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Braking issue on Caledonian Sleeper causes train to "run away" at Edinburgh

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LAX54

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I think everyone who needs to know, knows exactly what happened, and more than likely within a very short time of the incident happening, one assumes there will be a full internal enquiry as to how !
 
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EvoIV

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It's been a fascinating thread to read, mainly because I don't think I've ever seen so many well intentioned but slightly baffling posts using half understood knowledge of train brake systems. I guess that's not a subject that interests many enthusiasts which is probably understandable. I've also learned some things too about passenger stock I'm not familiar with.

Just for accuracy, I'm not aware of any current container flats that are not single piped. As has already been said on freight wagons the yellow main reservoir pipe is only ever used for auxiliary things such as opening discharge doors etc.

Single piped wagons don't run out of air under any kind of normal braking and are not limited in any way in terms of how often you can apply and release the brakes. The limitation is in how long you have to wait for the brakes to fully release throughout the consist before adding power again. Obviously in situations such as hill starts you do apply power against brake but generally try to avoid it otherwise.

A brake test is performed after remarshalling a train, with certain exceptions, and in some other specific situations without overcomplicating things. It shows brake pipe continuity throughout the train by trapping air in the brake pipe, this then being released from the rear (normally) It checks the brakes on the last vehicle apply and release as they should, which proves continuity. The brake pipe is then overcharged to equalise the distributors. This will show nearly all of the issues that could have caused this incident so likely either the brake test was not carried out correctly or the integrity of the brake pipe was not maintained after the brake test was carried out.
 

EE Andy b1

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Are you trying to suggest that the train pipe cock was closed while the pipe was charged?

The brake pipe cock was accidentally knocked and isolated the air trapped in the brake pipe after the brake test when other cables were being attached, hence brakes released, train moved off, running brake test done, train slowed by dynamic brake on loco. Next event was a runaway, no train brake as isolated from Class 92, loco brake only, until guard realised it was a runaway operated the shunting lever and released the air trapped in the brake pipe and train eventually came to a stop.
 

43096

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The brake pipe cock was accidentally knocked and isolated the air trapped in the brake pipe after the brake test when other cables were being attached, hence brakes released, train moved off, running brake test done, train slowed by dynamic brake on loco. Next event was a runaway, no train brake as isolated from Class 92, loco brake only, until guard realised it was a runaway operated the shunting lever and released the air trapped in the brake pipe and train eventually came to a stop.
So are the cocks not latched in the same way as a standard air brake pipe is? If so, it sounds rather like the incident at Darlington four decades ago.
 

EE Andy b1

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So are the cocks not latched in the same way as a standard air brake pipe is? If so, it sounds rather like the incident at Darlington four decades ago.

Yes they are latched on the Class 92 bufferbeam but you then have them pipes coupled to the dellner coupler. If you look at that photo I posted on #70 you can see. I don't know if there are other isolating cocks on the dellner, can't tell.
 

43096

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Yes they are latched on the Class 92 bufferbeam but you then have them pipes coupled to the dellner coupler. If you look at that photo I posted on #70 you can see. I don't know if there are other isolating cocks on the dellner, can't tell.
Sorry, I wasn’t clear - I was referring to the pipes attached to the Dellner, rather than the standard air pipes.
 

AndrewE

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Just for accuracy, I'm not aware of any current container flats that are not single piped. As has already been said on freight wagons the yellow main reservoir pipe is only ever used for auxiliary things such as opening discharge doors etc.
I was sure they were originally - and here's the evidence: https://www.ltsv.com/images/P0025L.jpg
P0025L.jpg
 

swt_passenger

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Does anyone know why the decision was made to adopt a Dellner without adopting an installation that included the relevant jumper cables in the coupler head?
Perhaps you can’t (or don’t want to) supply the overall train’s hotel services through the coupler head, or you want to limit the modifications to the locos. AIUI when a pair of EMUs or DMUs are coupled it’s only control and indication circuits that pass through the head, there’s nothing that you’d call high powered.
 

InOban

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I think that if you read the other threads on the Mk5 sleepers and the mods to the 92s and 73s you will find that both the voltage and the power are more than a Dellner can manage.
 

aleggatta

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I think that if you read the other threads on the Mk5 sleepers and the mods to the 92s and 73s you will find that both the voltage and the power are more than a Dellner can manage.

