Hmm, it still has to get through the Senate so there is still a decent chance that it will be defeated.
Generally though the U.S. has huge issues with the state of its infrastructure.
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AMTRAK Train derailed in Philidelphia USA
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Hmm, it still has to get through the Senate so there is still a decent chance that it will be defeated.
Generally though the U.S. has huge issues with the state of its infrastructure.
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SpacePhoenix
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It's a bit worrying how at least one coach of the train has badly disintegrated in the crash
WessexEclectic
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Apparently it hit one of the catenery supports which are not insubstantial.
ac6000cw
Established Member
It apparently hit a (very substantial) catenery support side-on, which ripped out the side of the coach. There is a lot of energy to dissipate in a 100 mph derailment...
This is a country that considers public transportation to be a form of communism. And the Senate is also controlled by the right wing gun nuts.
edwin_m
Veteran Member
Rather alarming story on the BBC about Amtrak's safety record. Appears to be suggesting that the chance of injury is about 50 times more for travelling the same distance by rail than in France or Germany.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32694447
My Amtrak mileage during four visits in 1985-2000 must be well into the tens of thousands. Which suggests my risk of getting an injury was pretty significant (though it doesn't say how severe an injury - in fact I do recall stubbing my thumb on the luggage rack...).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32694447
My Amtrak mileage during four visits in 1985-2000 must be well into the tens of thousands. Which suggests my risk of getting an injury was pretty significant (though it doesn't say how severe an injury - in fact I do recall stubbing my thumb on the luggage rack...).
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True but the majority isn't as overwhelming so will only need a couple of defections (assuming the entire Senate actually turned out to vote) to swing it around.
It ain't over till the fat lady sings as they say
philabos
Member
ME123 forgive me if I say I think you may have somewhat overstated the issue.
50% of Amtrak's passengers are in the Northeast, in 6% of the the U.S. Continental land mass. Chicago area and the west coast account for another 35%. Not much left for the rest of the country.
Politicians of all stripes are quickly taking advantage of this tragedy to further their talking points. I will not go into the struggles of Positive Train Control, but it is still a,work in progress. We,could,have installed TPWS years ago after it was developed in the UK. I hope PTC does work as advertised, and we do not wind up with a system twice as expensive and half as good as yours. Time will tell.
Even in this case, we could have done more based on the system the Pennsylvania Railroad Installed in the 1950's, but it sadly did not happen.
The lawyer for the engineer has stated the engineer does not remember the accident. The train made an on time departure from Philadelphia, so everything appeared normal only minutes before the accident. Much more will come out as the investigation continues.
50% of Amtrak's passengers are in the Northeast, in 6% of the the U.S. Continental land mass. Chicago area and the west coast account for another 35%. Not much left for the rest of the country.
Politicians of all stripes are quickly taking advantage of this tragedy to further their talking points. I will not go into the struggles of Positive Train Control, but it is still a,work in progress. We,could,have installed TPWS years ago after it was developed in the UK. I hope PTC does work as advertised, and we do not wind up with a system twice as expensive and half as good as yours. Time will tell.
Even in this case, we could have done more based on the system the Pennsylvania Railroad Installed in the 1950's, but it sadly did not happen.
The lawyer for the engineer has stated the engineer does not remember the accident. The train made an on time departure from Philadelphia, so everything appeared normal only minutes before the accident. Much more will come out as the investigation continues.
It always seems to take major accidents to get any sort of safety systems implemented.
Now I can understand to a point why this happens. What price to save one life and all that, but surely a system to prevent speeding, skipping red signals etc, should be a requirement on all railway lines these days? It shouldn't even be something that's debated, bar procuring the right equipment for the best price.
Obviously I'm still rather naive in such matters!
Now I can understand to a point why this happens. What price to save one life and all that, but surely a system to prevent speeding, skipping red signals etc, should be a requirement on all railway lines these days? It shouldn't even be something that's debated, bar procuring the right equipment for the best price.
Obviously I'm still rather naive in such matters!
WatcherZero
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Been a ruling on the 2013 Metro North crash, Driver absolved of criminal blame because he had an undiagnosed Sleep Apnea condition, Amtrak now told to screen for sleeping disorders.
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philabos
Member
Interesting briefing from NTSB today. As we know the train derailed at 102mph after being placed in emergency from 106 mph.
At 65 seconds prior to that event, the train was at 70 mph,
43 seconds at 80 mph
31 seconds at 90 mph
16 seconds at 100 mph
They have reviewed the brake test at Washington and found no exceptions.
