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Passengers abandon train at Lewisham with 3rd rails still live.

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carriageline

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I'm sure you're right, that most such situations are quickly (5-15 minutes) resolved through normal action. The problem is when they aren't: repeated 'just another 10 minutes' quickly mounts up, and, if and as information to passengers, will lead to a loss of trust by them in 'the railway', and them making their own arrangements, as they did on March 2nd. There has to be a point (15 minutes?) at which - even, perhaps especially, if things have just come to standstill, as they had - an incident is declared, and the alternative course(s) of action are considered, and set in motion - bearing in mind that the 'golden hour' to deal with the situation is by then probably only 45 minutes. And if 'normal actions' clear the situation quickly, good, the alternative can be stood down, but by then there should be an expectation that they won't.

Which I completely agree with, and as a base principle that’s what happens. At 15 minutes is quite a good time to start looking at getting the passengers off.

But once you get to 15 minutes, what if staff on site say “5 minutes and issue will be resolved” obviously, you take that. But that 5 minutes soon turns into another 5 minutes, then another 5 minutes. At some point, someone has to say enough is enough.

Really, the second train should of moved into the platform before they took the juice off to start clearing the conductor rail. But that’s hindsight at its best. Clearing the conductor rail normally only takes a few minutes. And I imagine that’s how long all staff would of thought it would of taken.

Many lessons here me thinks
 
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corfield

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Really interesting update to this.

Report doesn’t read as self-serving or arse covering at all. As someone who does incident investigations and writes similar reports I found it quite good – although could do with para numbering as did come across as “wall of text”. (yes, I get the irony of that!)

So, my rebuild of the key facts is below, as well as questions it raises (apologies if they are dealt with – don’t have time to read the entire thing).

2M48,
1737 attempting to leave station, eventually ceasing 1820 (43 minutes spent moving 100m??? including at least one evac whilst still next to the platform at 1747 after having already been at the station for 22 mins)
1830 Mobile Ops Manager (MOM, a team or a person?) arrives to start de-icing etc.
Has to stop due to self-evacuation of 2M50. Over next 2 hours various back and forward as people got off and so on. Staff accompanied them and BTP also evacuated some. Eventually got going 2153 (+4 hours).
PA system failed approx. 2015, driver had given a level of updating to pax on board.
Pax on board in pretty horrible conditions.

2M50,
1737 stopped waiting for 2M48 to clear station/signal. 10 metres from platform.
1810 (+43 mins!) told to move in which actually couldn’t do due to being in normal working rules.
1839 (+29 mins) told again but now explicitly using Emergency rules.
1841, pax began to detrain, 1 hour and 4 mins after coming to halt 10metres from station.
Cue track emergency isolation etc. and the snowballing of this incident as described in 2M48 above.
1945 (+60 mins from 1st evac) lots of handles and issues resetting plus pissed off pax. Driver and MOM began evac 2001 (+16 mins). Then large scale evac commenced with BTP/Fire Bde giving some control.
2052 train was empty.

2S54,
1740 stopped due to 2M50 ahead of it.
1900 (+80 mins) self evac started, and subsequent other evacs.

2R46,
1740 became trapped, 2106 (+3 1/2 hours) self evacs began (poss earlier?)

2H50,
1745 became trapped, circa 1845ish first self evac, 1952 a lot more, again 2051 and 2103.

2S56,
1752 became trapped. 1907 self evacs started, later many more with NR staff around and people shepherded off the railway.

2R48,
1750 became trapped. 1821 driver told to switch ends to go back to last station. Unable to do this due to first self evacs and power isolation. Lost heating and lighting.
Approx 1920 (+1h30) self evacs started. Persuaded to get back on. 2136 (+3h45) power on and went back to previous station.

2H00,
1745 became trapped. 1900 power isolated and pax could see people getting off train ahead. Lots of driver etc. walking through train but config made this difficult. No self evacs and eventually moved 2158 (+4 hours).

So what do I think from what the report identifies? Well overall what a horrible F****** night shift that must have been for a lot of people! And even worse for the passengers.

