Braking issue on Caledonian Sleeper causes train to "run away" at Edinburgh

Cowley said:

It’s an unfortunate incident that will be learned from and hopefully won’t ever happen again due to the way safety is treated on the railways in this country.
Nobody was hurt and no damage was done.
A lesson learned, but thankfully not the hard way...

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This is what I meant. Play it down. The reality is, the brand new highest tech, safest, new multimillion train didn’t have working brakes. And it overran a massive station. There has been tens of millions ploughed into design, testing and years of time as well. And within weeks it fails to stop. And the view is “oh well, no harm done”. Have you guys ever seen how a board/management visibly shakes when it is properly threatened with corporate manslaughter. And how it desperately tries to shaft the poor usually overworked sod on the ground who made a mistake who will get hung out to dry. Passengers have a right to expect that this sort of ridiculousness cannot happen. We get told the railway is so safe because of all the safety - and a potentially catastrophic incident occurs on brand new stock that has supposedly been through the most stringent testing and weeks later this happens ...

6Z09 said:

That then is a step backwards.
Have no lessons been learned from past mishaps?
Its up to the staff on the ground to be happy with the protection or stop work.
Been like that for the last forty years .

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Do tell what sort of safe systems we should be implementing that also guards against a train which is unable to stop, I'm most intrigued.

alxndr said:

Do tell what sort of safe systems we should be implementing that also guards against a train which is unable to stop, I'm most intrigued.

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You have a system that won’t let it start If the brakes are disabled. Without multiple switches to make sure it’s enirelt deliberate. And repeaters....

Justapunter said:

You have a system that won’t let it start If the brakes are disabled. Without multiple switches to make sure it’s enirelt deliberate. And repeaters....

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That's not quite what I was getting at. I was referring to the safe system of work that 6Z09 thinks should be implemented before going on track that conforms to their earlier statement:

6Z09 said:

The "orange army" should and do have safe system of work that does not rely on anyone but themselves.

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Justapunter said:

This is what I meant. Play it down. The reality is, the brand new highest tech, safest, new multimillion train didn’t have working brakes. And it overran a massive station. There has been tens of millions ploughed into design, testing and years of time as well. And within weeks it fails to stop. And the view is “oh well, no harm done”. Have you guys ever seen how a board/management s@@@s (intentionally strong word) itself when it is properly threatened with corporate manslaughter. And how it desperately tries to shaft the poor usually overworked sod on the ground who made a mistake who will get hung out to dry. Passengers have a right to expect that this sort of ridiculousness cannot happen. We get told the railway is so safe because of all the safety - and a potentially catastrophic incident occurs on brand new stock that has supposedly been through the most stringent testing and weeks later this happens ...

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Yes. And please read my follow up post (#90) before deciding that getting into your car is a safer option than taking the train anywhere in this country.

Cowley said:

Yes. And please read my follow up post (#90) before deciding that getting into your car is a safer option than taking the train anywhere in this country.

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A sense of proportion is needed. Personally I feel pretty safe when travelling by train, and compared to being at the mercy of the weakest (for that read thickest) link when travelling by road the safety culture on the railway is infinitely superior - it doesn't even begin to compare. However, this *is* a very serious incident which could have had very serious consequences, so I don't think any purpose is served by playing it down.

syorksdeano said:

That's very poor taste, but reminds me of another incident on a plane where in in-flight movie was Alive.

But going back to the braking system issue, when was the last time something like this happened?

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I remember an incident at Watford about 20 years ago. If I recall correctly, a new brake pipe fitted to a loco hadn't had something removed which blocked the pipe

Have they run the old stock on the lowland sleeper tonight?

Justapunter said:

This is what I meant. Play it down. The reality is, the brand new highest tech, safest, new multimillion train didn’t have working brakes. And it overran a massive station. There has been tens of millions ploughed into design, testing and years of time as well. And within weeks it fails to stop. And the view is “oh well, no harm done”. Have you guys ever seen how a board/management s@@@s (intentionally strong word) itself when it is properly threatened with corporate manslaughter. And how it desperately tries to shaft the poor usually overworked sod on the ground who made a mistake who will get hung out to dry. Passengers have a right to expect that this sort of ridiculousness cannot happen. We get told the railway is so safe because of all the safety - and a potentially catastrophic incident occurs on brand new stock that has supposedly been through the most stringent testing and weeks later this happens ...