A track geometry car passed the site 24 hours before with no problem indicated.
Most of the signals have been tested with no anomalies found.
The engineer has agreed to be interviewed. As reported earlier, he has no memory of the incident or at least did not as of this morning.
More to follow .
At 65 seconds prior to that event, the train was at 70 mph,
43 seconds at 80 mph
31 seconds at 90 mph
16 seconds at 100 mph
They have reviewed the brake test at Washington and found no exceptions.
A track geometry car passed the site 24 hours before with no problem indicated.
Most of the signals have been tested with no anomalies found.
The engineer has agreed to be interviewed. As reported earlier, he has no memory of the incident or at least did not as of this morning.
More to follow .
HSTEd
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Well as I understand it this area is part of the ex Pennsylvannia Railroad 11(12)kV 25Hz power supply system.
That means the supports are not only holding up the overhead equipment, but are probably carrying 138kV feeders above the track.
As can be seen here.
It looks very heavy duty.
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ac6000cw
Established Member
Interesting article from the NYT looking at the state of PTC (Positive Train Control) installation on the NE corridor - http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/u...n-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0
Background to this - some form of PTC on passenger and most freight mainlines was made mandatory in 2008, in the wake of the head-on passenger/freight collision at in the LA area, with a deadline of December 2015 for implementation. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_train_control
Background to this - some form of PTC on passenger and most freight mainlines was made mandatory in 2008, in the wake of the head-on passenger/freight collision at in the LA area, with a deadline of December 2015 for implementation. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_train_control
philabos
Member
The WSJ has an article this morning on the existing signal system.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-...-avoided-by-tweak-to-signal-system-1431622980
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-...-avoided-by-tweak-to-signal-system-1431622980
Story emerging that the train may have been struck prior to the curve:
http://news.yahoo.com/amtrak-ceo-railroad-takes-full-responsibility-crash-062049373--finance.html
"The regional engineer, who was in the same area as the Amtrak train, said his train had been hit by a rock or some other projectile. The conductor heard Brandon Bostian, who was at the Amtrak controls, say the same had happened to his train, according to Sumwalt.
The windshield of the Amtrak train was shattered in the accident but one area of glass had a breakage pattern that could be consistent with being hit by an object and the FBI is investigating"
http://news.yahoo.com/amtrak-ceo-railroad-takes-full-responsibility-crash-062049373--finance.html
"The regional engineer, who was in the same area as the Amtrak train, said his train had been hit by a rock or some other projectile. The conductor heard Brandon Bostian, who was at the Amtrak controls, say the same had happened to his train, according to Sumwalt.
The windshield of the Amtrak train was shattered in the accident but one area of glass had a breakage pattern that could be consistent with being hit by an object and the FBI is investigating"
philabos
Member
At the NTSB briefing today, it was announced the FBI has been brought into the investigation to determine the origin of certain damage to the Amtrak locomotive.
It has been known for several days that a SEPTA train on Track 1 was struck by a rock or bullet at or in the vicinity of the North Philadelphia station. The SEPTA train ( a commuter carrier operating on Amtrak tracks) was taken out of service and passengers bussed onward. There was also a report (still being investigated) that an Amtrak Acela train enroute to Philadelphia and Washington was also struck by projectiles in the area. This train was likely operating on track 3.
The Asst. Conductor on train 188 (the train that derailed) told the NTSB a radio transmission was heard from the SEPTA train that it had been struck. According to the Asst. Conductor, she also heard her engineer (on train 188) say over the radio his locomotive was also being struck. The engineer apparently has no memory of this, but he also does not remember the accident. He does remember passing North Philadelphia, but apparently nothing beyond.
It is now up to the FBI to determine if the windshield damage is the result of flying debris or if the locomotive was indeed struck by flying projectiles.
Although it is now certain the SEPTA train was hit, no determination has been made as to exactly what hit the train. NTSB will await the FBI results and in the meantime review all of the radio exchanges that took place that night.
The engineer told the NTSB that he was not fatigued or ill.
It has been known for several days that a SEPTA train on Track 1 was struck by a rock or bullet at or in the vicinity of the North Philadelphia station. The SEPTA train ( a commuter carrier operating on Amtrak tracks) was taken out of service and passengers bussed onward. There was also a report (still being investigated) that an Amtrak Acela train enroute to Philadelphia and Washington was also struck by projectiles in the area. This train was likely operating on track 3.
