Page 34 of the report:
I don't think it matters what they do - all methods are falable
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Train doing 6x speed limit at Sandy, 19/10/18
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Tom B
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Wasn't there an accident somewhere (Nuneaton, perhaps?) caused by a TSR being missed with catastrophic consequences?
There must surely be a higher risk attached to larger drops in speed.
Saperstein
Member
Yes the Nuneaton rail crash occurred on 6 June 1975, on the West Coast Main Line just south of Nuneaton railway station in Warwickshire, England.
6 killed - 38 injured.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuneaton_rail_crash
Saperstein
the essential point is if you are in charge of any type of public transport vehicle be it a taxi, bus,tram, train or aircraft you have a duty of care to maintain vigilance.
For example in a road vehicle if you were on a motorway and fiddling about for medication and got spotted by the police that is 6 penalty points on your license it is a serious matter. In a worse case scenario you would have ploughed into the back of stationary traffic and possibly killed people
missing the ESR signs is a failure to be vigilant but luckily in this case nothing untoward happened
For example in a road vehicle if you were on a motorway and fiddling about for medication and got spotted by the police that is 6 penalty points on your license it is a serious matter. In a worse case scenario you would have ploughed into the back of stationary traffic and possibly killed people
missing the ESR signs is a failure to be vigilant but luckily in this case nothing untoward happened
hooverboy
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and what happens with ESR in the case of inclement weather?
this could be made so much easier when the markers all have transponders that communicate to both the control centre and the train cab signalling system.
the speed limit is then programmed in by control, and the display is right in your face,so absolutely no excuse for missing it.
we could go even more technical and get limiters shoved in the cab as well, so nobody will be breaking any speed limits,ever.
axlecounter
Member
As a driver would you not slam the brakes on if you got an AWS warning from a (to you) unknown source? Or at least strongly reduce your speed.
Under any ETCS level you can transmit the TSR/ESR to the train (either from a balise under level 1, or over GSM-R under level 2/3) which will then enforce it the same way as any PSR is enforced by the signalling system.
Feel like someone has done it now? ;P
bahnause
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bramling
Veteran Member
Depends. The liability shifts to those inputting the data into the system, and to a lesser extent those who have designed, tested and assured the system. This went awry on the Cambrian system. I don’t doubt it’s safer, but I don’t think one can go as far as to say the risk is completely eliminated.
philthetube
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Those of us who drive should consider ir they have ever been not been sure of the speed limit at their current location, if so they have missed seeing a speed limit sign. Train drivers are human and it will happen on occasions.
Can't help thinking a trick has been missed by not making all signals controllable and not using signals to display turnout speeds / restrictions. Green signals accompanied by contradictory AWS magnets, flashing lights that fall over and garbled radio messages feels rather patch and mend. No method will be perfect but it could be a lot more robust.
Bromley boy
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Not necessarily. It’s not uncommon for portable AWS magnets to be left in situ after ESRs/TSRs have been removed.
An AWS warning with no apparent cause would prompt a very good look round for an associated warning board, but not necessarily an immediate reduction in speed.
It may sound “Heath Robinson” but, to be fair, the system works very well, as proven by the fact we need to go back to the 1970s to find a serious accident caused by a train “busting” a speed restriction.
Signals indicating speed wouldn’t really help since, by definition, line speed remains constant, and is varied by TSR and ESRs. This would also necessitate a complete rewrite of the way UK signalling operates i.e. route rather than speed based indications.
As has been indicated above, no system is perfect - even ETCS coupled with in-cab signalling can be error prone where the information is entered incorrectly.
As an aside, does anyone know how ESR/TSRs are dealt with by the French TVM 400 system as used on HS1?
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HS1 - I would've thought it be via the in-cab signalling / speed display (based upon the manual input of the required data (the location and speed of the ESR/TSR) to be displayed in-cab).
Lineside boards are used on cab-signalled lines when a TSR of less that 80km/h is required. When this is the case a restriction of 160km/h is first imposed by the cab signalling display before the train reaches the warning board.
There is no mention if KVB is used as an additional control as in France.
I'm not sure I concur with your logic. If no trains exceeded the speed limit that would prove that the system works very well. The fact that there have been no serious accidents suggests that either no trains exceed the limit (which we know isn't correct) or that excess speed does not automatically lead to a catastrophic incident.
edwin_m
Veteran Member
With traditional relay-baesd interlockings making signals controllable would have involved a lot more cabling and relays because the signal aspects are worked out by logic at the trackside rather than centrally. As well as costing more this would have meant a lot more to go wrong. Solid State Interlocking does the aspect sequencing centrally so most SSI schemes have the facility to replace any signal to danger, as I presume do those using more modern computer based interlockings. SSI also includes a facility for a technician to apply a temporary approach control to any signal, but I don't think it's ever been used.
With ERTMS on the horizon it's unlikely there will be any fundamental changes to traditional UK signalling practice now.
Dren Ahmeti
Member
One of the signals on the Down Main out of Paddington (TVSC) was locked into approach control for a while.
@Nippy ?
I’m sure that I’ve seen a message about it elsewhere too. Would/could it be done to keep things moving if the signal in rear was showing blank vice green, as an example?
Yes.
Conflicting information (albeit, percieved, in this case -- as the AWS was for the ERS / TSR lineside quipment) from the warning AWS immediately followed by Green signal AWS bell could easy confuse many drivers - which is why such emergency instalation are designed by a competetent person, as they know or should know the parameters for laying down the AWS magnets.
How many drivers here have hit the button, as a matter of learned behaviour, and missed (or failed to see) what AWS was warning them of - or thought it was for something else?
Despite the rules about placement it amazes me the number of times these rules are not followed or are bent. Things such as temporary magnets between the permanent signal magnet and the signal. Because what your really need as you stop at a red is to work out whether you need to stop before or after the temporary magnet to avoid stopping on the magnet...
T786 on the up relief near Pangbourne has been on some form of temporary approach control for the last couple of weeks.
T786 on the up relief near Pangbourne has been on some form of temporary approach control for the last couple of weeks.
edwin_m
Veteran Member
The report states that in this case the ESR and PSR boards and their magnets were moved further out than the normal distance, so as not to clash with the signal, and that their positioning was in accordance with standards. So that particular issue doesn't arise in this case, though I believe it has in others.
O L Leigh
Established Member
There's been an ongoing issue with the signals at Bromsgrove on the Down since the December timetable change. The last signal at the bottom of the hill protecting the station (I'm sorry, but I don't recall it's number) has been set to approach control due to an issue that is still awaiting rectification. Could this be an example of this...?
On the point of AWS magnet placing, I have seen some real shockers over the years but things do seem to have improved lately. I can't recall any recent cases of temporary magnets conflicting with permanent ones or magnets placed too close to signals. Yes there are cases where the warning is not amazingly effective, but I tend to find that this happens at locations where there has been a restriction for some time and you get so used to it being there that you can fail to register it after a while. However, if I get an unexpected AWS warning, particularly in an unusual location, it does tend to snap my attention forward so that I can ascertain it's cause and what, if anything, I need to do about it.
edwin_m
Veteran Member
Could well be. I've not had detailed involvement with signalling for some decades so I can't claim to be up on what is done today!
swt_passenger
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It’s explained in the report, but as well as the driver realising his mistake NR had a watchman on site who reported the incident to the signaller. Paragraphs 39-41.
No it’s not. The title is exactly what happened.
It can't be clickbate if it's true.
Yes, it happens quite a bit, not for Speeds though. Defective data for a Preliminary Route Indicator caused SN.105 to be restricted for about a year. I tried to use Line 2 where I could to get round it.
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