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Court Finds Guard Followed Instructions After Accident At Chorley Station on 21/02/10

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AntoniC

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A court has found that a Guard followed instructions after an intoxicated passenger suffered life changing injuries following an incident at Chorley staion.

The court found that the Guard correctly followed all the instructions in the Rule Book.

The passenger sued First/Keolis Transpennine Limited and lost.

He then appealed the decision and lost.

Here is the Court Of Appeal Decison :
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY)
HIS HONOUR JUDGE GORE QC
SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Claim No 3MA90050


Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

17/01/18
B e f o r e :


____________________

Between:
IAN WHITING

Appellant
- and -



FIRST/KEOLIS TRANSPENNINE LIMITED


Respondent

____________________

Susan Rodway QC (instructed by Glassbrooks Limited) for the Appellant
Michael Rawlinson QC (instructed by Transportation Claims Limited)

for the Respondent
Hearing date: 7 December 2017

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
____________________

Crown Copyright ©


  1. Lord Justice Hickinbottom :

    Introduction
  2. [2017] EWCA Civ 201, in which he reviewed previous authorities including Fage UK Limited v Chobani UK Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at [114]-[115], and confirmed at [28] that appellate courts will not interfere with findings of fact by trial judges "unless compelled to do so". The approach was perhaps most elegantly described by Laws LJ in Subesh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 56 at [44]:


    "The burden so assumed [by the appellant] is not the burden of proof normally carried by a claimant in first instance proceedings where there are factual disputes. As appellant, if he is to succeed, he must persuade the appeal court or tribunal not merely that a different view of the facts from that taken below is reasonable and possible, but that there are objective grounds upon which the court ought to conclude that a different view is the right one. The divide between these positions is not caught by the difference between a perceived error and a disagreement. In either case the appeal court disagrees with the court below, and, indeed, may express itself in such terms. The true distinction is between the case where an appeal court might prefer a different view (perhaps on marginal grounds) and one where it concludes that the process of reasoning, and the application of the relevant law, require it to adopt a different view. The burden which an appellant assumes is to show that the case falls within this latter category." (emphasis in the original).
  3. [2002] EWCA Civ 1052, upon which Ms Rodway relied, the Court of Appeal found that the first instance judge had erred in rejecting agreed expert evidence as to that father's damaged personality and continuing emotional and psychological instability, on the basis of his own impression of the father's personality and stability gained from his performance in the witness box.

  4. [2003] EWCA Civ 1223; [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 331 at [42], in relation to the circumstances in which the court may reject the evidence of a single joint expert (but applicable to a situation in which more than one expert instructed by the parties are agreed):


    "All depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. For example, the joint expert may be the only witness on a particular topic, as for instance where the facts on which he expresses an opinion are agreed. In such circumstances it is difficult to envisage a case in which it would be appropriate to decide this case on the basis that the expert's opinion was wrong. More often, however, the expert's opinion will be only part of the evidence in the case. For example, the assumptions upon which the expert gave his opinion may prove to be incorrect by the time the judge has heard all the evidence of fact. In that event the opinion of the expert may no longer be relevant, although it is to be hoped that all relevant assumptions of fact will be put to the expert because the court will or may otherwise be left without expert evidence on what may be a significant question in the case. However, at the end of the trial the duty of the court is to apply the burden of proof and to find the facts having regard to all the evidence in the case, which will or may include both evidence of fact and evidence of opinion which may interrelate."
    In that case, the Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge because there was no rational explanation for the way the accident upon which the claim was founded could have happened on the trial judge's findings of fact.
  5. However, here, Judge Gore had direct evidence from Mr Stitt as to where and how the Appellant was standing when he looked down the platform for the last time before retiring to his guard's cab and signalling to the driver to move the train away, i.e. by the wall without evincing any intention to move away from the wall prior to the train's departure. The judge was, undoubtedly, entitled to accept that evidence. He was also entitled to accept the evidence that, normally, the time taken between final re-entry into his cab from the platform and the train moving away was under 10 seconds, and there was nothing unusual about the train's dispatch that day. He was certainly entitled to conclude that that period was considerably less than the 23 seconds it would have taken the Appellant to walk from his position at the wall to the gap between carriages 4 and 5. These were the crucial findings which led the judge to conclude on all the evidence before him that, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant did indeed fall between carriages 3 and 4.