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It's a serious incident no doubt but we don't at this point know whether it had anything at all to do with the new stock.

bramling said:

A sense of proportion is needed. Personally I feel pretty safe when travelling by train, and compared to being at the mercy of the weakest (for that read thickest) link when travelling by road the safety culture on the railway is infinitely superior - it doesn't even begin to compare. However, this *is* a very serious incident which could have had very serious consequences, so I don't think any purpose is served by playing it down.

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Absolutely. Which is why I rephrased my initial post.
This was very serious and thankfully didn’t lead to something disastrous (which it very much could have).
I see that 92020 is out working with mk5 stock again tonight after the RAIB have looked into the incident.
I’d assume that they would know slightly more about what’s safe than the likes of us on here..?

alxndr said:

Do tell what sort of safe systems we should be implementing that also guards against a train which is unable to stop, I'm most intrigued.

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No need to be intrigued,no new systems needed, lookouts have protected track staff from trains for many years very successfully.
The fact I am writing this is proof that it works.
My initial comment was in response to someone saying it was fortunate no "orange army" were in the way of a runaway train.

Cowley said:

I’d assume that they would know slightly more about what’s safe than the likes of us on here..?

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I would say that it is an absolute 100% copper-bottomed nailed-on certainty.

I've been following this thread this evening and some of the reaction has been incredible. Two-pipe trains have been running successfully and safely for decades. There have been one or two slip-ups with air cocks left in the wrong positions, some of which have resulted in incidents and some which haven't, but the technology works just fine.

O L Leigh said:

I would say that it is an absolute 100% copper-bottomed nailed-on certainty.

I've been following this thread this evening and some of the reaction has been incredible. Two-pipe trains have been running successfully and safely for decades. There have been one or two slip-ups with air cocks left in the wrong positions, some of which have resulted in incidents and some which haven't, but the technology works just fine.

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Exactly, many OTT theories, the cause must be apparent to those involved ,so no need to reinvent the wheel.

6Z09 said:

No need to be intrigued,no new systems needed, lookouts have protected track staff from trains for many years very successfully.
The fact I am writing this is proof that it works!

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Lookouts are not suitable for all environments and are considered a last resort. Dark, fog, heavy rain, curves, poor sighting for other reasons, human fallibility, staffing levels, nature of the work being undertaken...

It is completely impractical to only undertake work with a lookout present.

Cowley said:

I see that 92020 is out working with mk5 stock again tonight after the RAIB have looked into the incident.
I’d assume that they would know slightly more about what’s safe than the likes of us on here..?

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If the stock is in use again tonight it's fair to say everything must be as it should be.

alxndr said:

Lookouts are not suitable for all environments and are considered a last resort. Dark, fog, heavy rain, curves, poor sighting for other reasons, human fallibility, staffing levels, nature of the work being undertaken...

It is completely impractical to only undertake work with a lookout present.

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Yes they are last resort, so anything else should be even more safe ! , so no need for any new systems ,just use the current systems properly and if not safe dont work.Been the case for years.

ok out off touch by 25 years buuuttt


rules required
full dump off brake before detachment
smaller portion detached from larger portion [if possible but crusial if 2 on 6 or eight]
uncouple pressed before detachment on 455/456
brake test off both portions before commencement

now in practice on say veps cigs or epbs sit with say 20psi on ep brake
when jumper dropped rear portion brakes release but still coupled
driver inserts master key in rear portion and to on positon brake dumps cancel aws then brake release

now this always works because the front portion has been proven as complete and functional
the rear portion now works because operating the master controler dumping the brake and recharging proves continuity
now assuming you have a non unit formation things can creep in where actions other than as to the book can cause problems as say 5 coaches detached without brakes fully applied as in full service or emergency application may remain charged and fully released

but this would require two thee or four further mistakes or actions as in physical uncoupling will not drop the brake pipe pressure enough to apply the brakes
no continuity test is carried out before departure
no running brake test is carried out at first opperatunity
on board staff becoming aware of a missed stop or un usual possibly dangerous conditions are unaware or unable to operate a brake application or apply an emergency stop procedure in connection with the driver or other control agencies like a signaller or control

now if this is difficult to follow please bare with me as i do not do gramer punctuation or compositon naturally i do off course do helpful and informative well

O L Leigh said:

I've been following this thread this evening and some of the reaction has been incredible.

