One woman was killed and 22 were left injured after two passenger trains collided in the southeastern state of Styria. Three children are among the injured.
The crash, involving a EuroCity cross-border train and a regional train, took place just before 1pm CET in Niklasdorf town near Leoben.
The route between Bruck/Mur - Leoben is suspended until further notice.
Interesting...do they not have signal overlaps to prevent this in the way we do?This may have similarities to the incident at Rafz in Switzerland during 2015. At first glance it looks like the modern fast accelerating local unit has started from rest at a platform, accelerated, passed a red and crashed into the side of an unseen express passing through in the same direction on an adjacent track at a merging junction. At Rafz, the train protection system, although provided and working correctly was unable to prevent the collision following the local train's departure, because the emergency braking only engaged on passing the red signal by which time sufficient momentum had been gained to not be able to stop before the merging point of the tracks.
Don't forget that overlaps time out eventually, or may not have been active in the first place because the train starting away now entered the platform in the other direction. As in Rafz, I see here in Austria a short platform in the middle of a long block with signals a significant distance ahead of the normal stopping position. In Rafz the local train had reversed at the platform which had reset the on board train protection. When opening the opposite end cab the train then had no speed protection applied and could be driven at unlimited pace towards the protecting signal and only on passing this got the trainstop intervention. There was in that case some 80m between signal and fouling point, but the high performance unit had already reached too high a speed to stop in time. SBB quickly introduced a new rule that, on reversing, all trains would be limited to a blanket speed restriction (40kph I think) until protection and warning systems are properly engaged at the first transponder encountered.Interesting...do they not have signal overlaps to prevent this in the way we do?
Austria used to have longer overlaps similar to Germany, but since quite some time the minimum length was changed down to 50 m in order to avoid overlaps extending across sets of points.Don't forget that overlaps time out eventually, or may not have been active in the first place because the train starting away now entered the platform in the other direction.Interesting...do they not have signal overlaps to prevent this in the way we do?
I didn't know DB provided those. It's a similar function to additional UK TPWS overspeed loops provided where there's an appreciable distance between a normal stopping position and the signal ahead protecting a junction. With TPWS, once you've passed succesfully under an overspeed trap (OSS) in the normal position on approach to a red, there no further restriction on speed applied at all. At least with Indusi there's a persistent distance-based speed restriction applied, no matter how long you stop at the station, as long as you continue in the same direction, so I guess Germany doesn't need quite so many of these extra fill-in transponders as UK, probably mainly only where reversing regularly takes place?. How does PZB90 improve on this?In addition, unlike Germany there never was a mass-programme of fitting additional 500 Hz PZB inductors in places where there is a danger of trains accelerating against a station starter showing danger
From Drehscheibe-online:The only English language link I found wAs this.
Hence my hesitation.