  6. Neither those intermediary findings of fact nor the final conclusion were perverse, as being contrary to agreed expert evidence. None of the experts said that, in terms of their own discipline of medicine or engineering, it was impossible for the Appellant to have fallen between carriage 3 and 4. They simply said that, on the basis of the information with which they had been provided (notably the injuries the Appellant suffered and the train's undercarriage furniture) it was more likely than not that he fell between carriages 4 and 5. That opinion was a matter which the judge was required to take into account in determining, on the basis of all the evidence before him, whether the Appellant had shown on the balance of probabilities that he had fallen there; but it did not, in itself, determine that issue. Their opinion may – and almost certainly would – have been different had they been asked to proceed on the assumption that the Appellant was at the wall when Mr Stitt looked down the platform, about 10 seconds prior to the train moving away.

  7. In determining the issue of where the Appellant fell, the judge did not ignore the expert evidence. Rather, he clearly took it into account.

  8. In paragraphs 20-23 of his judgment, he considered the engineering evidence. In respect of Mr Rennie, the judge noted that he had not indicated that he considered it more likely that the Appellant had fallen between carriages 4 and 5 until his oral evidence (save, apparently, for an unrecorded indication at the joint experts' meeting). He also noted Mr Rennie's concession that, even with his feet on the line, the Appellant could have been leaning over to his left to such an extent that the undercarriage furniture would have passed over his body. The judge recorded Mr Mottram as being unconvinced that the Appellant had fallen between carriages 4 and 5, but he would defer to the medical experts insofar as conclusions could be drawn from the evidence of injuries.

  9. The judge dealt with the medical evidence in paragraphs 24-26. He noted that Dr Hulse was firm and consistent in his view that the Appellant had probably fallen between carriages 4 and 5, because of the likelihood that, if he had fallen between carriages 3 and 4 the undercarriage furniture (notably the obstacle deflector and ladder) would have hit his body such that his feet would not have been in the position on the line that led to the amputation injuries he suffered to his feet. However, in paragraph 24 of his judgment, the judge referred to a number of variables that might have affected the likelihood of the fall being between carriages 4 and 5 – notably the Appellant's physiology – and the possibility, accepted by Dr Hulse, of the Appellant having been leaned over to the left, which would have reduced the risk of him being hit by the furniture under the front of carriage 4. The accident which occurred was the result of dynamics, the precise circumstances of which are unknown. In any event, Dr Hulse did not rule out the possibility of the fall being between carriages 3 and 4.

  10. The expert evidence also went to some other issues – to which I shall shortly come – but the judge clearly had very well in mind the evidence of the experts that, on the basis of the injuries received by the Appellant to his feet and the undercarriage furniture, it was more likely that he had fallen between carriages 4 and 5; and took that into account in concluding on the basis of all the evidence, but particularly that of Mr Stitt, that it was between carriage 3 and 4.

  11. The other evidence upon which Ms Rodway relies in support of her submission that the judge's finding that the Appellant fell between carriages 3 and 4 was one that he could not properly make, was as follows.


    Trainers
  12. Ms Rodway submitted to Judge Gore that inferences could be drawn as to where the Appellant fell from where his trainers were found. The best evidence as to the location of the trainers as found on the tracks was, she submitted, from Mr Wilcock. He said that he had appreciated the potential importance of the position of the shoes, and had placed them on the platform adjacent to where he had found them on the tracks. No one had plotted where he put them; but someone had, after the event, placed the yellow arrows on the exhibits to his statements, where I have described (see paragraph 20 above). In his oral evidence, Mr Wilcock confirmed those positions, to within a few feet (see paragraph 21 above); and the judge said that he accepted Mr Wilcock's evidence "in its entirety" (paragraph 14 of his judgment). The agreed expert evidence was that the forward-moving train would not have kicked back the trainers, southwards, by more than a metre. The position of the trainers on the track were therefore inconsistent with the Appellant having fallen between carriages 3 and 4: the trainers were found too far south for that. The judge's finding as to the place of the fall was incompatible with this evidence.