1) This thing snowballed fast.

2) The chance to nip it early died within 15 minutes. (2M48 self evac whilst still at platform, having already reported significant issues and taken nearly ½ an hour to fail to clear the platform).

3) Within 33 minutes the next opportunity to limit the damage was lost when 2M50 could have been brought into the platform under Emergency rules. This could have evacuated the train and cleared the points that were trapping most (all?) of the other trains. Enabling their progress and avoiding their evacuations.

4) First positive action (sending the MOM, which I think is an individual) was 45 minutes after 2M48 first reported issues.

5) Railway staff focussed entirely on getting trains running, BTP/Fire Bde appeared more human focused with evacuation assistance. Railway people convinced that keeping people on trains is the (only?) answer, and persisted with that even after people were self-evacuating. [note this is massively reinforced by the Railway posters on this thread who almost refuse to even consider an alternative]

6) Control Centre was suffering massive info lag with commensurate impact on the quality and relevance of their decisions, as and when any were made (and also impacting their sense of urgency). For anyone with a military history background – think how Blitzkreig overwhelmed the Allies in 1940 as by the time the Allied Command got some information and made a decision, the real situation was actually completely different and the decision was utterly wrong, if even possible for people to try to action. Hence operational failure through inaction giving massive strategic failure.

7) No effective Command system, BTP in separate chain, GOLD/SILVER/BRONZE although existed and part of the Railway Management system don't appear to have functioned as I'd expect - i.e. giving unity of command. Comms also poor.

8) There is actual substantial Railway policy that identifies the human, comms, command & control issues and identifies what should be done to alleviate them. This appears not to have actually been implemented in the breach.


So, as I posited months ago in my first post on this topic, huge sympathy for the people in the train cabs, on the trackside and in control – but ultimately, the system completely failed to manage this.

Basically, they (Railway staff/control) did exactly what I suspected. Focussed on doing what they wanted to do, and utterly failed to ever stand back and recognise that time was passing, that their plan wasn’t working and that they desperately needed to adapt. Yes pax on the track undoubtedly creates huge problems – but as this illustrated, persisting from the start and then over an extended period in trying to keep them on the trains, but then failing – creates even bigger problems. These are humans, not inanimate cargo.

As I also suggested – effective comms can work: where BTP were present and drivers/other staff were able to exert an effective presence in the train, self evacs were much reduced or avoided. Also notably despite the 3rd rail risks that the Railway Personnel are so preoccupied about (and which are so emotive on this topic), there were no significant injuries (partly due to BTP and other support).

Interesting its highlighted that the actual ATOC/NR Guidance Note has some good policy… my italics

1) Take immediate action to prevent situations becoming worse. Not done
2) How to meet pax needs – pax related considerations should take precedence over railway ones. Not done
3) Demonstrate care, empathy, competence and confidence to retain control of the situation (numerous Railway staff posters on this topic take note!). Sincere attempts but overall ineffective
4) Avoid relying on a single plan. To misquote Highlander - the railway's view is that there can only be one plan.
5) Avoid temptation of deferring decisions in hope situation gets better/more info comes in. Initiate response plan in full early as easier to stand resources down and then ramp up as degrades into crisis. I.e. plan for worst, hope for best. Not done

If I could sum up what we in the military have learn about managing situations it would be the above. Clearly the knowledge is there and being promulgated in the industry – just not adhered to. That suggests a lot of training is needed and some top down culture change.

Above all, my judgement is that given how the people approached the day, and how they responded to the issues – this wasn't a set of really bad luck -
it was 100% certain to happen the way it did. That's usually the case when such incidents are investigated - hardwired for failure even when the policy is actually good and the people genuinely trying hard.

Hopefully this incident will at least serve to drive some significant improvements…


ps. Don't take any personal "I'm amazeballs" from this, I've seen and learnt all this stuff personally with no lack of mistakes, and hence the sympathy for the people. Thing is, when you fk up, first thing is admit it, second is learn what you should have done and third is practice what you'll do next time.
 

