Landslip At Corby (13/06)

Dren Ahmeti said:

T3 (Engineers) Possession given back at 1948, with a 20mph ESR (Emergency Speed Restriction) on both the Up and Down Corby.

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Considering a Monday opening was on the cards, if the line opens in the morning, it’s a bloody brilliant job well done!
Some of the photos and reports coming from the people on the site showed just what a difficult situation this was.

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RichSwitch said:

Given the possession was given back at 19.48, it begs two questions:
1. What time did the HST in question move?
2. Where did it go to?

I’m guessing it went under its own power.


Indeed

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Edders23 said:

I'm struggling with this as everyone is quoting the location as Corby when Corby tunnel is to the north of the town and the only road bridge seen in some of the photos is near Gretton several miles North of Corby station and approx 1 mile north of the tunnel which would make sense as the train was in a cutting but there are mentions of lakes which I cannot think of any close to the line,

I would have thought the cause was more likely waterlogged fields and the water draining into the cutting

Whilst I live nearly 20 miles away I do know this area a little and there is no easy access to the line if this was where I think it was

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RichSwitch said:

Given the possession was given back at 19.48, it begs two questions:
1. What time did the HST in question move?
2. Where did it go to?

I’m guessing it went under its own power.


Indeed

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Gus said:

I cannot help recalling an incident which happened in the dark at the same spot in the mid 1970's.
The gradient from the old Stewart and Lloyds sidings falls towards Corby tunnel.
A freight had arrived at Lloyds sidings earlier and the wagons uncoupled minus a brake van. The raft of wagons later travelled backwards but unfortunately Lloyds Box (No2?) still had the points set to the up mainline.
The result was the runaway wagons built up speed going the wrong way on the up main through Corby tunnel and at the northern entrance to the tunnel met a Class 31 hauled freight train, the driver's fate was sealed.
There was a set of catch points not very far away and if the wagons had reached the catch points the up goods would have just collided with some derailed coal wagons and the driver may have had a chance

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philthetube said:

Definitely a glass half empty man, considering it was an unavoidable situation. how about a bit of praise for them organising a train at short notice.

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Gus said:

I cannot help recalling an incident which happened in the dark at the same spot in the mid 1970's.
The gradient from the old Stewart and Lloyds sidings falls towards Corby tunnel.
A freight had arrived at Lloyds sidings earlier and the wagons uncoupled minus a brake van. The raft of wagons later travelled backwards but unfortunately Lloyds Box (No2?) still had the points set to the up mainline.
The result was the runaway wagons built up speed going the wrong way on the up main through Corby tunnel and at the northern entrance to the tunnel met a Class 31 hauled freight train, the driver's fate was sealed.
There was a set of catch points not very far away and if the wagons had reached the catch points the up goods would have just collided with some derailed coal wagons and the driver may have had a chance

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2HAP said:

That was on 11 September 1975, involving 31 150.

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whoosh said:

Each power car has a 1050 gallon diesel tank.

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Bletchleyite said:

Can you imagine rocking up at the local Esso for that? Best get a mortgage

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westcoaster said:

http://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/train/O13763/2019/06/14/advance this was the service to London at 0030. Looks to have been stationary for 40+ mins at Luton airport parkway.

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whhistle said:

Trying to put this all in some sort of time order:

INCIDENT 2: 1B53
Local BBC News reports 1B53 passengers had an 8 hour journey to London. From RTT, it looks like this train called at Leicester but then diverted to Corby. Whether it then somehow came back through Leicester (picking up the 180 mins delay time), I don't know - this conflicts with the official report below.



INCIDENT 3: THE CORBY AREA
Official report from Network Rail

16:01: Driver of 1D43 reports bank slip and water above rail head near Corby line. Driver is currently checking track.

16:15: 1D43 trapped as rear bogie completely cover in silt.

16:29: Driver of 1C52 reports water is freely running and covering the down (towards Leicester) line. Water is rising on the (towards London) line and covering the rail in certain areas but passable at 5mph.

16:40: (towards London) line to be cleared at extreme caution by 1C52/1C55. 1B53 (the last in the queue) will be used to evacuate 1D43.

16:45: 1C52 now reports that the track beyond 1D43 is completely under water and they are unable to pass. Both lines now at a compete job stop.

16:491C52 to be used to evacuate passengers, 1C55 and 1B53 will return wrong direction and cross over at Manton Junction. EDIT: Perhaps this is where 1B53 picked up the ~180 min delay.

16:50: Network Rail staff arrived on site. Three trains (1C52, 1C55, 1B53) stood on (towards London) line. One train (1D43) stood on (towards Leicester) line.


BBC News link: Flood passengers stranded on rescue train


REPORT FROM PERSON ON 1B53 A TRAIN (BBC News):
After rescuing passengers from 1D43, the rescue train headed south towards Corby.
The train stopped and sat in tunnel near Corby for an hour as the landslip / flooding had got worse.
It then turned back around to head towards Leicester.
However due to further flooding, it stopped before getting very far.
It was then decided to evacuate using the power car door where passengers had to head past a scrap yard (clue to exact location?) and on to buses.