  13. The judge dealt with the issue in paragraphs 15-16 of his judgment. He was not persuaded that the evidence as to where the Appellant's trainers were found provided a basis upon which any inference could be drawn as to where he had fallen, for four reasons, namely, in the judge's own words:


    "(1) No steps were taken by anyone to plot or mark or measure the locations of the trainers…; Mr Wilcock only confirms the positions in his oral testimony… as 'an approximation'.(2) Although he says he was careful because he thought the police might regard positions as relevant, it was a dark, dank night and, even though no one challenged that all the lights were working, I am far from satisfied that retrieval was as precise as has been suggested.(3) There is no evidence to confirm that these were the [Appellant's] trainers or even that they were a pair, although Mr Wilcock asserted them to have been a pair in his statement to the [police].(4) There is no evidence as to which trainer lay where. By that I mean which one was the right trainer and which one was the left."
  14. I accept that there is force in Ms Rodway's argument that the judge was incorrect to suggest that the trainers may not have been the Appellants (because his wife, who saw them, referred to them as being "his"); and also that there may have been some relevance as to which trainer (right or left) lay furthest south and/or, in paragraph 16, as to possible throw back.

  15. However, the judge's first and main reason for not attaching any significant evidential weight to the trainers was that he was unpersuaded that the evidence as to where they were found was reliable. As he said, at the time, no steps were taken to plot where they were found; and Mr Wilcock could only confirm that the yellow arrow markings on the photograph were "an approximation". In his oral evidence, he said that the markings were accurate to within "a few feet"; but that has to be treated with some considerable caution, because he accepted that the place marked on the same photograph as where he found the Appellant on the tracks – on any view, a more important locus – was wrong by some yards. Ms Rodway emphasised the judge's statement that he accepted Mr Wilcock's evidence "in its entirety"; but it is clear from considering his judgment as a whole that he did not consider reliable Mr Wilcock's evidence that the yellow arrows purporting to show where the Appellant's trainers were found were no more than a "few feet" out from where the shoes were in fact found. I do not consider that literal internal inconsistency in the judgment to be of any moment.

  16. Both Counsel cross-examined the expert engineers on the basis that the trainers did not assist in identifying where the Appellant had fallen, because of the unreliability of the evidence as to where they were found (see 16 February 2016 transcript, page 24B and 42B). Indeed, Ms Rodway confirmed that, in her view, the judge could derive no assistance from the position of the trainers (ibid, page 42F). In any event, the judge was clearly entitled to consider the evidence as to the locations where the trainers were found was unreliable; and thus to discount the value of the trainers as he did.


    The Distance the Appellant was Dragged or Thrown
  17. In his oral evidence, as I have described, Mr Wilcock denied that he had found the Appellant where the exhibit to his statement showed: he said he had found him on the tracks adjacent to the billboard. Ms Rodway submitted that the judge erred in finding that the Appellant had been dragged or thrown 30 feet (from the gap between carriages 3 and 4) as a result of the impact of the train, but could not have been dragged or thrown 100 feet (from the gap between carriages 4 and 5), was not a finding open to him, because Dr Hulse had said that it was not possible to draw any conclusion either way as to the distance he had been dragged or thrown. Dr Hulse indicated that the thick winter jacket being worn by the Appellant would have protected him to an extent. That evidence was not challenged, and Dr Metcalf was not questioned on that issue.