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Agreed. Clearly this was a very serious incident. Thankfully nobody has been injured and the RAIB is investigating.

Quite what the hysterical and rather silly comments upthread are intended to achieve is unclear!

big all said:

ok out off touch by 25 years buuuttt


rules required
full dump off brake before detachment
smaller portion detached from larger portion [if possible but crusial if 2 on 6 or eight]
uncouple pressed before detachment on 455/456
brake test off both portions before commencement

now in practice on say veps cigs or epbs sit with say 20psi on ep brake
when jumper dropped rear portion brakes release but still coupled
driver inserts master key in rear portion and to on positon brake dumps cancel aws then brake release

now this always works because the front portion has been proven as complete and functional
the rear portion now works because operating the master controler dumping the brake and recharging proves continuity
now assuming you have a non unit formation things can creep in where actions other than as to the book can cause problems as say 5 coaches detached without brakes fully applied as in full service or emergency application may remain charged and fully released

but this would require two thee or four further mistakes or actions as in physical uncoupling will not drop the brake pipe pressure enough to apply the brakes
no continuity test is carried out before departure
no running brake test is carried out at first opperatunity
on board staff becoming aware of a missed stop or un usual possibly dangerous conditions are unaware or unable to operate a brake application or apply an emergency stop procedure in connection with the driver or other control agencies like a signaller or control

now if this is difficult to follow please bare with me as i do not do gramer punctuation or compositon naturally i do off course do helpful and informative well

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I guess the difference is that with units you either have brake continuity or you have a (serious!) defect.

Locos, on the other hand, have separate train and loco brake systems, can be configured to run “light engine”, or to pull all kinds of passenger or freight stock, both in normal operation and with defects/brakes isolated, so clearly have quite a bit more flexibility.

Bromley boy said:

I guess the difference is that with units you either have brake continuity or you have a (serious!) defect.

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ISTR an incident (quite) a few years ago where a driver isolated something like 80% of the brakes on her train as part of an incorrect response to a defect, resulting in a SPAD - because it's quite a while ago I can't remember where or what. Where I am we occasionally get trains left with brakes isolated after being used for training, normally only one car, which of course gets picked up on brake test.

Cowley said:

Yes I probably should’ve engaged brain before moving off on that post.
It was as you say Very serious, and I was trying to say (badly) that it will be learned from and that thankfully no-one was harmed during this potentially disastrous incident.

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I knew what you meant and knew you weren't downplaying the seriousness. Don't take it to heart, some people just like to bash away at the keyboard.

I'm a huge fan of Cal Sleeper as I hope as been noted - but scanning above, there's a question that I'm surprised has been missed. If this had happned on the Glasgow Central portion.....

I'm hoping I missed that discussion on a quick scan.

There was one a few years ago on the Styal line when the wrong isolating valves were operated on the rear loco of a top-and-tail engineering train and the brakes seemed to be working normally but the reservoir wasn't being replenished from the train pipe. After a few brake applications the reservoir was empty and the loco was unbraked. A coupling broke leaving it rolling back and forth on gradients and I think nearly hitting some track workers before coming to a stop.

Crepello said:

I'm a huge fan of Cal Sleeper as I hope as been noted - but scanning above, there's a question that I'm surprised has been missed. If this had happned on the Glasgow Central portion.....

I'm hoping I missed that discussion on a quick scan.

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But the loco stays attached to the Glasgow portion rather than being added in the Edinburgh case

6Z09 said:

No need to be intrigued,no new systems needed, lookouts have protected track staff from trains for many years very successfully.
The fact I am writing this is proof that it works.
My initial comment was in response to someone saying it was fortunate no "orange army" were in the way of a runaway train.

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If the “orange army” were working under the protection of a lookout (which is certainly allowed outside Scotland, if not inside it), then it’d be no different to any other train approaching.

If they were working under the protection of a line blockage, and therefore not expecting any trains to approach, things would be different and they would be at risk should a train approach unexpectedly.

It would indeed seem fortunate that no-one was working under a line blockage east of the station.

Crepello said:

I'm a huge fan of Cal Sleeper as I hope as been noted - but scanning above, there's a question that I'm surprised has been missed. If this had happned on the Glasgow Central portion.....

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It would have stopped a mile or so after the booked call at Motherwell.

If this train had been originally routed into a dead end platform would this have been a full on crash?

