6A11 (Robeston Sidings - Theale Murco) on fire near Llanelli (27/08)

[Western 52]

I can't really tell to be honest, it looks as if the wagon has crumped on impact of the derailment but then I don't see how it has ended up like that. But then has the heat of the fire essentially welded it in on itself?

Would a vacuum implosion happen with fully loaded wagons? Oil is not compressable. Some years ago the Mythbusters tv show did an implosion but the tank was empty.

 

[Saint66]

Thank goodness the crew were okay and no one was injured.

 

[Harbon 1]

Would a vacuum implosion happen with fully loaded wagons? Oil is not compressable. Some years ago the Mythbusters tv show did an implosion but the tank was empty.

I seem to remember that under normal circumstances, they couldn't get the same effect as the video linked earlier. To get anything like that it took until they got bored of trying to replicate the conditions and tried to replicate the outcome instead!

 

[Western 52]

I seem to remember that under normal circumstances, they couldn't get the same effect as the video linked earlier. To get anything like that it took until they got bored of trying to replicate the conditions and tried to replicate the outcome instead!

Yes I remember! It was quite extreme.

 

[DelW]

Presumably the Heart of Wales service will now be a bus all the way as the line was already shut north of Llandrindod? RTT shows today's 2M37 Carmarthen to Llandrindod as running though. Not updated I guess.

The Heart of Wales has had a terrible time recently. Cut to two trains per day Covid timetable (Sunday service all week), then the south half closed by rotted bridge timbers at Pontaddulais, when that reopened the northern half was closed by a landslip, now closed throughout. It's rivalling the Conwy Valley as a train service that rarely has any trains.

 

[G0ORC]

Bad as it is, it could have been a lot worse.

I don't want to think about the consequences if the train had been conveying Aviation Fuel

 

[Dunfanaghy Rd]

Would a vacuum implosion happen with fully loaded wagons? Oil is not compressable. Some years ago the Mythbusters tv show did an implosion but the tank was empty.

I'm sure it happened to the loaded railcars in the Stewarton derailment a few years back. There is a pressure relief valve to prevent the vessel exploding (which then pumps vapour into the fire ) , but no return to stop a vacuum being created.
Pat
(PS We always called petroleum tanks railcars as that was the term used by the customers. Very USA-centric industry!)

 

[ChiefPlanner]

The Heart of Wales has had a terrible time recently. Cut to two trains per day Covid timetable (Sunday service all week), then the south half closed by rotted bridge timbers at Pontaddulais, when that reopened the northern half was closed by a landslip, now closed throughout. It's rivalling the Conwy Valley as a train service that rarely has any trains.

Indeed it has , and (luckily) there is now no meaningful coal traffic from Gwaun Cae Gurwen , as that is "isolated" now.

Talking of freight - west of Llanelli the flows can be accommodated via the Landore loop - tank trains being empty in that direction should be OK via Cockett Bank , but the need to serve the tinplate works at Trostre may need special arrangements. Heavy export flows.

 

[gallafent]

REC

REC?

 

[Western 52]

These oil trains pass my house several times each day without incident and their safety record is good. A few years ago the 6B13 Westerleigh tanks damaged miles of track after a wagon brake had been left on. The train was eventually stopped near the site of today's accident. Trains were disrupted for days while tracks were repaired.

 

[al78]

Before 8am this morning, BBC breakfast reported two crew members injured whilst at the same time the BBC website said their were no injuries!

Probably a lag between the real time reporting and updating the website.

 

[JN114]

REC?

Railway Emergency (Group) Call - a functionality of the on-train GSM-R radio that when initiated broadcasts an emergency stop message to all trains in the vicinity.

Of course “REC call” is one of those irritating misuses of an abbreviation, as the C in REC is “call”, leading to “call call” when you spell it out. Like ATM machine, BIL light or IET train...

 

[DelW]

Bad as it is, it could have been a lot worse.

I don't want to think about the consequences if the train had been conveying Aviation Fuel

Or in a different location.

At Lac Megantic in Canada, fire and explosion resulting from derailed tank wagons carrying crude oil, killed 47 residents and wiped out the town centre.

 

[gallafent]

Railway Emergency (Group) Call - a functionality of the on-train GSM-R radio that when initiated broadcasts an emergency stop message to all trains in the vicinity.