The Asst. Conductor on train 188 (the train that derailed) told the NTSB a radio transmission was heard from the SEPTA train that it had been struck. According to the Asst. Conductor, she also heard her engineer (on train 188) say over the radio his locomotive was also being struck. The engineer apparently has no memory of this, but he also does not remember the accident. He does remember passing North Philadelphia, but apparently nothing beyond.
It is now up to the FBI to determine if the windshield damage is the result of flying debris or if the locomotive was indeed struck by flying projectiles.
Although it is now certain the SEPTA train was hit, no determination has been made as to exactly what hit the train. NTSB will await the FBI results and in the meantime review all of the radio exchanges that took place that night.
The engineer told the NTSB that he was not fatigued or ill.
TheNewNo2
Member
America is broken, unfortunately the two sides in politics can't decide what bits are broken, and given there is now zero overlap between the parties (no republican is more liberal than any democrat) it all just gets worse.
Amtrak was set up to fail, I think it was Nixon who created it, and it has passed many many deadlines by which it must be solvent, but no one ever quite got around to just killing it.
The statistics are scary though - passenger miles per injury in France or Germany is in the 4-5million range. In the US it doesn't top 100k. The fact they don't have AWS/TPWS installations is quite scary.
Amtrak was set up to fail, I think it was Nixon who created it, and it has passed many many deadlines by which it must be solvent, but no one ever quite got around to just killing it.
The statistics are scary though - passenger miles per injury in France or Germany is in the 4-5million range. In the US it doesn't top 100k. The fact they don't have AWS/TPWS installations is quite scary.
Tim R-T-C
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Another crash last night, train hit bus stopped on crossing. Insane that this could happen, amazingly no casualties.
http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32771048
http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32771048
Reading NTSB rail reports is also scary. The US is still using 'Staff and Ticket' and individual, non-interlocked, point levers on quite busy freight lines.
Crazy stuff happens like an Amtrack yard being signalled using one set of meaning for the lights and the railway you run on once out of that yard using a quite different set of meanings. There seem to be about 70 different signalling systems in use opertating on around 10 basic principals (I exaggerate).
Crazy stuff happens like an Amtrack yard being signalled using one set of meaning for the lights and the railway you run on once out of that yard using a quite different set of meanings. There seem to be about 70 different signalling systems in use opertating on around 10 basic principals (I exaggerate).
Crossing abuse over there appears to be enormous (not helped but quite a lot of them being open crossings with no barriers). It is lucky that most of their traffic is slow and heavy freight otherwise they'd probably have had a couple of Ufton Nervets by now.
ac6000cw
Established Member
There is actually no 'Staff' - in 'dark' (unsignalled) territory it's usually just 'track warrants' issued verbally over the radio which the crew has to write down (the 'Ticket') and repeat back to the dispatcher (signaller) for confirmation. In reality most mainlines were equipped with CTC or Automatic Block signalling years ago for capacity/efficiency as well as safety reasons.
Maximum speed on unsignalled lines is 49 mph, 79 mph with signalling. Running faster than that requires some form of automatic train stop equipment to be installed. Also installation of modern Positive Train Control (PTC) on most passenger and heavily used freight lines becomes mandatory by the end of this year - although that looks likely to slip for various reasons including availability of radio spectrum space.
The level (grade) crossing abuse is by far the biggest safety problem on US railroads....
londonbridge
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Just seen this one on the BBC News Channel, surely this is the drivers fault for moving on to the crossing when presumably he could see there wasn't enough room for him to clear it?
Ploughman
Established Member
I wonder how many passengers have taken note of the Advert and phone number on the side of the bus at about 0.50 secs?
philabos
Member
Media reporting the FBI and NTSB to meet tomorrow. Amtrak service to resume tomorrow with full schedule.
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Nationwide, US railroads, both freight and passenger, are embroiled in difficulties implementing a huge federally mandated project for advanced radio based positive train control systems, achieving what Europeans would call ATP functionality, but sadly according to this report: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/u...onths-away-from-installing-safety-system.html it seems modern radio-based PTC for the North East Corridor had already been largely designed and built but the equipment had lain idle for FOUR YEARS pending resolution of a dispute over rights to use certain radio frequencies. As demonstrated by the 2013 Santiago de Compostella tragedy in Spain and the Metro North Bronx derailment the same year, perhaps this latest Amtrack Philadelphia derailment might also have been prevented by a little more intelligent use of legacy technologies that already exist and are in extensive use.
