If I remember correctly, the units were owned by a bank. BR got a concession to spend ££ on leasing stock rather that buying it.
This gives the wrong emphasis.
The procurement of the class 365s started as a result of a government instruction. I think it was during the time Roger Freeman was the Minister of Transport responsible for railways, and BR was told that it had to lease trains which had a capital value of £150m; moreover, the selected supplier of the trains had to arrange the necessary finance and also be responsible for their maintenance, thereby transferring risk from the state to the private sector.
If I remember correctly, there was some sort of internal bidding process in BR to determine which potential procurement exercises would be taken forward; this resulted in class 365s for NSE and IC225s for the WCML being selected. We are, of course, taking about events over 25 years ago, and I'm pretty sure that there was some sort of internal competition, but only these two types of trains were taken forward as procurement exercises.
This was, of course, an unusual procurement exercise in that an ITT would usually be issued for a certain number of trains; however, as this was based around a sum of money, the exercise was to determine how many trains could be procured for that capital value. Therefore, although BR's ITT was similar to its normal format with the two key documents being a draft sale and purchase agreement and a procurement spec, it included an invitation to the two potential suppliers to meet with BR and agree to undertake much of the work usually undertaken post-tender on a confidential pre-tender basis; ABB agreed to this, but GEC-ALSTOM did not.
Over the tender preparation period, BR's Project Engineer and Procurement Project Manager for the class 365s worked with ABB, and by the time that the tender had to be submitted the specification for the class 365s had been agreed, as had the terms and conditions of contract for the supply of the trains; all that was unknown was how many 365s ABB could supply to BR for a capital value of £150m, and in accordance with the specification and Ts&Cs agreed. So when the tender was opened, out popped the magic number 41 x 4-car sets.
By contrast, GEC-ALSTOM said they were prepared to supply a certain number of trains (can't remember how many), and declared the specification for the trains and the Ts&Cs under which they were prepared to supply them.
This was just the start of many hours of work to establish train lease and maintenance agreements, and to novate certain rights and obligations from BR to the financier; BR had to make great use of outside lawyers over this period, as it was an area over which it had no significant knowledge. The BRB Director of Funds had a Leasing Manager with the necessary skills to establish
"straight-forward" leases, but ones which transferred all risk to third-parties were completely new to it. There's probably some information about this leasing exercise in the National Archives, and the financing model adopted included a bank in the Cayman Islands and another in France, the latter to take advantage of the French tax regime which treated investment allowances differently to here in the UK (if I remember correctly).
One interesting element of the procurement contract related to the warranty; as the 365s were being leased from the manufacturer and he was also responsible for their maintenance, the warranty didn't start until the lease ended and BR became responsible for the train's maintenance. I guess this obligation will have been
"lost" somewhere along the way; if it hasn't, I guess the warranty started at the time ownership passed to the government, as successor to BR!
The procurement of the class 365s by this lease wasn't BR's preferred method, and it wasn't the cheapest option available to it; at one time, the question was asked of the Board member responsible for finance if it was necessary to go ahead with the procurement exercise, and the answer was a most emphatic
"yes" !
