coppercapped
Established Member
Well all I have ever heard you say on these forums is absolute praise for bi-modes. So far from merely "accepting them as a reasonable compromise" you are seemingly unable to see any downsides! I've also not heard you say this delay/deferral/cancellation is the utter catastrophe that it is, probably because of your love of the bi-mode concept. Bi-modes is a huge part of the process that has resulted in the absolute catastrophe that is this countries electrification program, because as I have said before repeatedly the government can get away with it because of bi-modes! Without bi-modes they would need to get it done. NR are starting to get their act together now but the rest of the work has been delayed indefinitely, because they don't need to complete it.
Please show me a post where you have done anything but praise the Hitachi bi-modes for GWML, "accept bi-modes as a realistic compromise" yeah right!!!
The strident tone you have adopted in your posts about the effect that the bi-mode trains have had on the electrification of the GW and the prospects for electrification of other routes does not contribute to an informed discussion. An examination of the sequence of events leads to a very different conclusion.
H. L. Mencken’s remark “For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong” is as true now as it was when he wrote it. I don’t expect to persuade you to change your standpoint as your views appear very entrenched - but I hope to make it clear to others that it is based on a false premise.
The delays that have occurred in the GW modernisation scheme have many causes - in fact until last year there was no overarching modernisation programme at all, just a series of programmes that happened to be running roughly in parallel on the same route. Over the years there have been several reports on events affecting the GW. The National Audit Office has produced two, one in July 2014 on the procurement of the Thameslink and IEP trains and one this month on modernising the GW. The Public Accounts Committee also issued a report on procuring new trains in November 2014. 11 years ago the ORR reported a signalling review covering the next five or so years, but included hints further in the future. There have also been other reports, such as the Shaw report, and other papers. Even if one disagrees with the conclusions of any or all of the individual documents, the facts reported in them are accurate.
The programmes affecting the Great Western routes were:
- HST replacement / IEP
- Reading area rebuild
- Crossrail
- Electrification
- Resignalling the route - firstly with ac immune equipment and then with an ERTMS overlay.
There was a complete failure of business direction on the part of the DfT and to a lesser extent, Network Rail and big failures in Network Rail's management since this whole sorry business started in 2007. The Regulator, the ORR, was also out of its depth.
It seemed to occur to nobody - at least publicly - that all these separate programmes in many cases needed access to the same bit of route in order to carry out the work needed. The only organisation which could schedule such infrastructure work was Network Rail but in, for example, the stretch out to Maidenhead the Crossrail work packages were fixed by Act of Parliament. At the same time the overhead had to be designed for, and in some cases updated and strengthened for, increased use by the IEPs and electric outer-suburban trains. The IEP schedule had been fixed by the DfT.
Agility Trains were contracted to build or reconstruct 4 maintenance depots with their connections to the main lines and modify several more. All these needed track and signalling work.
Network Rail did not have the authority to re-schedule much of this work - the only parts where it had a free hand in was the electrification work west of Maidenhead. Even here there were uncertainties as to the scope of the works needed. A recipe for disaster.
This is not to say that Network Rail is blameless - by no means. It could, and should, have done its costings better - but that would have taken more time - and it seriously underestimated the quantity of work needed.
Some parts worked well - the Reading area was planned sufficiently in advance of the other work that re-signalling and the rebuild could be done without affecting other areas too significantly. It also helped that it was let as a package and project managed by Bechtel - with a project manager who ate six inch nails for breakfast. It came in a year ahead of the originally proposed date and £3 million under budget. The Box Tunnel work and the wiring of the Severn Tunnel also met their schedules and the re-planned train services worked pretty well.
The argument that you make - that the bi-modes (IEPs and similar) are the reason for accepting the delay in completing the work - is very wide of the mark. The major underlying cause is the shortage of skilled signal engineers in all areas - design, installation and commissioning. Look no further that the phase out of the Swindon Panel Box - it was finally de-commissioned well over a year late. The reasons for these shortages lie 15 and more years back, when Railtrack / Network Rail decided to make-do-and-mend much signalling rather than buy new. As a result the signalling contractors downsized.
It’s no good crying over spilt milk - but the bi-modes enable the electrification that will be in place in the next 18 months or so to be used. The rest of the currently planned GW work will be finished - but the resignalling and track alterations at Oxford and Bristol have to come first.
Whether electrification will be extended, or other routes electrified, has little to do with the presence of bi-modes, but everything to do with the costs of electrification and the costs and timescales of all the associated work needed.
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