The Spanish Santiago de Compostella incident, like Philadelphia involved over-speeding in a tight curve, and was at least partly a result of authorities deciding it wasn't worth the effort to properly configure the trackside safety protection systems at a high risk transition between the new line and the old line just before the sharp curve, for a temporary interim stage of a major new line project. in the absence of the final ETCS, a legacy warning and protection system was present in the transition area but was only used for signal protection not for static speed restrictions, although there were known methods for configuring the system for that purpose. However as with many rail organisations Spanish railways were reluctant to extend the use of the legacy system to protecting static speed restrictions for curves for example, perhaps seeing it as costly 'scope creep' or, as with early BR AWS at speed restriction warning boards in the 1950s, considering it 'too confusing' for the driver. Consequentially there was no warning and no intervention approaching the curve, nor did the second driver in the cab notice the mistake. Tellingly, within days of the incident technicians had completed fitting the legacy trackside protection systems for the speed restriction.
The Metro North (MN) Bronx derailment in December 2013 was also not prevented by safety systems, despite the trains having an effective speed control system, designed to positively control trains on approach to signals and stop them if they pass reds - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulse_code_cab_signaling . These systems use a range of pulse codes at varying frequencies superimposed on the track circuit voltage used for train detection. On entering a new track section at an insulated boundary joint, an inductive sensor at the front of the train picks up the pulse frequency just before the first axle shorts out the rail voltage and equipment on the train processes it accordingly. Unfortunately, despite every cab on Metro North being fitted with this technology there was an institutional reluctance at that particular railroad, unlike the nearby Long Island Railroad (LIRR), to use the system for enforcing static speed limits not related to dynamic signalling states, such as those on curves. Nevertheless, within days of the incident technicians were out installing the appropriate code generator modules for the particular track circuits on the curve and its approaches.
The Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR) invented the original pulse code system in the 1920s. What is now referred to as Amtrack's North East Corridor (NEC) was once PRR property and unsurprisingly the infrastructure and all the trains that run on it are equipped with the pulse code system. Amtrack started to use the pulse codes to enforce civil speed limits on the NEC in the 1990s, supplemented by a new transponder based system from 2000 that enables the Acela trains to run at up to 150MPH, but the fitment was confined to what were considered the most dangerous speed restrictions. The southbound track at the crash site made the grade because of the longer, higher speed (110MPH) straight approach, but the northbound failed the investment criteria because all Amtrack trains stop or go slowly through Philadelphia and their typical achievable speed, on re-accelerating and reaching the curve was assumed to be within an acceptable safe range.
Justifying not fitting of this automatic train control (ATC) system based on likely achievable speed of rolling stock of the time (1990s) perhaps left a dangerous trap for when future trains arrived having better acceleration, as I think was demonstrated at Frankford Junction tragically. The almost brand new Amtrack City Sprinter locomotive involved: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amtrak_Cities_Sprinter is capable of developing extraordinary feats of short-term power and tractive effort output across a wide speed range, and was built to be able to accelerate eighteen Amfleet cars from 0 to 125MPH within eight minutes. The derailed train was only seven cars so might have been up to 100MPH within two or three minutes, and with that kind of performance it's worth exploiting it for a short burst of higher speed sprinting after the station stop before having to brake sharply again for the curve. With older less powerful trains, it may not have been worth trying for the top speed until after the curve.
So better performance may have changed the safety assumptions. Perhaps that was tolerated under the assumption the new radio PTC should have been in operation by now, although in that case some of the more dangerous 'borderline fail' sites should have been reconsidered for the old system once it was known how late the new system delivery might be. Amtrak has now been ordered by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to install the old ATC system at the crash site and reassess other speed restriction sites along the route. The new northbound speed restriction at Frankford Junction has been set at 45MPH, which corresponds to one of the original standard pulse codes. The legacy system has now been installed within days, just as in the aftermath of the MN Bronx incident.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b49d57c-fc8f-11e4-800d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3aXKl0aF9
Here is an interesting paper on NEC protection systems:
https://www.arema.org/files/library/2001_Conference_Proceedings/00022.pdf
The Spanish Santiago de Compostella incident, like Philadelphia involved over-speeding in a tight curve, and was at least partly a result of authorities deciding it wasn't worth the effort to properly configure the trackside safety protection systems at a high risk transition between the new line and the old line just before the sharp curve, for a temporary interim stage of a major new line project. in the absence of the final ETCS, a legacy warning and protection system was present in the transition area but was only used for signal protection not for static speed restrictions, although there were known methods for configuring the system for that purpose. However as with many rail organisations Spanish railways were reluctant to extend the use of the legacy system to protecting static speed restrictions for curves for example, perhaps seeing it as costly 'scope creep' or, as with early BR AWS at speed restriction warning boards in the 1950s, considering it 'too confusing' for the driver. Consequentially there was no warning and no intervention approaching the curve, nor did the second driver in the cab notice the mistake. Tellingly, within days of the incident technicians had completed fitting the legacy trackside protection systems for the speed restriction.