Bromley boy

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If I could sum up what we in the military have learn about managing situations it would be the above. Clearly the knowledge is there and being promulgated in the industry – just not adhered to. That suggests a lot of training is needed and some top down culture change.

Above all, my judgement is that given how the people approached the day, and how they responded to the issues – this wasn't a set of really bad luck -
it was 100% certain to happen the way it did. That's usually the case when such incidents are investigated - hardwired for failure even when the policy is actually good and the people genuinely trying hard.
Hopefully this incident will at least serve to drive some significant improvements…

Yes agreed.

The problems at Lewisham were compounded by the following:

- DOO trains full and standing without corridor connections. The only way the driver can “keep an effective presence” is via PA announcements, which would have died with the electrics as soon as the emergency batteries failed;

- station staff at Lewisham are not PTS trained so could not go onto the tracks to assist with an evac;

- drivers are not trained to evacuate (it would be impossible for one person to do anyway, and would take far longer than 15 minutes so even if an evac was started you’d probably still end up with passengers self-evacuating at the far end of the train). Drivers’ procedures if passengers self evac onto the track is to hit the emergency button, ask for an emergency electrical switch off and put the short circuit bar down;

- as you have said, there is a lack of a coherent command structure: nobody who has the authority to bring signaller, TOC staff together etc. in a joined up way to coordinate a recovery (MOM is closest to this but may be a long way away from any incident).

Since nobody died and these events are very rare I suspect the net result will be that nothing will really change.

EDIT: and yes MOM = a mobile operations manager, individual network rail staff members who attend various incidents and are PTS/rules trained.
 
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yorksrob

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Shouldn't all platform staff be PTS trained as a matter of course ? It doesn't take that long.
 

OneOffDave

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- drivers are not trained to evacuate (it would be impossible for one person to do anyway, and would take far longer than 15 minutes so even if an evac was started you’d probably still end up with passengers self-evacuating at the far end of the train). Drivers’ procedures if passengers self evac onto the track is to hit the emergency button, ask for an emergency electrical switch off and put the short circuit bar down;

This is the bit that bothers me. What are they supposed to do if there's an urgent need to evacuate a train when it's not in a station? Admittedly these events are rare but can/do happen. I can see a TOC executive struggling when gripping the rail at an inquest when the lawyer for the family of a deceased person asks what training the TOC had put in place to safeguard passengers in the event of evacuation.
 

bramling

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Yes agreed.

The problems at Lewisham were compounded by the following:

- DOO trains full and standing without corridor connections. The only way the driver can “keep an effective presence” is via PA announcements, which would have died with the electrics as soon as the emergency batteries failed;

- station staff at Lewisham are not PTS trained so could not go onto the tracks to assist with an evac;

- drivers are not trained to evacuate (it would be impossible for one person to do anyway, and would take far longer than 15 minutes so even if an evac was started you’d probably still end up with passengers self-evacuating at the far end of the train). Drivers’ procedures if passengers self evac onto the track is to hit the emergency button, ask for an emergency electrical switch off and put the short circuit bar down;

- as you have said, there is a lack of a coherent command structure: nobody who has the authority to bring signaller, TOC staff together etc. in a joined up way to coordinate a recovery (MOM is closest to this but may be a long way away from any incident).

Since nobody died and these events are very rare I suspect the net result will be that nothing will really change.

EDIT: and yes MOM = a mobile operations manager, individual network rail staff members who attend various incidents and are PTS/rules trained.

The biggest issue I can see is the lack of “operational” training for station staff on the mainline nowadays. The train crew, and on DOO trains this is of course just one person, is completely on their own as the only person immediately nearby who can actually do anything.

Contrast with London Underground where there should always be a fully trained station supervisor nearby who can implement procedures, supported by operationally trained customer service staff, with plenty more nearby.

