100MPH MK1 Coaches

ralphchadkirk · 27 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
I will stand corrected, but I believe the Dead Mans Handle was only built into trains from the mid 1960's onwards, which would mean that most Mk1 stock trains prior to this time do not have a Dead Mans Handle, unless they have been adapted in some way to have one fitted.

Trains had deadman's handles before the 1960's.

However, the problem I see with most Dead Mans Handles systems is that they can be switched off by the driver I believe, which for me as a passenger should not be the case.

The circuits can be isolated to allow the train to be moved if the equipment fails.

I know more recent trains built in the last 10 - 15 years, have it such that the Dead Mans Handle cannot be switched

Yes they can.

which for me means that the train would be a lot safer and would brake so to stop incidents like what happened in Spain.

A deadman's handle would not have prevented the recent Spanish incident.

RailUK Forums

krus_aragon · 27 Jul 2013

ralphchadkirk said:
Trains had deadman's handles before the 1960's.

Working this from first principles...

Steam locomotives would always have had two people on the footplate, so going to only the one person up front on a new diesel or electric locomotive/unit seems a sensible point to assume DSDs were introduced. But what about steam push-pull and railmotor services, where the fireman could be at the middle or rear of the train instead? Were these steam engines fitted with an early DSD, or was the Fireman expected to be vigilant and apply the handbrake is things went awry?

edwin_m · 27 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
Before anyone comments, I also believe through the 1950s/1960s, a few major crashes happened with Mk1 stock where a number of people got killed due to the driver not having concentration and not having a dead man's handle within the loco that was hauling the train?

There have indeed been many accidents over the years where the driver either drove through a speed restriction too fast or passed a signal at danger. The consequences would be worse with Mk1 stock because of its lower strength compared to later designs (but even worse with pre-Mk1 designs). However the deadman's handle doesn't have any bearing on these accidents, as the driver has been sufficiently alert to keep it depressed but for whatever reason hasn't responded to the signal or speed restriction.

As mentioned, in recent years the TPWS system has been installed at the higher-risk signals and speed restrictions to apply the brakes if the driver is approaching them too fast. This is now fitted to all trains running on the main line so reduces the accident risk for the remaining Mk1 stock by making accidents less likely.

30907 · 27 Jul 2013

krus_aragon said:
Working this from first principles...

Steam locomotives would always have had two people on the footplate, so going to only the one person up front on a new diesel or electric locomotive/unit seems a sensible point to assume DSDs were introduced. But what about steam push-pull and railmotor services, where the fireman could be at the middle or rear of the train instead? Were these steam engines fitted with an early DSD, or was the Fireman expected to be vigilant and apply the handbrake is things went awry?

AFAIK "deadman's handles" date from fairly on in the days of electric units (or possibly also trams), which were manned by a motorman only. The more sophisticated DSD is I think 1960's.
No steam locos had/have an equivalent device, not least because a steam engine can't run on autopilot. I seem to remember it was the guard's duty to keep an eye on the train's running, which is why passenger brake vans had a brake valve and periscopes/duckets.
Rail motors/push and pull workings sometimes operated without a guard but only on short branches (at least on the Southern).

flhh66555 · 27 Jul 2013

As far as the Mk 1 debate goes, I love them. I would ride anywhere on them. As for them having a place on today’s network then I agree with those on here who say as long as Network Rail say they are ok then that’s fine. If you don’t want to ride on them then don’t.
With reference to the Dead Mans Handle or Driver safety device: as with anything that can fail it so goes it has to be able to be bypassed. Therefore it follows rules are put in place to cover such events.
With the greatest of respect for all those lost in rail accidents the one that springs to mind is Southall.
An Isolated AWS and allowed to stay in service. Rule change after said incident. And so it has always been on the railway. It may be disconcerting to readers to know that every safety device can be isolated but alas it is a requirement in the event of failure.
You just got to put faith in the man at the front.

