therefore ease of getting to it/checking in/baggage collection, etc. there's a preference to use it from places like Farnborough/Camberley) as such (and although it may only be 5% of people who use it) the journey time saving by cutting 1:20 from the current Southampton to Manchester rail journey time would appear to be much more. Post HS2 the journey time from Farnborough would be circa 2:20 by train, whilst to get to Southampton Airport would be 45 minutes in good traffic. Whilst other places, like Basingstoke, Salisbury or Winchester, the figure shifts more towards air having an advantage there's still going to be a reduced journey time compared with rail from Southampton.

Whilst a few percent shift may not be a total deal breaker in its own right for the airlines looking to reduce frequency of its on top of a reduction of air use from city to city air travel. That's before you consider the impact from the change in culture (including many younger people being more inclined to not fly compared with those who are approaching retirement, which will shift travel for work/leisure purposes away from air over time) and the likely move to digital meetings (which is likely to have been massively accelerated due to the current situation).

Combined that's probably enough to result in a reduction in capacity and/or frequency, either would make air travel less attractive (lower capacity could mean a higher cost per passenger on staff costs).

However the fall of Flybe would also likely result in air fares being more expensive as there's less competition within the industry, that's before you consider the other airlines which could fold due to the current situation we are in. It also doesn't take into account any additional environmental taxes which could be brought in over the next few years.

 

[cle]

Nothing is super seamless these days, whichever mode or route we take will entail escalators, footbridges, lifts and so forth. Look at the new Kings Cross for example. It's all great because it's accessible, but sometimes more convoluted.

I don't think people make big transport decisions based on a footbridge - 'connecting' is more psychological aversion than granular step-by-step detail of the actual transit process.

 

[gsnedders]

Nothing is super seamless these days, whichever mode or route we take will entail escalators, footbridges, lifts and so forth. Look at the new Kings Cross for example. It's all great because it's accessible, but sometimes more convoluted.

I don't think people make big transport decisions based on a footbridge - 'connecting' is more psychological aversion than granular step-by-step detail of the actual transit process.

For enough people, there's a significant difference between having to lift your luggage onto a check-in belt, in an environment where there are trolley are readily available, versus lifting it onto the train and then onto the rack.