Having said that there’s been some “interesting” detrainments over the years on LU. The well-known witches hat incident on the Northern Line a few years ago was one such - a metallic witches hat at Halloween earthed the positive rail and resulted in five trains becoming stalled, all late at night and full of drunks. Because of the time of night and the number of trains within a small area most of these were done with just two staff - the driver and one member of station staff. There weren’t any major issues, although to be fair the trains weren’t by any means crush loaded - however five trains, all stuck between stations in tunnel, everybody safely off within an hour, I think that demonstrates the value in trained staff.
 
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Dr Hoo

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Although it comes up quite often I am far from convinced that ‘operational training for station staff’ has much to offer. (This is after having been a front line local manager in operations and having ‘got the T-shirt’ for major operational problems in the snow on both LM and Southern regions under BR.)

In my view the place for station staff during major incidents is managing and caring for passengers at the stations. The report under consideration makes it clear that there were gaps in this area (although it is not a major focus). The platforms at Lewisham hadn’t been cleared of snow and ice (apparently done by the Fire Brigade) and when evacuated passengers finally made it to the platforms there was little for them. After two or three hours in darkness, freezing cold and in some cases having soiled themselves it seems that the best that could be done was handing out a delay repay form along with some questionable advice about ‘tapping out’ that may well have led to overcharges. No hot drinks, opportunity to charge mobile phones, help in getting taxis or whatever. (If anyone can provide a better picture I will be very pleased to read it.)

Having trained station staff on various emergency procedures such as hand signalling, point winding and hook switch operation I was always uneasy about them trying to use their ‘skills’ in anger for the first time ever in what could often by extreme conditions. They would lack the critical component of ‘habituation’ and situational awareness that technical and engineering staff had as they were on the track on a daily basis. Early in my career I had to deal with a willing lone member of staff at a wayside station who had tried to get involved in an emergency situation and had a fit in the process.

Apart from training and competency testing there are various other issues around medical fitness and personal protective equipment, etc. that make it much more complicated than it first appears.

My heart goes out to all who were involved at Lewisham. For what it is worth one of my own experiences back in BR day’s could easily have turned out just as bad. Early one morning the newspaper empties had to be shunted into the yard at Rochester both to clear the line for the morning peak and to release the locomotive for standby duties in heavy snow. The crossover didn’t have point heaters and predictably failed with loss of detection both ends. Eventually got train shunted and loco released but meanwhile had Up morning peak stood whilst snow accumulated on the third rail up Sole Street Bank. Had to handsignal the entire service past the protecting signal for the crossover despite the telephone having failed (so had to cross the track and live rails in deep snow to use a phone on the opposite line multiple times). Amazingly we got the service back on the move and not a single train stalled on the bank. Everyone got to work late but at least no evacuations.

The only real difference from Lewisham was that I had got up at 0400 to make sure that I was on site at Rochester before 0600 in case anything went wrong, so I was in a position to intervene immediately. (This is NOT included simply as a smug-mug, smart-arse comment.) To my mind the biggest lesson from Lewisham is to have a couple of fully trained Network Rail staff standing by at key locations before the peaks during severe weather.

At least these days we have proper investigations and reports that can help with systematic learning of lessons. Years ago we just banked stuff in personal experience vaults and probably missed a lot of opportunities to improve things more widely.
 

bramling

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Although it comes up quite often I am far from convinced that ‘operational training for station staff’ has much to offer. (This is after having been a front line local manager in operations and having ‘got the T-shirt’ for major operational problems in the snow on both LM and Southern regions under BR.)

In my view the place for station staff during major incidents is managing and caring for passengers at the stations. The report under consideration makes it clear that there were gaps in this area (although it is not a major focus). The platforms at Lewisham hadn’t been cleared of snow and ice (apparently done by the Fire Brigade) and when evacuated passengers finally made it to the platforms there was little for them. After two or three hours in darkness, freezing cold and in some cases having soiled themselves it seems that the best that could be done was handing out a delay repay form along with some questionable advice about ‘tapping out’ that may well have led to overcharges. No hot drinks, opportunity to charge mobile phones, help in getting taxis or whatever. (If anyone can provide a better picture I will be very pleased to read it.)