RobShipway · 27 Jul 2013

flhh66555 said:
As far as the Mk 1 debate goes, I love them. I would ride anywhere on them. As for them having a place on todays network then I agree with those on here who say as long as Network Rail say they are ok then thats fine. If you dont want to ride on them then dont.
With reference to the Dead Mans Handle or Driver safety device: as with anything that can fail it so goes it has to be able to be bypassed. Therefore it follows rules are put in place to cover such events.
With the greatest of respect for all those lost in rail accidents the one that springs to mind is Southall.
An Isolated AWS and allowed to stay in service. Rule change after said incident. And so it has always been on the railway. It may be disconcerting to readers to know that every safety device can be isolated but alas it is a requirement in the event of failure.
You just got to put faith in the man at the front.

My point is that there have been major accidents where drivers have either fallen asleep, who points have been crossed at danger such that in these circumstances, if the driver safety device should have activated but did not in many cases. It is only in more recent years (last 15 - 20) that I believe the systems have become better, to enable deaths not to occur depending on the circumstance of the accident.

flhh66555 · 27 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
My point is that there have been major accidents where drivers have either fallen asleep, who points have been crossed at danger such that in these circumstances, if the driver safety device should have activated but did not in many cases. It is only in more recent years (last 15 - 20) that I believe the systems have become better, to enable deaths not to occur depending on the circumstance of the accident.

could you please inform me of the major accidents caused by driver falling asleep and the safety device not operating?

RichmondCommu · 28 Jul 2013

bronzeonion said:
I didn't reply to your post about Clapham because I didn't want to sound sarcastic or over the top because it's harder to express emotion on text and didn't think a smiley was appropriate for what you had been through.

Yes I will reconsider my statement, crash worthiness in the UK and not mainland Europe is overdone.

In recent years the safety record in this country has been excellent however this doesn't mean that the rail industry should take its eye off the ball. Rolling out ERTMS should be considered a priority. Furthermore, in terms of train design safety surely has to be the number one priority. In all fairness I don't care if certain fixtures and fittings rattle at high speed providing that in the event of a collision everything has been done to protect those on board.

I loved reading about the '140 mph club' on here recently and the exploits of those drivers made me smile however Network Rail and the TOC's are quite right to ban such practices. I have no issue with mk1's running on Network Rail but lets not pretend that they are better than modern rolling stock.

RobShipway · 28 Jul 2013

flhh66555 said:
could you please inform me of the major accidents caused by driver falling asleep and the safety device not operating?

Try reading about the following:

11th October 1984 - Wembley Central rail crash, 11 October 1984 3 killed, 18 injured: collision: signal passed at danger; driver's mental state incapacitated by medical condition occurring.

4th December 1984 - Eccles rail crash (1984), 4 December 1984; 3 killed, 68 injured: Inattention by driver; signal passed at danger, rear-end collision

19 September 1986 - Colwich rail crash, 19 September 1986; 1 killed 60 injured: head-on collision at converging route: driver failed to read a notification regarding recent signalling changes; misread signals[47]

4th August 1990 - Stafford rail crash (1990), 4 August 1990; 1 killed, 35 injured: train passed signal at danger, rear-end collision: drunk driver, allegations excessive working hours.

And there is many more that can be attributed to driver fatigue where they are tired or the drivers fell asleep even if only for a moment, where the Drivers Safety Device should have kicked in and stopped the train, thus preventing the accident from happening.

flhh66555 · 28 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
Try reading about the following:

11th October 1984 - Wembley Central rail crash, 11 October 1984 3 killed, 18 injured: collision: signal passed at danger; driver's mental state incapacitated by medical condition occurring.

4th December 1984 - Eccles rail crash (1984), 4 December 1984; 3 killed, 68 injured: Inattention by driver; signal passed at danger, rear-end collision

19 September 1986 - Colwich rail crash, 19 September 1986; 1 killed 60 injured: head-on collision at converging route: driver failed to read a notification regarding recent signalling changes; misread signals[47]

4th August 1990 - Stafford rail crash (1990), 4 August 1990; 1 killed, 35 injured: train passed signal at danger, rear-end collision: drunk driver, allegations excessive working hours.

And there is many more that can be attributed to driver fatigue where they are tired or the drivers fell asleep even if only for a moment, where the Drivers Safety Device should have kicked in and stopped the train, thus preventing the accident from happening.

