As many already know, with the move to accepting Contactless Payment, TfL are almost entirely reliant on barriers for fare enforcement on public transport. This is due to the (now well-publicised) fact that Revenue Inspectors – themselves a rare sight – cannot check the status of Contactless payment cards in real-time.
And yet despite the above fact:
It’s astonishing that Train Operating Companies have accepted this (given their concerns about the Oyster Extension Permit some years ago!), and yet here we are. In my opinion, this major limitation should have been a blocker to implementing Contactless, but instead we have a system that is ripe for a specific kind of abuse most appealing to hardened fare evaders which is only detectable in retrospect. In particular, I think it’s telling that almost 11k Contactless payment cards have failed Revenue Inspection 3 times in the preceding 20 month period.
TfL believe revenue protection arrangements for Contactless “work well”. I completely disagree – and I think the only reason the problem is not more endemic is because fare evaders are, for the most past, unaware that their Contactless card must be taken on trust. (I’m aware of the irony in this post therefore – but it’s well-publicised elsewhere including outside this site (and in public TfL documents [p.60+]), meaning I suspect it is a growing problem regardless!). I cannot think of any other type of fare evasion which can be conducted so regularly, with effectively zero risk to the person involved in the fraud.
My opinion is that (short of abandoning Contactless) TfL should be working hard toward a system of RIDs being able to check Contactless payment card touch-in/touch-out validation in real time. This is obviously not an easy task - but I see no reason why entry/exit gates can't upload the "last 6 digits" of card numbers (along with a timestamp) to a basic revenue protection database within minutes, which retains records in that database for 315 minutes, with the central system tracking the last successful update time for every station (noting the "oldest updated time" of that list). This data could be made available to RIDs for live interrogation, and downloaded to RIDs for use where the Internet is temporarily unavailable (with a "last download time" recorded on the RID). If a card is valid for travel but not on the RID as confirmed as being touched in recently, it could display a question mark along with the "oldest updated station time" (and the RID's "last download time", if offline). If the inspector is aware that the passenger has been on board earlier than both those times, they would be aware that a card was not valid; and if they had suspicions, they could check again once both times had been updated.
And yet despite the above fact:
- There are multiple central stations, and multiple stations outside zone 3, where no barriers are in place
- Multiple central stations have lesser-used entrances where barriers are routinely left open
- The ever-increasing expansion of the Contactless-only PAYG network means that opportunities exist for substantial short-faring or dumb-belling, even where barriers cannot be avoided at one or both ends
It’s astonishing that Train Operating Companies have accepted this (given their concerns about the Oyster Extension Permit some years ago!), and yet here we are. In my opinion, this major limitation should have been a blocker to implementing Contactless, but instead we have a system that is ripe for a specific kind of abuse most appealing to hardened fare evaders which is only detectable in retrospect. In particular, I think it’s telling that almost 11k Contactless payment cards have failed Revenue Inspection 3 times in the preceding 20 month period.
TfL believe revenue protection arrangements for Contactless “work well”. I completely disagree – and I think the only reason the problem is not more endemic is because fare evaders are, for the most past, unaware that their Contactless card must be taken on trust. (I’m aware of the irony in this post therefore – but it’s well-publicised elsewhere including outside this site (and in public TfL documents [p.60+]), meaning I suspect it is a growing problem regardless!). I cannot think of any other type of fare evasion which can be conducted so regularly, with effectively zero risk to the person involved in the fraud.
My opinion is that (short of abandoning Contactless) TfL should be working hard toward a system of RIDs being able to check Contactless payment card touch-in/touch-out validation in real time. This is obviously not an easy task - but I see no reason why entry/exit gates can't upload the "last 6 digits" of card numbers (along with a timestamp) to a basic revenue protection database within minutes, which retains records in that database for 315 minutes, with the central system tracking the last successful update time for every station (noting the "oldest updated time" of that list). This data could be made available to RIDs for live interrogation, and downloaded to RIDs for use where the Internet is temporarily unavailable (with a "last download time" recorded on the RID). If a card is valid for travel but not on the RID as confirmed as being touched in recently, it could display a question mark along with the "oldest updated station time" (and the RID's "last download time", if offline). If the inspector is aware that the passenger has been on board earlier than both those times, they would be aware that a card was not valid; and if they had suspicions, they could check again once both times had been updated.
penalty fares are for innocent mistakes. The more important avenue and deterrent is the ability to prosecute, and that is surely the purpose of a Revenue Inspector, who can assess the passenger's story and determine whether it is more likely to be an honest mistake or an occurrence of intentional evasion. Contactless means there is no 'credibility check' on the passenger as they are long gone by the time the day's touches are resolved and a revenue inspection failure is realised.
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