Of course “REC call” is one of those irritating misuses of an abbreviation, as the C in REC is “call”, leading to “call call” when you spell it out. Like ATM machine, BIL light or IET train...

Thanks for the explanation

And yes, PIN number …………

 

[BRX]

Bad as it is, it could have been a lot worse.

I don't want to think about the consequences if the train had been conveying Aviation Fuel

Aviation fuel trains have always seemed much more alarming than nuclear waste trains to me... yet the latter seem to arouse more concern in the general public.

 

[Deepgreen]

In fairness, that's a limitation of the English language. An aggregates train is a train carrying aggregates; a passenger train is a train carrying passengers; a diesel train is a train carrying diesel.

No - a 'diesel train' is universally understood to mean a train powered by a diesel engine (which this was anyway). The language limitations do not stop it being called, say, a fuel oil-carrying train.

 

[John Webb]

Bad as it is, it could have been a lot worse.

I don't want to think about the consequences if the train had been conveying Aviation Fuel

Which type of aviation fuel? AVGAS (AViation GASoline) is petrol and is a minority fuel as it is used in piston-engined aircraft; it is certainly more hazardous than AVTUR (AViation TURbine fuel) which is the predominant aviation fuel as it is used by jet aircraft. It is similar to paraffin in ignition temperature and other characteristics.

What concerns me is the degree to which leakage will have contaminated the ballast and underlying ground, bearing in mind the closeness of the line to the estuary of the River Loughor/Afon Llwchwr. Will they have to dig out all the ballast? And the ground underneath? That would delay reinstatement of the line considerably!

 

[Deepgreen]

From the pictures (from BBC News) I have seen (screenshots attached), the train is 'wrong line' only if it was approaching the cameras - the class 66 loco in the shot has tail lights showing, but is that another 66 that has been brought up to remove some tankers (seems too soon for that), or the train loco that was heading towards the camera but which is now showing red lights as warnings? I also note that the signal in rear/ahead of the train is blank - was its power supply destroyed by the incident? These are rhetorical questions, I suspect, as I don't expect answers to be available yet.

Aviation fuel trains have always seemed much more alarming than nuclear waste trains to me... yet the latter seem to arouse more concern in the general public.

Nuclear waste spillage or leakage could, among other things, kill people slowly and painfully, cause birth defects and make the site unusable for centuries - perhaps that has something to do with the nervousness.

 

[Crossover]

From the pictures (from BBC News) I have seen (screenshots attached), the train is 'wrong line' only if it was approaching the cameras - the class 66 loco in the shot has tail lights showing, but is that another 66 that has been brought up to remove some tankers (seems too soon for that), or the train loco that was heading towards the camera but which is now showing red lights as warnings? I also note that the signal in rear/ahead of the train is blank - was its power supply destroyed by the incident? These are rhetorical questions, I suspect, as I don't expect answers to be available yet.

View attachment 82816View attachment 82817

Mentioned earlier in the thread that the 66 was brought in as 1Z99 to rescue the undamaged wagons. The train was hauled by a 60

 

[PG]

is that another 66 that has been brought up to remove some tankers

Yes, posted upthread that the 66 was sent later to remove some of the tankers.

 

[konstant]

