Austria rail accident

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Adlington

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English link (Euronews)
One woman was killed and 22 were left injured after two passenger trains collided in the southeastern state of Styria. Three children are among the injured.

The crash, involving a EuroCity cross-border train and a regional train, took place just before 1pm CET in Niklasdorf town near Leoben.

The route between Bruck/Mur - Leoben is suspended until further notice.
 

LNW-GW Joint

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I think it's the daily Graz-Saarbrücken service (EC216 Dachstein), which when I saw it a couple of years ago was a DB loco-hauled IC set.
The local train seems to have been on the S8 route.
More pictures here: https://diepresse.com/home/panorama...llision-im-Bahnhof-Niklasdorf#slide-5370417-9
Seems to have been a flank collision.
It's a double-track route according to the Schweers atlas.
The local would have been stopping at Nicklasdorf, the express passing through.
EC216 train composition: http://www.vagonweb.cz/razeni/vlak.php?zeme=OeBB&kategorie=EC&cislo=216&nazev=Dachstein&rok=2018
 
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D365

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I don’t have any ill meaning in the slightest, but this seems like the latest in a spate of high-profile European train crashes.

Though I would say this looks especially odd. And yes that looks like [the remanents of] a DB set.
 

43096

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Standard DB IC push-pull set involved forming EC216 (101011 was the loco) and one of the new Siemens "CityJets" is the local service.
 

MarkyT

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This may have similarities to the incident at Rafz in Switzerland during 2015. At first glance it looks like the modern fast accelerating local unit has started from rest at a platform, accelerated, passed a red and crashed into the side of an unseen express passing through in the same direction on an adjacent track at a merging junction. At Rafz, the train protection system, although provided and working correctly was unable to prevent the collision following the local train's departure, because the emergency braking only engaged on passing the red signal by which time sufficient momentum had been gained to not be able to stop before the merging point of the tracks.
 

Bletchleyite

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This may have similarities to the incident at Rafz in Switzerland during 2015. At first glance it looks like the modern fast accelerating local unit has started from rest at a platform, accelerated, passed a red and crashed into the side of an unseen express passing through in the same direction on an adjacent track at a merging junction. At Rafz, the train protection system, although provided and working correctly was unable to prevent the collision following the local train's departure, because the emergency braking only engaged on passing the red signal by which time sufficient momentum had been gained to not be able to stop before the merging point of the tracks.
Interesting...do they not have signal overlaps to prevent this in the way we do?
 

MarkyT

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Interesting...do they not have signal overlaps to prevent this in the way we do?
Don't forget that overlaps time out eventually, or may not have been active in the first place because the train starting away now entered the platform in the other direction. As in Rafz, I see here in Austria a short platform in the middle of a long block with signals a significant distance ahead of the normal stopping position. In Rafz the local train had reversed at the platform which had reset the on board train protection. When opening the opposite end cab the train then had no speed protection applied and could be driven at unlimited pace towards the protecting signal and only on passing this got the trainstop intervention. There was in that case some 80m between signal and fouling point, but the high performance unit had already reached too high a speed to stop in time. SBB quickly introduced a new rule that, on reversing, all trains would be limited to a blanket speed restriction (40kph I think) until protection and warning systems are properly engaged at the first transponder encountered.
 

Jan

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Interesting...do they not have signal overlaps to prevent this in the way we do?
Don't forget that overlaps time out eventually, or may not have been active in the first place because the train starting away now entered the platform in the other direction.
Austria used to have longer overlaps similar to Germany, but since quite some time the minimum length was changed down to 50 m in order to avoid overlaps extending across sets of points.
But also what MarkyT said - even longer overlaps don't help if the they've already timed out after a station stop or if a train was reversing.

In addition, unlike Germany there never was a mass-programme of fitting additional 500 Hz PZB inductors in places where there is a danger of trains accelerating against a station starter showing danger, originally triggered by the relatively similar accident in Rüsselsheim in 1990 (!) [1] and the corresponding upgrade of the Indusi train protection system to PZB90 still isn't mandatory if I'm not mistaken (although trains delivered in the last few years should finally have PZB90 by default I think, even in Austria).

[1] A suburban S-Bahn train accelerated against a signal showing danger and the combination of a quick-accelerating train and relatively long distance between platform and signal meant that when it reached the signal it was travelling much too fast to stop in time before colliding with another S-Bahn crossing its path in the opposite direction.
 

MarkyT

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In addition, unlike Germany there never was a mass-programme of fitting additional 500 Hz PZB inductors in places where there is a danger of trains accelerating against a station starter showing danger
I didn't know DB provided those. It's a similar function to additional UK TPWS overspeed loops provided where there's an appreciable distance between a normal stopping position and the signal ahead protecting a junction. With TPWS, once you've passed succesfully under an overspeed trap (OSS) in the normal position on approach to a red, there no further restriction on speed applied at all. At least with Indusi there's a persistent distance-based speed restriction applied, no matter how long you stop at the station, as long as you continue in the same direction, so I guess Germany doesn't need quite so many of these extra fill-in transponders as UK, probably mainly only where reversing regularly takes place?. How does PZB90 improve on this?
 

Jan

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It was not just additional fill-in 500 Hz inductors, but also providing one at all in the first place - before that, they were use somewhat more sparingly.

The major difference of PZB90 is the so-called "restrictive mode": Looking at the speeds normally applicable for passenger trains for example, a 1000 Hz activation normally enforces a braking curve down to a speed of 85 km/h. Now if with PZB90 the train comes to a stop (or just crawls along very slowly) while still within the 1000 Hz supervision, this speed limit decreases to 45 km/h. The same happens after passing a 500 Hz inductor - the normal supervised braking curve is 65 down to 45 km/h, but after a stop this decreases to 25 km/h.

Operationally it's of course not the ideal solution, as this causes some slowdowns because of trains having to run at at restricted speeds a little longer even after the signal clears, but on the flip side for a legacy train protection system it's a quite effective solution for ensuring that after a stop (with the overlap having potentially timed out) trains cannot approach a signal potentially showing danger too fast.
 

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