I am intrigued if the train has been allowed to run again because:

- I personally am fairly shocked that there wasn't a failsafe system that didn't at the very least warn the driver that there was a huge problem straight after Carstairs - although personally I would have expect there to be an automatic failsafe that just locked the thing up until the problem had been rectified. As these carriages are presumably designed to attach to a range of locomotion, I would have thought it would be very, very much of a priority in the design of the carriages to lock on the brakes if they do not receive confirmation of the relevant input from the locomotive end, so the thing could simply not have pulled away from Carstairs. Bearing mind these carriages seem to have alarms for everything else that drive the staff crazy, surely it would be possible to have one for arguably the most important safety feature on the whole train?

2. Presuming for some reason that such a failsafe does not exist on this configuration, then I would have presumed this would have been identified as a big risk in terms of the coupling procedures and as this is a new train the RAIB would want to be extremely sure the procedure is sufficient by going through those procedures with a fine tooth comb.

3. Presuming the RAIB did manage to satisfy itself that the procedures are sufficient I would have thought that they would want to ensure that the coupling teams and drivers have been drilled to near death in them bearing in mind the failure has now happened at least once. If you think about the groundstaff at an airport, if a plane hit the runway without something important having being done you might first look at procedure. If you were satisfied the procedure was correct you might not ground every plane, but you might well isolate the ground team relating to the incident and ensure that they are extremely clear as to how to properly implement that procedure.

As there are so few 'groundstaff' and 'pilots' in this case I would have expected the RAIB to isolate them all and ensure the procedures are simulated again and again and again and the training procedures beefed up massively to ensure an absolute minimal risk of this happening ever again.

If I was the RMT (of whom I am normally no real fan) I would be telling the Sleeper that the already stressed cabin staff will be declining to work the train until are confident that they had not had added to their duties constant stress about having to hit the big red button. That would feel entirely appropriate to me.

As a regular sleeper user, this all feels very troubling to me as it feels like it fits with the pattern of poor planning and communication that has plagued the service recently. I do not want to end up in a crashed carriage because of a screw up on something that happens to the Sleeper carriages every single night the service runs. Modern safety systems should be more than capable of capturing those risks. As I say, I am hugely intrigued if the RAIB has decided to overlook all this and let the train continue to run.

It all feels a bit like the Sleeper's 737 Max moment, with a lucky escape in this case.

It is worth noting that that RAIB don't have an enforcement role. They identify what happened and the causes and then make recommendations on how it can be avoided in the future. It is then up to the organisations involved and regulators to ensure procedures are changed (or developed) in light of the recommendations. There is always a good preamble explaining this in their reports but their website also has a neat summary:

Our responsibilities
We’re responsible for:

• investigating the causes of railway accidents and incidents where we believe our investigation will bring safety learning to the industry
• identifying the factors that may lead to a similar accident or make the consequences worse
• highlighting gaps in the railway industry’s safety defences that are revealed during our investigations
• making recommendations to prevent the same thing happening again
• increasing awareness of how railway accidents happen
• co-operating with other investigation organisations nationally and internationally to share and encourage good practice.

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So let's not get carried away in just what the RAIB can and will do.

edwin_m said:

There was one a few years ago on the Styal line when the wrong isolating valves were operated on the rear loco of a top-and-tail engineering train and the brakes seemed to be working normally but the reservoir wasn't being replenished from the train pipe. After a few brake applications the reservoir was empty and the loco was unbraked. A coupling broke leaving it rolling back and forth on gradients and I think nearly hitting some track workers before coming to a stop.

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How were the brake applications made, if the train was isolated from the loco?

modernrail said:

I am intrigued if the train has been allowed to run again

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From the sound of what's been said on this thread and elsewhere if they were to ground trains they'd need to ground every single train which uses the twin pipe brake system. Which I think is basically everything on the entire network. It doesn't appear that this was down to an issue specifically with the new rolling stock. The fact that it is still in service and not grounded should be the big clue to that. The railway doesn't take chances, indeed it's perhaps the most risk averse mode of transport going in this country!

At risk of going all Donald Rumsfeld, it was either known known or an unknown unknown. If there is a systemic risk, due to the set up, then it’s a brave or foolhardy person who runs the risk.

If it’s systemic, it will be amazing if it hasn’t cropped up elsewhere before. And what everyone else will do about it.

You comment that the railway doesn’t take chances. It clearly does. Or it didn’t know how lucky it has been. Now it is aware, it has to remove the risk.