Having trained station staff on various emergency procedures such as hand signalling, point winding and hook switch operation I was always uneasy about them trying to use their ‘skills’ in anger for the first time ever in what could often by extreme conditions. They would lack the critical component of ‘habituation’ and situational awareness that technical and engineering staff had as they were on the track on a daily basis. Early in my career I had to deal with a willing lone member of staff at a wayside station who had tried to get involved in an emergency situation and had a fit in the process.

Apart from training and competency testing there are various other issues around medical fitness and personal protective equipment, etc. that make it much more complicated than it first appears.

My heart goes out to all who were involved at Lewisham. For what it is worth one of my own experiences back in BR day’s could easily have turned out just as bad. Early one morning the newspaper empties had to be shunted into the yard at Rochester both to clear the line for the morning peak and to release the locomotive for standby duties in heavy snow. The crossover didn’t have point heaters and predictably failed with loss of detection both ends. Eventually got train shunted and loco released but meanwhile had Up morning peak stood whilst snow accumulated on the third rail up Sole Street Bank. Had to handsignal the entire service past the protecting signal for the crossover despite the telephone having failed (so had to cross the track and live rails in deep snow to use a phone on the opposite line multiple times). Amazingly we got the service back on the move and not a single train stalled on the bank. Everyone got to work late but at least no evacuations.

The only real difference from Lewisham was that I had got up at 0400 to make sure that I was on site at Rochester before 0600 in case anything went wrong, so I was in a position to intervene immediately. (This is NOT included simply as a smug-mug, smart-arse comment.) To my mind the biggest lesson from Lewisham is to have a couple of fully trained Network Rail staff standing by at key locations before the peaks during severe weather.

At least these days we have proper investigations and reports that can help with systematic learning of lessons. Years ago we just banked stuff in personal experience vaults and probably missed a lot of opportunities to improve things more widely.

Some excellent points there, and the point about local staff needing to be kept fully competent is a very important one. LU does suffer from that, especially as over the years training and exposure to incidents has tended to decrease.

The big issue is how much we’re all prepared to pay - and there’s no right or wrong answer to that question. However, as someone wisely posted elsewhere on this thread, if we’re not prepared to pay for local staff to be operationally competent then we have to accept that occasional messes like Lewisham will happen, and we shouldn’t be surprised or annoyed about that.

In the absence of local staff, I simply can’t see any means to quickly cope with multiple simultaneous incidents - especially in situations like extreme weather where other local transport may be disrupted and managers struggle to reach site. Even having staff able to walk to a train and support the driver would help.
 

edwin_m

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Having trained station staff on various emergency procedures such as hand signalling, point winding and hook switch operation I was always uneasy about them trying to use their ‘skills’ in anger for the first time ever in what could often by extreme conditions. They would lack the critical component of ‘habituation’ and situational awareness that technical and engineering staff had as they were on the track on a daily basis.
There's a report on Railways Archive of a recent derailment in Ireland caused by a member of station staff who was allegedly competent to wind points but had only ever done so on the training course.

And BBC is reporting today that a GWR 80x unit was stranded for several hours near Exeter.
 
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bramling

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There's a report on Railways Archive of a recent derailment caused by a member of station staff who was allegedly competent to wind points but had only ever done so on the training course.

There was the Ealing Broadway derailment, which might be the one you’re thinking of. That was a mess from start to finish.

If staff are going to be so trained then it needs to be done properly, no half measures, which carries a substantial cost. Otherwise it’s a case of having managers pretty thickly spread all over the show - then people would moan that there’s lots of managers sitting around not doing much for large amounts of time, especially on the privatised railway when there’s less scope for them to do other used tasks when not required.

LU does this all rather better. Operational managers who can do pretty much everything (manage incidents, drive trains in emergency and signal trains), whilst the rest of the time are busy doing things like competence assurance, investigating incidents, training / familiarising staff and if all else fails keep an eye on the railway. The fragmented privatised railway simply doesn’t have this flexibility.