I accept that TPWS would/could have prevented possibly all of these instances but that is not the dead mans handle nor are any of the above driver falling asleep. How many more is many more as you keep saying. As your original post speculates many deaths attributed to drivers falling asleep and then a safety device (dead mans) not working I am yet to see proof. I am not being purposely awkward just looking for the facts to back up your original statement.

edwin_m · 28 Jul 2013

I've probably read most of the accident reports from the past century and I don't recall a single one where a driver's safety device was fitted but failed to operate correctly. In all the accidents referred to above, the driver was sufficiently alert to operate the DSD but not sufficiently alert to control the train.

flhh66555 · 28 Jul 2013

edwin_m said:
I've probably read most of the accident reports from the past century and I don't recall a single one where a driver's safety device was fitted but failed to operate correctly. In all the accidents referred to above, the driver was sufficiently alert to operate the DSD but not sufficiently alert to control the train.

my point exactly. thank you

Bill EWS · 28 Jul 2013

Robbies: In most modern locomotives and Units the DSD is built into the control handle and cannot be isolated in normal conditions. It can be isolated when there are certain problems but other safety rules come into play and an assistant driver will most likely be aquired to continue the journey. It is impossible to tie down the DSD in these machines, as Headshot119 has explained.

Edit: I forgot to add that similar rules apply when the AWS has failed or had to be isolated.

Likewise. When the Reverser is placed in the 'neutral' position the brakes automatically apply. This avoids the possibility of a train/loco running way if/when the driver leaves the driving cab for whatever reason.

The term Deadman's Handle' is an unofficial term used by the general public and many news reporters. The offical term is DSD = Drive's Safety Device.

ainsworth74 · 28 Jul 2013

I have to agree with the above, the only incidents I can think of where fatigue or other incapacity was an issue the driver remained alert enough to operate the DSD.

455driver · 28 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
My point is that there have been major accidents where drivers have either fallen asleep, who points have been crossed at danger such that in these circumstances, if the driver safety device should have activated but did not in many cases. It is only in more recent years (last 15 - 20) that I believe the systems have become better, to enable deaths not to occur depending on the circumstance of the accident.

What a load of <deleted>, you dont have a clue do you, yes safety systems have improved over time just like everything else (except common sense) but safety devices are not swiched on when the driver wants them they are on all the time and cannot just be isolated because the drivers wants too.

Lets have some links to the reports about all this carnage then! :lol:

flhh66555 · 28 Jul 2013

455driver said:
What a load of <deleted>, you dont have a clue do you, yes safety systems have improved over time just like everything else (except common sense) but safety devices are not swiched on when the driver wants them they are on all the time and cannot just be isolated because the drivers wants too.

Lets have some links to the reports about all this carnage then!

again, my point exactly. but better put. thank you

Beveridges · 29 Jul 2013

The "Cumbrian Choppers" tour reached 100mph back in Dec 2004 on 67-hauled part and that had Mk1s.

cjmillsnun · 29 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
Try reading about the following:

1. 11th October 1984 - Wembley Central rail crash, 11 October 1984 3 killed, 18 injured: collision: signal passed at danger; driver's mental state incapacitated by medical condition occurring.

2. 4th December 1984 - Eccles rail crash (1984), 4 December 1984; 3 killed, 68 injured: Inattention by driver; signal passed at danger, rear-end collision

3. 19 September 1986 - Colwich rail crash, 19 September 1986; 1 killed 60 injured: head-on collision at converging route: driver failed to read a notification regarding recent signalling changes; misread signals[47]

4. 4th August 1990 - Stafford rail crash (1990), 4 August 1990; 1 killed, 35 injured: train passed signal at danger, rear-end collision: drunk driver, allegations excessive working hours.

And there is many more that can be attributed to driver fatigue where they are tired or the drivers fell asleep even if only for a moment, where the Drivers Safety Device should have kicked in and stopped the train, thus preventing the accident from happening.

The only one there that has any relevance to driver fatigue is the Stafford crash, and even then it was an allegation only and the driver was under the influence of alcohol.

In all cases I believe the driver was awake, so the DSD wouldn't have prevented it.

RobShipway · 29 Jul 2013

cjmillsnun said:
The only one there that has any relevance to driver fatigue is the Stafford crash, and even then it was an allegation only and the driver was under the influence of alcohol.

In all cases I believe the driver was awake, so the DSD wouldn't have prevented it.