The Metro North (MN) Bronx derailment in December 2013 was also not prevented by safety systems, despite the trains having an effective speed control system, designed to positively control trains on approach to signals and stop them if they pass reds - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulse_code_cab_signaling . These systems use a range of pulse codes at varying frequencies superimposed on the track circuit voltage used for train detection. On entering a new track section at an insulated boundary joint, an inductive sensor at the front of the train picks up the pulse frequency just before the first axle shorts out the rail voltage and equipment on the train processes it accordingly. Unfortunately, despite every cab on Metro North being fitted with this technology there was an institutional reluctance at that particular railroad, unlike the nearby Long Island Railroad (LIRR), to use the system for enforcing static speed limits not related to dynamic signalling states, such as those on curves. Nevertheless, within days of the incident technicians were out installing the appropriate code generator modules for the particular track circuits on the curve and its approaches.
The Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR) invented the original pulse code system in the 1920s. What is now referred to as Amtrack's North East Corridor (NEC) was once PRR property and unsurprisingly the infrastructure and all the trains that run on it are equipped with the pulse code system. Amtrack started to use the pulse codes to enforce civil speed limits on the NEC in the 1990s, supplemented by a new transponder based system from 2000 that enables the Acela trains to run at up to 150MPH, but the fitment was confined to what were considered the most dangerous speed restrictions. The southbound track at the crash site made the grade because of the longer, higher speed (110MPH) straight approach, but the northbound failed the investment criteria because all Amtrack trains stop or go slowly through Philadelphia and their typical achievable speed, on re-accelerating and reaching the curve was assumed to be within an acceptable safe range.
Justifying not fitting of this automatic train control (ATC) system based on likely achievable speed of rolling stock of the time (1990s) perhaps left a dangerous trap for when future trains arrived having better acceleration, as I think was demonstrated at Frankford Junction tragically. The almost brand new Amtrack City Sprinter locomotive involved: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amtrak_Cities_Sprinter is capable of developing extraordinary feats of short-term power and tractive effort output across a wide speed range, and was built to be able to accelerate eighteen Amfleet cars from 0 to 125MPH within eight minutes. The derailed train was only seven cars so might have been up to 100MPH within two or three minutes, and with that kind of performance it's worth exploiting it for a short burst of higher speed sprinting after the station stop before having to brake sharply again for the curve. With older less powerful trains, it may not have been worth trying for the top speed until after the curve.
So better performance may have changed the safety assumptions. Perhaps that was tolerated under the assumption the new radio PTC should have been in operation by now, although in that case some of the more dangerous 'borderline fail' sites should have been reconsidered for the old system once it was known how late the new system delivery might be. Amtrak has now been ordered by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to install the old ATC system at the crash site and reassess other speed restriction sites along the route. The new northbound speed restriction at Frankford Junction has been set at 45MPH, which corresponds to one of the original standard pulse codes. The legacy system has now been installed within days, just as in the aftermath of the MN Bronx incident.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b49d57c-fc8f-11e4-800d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3aXKl0aF9
Here is an interesting paper on NEC protection systems:
https://www.arema.org/files/library/2001_Conference_Proceedings/00022.pdf
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WatcherZero
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FBI/NTSB has ruled out firearm damage and states there is no evidence the damage was caused prior to the crash. They also found no communication from the train driver that it had been hit which the conductor claimed to have overheard.
philabos
Member
The Transportation Secretary was questioned about the legacy PRR system this morning.
Hopefully this will display in the UK.
http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/transportation-secy--we-need-more-investment-447018563767
Hopefully this will display in the UK.
http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/transportation-secy--we-need-more-investment-447018563767
Yes it worked! Interesting report. Got right to the point on ATC. I note from the following report that four of the injured are now suing Amtrak over that very issue.
I suspect there are many places like this in Britain as well, a straight bit with a 60 limit, with much traffic doing less, and then a curve which you can't take at more than 60, but there's no protection against someone who barrels it up to 100 mph on that restricted straight bit.
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