The news report on the radio suggests the person was "on the 15:00 from Leicester". The news reporter says 15:10 from Leicester, which would make the train 1B53.

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AY1975 said:

When I try to view this one I get:

Hello!
It appears that you took a wrong route back at Croxley Green Jn, as the rails to this page don't appear to exist anymore. Just in case there was meant to be a page here, we've told the permanent way team and they'll have a look into it.

I presume this means it departed Kettering at 00.30.

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duffield said:

The last part of the URL is wrong. If you change it to 'advanced' it works:
http://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/train/O13763/2019/06/14/advanced

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AY1975 said:

Yes, it works now. I was under the impression that this train was formed of the set from the cancelled 13.59 Sheffield-St Pancras (which is booked for an HST, and usually formed of an ex-Grand Central set), but it says the 00.30 Kettering-St Pancras special was timed for a DMU (i.e. a Meridian).

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At about 15:53 hrs on Thursday 13 June 2019, a northbound passenger train collided with aggregate on the tracks about one mile north of Corby station. The aggregate had washed onto the track from the adjacent cutting slope as a result of flooding. The train was travelling at 42 mph (68 km/h) and did not derail. The driver brought the train to a stand and contacted the signaller to report the landslip and flooding.

The train was the 14:34 hrs service from London St Pancras to Nottingham, and was carrying 190 passengers. It had been diverted from its planned route via Market Harborough to an alternative route via Corby, as a result of another incident taking place south of Leicester station. The High Speed Train (HST), comprised a class 43 diesel-electric power car at each end and eight coaches in between.

When the driver examined the train, he found the rear power car was trapped by further aggregate that had washed-out from the cutting slope after the train had stopped. The passengers were evacuated to a southbound train which was subsequently trapped by flood water. Once lighting and road transport were in place, all of the passengers (from both trains) were evacuated and taken by road to Kettering station. There was no one reported to the RAIB as having being injured during the initial collision or subsequent evacuations.

Our investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the flooding and cutting slope failure at this location. It will also consider:

• the history and condition of the cutting slope and nearby drainage
• the maintenance of the cutting slope and nearby drainage
• the management of the infrastructure in response to prolonged heavy rainfall
• any relevant underlying management factors

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Chris M said:

The RAIB have today announced they are investigating:

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/train-collision-with-washed-out-aggregate-corby

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Summary
At about 15:53 hrs on Thursday 13 June 2019, a northbound passenger train, travelling at 40 mph (64 km/h), collided with debris washed out by flood water from an adjacent cutting slope, around one mile (1.6 km) north of Corby station. After reporting the incident, the driver found the rear of the train had become trapped by further debris washed out from the cutting slope. All 191 passengers on the train were later transferred to a southbound train, which itself then became trapped by flood water to the north and south. Between 450 and 550 passengers (from both trains) were then taken off the southbound train by 23:14 hrs, and conveyed to nearby stations to continue their journey by rail. No one was reported as injured as a result of the collision or subsequent detrainments. However, conditions on the southbound train were very uncomfortable for passengers due to overcrowding. Temporary repairs were made to the cutting slope and track to allow the railway to reopen the following day with a speed restriction in place.

The investigation found that the cutting slope had failed because it was not designed to cope with a large volume of water that had accumulated at its crest. Flood water had accumulated at the crest because two adjacent flood storage ponds had overfilled with water from a nearby brook. A blockage beneath a bridge over the brook caused its level to rise so water flowed over a spillway and into the ponds, which had not been routinely pumped down for nearly four weeks. The bank of the pond closest to the railway was a low point and the excess water spilled into the field between the ponds and the crest of the cutting slope. Exceptionally heavy rainfall was not a factor in the incident.

The investigation also found three underlying causes. One was a lack of engagement and communication between various parties responsible for the flood management system at this location about the potential for it to cause flooding on the railway. A second was the absence of an effective flood management system to manage the risk to the railway line, which is a principal transport route. Thirdly, although Network Rail was aware that the cutting slope was at risk of a washout failure when the nearby ponds overfilled and had long-term plans to act, it had not taken any action to mitigate this risk in the short term. The investigation also considered why the rescue and evacuation of passengers was significantly delayed and found that a lack of equipment for transferring passengers from one train to another was a factor.

Recommendations
RAIB has made five recommendations. The first calls for the Environment Agency to work with Northamptonshire County Council, Anglian Water, Homes England, Corby Borough Council and Network Rail to implement an effective flood management system at this location. The second calls for Network Rail to identify similar locations prone to safety critical flooding and review how it manages flood risk at each of those places. The third relates to Network Rail providing its staff with training and guidance on how to better manage the short-term risks to earthworks while waiting for longer term planned work to take place. The fourth calls for Network Rail and the Rail Delivery Group, as part of an ongoing industry-wide programme of work to improve the management of stranded passenger train incidents, to jointly review their procedures for managing stranded trains to identify what emergency equipment is needed, and the fifth relates to Network Rail, as part of the same ongoing industry-wide programme of work, taking steps with train operating companies to make this equipment available for use.

RAIB also identified one learning point, which urges non-railway organisations responsible for managing flood risk to include the effect of flooding on railway lines, which are part of the United Kingdom’s national infrastructure, in their planning.

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