Amtrak & CSX collision, South Carolina

[Taunton]

Unfortunately the "treatment" is commonly done by the railway management themselves. Brightline is a Florida East Coast Railway commercial venture, using their tracks which have been there for more than a century, since when the coastal area which was virgin countryside has become dense urban development right up to the unfenced tracks, with multiple level crossings of major wide and busy streets protected by nothing more than AHBs on the vehicle approach side, over which they are running at 80mph.

Given that all that has opened so far is a short stretch between Ft Lauderdale and West Palm Beach, almost a demonstration section, the fatality rate is pretty poor. The railway management attitude that "it's your fault for getting in the way of our trains" will not last - already senior politicians are calling it "victim blaming".

Starting to run through here at 80mph unfenced? The railway claimed "Upgraded crossings", but the upgrade appears to comprise just moving the strike-in point on the tracks further out for higher speed running.

https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@26.5...4!1s0u0nqHf5G6ZTU9D0D8SwxQ!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

and here just along the line is a traffic signal just one vehicle length beyond an AHB barrier. There isn't even any "Caution Do Not Stop On Tracks" standard US roadsign. Can you imagine what an RSSB risk assessment would make of this.

https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@26.4...4!1s--P41SlVA0z2In3g6h8TzA!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

 

[AlexNL]

In a traffic setup like that, why aren't those traffic lights before the LC? I'm assuming that they're not linked to the crossing lights either...

 

[ac6000cw]

Reading all the above I find it both staggering and depressing that the country whose entire creation, expansion and modern history was created by railways should treat its 'favorite son' so poorly.

Unfortunately the majority of Americans probably just regard trains as things that delay them at level crossings - they never ride passenger trains and have little idea of the importance to the economy of the freight they carry.

And despite regular 'lifesaver' campaigns by the railroads and other organisations targeting crossing safety i.e. using them properly, some people just seem to regard 'beating the train' almost as a (very dangerous) sport. Even though I'm only an occasional visitor to the country, I've personally seen two pickup trucks follow each other as they weaved through the barriers just in front of a freight (to the accompaniment of much train horn blaring...)

That said, it does sound very much like Brightline (FEC) needs to install some full-barrier crossings (called 'four-quadrant' crossings in the US), lineside fencing and hard (steel or concrete) lane dividers on the crossing approaches (to discourage weaving around the half barriers). This is all stuff that is in use on the upgraded (to max 110mph operation) lines in the mid-west, so it's readily available equipment and techniques.

 

[ac6000cw]

In a traffic setup like that, why aren't those traffic lights before the LC? I'm assuming that they're not linked to the crossing lights either...

Sometimes they are linked, but they don't always work as well as they should - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Fox_River_Grove_bus–train_collision
and https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pa...n_Elmwood_Park_Illinois_November_23_2005.aspx

 

[b0b]

Sometimes they are linked, but they don't always work as well as they should - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Fox_River_Grove_bus–train_collision
and https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pa...n_Elmwood_Park_Illinois_November_23_2005.aspx

Here is the full report for the Elmwood Park crossing

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAB0803.pdf

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the
Elmwood Park accident was a combination of factors that led to the development of a trafficqueue on the West Grand Avenue highway-rail grade crossing and prevented queued vehiclesfrom exiting the crossing prior to the arrival of a Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad (METRA) train: the factors were the acute angle of intersection between West Grand Avenue and the railroad tracks, which resulted in an exceptionally wide grade crossing; the unusually heavy vehicle traffic that preceded the Thanksgiving holiday; and the complex street and rail pattern and related signal interactions between Harlem Avenue and the West Grand Avenue grade crossing, which frequently desynchronized the traffic signals along West Grand Avenue during peak travel times....

 

[ac6000cw]

An NTSB Safety Recommendation Report "Train Operation During Signal Suspension" has been released - https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations...ce=news&utm_medium=email&utm_content=railroad

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating a head-on collision that
occurred on February 4, 2018, about 2:27 a.m. eastern standard time on the CSX Transportation
(CSX) Columbia Subdivision in Cayce, South Carolina. Southbound Amtrak train 91, operating
on a track warrant, diverted from the main track through a reversed hand-thrown switch into a
siding and collided head-on with stationary CSX local freight train F777 03.

The engineer and conductor of the Amtrak train died as a result of the collision. At least
92 passengers and crewmembers on the Amtrak train were transported to medical facilities. The
engineer of the stopped CSX train had exited the lead locomotive before the Amtrak train entered
the siding, ran to safety, and was not injured. The conductor of the CSX lead locomotive saw the
Amtrak train approaching in the siding and ran to the back of locomotive. The conductor was
thrown off the locomotive and sustained minor injuries.

The normal method of train operation on the subdivision was a traffic control system with
wayside signals. Signal indications authorize movement in either direction. On the day before the
accident, February 3, 2018, CSX signal personnel suspended the traffic control signal system to
install updated traffic control system components for implementing positive train control (PTC)
on the subdivision. During this time, scheduled to last through February 4, 2018, the signals would
not operate and dispatchers would use track warrants to move trains through absolute blocks in the
work territory. Although the installation was only partially complete, the signal personnel stopped
work at the accident location at 7:00 p.m., and the signal suspension remained in place.

Ongoing Investigation

In the current accident in Cayce, South Carolina, as well as in the Granger accident, the
evidence indicates that human decision making and actions likely played key roles in the accident
scenarios. In both accidents, safe movement of the trains through the signal suspension depended
on proper switch alignment, which, in turn, relied on error-free manual work. The risk of error in
the manual work was not safeguarded, either by technology or supervision. Thus, the reliance on
error-free human performance for safe train movement created a single point-of-failure in the
operating practices currently used and in compliance with extant regulations.

The NTSB concludes that additional measures are needed, such as restricted speed, to ensure safe operations
during signal suspensions, especially during the movement of passenger trains, due to the
likelihood of harm to the traveling public.

Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issue
an Emergency Order directing railroads to require that when signal suspensions are in effect and a
switch has been reported relined for a main track, the next train or locomotive to pass the location
must approach the switch location at restricted speed. After the switch position is verified, require
the train crew to report to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track before
trains are permitted to operate at maximum-authorized speed.

Recommendation

As a result of this report, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following
urgent safety recommendation:

To the Federal Railroad Administration:
Issue an Emergency Order directing railroads to require that when signal
suspensions are in effect and a switch has been reported relined for a main track,
the next train or locomotive to pass the location must approach the switch location
at restricted speed. After the switch position is verified, the train crew must report
to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track before trains
are permitted to operate at maximum-authorized speed. (R-18-005) (Urgent)

There is also some historical information about similar accidents (and recommendations) in the document.