6A11 Derailed and Caught Fire at Llangennech: At 2317, the driver of 6A11 (DBC) 2152 Robeston - Theale reported that the 3rd vehicle behind the loco, GERS type no. 89005 fuel tank was on fire. The vehicle was on the Up District line in the vicinity of Llangennech and was conveying diesel fuel so a Dangerous Goods Incident (DGI) was declared by the Route Control. The Fire Service were mobilised and at 2317, they reported that they had received a report from a member of the public that heard a loud bang and then saw a train on fire. At 2324, the driver reported that they had detached the loco from the train and driven away from the scene as the 3rd to 6th vehicles appeared to be on fire and that they were not able to advise if the train had derailed or not. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) and the British Transport Police (BTP) were advised and a LOM and MOM were sent to the scene to assist with communications and act as the Rail Incident Officer (RIO) as required. At 2337, the driver was reported to be a safe distance away from the train some 4oo yards in advance of it. The Fire Service arrived on scene at 2346 with 5 fire tenders. At 0024, the Fire Service implemented an 800m exclusion zone and set up an Incident Room at Llangennech Junior School and at 0041 it was reported that at least 3 of the vehicles had derailed with the train still on fire. At 0053, SCO 24:7 was contacted and requested to arrange for a recovery team to attend and MFSDD was declared on behalf of the Route Control at 0059 by the FSDM. Also, at 0059, it was reported that 300 properties in the area were being evacuated to Llangennech Junior School and the Llangennech Community Centre. At 0100, the Fire Service reported that 5 of the wagons were on fire, 2 wagons had derailed and fallen down the embankment and that the train had split in several places. Due to the risk of the rear portion of the train running away, the RIO and Fire Service walked from Llangennech station to the rear portion of the train to apply the handbrakes. The Fire Service confirmed that the rear portion had split far enough away from the fire to allow them to safely approach the rear portion. At 0114, it was reported that the area of the incident is a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and a Special Area of Conservation with the nearest water course 131.47m from the scene so an Environmental Incident Report was filed. At 0145, the RAIB Duty Co-ordinator advised that inspectors had been notified to attend the site later this morning and that if the site needs to be made safe, those activities could be carried out but no site recovery or re-railing operations were to occur until they authorise it once on site. Post a multi-agency meeting in the Incident Room at Llangennech Junior School, the Fire Service stated that they were not expecting the fire to be extinguished for several days and at present were looking at possibly allowing the fire to burn out. There were 5 wagons on fire with the possibility of a 6th with each wagon carrying 100,000 litres of fuel. The BTP declared the incident a Major Incident at 0018 and at 0252, reports from a police helicopter advised the following:

From the front of the train in direction of travel.

Two wagons on track.
Three, possibly 5 derailed and on fire. The Fire Service are particularly concerned about these.
Two derailed and hot but not on fire.
Two derailed not affected by heat or fire.
Fourteen in rear all on track and ok.

The Fire Service ran out hoses to monitor/cool down the 3, possibly 5, that are a concern and stated that these hoses would not be used to extinguish the fire. At 0325, the Fire Service requested that the 14 rear wagons be moved 300 metres from the fire which was agreed as this was deemed necessary to make the site safe. The Fire Service also advised that they planned to start tackling the fire at first light and at 0338, DBC confirmed that an assisting loco was ready to depart Margam and route via Landore to move the 14 rearmost wagons clear. At 0419, the Fire Service advised that:

Fourteen wagons have been split from the train and are on the line safe.
Five wagons have split and are derailed but safe.
Four wagons have split, derailed and are on fire.
Two wagons have split and are on the track.

They also advised that the exclusion zone had been reduced from 800 metres to 500 metres. At 0426, the RAIB confirmed that they were happy for the 14 wagons to be moved clear but that they are not removed completely from the site to. It was confirmed that there were no signs of landslip at the site and the BTP confirmed no signs initially of any terrorist or malicious intent in causing the incident. There is a low risk to any further issues in terms of human risk at site i.e. explosion; however, the current high risk is the leakage of fuel into the local water course. At 0505, the FSDM requested that a Restriction of Use (RoU) notice be issued as soon as possible and forwarded to Capacity Planning.

 

[Deepgreen]

Mentioned earlier in the thread that the 66 was brought in as 1Z99 to rescue the undamaged wagons. The train was hauled by a 60

I missed that - many thanks. I was doubtful because the BBC News report said that the site was not in a state, even this morning, where any clearance could yet begin, so I assumed no rail movements would take place until it was declared ready.

They would face a disciplinary & possible be in need of psychiatric help if they didn't

Well - some people are going to busy, then, because, according to post no.81 by 'Konstant', that's what happened.

 

[Lucan]

Nuclear waste spillage or leakage could, among other things, kill people slowly and painfully, cause birth defects and make the site unusable for centuries

Only if people went up to it, stood close to it for some time and/or handled it. Nuclear waste is not even transported until its activity had decayed to relatively low levels, typically after several years in storage under water if it is classified as high level waste. OTOH I have worked at nuclear power stations and have done inspections within yards, and in line of sight, of exposed fuel cans that were generating power only 4 weeks earlier, and still my dosimeter showed well within safe limits.

