Rail crash driver died after telling signalman train had passed

The Nomad said:

With regard to GPS signals, surely the answer is that it shows when the position signal last refreshed - either as a timer or, say, a red outline if it's been more than a period of time.

Thus in this scenario, the signaller would know almost exactly where it was or say that it's not safe to cross presently until the train is located exactly.

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Certain GPS errors can result in a totally fictitious postion being reported, particularly when line of sight is blocked. Mentioned above that there are tunnels near to this crossing.

Alanko said:

From a layman's perspective, similar questions are asked about aviation; why either some fairly mainstream piece of helpful technology isn't commonly employed, or why some antiquated technology is still heavily relied on.

I think the challenge would be phasing GPS into other working practices and standards and training up vast numbers of staff so that it doesn't all go wrong when somebody gets too reliant on what a dot on the map is telling them.

In this era of 'The Internet of Things' GPS in rail vehicles feels entirely possible, so there must be a compelling reason for why it isn't done.

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But if there is no alternative system or process, they have nothing to rely on except the dot on the map!

Traditionally GPS wasn't accurate enough on a moving vehicle to tell which of several adjacent tracks it was on, which is obviously a major restriction for use in signalling. Modern systems should be more accurate, particularly if using differential techniques as mentioned above, but as far as I'm aware they aren't used for vital location purposes on railways anywhere in the world. This is somewhat surprising as it's used to navigate various missiles, but the military version has various enhancements that aren't available to other users, and missiles generally operate at an altitude where line of sight to satellites is always available.

High Dyke said:

However until recently it was identified that there are a number of User Worked Crossings (UWC) that signallers aren't aware of. Following a miscommunication regarding the correct identification of a level crossing near Barnetby (North Lincolnshire), which luckily didn't result in an incident, it was found there are numerous crossings on the rail network that are not identified on signal box diagrams or in the signal box instructions - though this should be changed by now, or work in progress.

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ForTheLoveOf said:

Are you saying that these weren't on the Sectional Appendix or that the signallers didn't have a copy of the Sectional Appendix in the box?

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I don’t know about the Sectional Appedices of any other route but in Scotland it used to be that if a user worked or footpath crossing didn’t have a phone or any other additional warning equipment then it wasn’t included in the Table A diagram or on the box diagram, panel or VDU screen. All signalboxes have an up to date hard copy of the Sectional Appendix available (all should also have access to NESA online) and this should be checked on a regular basis as part of the LOM’s visits and recorded as per the National Operating Procedures (formerly the Operations Manual), the record of which is auditable. The usual fall down being that no one in the box wants to take responsibility for transferring updates from the WON/PON to the book itself.

Highlandspring said:

The usual fall down being that no one in the box wants to take responsibility for transferring updates from the WON/PON to the book itself.

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Is this just a matter of re-printing and replacing affected pages or is it still necessary to annotate changes by hand? I never had to maintain a Sectional Appendix but even back in the 80s it seemed ridiculous to have to do annotations and tape bits of text into the Rule Book.

The amended Table A diagram is printed in full so it’s just a matter of tearing off the page, using the hole punch and inserting into the binder.

Highlandspring said:

I don’t know about the Sectional Appedices of any other route but in Scotland it used to be that if a user worked or footpath crossing didn’t have a phone or any other additional warning equipment then it wasn’t included in the Table A diagram or on the box diagram, panel or VDU screen. All signalboxes have an up to date hard copy of the Sectional Appendix available (all should also have access to NESA online) and this should be checked on a regular basis as part of the LOM’s visits and recorded as per the National Operating Procedures (formerly the Operations Manual), the record of which is auditable. The usual fall down being that no one in the box wants to take responsibility for transferring updates from the WON/PON to the book itself.

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I would agree to most of those points. The Sect. App. was available and showed everything for that line, not just "my" sections, but the short Box Diagram above the Frame only showed the basics, which were the 3 UWC's in the sections between Onibury - Bromfield and Bromfield - Woofferton Junct. We didn't even have lights for the Track Circuits.

As for keeping it up-to-date, luckily we rarely got any alterations for our "bit" so if there were any it invariably got done on a Sunday. If there were changes elsewhere on the route they got ignored. And those changes were made by good old pen and ink (Well biro really!)

An old RAIB report from 2014
A woman died at the same crossing last year and declared a non-suspicious deliberate act.
I remember the off-road biker death before that (see link).
I think not long after that it was all padlocked up and only the land owner could use it.

Highlandspring said:

I don’t know about the Sectional Appedices of any other route but in Scotland it used to be that if a user worked or footpath crossing didn’t have a phone or any other additional warning equipment then it wasn’t included in the Table A diagram or on the box diagram, panel or VDU screen. All signalboxes have an up to date hard copy of the Sectional Appendix available (all should also have access to NESA online) and this should be checked on a regular basis as part of the LOM’s visits and recorded as per the National Operating Procedures (formerly the Operations Manual), the record of which is auditable. The usual fall down being that no one in the box wants to take responsibility for transferring updates from the WON/PON to the book itself.

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I haven’t seen a regular updated copy of the sectional appendix since the paper versions were abandoned. With nearly 90 signallers/SSMs and only a few PCs with generic passwords for CCF and that’s about it as far access for the signallers, apart from the couple of PCs used competency testing.

sefton said:

Even if someone is following the rule book, it doesn't mean that improvements cannot be made to prevent someone else dying.

It is rather poor form to continue to operate a system that you know kills people without even considering whether anything could be changed to prevent or reduce the possibility of the same thing happening again.

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talltim said:

And yet we do in so many other areas, where safety is already lower. Roads are a prime example.

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So the police no longer investigate deaths on the road; you learn something every day.

But going back to the point, if you have a system which doesn't prevent people being killed, then it is really dumb not to see if nothing can be improved to reduce the risk.

sefton said:

So the police no longer investigate deaths on the road; you learn something every day.

But going back to the point, if you have a system which doesn't prevent people being killed, then it is really dumb not to see if nothing can be improved to reduce the risk.

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Hmm
Whilst this is tragic for the driver and his family I can't help thinking that Colonel McMullan's (from HMRI) who said regarding the conversion to Half Barriers starting in 1957 still should apply today to all railway crossings

If AHBs are to be adopted the principle must be recognised that it is the responsibility of the individual to protect himself from the hazards of the railway in the same way as from the hazards of the road.

This was quoted in a Railway Magazine article last year about Hixon crash in 1968 where frankly the incompetence of Wynn's and the police was unbelievable