I can understand the ETS being required to be a seperate jumper, but the auxiliary/comms jumper could have been put on the coupler face
 

BRX

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If the isolating cock can be knocked accidentally during the coupling procedure then to me it would seem the problem is either or both of
(a) the continuity test being carried out before all the coupling/connecting is completed and there is no longer a risk of the lever being moved
(b) a design that makes it possible for the lever to be moved unintentionally.
 

High Dyke

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Question: So folk have been saying that the TM was the one to activate the emergency brakes in one coach which helped to slow the train down. Was that the one brake for that carriage or would it have activated all braking in the subsequent carriages? Would the isolation been exactly where the engine couple to the first carriage?
I believe someone stated BBC News as the source. Then again just last week during the hot weather a passenger on a train stranded at Peterborough was quoted as saying the air-con failed when they turned the engines off. Poor reporting of the fact that the electric wires were down and therefore no train supply...but the media and seemingly others don't understand that!

This thread is astonishing. I’ve never read so much drivel on the internet in my life.
It's given me a chuckle to pass a Sunday afternoon turn.
 

flash

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The brake pipe cock was accidentally knocked and isolated the air trapped in the brake pipe after the brake test when other cables were being attached, hence brakes released, train moved off, running brake test done, train slowed by dynamic brake on loco. Next event was a runaway, no train brake as isolated from Class 92, loco brake only, until guard realised it was a runaway operated the shunting lever and released the air trapped in the brake pipe and train eventually came to a stop.

It would seem to me if this is the case that there is a design defect in the brake pipe cock - whether its fitted to the loco or vehicle, my experience of 'standard' brake pipe cocks is that they are self-venting, so for this scenario to pan out both cocks would have to have been shut.
 

hwl

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Are the "Dellner" couplings on the Mk5 actually Dellner or CAF's clones?
 

EE Andy b1

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It would seem to me if this is the case that there is a design defect in the brake pipe cock - whether its fitted to the loco or vehicle, my experience of 'standard' brake pipe cocks is that they are self-venting, so for this scenario to pan out both cocks would have to have been shut.

I agree normally coupling brake pipe to brake pipe and leaving one isolating cock shut and one open, the air from the brake pipe would vent!
I don't know myself how it works on Mk5s via the dellner coupler, not a normal configuration for loco hauled stock.

The truth will out! as they say.
 

Bassman

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Irrespective of the speculation documented here of the technical and/or protocol issues which caused this event.

As a lay passenger it remains clear to me that the sleeper, appears to have run without a failsafe procedure for splitting the train. This failure has happened with potential dangerous consequences. It has happened within a relatively small number of working experiences (one failure of safety out of perhaps 100 times the new train has been split, which is a significant occurrence in probability terms!) .

It seems the scoping of failsafe procedures has not been thought through comprehensibly beforehand. If it was, then the incident would not have happened.

No matter the reassurances of learning from mistakes, unfortunately there are major implications of damage to reputation of trust and safety . Especially with another emergency braking incidence in recent history.

I am thankful this problem has come out before train splitting and new coaches were let out on the highlander. Is it safe to do so?

The problem now is increasingly reputational and perhaps becoming potentially more political rather than technical.

I can speculate that the reasons are within the franchising and bidding system itself.
 

AndrewE

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See post 273: presumably the RAIB have read CS's report and concluded that they don't need to get involved.
 

kingqueen

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I guess, but the fact we now (presumably) know what occurred generally wouldn't stop a RAIB investigation. They are generally very good at looking at the further underling causes that resulted in a situation, and I would normally expect them to be particularly interested where were it but for luck and quick thinking / action by signaller, driver and guard, this could have been a very significant crash.
 
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I guess, but the fact we now (presumably) know what occurred generally wouldn't stop a RAIB investigation. They are generally very good at looking at the further underling causes that resulted in a situation, and I would normally expect them to be particularly interested where were it but for luck and quick thinking / action by signaller, driver and guard, this could have been a very significant crash.
If there is a definitive cause and plan to deal with it, I am not sure what the RAIB could add, I have seen quite a few incidents over the years that they walk away from, when there is one and only one cause, that can be addressed by the company concerned.
 

ainsworth74

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RAIB have published an update today and are carrying out an investigation:

Loss of brake control on a passenger train approaching Edinburgh Waverley

Investigation into a loss of brake control on a passenger train approaching Edinburgh Waverley station, resulting in a station overrun, 1 August 2019.