That consideration does not even take account of the massive "armour" in which high level nuclear waste is transported, bolted steel boxes around 12"-14" thick. Low level nuclear waste is not carried within such armour but is is practically harmless; it consists of things like disposable overalls that workers have been wearing all day.

Having come from the intensely safety-oriented ethic of the UK nuclear industry, it never ceases to amaze me how easy-going by comparison is the approach of other potentially hazardous industries, like the chemical and fuel industries.

 

[dk1]

Well - some people are going to busy, then, because, according to post no.81 by 'Konstant', that's what happened.

Will make interesting reading. With highly flammable goods on fire apart from saving your sandwiches I dont understand.

 

[Dieseldriver]

Will make interesting reading. With highly flammable goods on fire apart from saving your sandwiches I dont understand.

It is stated in the Rule Book that you should, if safe to do so, uncouple vehicles from the train to prevent the fire spreading. If the Driver deemed it necessary and safe to do that then I say fair play to them. They were obviously unable to uncouple the wagons immediately adjacent to the fire but in uncoupling the loco and drawing it forward, they've made a conscious effort to lessen the consequences of the incident. You could argue that given the nature of the dangerous goods being transported at the time that the loco posed a minor risk in comparison however, every little helps and the Driver has taken the right course of action in my opinion.

 

[MotCO]

6A11 Derailed and Caught Fire at Llangennech: At 2317, the driver of 6A11 (DBC) 2152 Robeston - Theale reported that the 3rd vehicle behind the loco, GERS type no. 89005 fuel tank was on fire. The vehicle was on the Up District line in the vicinity of Llangennech and was conveying diesel fuel so a Dangerous Goods Incident (DGI) was declared by the Route Control. The Fire Service were mobilised and at 2317, they reported that they had received a report from a member of the public that heard a loud bang and then saw a train on fire. At 2324, the driver reported that they had detached the loco from the train and driven away from the scene as the 3rd to 6th vehicles appeared to be on fire and that they were not able to advise if the train had derailed or not. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) and the British Transport Police (BTP) were advised and a LOM and MOM were sent to the scene to assist with communications and act as the Rail Incident Officer (RIO) as required. At 2337, the driver was reported to be a safe distance away from the train some 4oo yards in advance of it. The Fire Service arrived on scene at 2346 with 5 fire tenders. At 0024, the Fire Service implemented an 800m exclusion zone and set up an Incident Room at Llangennech Junior School and at 0041 it was reported that at least 3 of the vehicles had derailed with the train still on fire. At 0053, SCO 24:7 was contacted and requested to arrange for a recovery team to attend and MFSDD was declared on behalf of the Route Control at 0059 by the FSDM. Also, at 0059, it was reported that 300 properties in the area were being evacuated to Llangennech Junior School and the Llangennech Community Centre. At 0100, the Fire Service reported that 5 of the wagons were on fire, 2 wagons had derailed and fallen down the embankment and that the train had split in several places. Due to the risk of the rear portion of the train running away, the RIO and Fire Service walked from Llangennech station to the rear portion of the train to apply the handbrakes. The Fire Service confirmed that the rear portion had split far enough away from the fire to allow them to safely approach the rear portion. At 0114, it was reported that the area of the incident is a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and a Special Area of Conservation with the nearest water course 131.47m from the scene so an Environmental Incident Report was filed. At 0145, the RAIB Duty Co-ordinator advised that inspectors had been notified to attend the site later this morning and that if the site needs to be made safe, those activities could be carried out but no site recovery or re-railing operations were to occur until they authorise it once on site. Post a multi-agency meeting in the Incident Room at Llangennech Junior School, the Fire Service stated that they were not expecting the fire to be extinguished for several days and at present were looking at possibly allowing the fire to burn out. There were 5 wagons on fire with the possibility of a 6th with each wagon carrying 100,000 litres of fuel. The BTP declared the incident a Major Incident at 0018 and at 0252, reports from a police helicopter advised the following:

From the front of the train in direction of travel.

Two wagons on track.
Three, possibly 5 derailed and on fire. The Fire Service are particularly concerned about these.
Two derailed and hot but not on fire.
Two derailed not affected by heat or fire.
Fourteen in rear all on track and ok.