Is there any modern equivalent of the old traction inspector role?
 

ejstubbs

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An interesting detail to me concerns the earlier points failure which meant that no train had used the line through platform 4 for ninety minutes, at the peak of the freezing rain episode. Is there a procedure for checking/clearing the third rail in such severe conditions before allowing the first train on to that section of track?

But yes, the clinch point seems to have been the delay in allowing 2M50 to proceed in to the platform under EPW - a decision that arguably should have been given greater priority under the principle of putting the needs of stranded passengers first, both those on 2M50 and those on the following trains which were blocked by 2M50.
 

bramling

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An interesting detail to me concerns the earlier points failure which meant that no train had used the line through platform 4 for ninety minutes, at the peak of the freezing rain episode. Is there a procedure for checking/clearing the third rail in such severe conditions before allowing the first train on to that section of track?

But yes, the clinch point seems to have been the delay in allowing 2M50 to proceed in to the platform under EPW - a decision that arguably should have been given greater priority under the principle of putting the needs of stranded passengers first, both those on 2M50 and those on the following trains which were blocked by 2M50.

Not really - and in practice who is there to actually do it unless staff happen to be on the ground for another reason?

It’s hard to predict the impact of ice and snow - sometimes one expects a train to get stuck and it sails through, other times the opposite applies. Gradient is of course a factor too, a downhill gradient means the train is more likely to be able to roll out of an isolated troublespot, as well as reducing rail adhesion issues which also don’t help - if the juice rails are icy then it’s also likely the running rails are wet.

The best mitigation with ice and snow is to keep the job going. As soon as one thing stops it’s like a chain link being broken and the whole thing can escalate very quickly as all sorts of other things then go wrong.
 
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tsr

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Is there any modern equivalent of the old traction inspector role?

Sometimes yes, sometimes no. I can think of certain companies which only have generic crew managers who deal with both operational matters and HR/employment issues concurrently, but others which have crew inspectors (eg. SWR) or competency managers (eg. GTR), the latter being closer to old-fashioned inspector roles. There seems to me to be little correlation with how well those companies deal with disruption and the type of managers/inspectors they have available, though.

An interesting detail to me concerns the earlier points failure which meant that no train had used the line through platform 4 for ninety minutes, at the peak of the freezing rain episode. Is there a procedure for checking/clearing the third rail in such severe conditions before allowing the first train on to that section of track?

This would be considered at service startup, but certainly up until last winter, procedures do not seem to be sufficiently reactive (and standardised enough) to consistently react to a specific section of track needing to be de-iced after not having been used due to disruption.
 

Robertj21a

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......Edited.........

At least these days we have proper investigations and reports that can help with systematic learning of lessons. Years ago we just banked stuff in personal experience vaults and probably missed a lot of opportunities to improve things more widely.

But *will* it help with systematic learning of lessons ? - or will all this just get filed away and largely ignored because it may be viewed as a rare 'one-off' ?

Who is actually responsible for ensuring that lessons learnt will be put into practice ?
 

Mojo

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There was the Ealing Broadway derailment, which might be the one you’re thinking of. That was a mess from start to finish.
That wasn’t involving someone handwinding points though; no operational member of staff even those incident response managers are qualified to do that as it is purely the reserve of signals staff (and indeed many points are air operated so cannot be handwound but have to be “blown over”).

In that instance; the Station supervisor was tasked to secure a set of points. That task /was/ completed correctly, it’s just that the Service Control team identified the points incorrectly that needed securing (partly because of an outdated diagram in the control room).
 

bramling

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That wasn’t involving someone handwinding points though; no operational member of staff even those incident response managers are qualified to do that as it is purely the reserve of signals staff (and indeed many points are air operated so cannot be handwound but have to be “blown over”).

In that instance; the Station supervisor was tasked to secure a set of points. That task /was/ completed correctly, it’s just that the Service Control team identified the points incorrectly that needed securing (partly because of an outdated diagram in the control room).