If you read thoroughly the reports for the accidents, which I have in all cases especially the Stafford crash, driver fatigue played a part on the accidents happening. Which with TPWS/AWS installed and the software working correctly for these, it would have prevented them from happening.

In answer to 455driver, I do have a clue mate and properly more so than you realise from reading my previous post.

However, as it is a free world and I have my opinions and everyone else has there opinions. It does not mean that either is right or either is wrong, it is just different ideas which is what forums like this are about as if we had the same ideas all of the time, it would be boring.

edwin_m · 29 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
If you read thoroughly the reports for the accidents, which I have in all cases especially the Stafford crash, driver fatigue played a part on the accidents happening. Which with TPWS/AWS installed and the software working correctly for these, it would have prevented them from happening.

I agree with regard to TPWS. Not necessarily so for AWS which was in fact in use in most of these accidents and the driver cancelled the warning but didn't act on it.

However your previous posts which have attracted disagreement and criticism referred to a driver's safety device. Perhaps you don't realise that while TPWS and AWS are "devices" that increase "safety" for the "driver", there is a specific piece of equipment called a Driver's Safety Device whose purpose is to stop the train if the driver fails to operate it. As several of us have said already, that device did not play any part in the accidents you have mentioned.

RobShipway · 29 Jul 2013

edwin_m said:
I agree with regard to TPWS. Not necessarily so for AWS which was in fact in use in most of these accidents and the driver cancelled the warning but didn't act on it.

However your previous posts which have attracted disagreement and criticism referred to a driver's safety device. Perhaps you don't realise that while TPWS and AWS are "devices" that increase "safety" for the "driver", there is a specific piece of equipment called a Driver's Safety Device whose purpose is to stop the train if the driver fails to operate it. As several of us have said already, that device did not play any part in the accidents you have mentioned.

Okay, here is where we are coming to my point. If the driver did not act on the AWS, surely the drivers safety device should have kicked in, if it sensed that the driver was not physically in command of the train?

flhh66555 · 29 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
Okay, here is where we are coming to my point. If the driver did not act on the AWS, surely the drivers safety device should have kicked in, if it sensed that the driver was not physically in command of the train?

The driver safety device kicks in when the pressure on the pedal is released (or vigilance not reset). ie when the driver is dead or incapacitated. nothing to do with any other system in place.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

flhh66555 said:
The driver safety device kicks in when the pressure on the pedal is released (or vigilance not reset). ie when the driver is dead or incapacitated. nothing to do with any other system in place.

if the driver did not react to the AWS then brakes apply. if he does reset the AWS how can the DSD possibly know that trouble is coming?

RobShipway · 29 Jul 2013

[/size]

if the driver did not react to the AWS then brakes apply. if he does reset the AWS how can the DSD possibly know that trouble is coming?[/QUOTE]

That is my point about the accidents in my previous post, especially the Stafford crash. I believe either the AWS was reset, prior to the accidents happening such then, that the brakes did not get applied at a time when it should have done to prevent the accidents from happening.

If there is not a link between the AWS and the DSD systems, then to my mind there should especially if the driver is suffering incapacity in any form or for that matter a problem is found with train, so that then such that together they can bring the train to a halt safely.

In details I have read on these systems, there seems to be no link between the two as one is put in place by the manufacturer of the train and the other is put in place due to being a requirement to run on the rails.

The reset of the AWS should not be done manually, it should be done automatically if the driver reacts to the DSD. If the driver does not react, then the brakes are applied by both systems.

flhh66555 · 29 Jul 2013

[/QUOTE]
That is my point about the accidents in my previous post, especially the Stafford crash. I believe either the AWS was reset, prior to the accidents happening such then, that the brakes did not get applied at a time when it should have done to prevent the accidents from happening.

If there is not a link between the AWS and the DSD systems, then to my mind there should especially if the driver is suffering incapacity in any form or for that matter a problem is found with train, so that then such that together they can bring the train to a halt safely.

In details I have read on these systems, there seems to be no link between the two as one is put in place by the manufacturer of the train and the other is put in place due to being a requirement to run on the rails.