At about 07:26 hrs on Thursday 1 August 2019, train 1B26, the Edinburgh portion of the 23:36 hrs ‘Lowland Sleeper’ service from London Euston, failed to stop as scheduled at Edinburgh Waverley station. It was brought to a stand approximately 650 metres beyond its intended stopping point. There was no damage or any injuries as a consequence of the incident. However, the outcome could potentially have been much worse, had it led to a collision with another train.

The train comprised eight Mark 5 coaches hauled by a Class 92 electric locomotive that had been attached at Carstairs. On the approach to Edinburgh the driver discovered that his train’s braking performance was well below normal. The RAIB’s preliminary investigation indicates that he had no control of the brakes on the coaches because a brake pipe isolating valve was in the closed position when the train left Carstairs station. This meant that the only effective brakes on the train as it approached Edinburgh were those on the locomotive, which were insufficient to maintain control of the train. The train was brought to a stand by the operation of an emergency device in one of the coaches by the Train Manager, which caused the train brakes to apply.

The RAIB’s investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the incident and will include consideration of:

  • how the isolating valve came to be closed at Carstairs;
  • the preparation of the train at Carstairs, including the attachment of the locomotive and testing of the train’s brakes;
  • how the train was driven;
  • the suitability of relevant procedures and working practices;
  • the design and approval of the brake system fitted to the Mark 5 coaches; and
  • any relevant underlying management or organisational factors.
The train operator issued a safety alert to the industry on 5 August 2019 (NIR 3350/224) reminding railway staff of the importance of carrying out the brake continuity test after all other train preparation activities.

Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, the Office of Rail and Road.

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation. This report will be available on our website.

Nice to have some clarity over exactly what happened as well!
 

JonathanP

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As a lay passenger it remains clear to me that the sleeper, appears to have run without a failsafe procedure for splitting the train. This failure has happened with potential dangerous consequences. It has happened within a relatively small number of working experiences (one failure of safety out of perhaps 100 times the new train has been split, which is a significant occurrence in probability terms!) .

It seems the scoping of failsafe procedures has not been thought through comprehensibly beforehand. If it was, then the incident would not have happened.

I am thankful this problem has come out before train splitting and new coaches were let out on the highlander. Is it safe to do so?

No system can ever be "failsafe" in the sense that it can never fail. When the term "failsafe" is used in a railway environment, it means that in the event of an unexpected occurrence(power failure, air leak), it will fail in a "safe" way.

Railway Systems are generally designed with the expectation they are operated by trained professionals, so overrides and isolators are available, whilst consumer equipment might simply stop working in the event of a fault. If rolling stock was designed so that the braking system was impossible to isolate, then in the event of a fault with the braking system, the only way to get it back to a depot would be to lift it off the track with a crane.
 

Surreytraveller

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No system can ever be "failsafe" in the sense that it can never fail. When the term "failsafe" is used in a railway environment, it means that in the event of an unexpected occurrence(power failure, air leak), it will fail in a "safe" way.

Railway Systems are generally designed with the expectation they are operated by trained professionals, so overrides and isolators are available, whilst consumer equipment might simply stop working in the event of a fault. If rolling stock was designed so that the braking system was impossible to isolate, then in the event of a fault with the braking system, the only way to get it back to a depot would be to lift it off the track with a crane.
Which is effectively what happened on Friday with all the 700s North of the Thames, with the drivers unable to reset the trains themselves.
 

LowLevel

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Lucky the guard kept their head and acted quickly when they realised something was wrong, by the sound of it.
 

Surreytraveller

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Lucky the guard kept their head and acted quickly when they realised something was wrong, by the sound of it.
Yes. Good job they haven't been replaced by untrained non-safety critical staff. I wonder if doing away with guards has been considered as part of the introduction of the new stock?
 

Bletchleyite

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Yes. Good job they haven't been replaced by untrained non-safety critical staff. I wonder if doing away with guards has been considered as part of the introduction of the new stock?

I doubt it - complications like this (and the driver being unable to access any part of the train without walking along the ballast, I guess?) would mean DOO is non-feasible on LHCS.

Having said that, the Germans and Swiss do.
 
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