In the Ealing case the issue seems to be more that the staff on site weren’t familiar with securing a slip set of points, which to me points more to a familiarisation and training issue - one wonders what formal training the staff involved would have had on dealing with that particular type of points (I have a strong feeling the answer is zero). Clearly no one identified that a crucial set of points was lying against the train.

The outdated diagram shouldn’t have made much difference as the points concerned were present on both the old and new layouts - although it does paint a sloppy picture of the management of the control room involved.

It would be interesting to see how local station staff would today handle securing something like the southbound route from Golders Green platform 5. I forget the number of points involved, but it’s a fair few, including slips!
 

bramling

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Sometimes yes, sometimes no. I can think of certain companies which only have generic crew managers who deal with both operational matters and HR/employment issues concurrently, but others which have crew inspectors (eg. SWR) or competency managers (eg. GTR), the latter being closer to old-fashioned inspector roles. There seems to me to be little correlation with how well those companies deal with disruption and the type of managers/inspectors they have available, though.

This is an interesting subject, especially as there seems to be variability between the TOCs. I’d certainly be interested to hear peoples experiences and views on the subject from different areas of the railway.
 

Robertj21a

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This is an interesting subject, especially as there seems to be variability between the TOCs. I’d certainly be interested to hear peoples experiences and views on the subject from different areas of the railway.

Perhaps it should go in a fresh thread, so that this one remains on-topic.
 

edwin_m

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There was the Ealing Broadway derailment, which might be the one you’re thinking of. That was a mess from start to finish.

If staff are going to be so trained then it needs to be done properly, no half measures, which carries a substantial cost. Otherwise it’s a case of having managers pretty thickly spread all over the show - then people would moan that there’s lots of managers sitting around not doing much for large amounts of time, especially on the privatised railway when there’s less scope for them to do other used tasks when not required.

LU does this all rather better. Operational managers who can do pretty much everything (manage incidents, drive trains in emergency and signal trains), whilst the rest of the time are busy doing things like competence assurance, investigating incidents, training / familiarising staff and if all else fails keep an eye on the railway. The fragmented privatised railway simply doesn’t have this flexibility.

Is there any modern equivalent of the old traction inspector role?

That wasn’t involving someone handwinding points though; no operational member of staff even those incident response managers are qualified to do that as it is purely the reserve of signals staff (and indeed many points are air operated so cannot be handwound but have to be “blown over”).

In that instance; the Station supervisor was tasked to secure a set of points. That task /was/ completed correctly, it’s just that the Service Control team identified the points incorrectly that needed securing (partly because of an outdated diagram in the control room).

In the Ealing case the issue seems to be more that the staff on site weren’t familiar with securing a slip set of points, which to me points more to a familiarisation and training issue - one wonders what formal training the staff involved would have had on dealing with that particular type of points (I have a strong feeling the answer is zero). Clearly no one identified that a crucial set of points was lying against the train.

The outdated diagram shouldn’t have made much difference as the points concerned were present on both the old and new layouts - although it does paint a sloppy picture of the management of the control room involved.

It would be interesting to see how local station staff would today handle securing something like the southbound route from Golders Green platform 5. I forget the number of points involved, but it’s a fair few, including slips!

I was in a hurry and omitted to mention in the post leading to this discussion that the derailment in question was in Ireland. Where of course there is still a vertically integrated railway...
 

notverydeep

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The RAIB report has now been published at https://assets.publishing.service.g..._data/file/788622/190325_R022019_Lewisham.pdf
The RAIB has made five recommendations:
  • Three are directed jointly at Network Rail and Southeastern and concern:
    • the management of conductor rail ice risk;
    • the process for the timely identification and management of train stranding events; and
    • the visibility and communication of information to and within railway control centres.
  • Two are directed at Southeastern and concern ensuring that it has a suitably large pool of staff to support train crews during incidents and that the essential needs of train passengers during extreme weather emergencies are reasonably met.
The RAIB has also identified two learning points. These concern:
  • *the timely application of emergency signalling rules, such as emergency permissive working, and of training and opportunities to apply such infrequently-used regulations; and
  • signallers and staff in railway control centres following appropriate protocols when using voice communications.
The implementation of safety learning identified in this report would have greatly reduced the impact of the incident on other trains that became stranded, and the wider service disruption that occurred as a result.
I haven't read it yet though!
 