The Fire Service ran out hoses to monitor/cool down the 3, possibly 5, that are a concern and stated that these hoses would not be used to extinguish the fire. At 0325, the Fire Service requested that the 14 rear wagons be moved 300 metres from the fire which was agreed as this was deemed necessary to make the site safe. The Fire Service also advised that they planned to start tackling the fire at first light and at 0338, DBC confirmed that an assisting loco was ready to depart Margam and route via Landore to move the 14 rearmost wagons clear. At 0419, the Fire Service advised that:

Fourteen wagons have been split from the train and are on the line safe.
Five wagons have split and are derailed but safe.
Four wagons have split, derailed and are on fire.
Two wagons have split and are on the track.

They also advised that the exclusion zone had been reduced from 800 metres to 500 metres. At 0426, the RAIB confirmed that they were happy for the 14 wagons to be moved clear but that they are not removed completely from the site to. It was confirmed that there were no signs of landslip at the site and the BTP confirmed no signs initially of any terrorist or malicious intent in causing the incident. There is a low risk to any further issues in terms of human risk at site i.e. explosion; however, the current high risk is the leakage of fuel into the local water course. At 0505, the FSDM requested that a Restriction of Use (RoU) notice be issued as soon as possible and forwarded to Capacity Planning.

Thank you for a very clear exposition of the incident.

 

[43096]

It is stated in the Rule Book that you should, if safe to do so, uncouple vehicles from the train to prevent the fire spreading. If the Driver deemed it necessary and safe to do that then I say fair play to them. They were obviously unable to uncouple the wagons immediately adjacent to the fire but in uncoupling the loco and drawing it forward, they've made a conscious effort to lessen the consequences of the incident. You could argue that given the nature of the dangerous goods being transported at the time that the loco posed a minor risk in comparison however, every little helps and the Driver has taken the right course of action in my opinion.

Uncoupling the loco and driving away is also probably the safest and fastest way to get away from the fire.

 

[bassmike]

It's quite large, police are going door to door evacuating. (Info from @DyfedPowys on Twitter)

'Police going from door to door evacuating' conjures up certain mental images!

 

[Bobdogs]

I see these trains passing through Ferryside about a mile away from me on the opposite side of the Towy estuary.
From this distance, most of the tanks look very scruffy. I'm no expert, perhaps Western 52 could either confirm or deny this being as he would appear to have a better view than me?
What sort of maintenance do they have?
It must be a hell of a job.

 

[Deepgreen]

Thank goodness the crew were okay and no one was injured.

Indeed, or, as the BBC chose to call them - "workers".

Only if people went up to it, stood close to it for some time and/or handled it. Nuclear waste is not even transported until its activity had decayed to relatively low levels, typically after several years in storage under water if it is classified as high level waste. OTOH I have worked at nuclear power stations and have done inspections within yards, and in line of sight, of exposed fuel cans that were generating power only 4 weeks earlier, and still my dosimeter showed well within safe limits.

That consideration does not even take account of the massive "armour" in which high level nuclear waste is transported, bolted steel boxes around 12"-14" thick. Low level nuclear waste is not carried within such armour but is is practically harmless; it consists of things like disposable overalls that workers have been wearing all day.

Having come from the intensely safety-oriented ethic of the UK nuclear industry, it never ceases to amaze me how easy-going by comparison is the approach of other potentially hazardous industries, like the chemical and fuel industries.

I think this is a case of perception being the driver of peoples' worries, which is presumably why the flasks are so strong and why such play was made in the 80s of crashing a class 45 and three coaches into one at 100mph to demonstrate their suitability to a potentially-sceptical public.

I also think there is a cost factor at work - to transport fuel in containers anything like as strong as nuclear waste's would be prohibitively expensive.

It is stated in the Rule Book that you should, if safe to do so, uncouple vehicles from the train to prevent the fire spreading. If the Driver deemed it necessary and safe to do that then I say fair play to them. They were obviously unable to uncouple the wagons immediately adjacent to the fire but in uncoupling the loco and drawing it forward, they've made a conscious effort to lessen the consequences of the incident. You could argue that given the nature of the dangerous goods being transported at the time that the loco posed a minor risk in comparison however, every little helps and the Driver has taken the right course of action in my opinion.

Agreed (and not just because of your user name!).