The reset of the AWS should not be done manually, it should be done automatically if the driver reacts to the DSD. If the driver does not react, then the brakes are applied by both systems.[/QUOTE]

unfortunately you seem not to grasp the complete difference between the two safety items and as such I can no longer explain it to you. and for the point of reference the Stafford crash could not have been avoided by DSD or AWS. he passed a signal at danger (authorised). failure to keep a good look out or possibly unsure of the location of the failed train he was assisting. no safety device covers that. and the death in question was his.

507 001 · 29 Jul 2013

That is my point about the accidents in my previous post, especially the Stafford crash. I believe either the AWS was reset, prior to the accidents happening such then, that the brakes did not get applied at a time when it should have done to prevent the accidents from happening.

If there is not a link between the AWS and the DSD systems, then to my mind there should especially if the driver is suffering incapacity in any form or for that matter a problem is found with train, so that then such that together they can bring the train to a halt safely.

In details I have read on these systems, there seems to be no link between the two as one is put in place by the manufacturer of the train and the other is put in place due to being a requirement to run on the rails.

The reset of the AWS should not be done manually, it should be done automatically if the driver reacts to the DSD. If the driver does not react, then the brakes are applied by both systems.

I think you've misunderstood what a drivers safety device actually is......

It's literally a pedal or, I believe on some older southern region emus, a handle the has to be depressed to keep the brakes off...... It does NOT monitor the performance of the driver/train or his/her reaction to other safety systems like AWS.

If the driver does not respond to an AWS alarm, the system applies the brakes.

If the driver releases the DSD pedal/handle then after a couple of seconds the system applies the brakes.

Unfortunately, as has been pointed out to you a few times now, in the crashes you have mentioned the driver has been awake enough to operate the safety systems, however he/she has been too fatigued/distracted/Ill/whatever that they have not been able to RESPOND to them correctly. It's not a case of whether the system behaved correctly or not.

edwin_m · 30 Jul 2013

Robbies said:
That is my point about the accidents in my previous post, especially the Stafford crash. I believe either the AWS was reset, prior to the accidents happening such then, that the brakes did not get applied at a time when it should have done to prevent the accidents from happening.

If there is not a link between the AWS and the DSD systems, then to my mind there should especially if the driver is suffering incapacity in any form or for that matter a problem is found with train, so that then such that together they can bring the train to a halt safely.

In details I have read on these systems, there seems to be no link between the two as one is put in place by the manufacturer of the train and the other is put in place due to being a requirement to run on the rails.

The reset of the AWS should not be done manually, it should be done automatically if the driver reacts to the DSD. If the driver does not react, then the brakes are applied by both systems.

The DSD will stop the train if the driver fails to operate it correctly regardless of the state of the signals or what else the train is doing. This is to guard against the hazard of the driver collapsing at the controls.

The AWS will stop the train if a caution signal or other warning is passed, and the driver fails to acknowledge it. This partially guards against the hazard of ignoring signals - a different situation from the one the DSD protects against. AWS would probably have prevented various serious accidents including Harrow if it had been fitted earlier. No doubt it has also prevented many accidents since then, but nobody knows about accidents that didn't happen!

However there still continued to be some accidents where the driver cancelled the AWS warning but failed to react to it, including Stafford etc. The cancellation feature is essential for the running of the railway, as things would rapidly become unworkable if every train did an emergency stop when passing any adverse signal aspect. TPWS provides a good measure of protection against these accidents and ATP or ERTMS provides an even greater degree of protection.

Linking the AWS reset to the DSD would significantly reduce safety. The point of the reset is to alert the driver to something which may require him to slow the train down. By pressing the button he confirms he is aware of this, and 99.999%* of the time will then slow the train down correctly. If the reset was done automatically and the driver wasn't fully alert (though still operating the DSD) then it is more likely he would fail to react. If the DSD is released the train will be braking to a stop anyway regardless of what AWS was doing.

*I don't know the actual figure but it is pretty close to 100%
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Robbies said:
Okay, here is where we are coming to my point. If the driver did not act on the AWS, surely the drivers safety device should have kicked in, if it sensed that the driver was not physically in command of the train?

That's exactly what AWS does if the driver doesn't react to it.

RobShipway · 30 Jul 2013

Okay, thank you for the explaination guys it is a lot clearer now.

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