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2HAP

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I've read the report. Am a little surprised that the RAIB appears not to interviewed any pax involved.
 

Aictos

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Shouldn't all platform staff be PTS trained as a matter of course ? It doesn't take that long.

I agree, a few years ago I was PTS trained and at the time in question I was working as a dispatcher with my PTS soon to run out in a manner of weeks.

So as I had already had the qualification I asked if before it expired if I could have it renewed as by then I had used it a number of times as part of my duties and the cost of renewing would be far less then if I recently qualified holding one, the answer I got back was Hell No.

I know there are good and bad points about having station staff qualified to hold a PTS but if they already held one then I can't see why they couldn't get it renewed.
 

ComUtoR

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Am a little surprised that the RAIB appears not to interviewed any pax involved.

What do you believe they could have added and could that be backed up with evidence ?
 

Esker-pades

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What do you believe they could have added and could that be backed up with evidence ?
In theory they could provide details about what factors made them egress earlier or later than expected which in turn could be fed into updating the existing plans that Network Rail and the TOCs have.

I say "in theory" because I would be sceptical of the information that most passengers provide (I say that as a passenger).
 

ComUtoR

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I say "in theory" because I would be sceptical of the information that most passengers provide (I say that as a passenger).

RAIB reports are quite clinical. Everything is backed up with evidence and there is a specific timeline created based purely on facts. Anything a passenger would provide will be anecdotal at best. It's clear from the report that there was a distinct lack of toilets and a lack of clear information. There was some evidence taken from passenger twitter feeds. From the previous incidents quoted in the report, there is clear evidence to back up some reasons why a passenger will egress.

An RAIB report isn't really a suitable place for discussion and debate. They are simply a presentation of facts.
 

Esker-pades

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RAIB reports are quite clinical. Everything is backed up with evidence and there is a specific timeline created based purely on facts. Anything a passenger would provide will be anecdotal at best. It's clear from the report that there was a distinct lack of toilets and a lack of clear information. There was some evidence taken from passenger twitter feeds. From the previous incidents quoted in the report, there is clear evidence to back up some reasons why a passenger will egress.

An RAIB report isn't really a suitable place for discussion and debate. They are simply a presentation of facts.
I agree entirely.
 

Taunton

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I think it's the first RAIB report to include Twitter feed screenshots.

It's also apparent from the report detail that operators have learnt NOTHING since the Kentish Town incident.
 

Carlisle

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T I was working as a dispatcher with my PTS soon to run out in a manner of weeks.

So as I had already had the qualification I asked if before it expired if I could have it renewed as by then I had used it a number of times as part of my duties and the cost of renewing would be far less then if I recently qualified holding one, the answer I got back was Hell No.
.
I think most railway companies have long subscribed to the theory that if an employees current role doesn’t require a PTS they simply won’t entertain paying for one regardless of whether it’s refresher training or from scratch
 
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yorksrob

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I know there are good and bad points about having station staff qualified to hold a PTS but if they already held one then I can't see why they couldn't get it renewed.

Yes, that would seem to be a sensible policy.
 

ComUtoR

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Yes, that would seem to be a sensible policy.

It would create an imbalance and unfairness. If someone held PTS and went into a grade where it wasn't required, then why should that member of staff be allowed to keep it to their benefit and other members of staff not be given the training ? That would be unfair. It would also cause issues with time off for training, costs spent on one part of the workforce and not others. It will also be a case where those with PTS may not be on duty at the time of an incident. If you wanted to ensure that those with PTS are always on duty then that may lead to an unfair distribution of duties.

If you decided to change role or change job etc then you have to accept that you may not be as qualified or have the same qualifications in your new role. Surely that is part of accepting a new job ?

Would it be acceptable for those who did change to a new job to maintain their competence in their own time and at their own costs ?
 
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