After the brake test was carried out??Shunter left brakes isolated on the rake. This is not speculation. Happy to be told it is, if it makes anybody feel better.
After the brake test was carried out??Shunter left brakes isolated on the rake. This is not speculation. Happy to be told it is, if it makes anybody feel better.
Good to hear. But we have tragically seen recently how that doesn't always reflect in reality. And a plurality of safety systems is a good thing. I am surprised that it seems to be seen as a bit "whoopsie.... never mind, no harm done, let's move on....." [which is the sense I get from some of the posts....[maybe wrongly]]The "orange army" should and do have safe system of work that does not rely on anyone but themselves.
That's almost Campbellesque spin. Several hundred tons was unable to stop because of what seems like a human error (can and does happen) and a system that allowed it to happen and hadn't designed the risk out via software or systems. How can that not be a major, major safety issue ?
I’m glad it’s all been cleared up by posters on here within 12 hours. Someone had better email the RAIB and let them know not to bother wasting their time progressing the investigation.
I’m glad it’s all been cleared up by posters on here within 12 hours. Someone had better email the RAIB and let them know not to bother wasting their time progressing the investigation.
Am I right that neither the driver nor the shunting staff at Carstairs are CS employees?
The "orange army" should and do have safe system of work that does not rely on anyone but themselves.
Not necessarily. In normal operation they are designed to be failsafe however, if there is no air whatsoever in a vehicle then the brakes will not apply (hence the use of handbrake when stabling). If there is no brake continuity between a locomotive and train then the brakes on the train will not respond to the driver making a brake application, only the locomotive brakes will apply. If there are multiple vehicles with brakes isolated, this will severely affect the brake force.Aren't braking systems supposed to be failsafe - ie an operating error ought to mean that they can't be released rather than that they can't be applied?
Brakes have changed, does pulling the modern equivalent do this?
It seems that you are correct. Obviously the investigation will find out the course of events and caused but to read a spokesperson say that there was no threat to safety would be laughable if it wasn't so serious.Incredible.
A modern UK train, on a highly regulated railway, can't stop.............
Please tell me I've misunderstood something.
"Welcome aboard the Caledonian Sleeper. Tonight film picks are Speed or The taking of Phelam 123".
No, that’s incorrect.There GBRf staff under contract to CS.
That then is a step backwards.Eh? Whit? Yes we do have safe systems of work, but in Scotland that doesn’t include a Lookout. I’m not sure of the exact distance from protecting signal to the tunnel, but if me and my team were working beyond the minimum overlap of our protecting signal and a train overshoots beyond it, then it’s potentially game over. We appoint Site Wardens, but their job is not to look for trains, but to watch that we don’t stray. I’d hope the driver is hard on the horn if he/she overshoots but as we see, human error happens.
No amount of disconnected points detection or signals are going to save a team working on the track from a train with degraded braking.
I once went on a day trip to Munich to see Manchester United play Bayern Munich. Someone decided it would be a good idea on the way out to play a documentary about the Munich air disaster on the plane's entertainment system.
My understanding, so open to correction, is that on modern stock it will dump the brakes but the driver can override it. So if someone hits the passcom then the driver can prevent the brakes applying whilst they ascertain the situation i.e. that it's an emergency where stopping is important rather than someone's kid thinking "oooh shiny red button!" or if they do need to stop then it gives the driver the option of not stopping in a tunnel or on a viaduct. But if the driver doesn't override it then it will still dump the brakes as is traditional.
I'm trying to understand the sequence of events at Carstairs - the 8 coaches are detached, presumably with the brakes still on (or are they held entirely on a hand brake?) then the loco attaches. If they are then inadvertently left isolated from the loco, then would the brakes not still be on, at the point at which the train tries to move away? Would it not require an action from the driver at this point to release the brakes - and if the driver were unable to release them it would quickly become apparent that something was wrong.Not necessarily. In normal operation they are designed to be failsafe however, if there is no air whatsoever in a vehicle then the brakes will not apply (hence the use of handbrake when stabling). If there is no brake continuity between a locomotive and train then the brakes on the train will not respond to the driver making a brake application, only the locomotive brakes will apply. If there are multiple vehicles with brakes isolated, this will severely affect the brake force.
Additionally, if there is severe low temperatures or snowfall, this can severely affect the brake force (check out the incidents at Carrbridge and Carstairs that occurred in 2010). If there is extremely poor railhead conditions then this can dramatically increase stopping distances (check out the Esher incident aswell as a couple of others).
I'm not offering any of these as an explanation or suggestion of events that lead to today's incident, just showing that whilst train brakes are 'failsafe', this does not necessarily mean incidents like this are impossible.
Obviously I don't know for certain, but I'm assuming the brake valve (or red button) in the guard's compartment would still dump the brakes (in the same way that hitting an emergency brake plunger in the rear cab of a unit will)?
Eh? Whit? Yes we do have safe systems of work, but in Scotland that doesn’t include a Lookout. I’m not sure of the exact distance from protecting signal to the tunnel, but if me and my team were working beyond the minimum overlap of our protecting signal and a train overshoots beyond it, then it’s potentially game over. We appoint Site Wardens, but their job is not to look for trains, but to watch that we don’t stray. I’d hope the driver is hard on the horn if he/she overshoots but as we see, human error happens.
No amount of disconnected points detection or signals are going to save a team working on the track from a train with degraded braking.
No lookout?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?