  18. At paragraph 26 of his judgment, the judge referred to that evidence of Dr Hulse, but continued:


    "However, in my judgment, unaided by any evidence from the doctors who do not address the point any more than I have recorded, the other injuries do not seem to be consistent with being dragged or thrown 100 feet by a moving train but are more consistent with being dragged or thrown the more modest distance of 30-odd feet from the starting point of the gap between the carriages 3 and 4 and the final resting place of the [Appellant's body] as described by Mr Wilcock. I also rely for that conclusion on the fact that, if, as is agreed, the [Appellant] fell when the train was stationary or just starting to move, its speed would not have yet been particularly great even though its injurious momentum, which would have been derived from the combination of its speed and its massive weight, would, in my judgment, have been sufficient to cause the traumatic injuries described…".
  19. I accept that this is not as finely worded as it might have been. However, in context, it seems to me that the judge was certainly not excluding the possibility of a fall between carriages 3 and 4 on this basis alone; but merely saying that, on all the evidence, the Appellant might have been expected to have suffered more widespread injuries if he had been dragged or thrown 100 feet, rather than 30 feet, by a train. It seems to me that the judge was simply making a common sense comment, rather than drawing a technical medical conclusion. But, in any event, this was not within the core reasoning of the judge. Insofar as he exceeded his role by making such a conclusion without appropriate supporting medical evidence, I do not consider that it was material to his ultimate finding in relation to where the Appellant fell, which was primarily based upon the evidence of Mr Stitt which he accepted.


    The Appellant's Thigh Injury
  20. Ms Rodway submitted that Judge Gore erred in concluding that it was "highly improbable" that the injury to the Appellant's right thigh was caused by a fall between carriages 4 and 5, when this formed no part of the evidence, yet alone conclusions, of the medical experts.

  21. However, I consider this criticism of the judge unfair. I appreciate that neither medical expert said in terms that the thigh injury was inconsistent with the Appellant falling and incurring injuries in the gap between carriages 4 and 5; and also that the medical experts considered that, if the undercarriage furniture had struck the Appellant's leg before the wheel struck him, then he would have been moved from the position that led to the particular injuries that he suffered to his feet. However, in paragraph 25 of his judgment, the judge carefully went through the evidence concerning the injury to the Appellant's thigh. He accepted, as he was entitled to do, Dr Hulse's evidence that this must have occurred at the same time as the injuries to his feet: Dr Metcalf expressed no view on that issue. The judge concluded that, although the precise dynamics might not be clear, the injury to the thigh was more likely to have been caused by the metal furniture under the front of carriage 4, rather than all of the injuries being caused by the furniture under the rear of carriage 6, which was the next batch of such furniture to pass over the Appellant. All the injuries being caused by carriage 6 postulated that he had placed his feet on the line only immediately prior to the rear wheels of carriage 6 passing him. That was a fully reasoned conclusion which the judge was entitled to reach.


    Blood on the tracks
  22. Ms Rodway submitted that the judge gave disproportionate weight to the evidence of the Appellant's wife, which was read out at trial as agreed, with regard to where she saw blood on the rail tracks. She visited the scene whilst the Appellant was still there waiting for an ambulance. Her statement said that, when the paramedics were treating her husband on the platform north of the billboard, she looked down and saw blood on the nearside track; and she was "pretty sure this was just before the billboard". Ms Rodway submits that there was no evidence as to whether that blood related to the place of the original injury, or (e.g.) the place to where he may have been dragged.

  23. There is nothing of force in this submission. In paragraph 14 of his judgment, the judge relies upon Mrs Whiting's evidence merely by way of confirmation of Mr Wilcock's evidence that the Appellant had been found adjacent to the billboard, about one-third northwards of its southernmost edge. It is simply not arguable that the judge erred in the way in which he treated the evidence of the Appellant's wife.


    Timings
  24. Ms Rodway submitted that, as Mr Stitt was unreliable as to the time it took for the Appellant to walk from the train to the wall – he said it took 3-4 seconds, although it was 30m and would have taken at least about 23 seconds – the judge was wrong to rely on his evidence that the time between him re-entering his car for the last time and the train moving away was only 6-7 seconds. There could easily have been a period of 23 seconds or more, she submitted, i.e. time enough for the Appellant to walk from the wall and fall between carriages 4 and 5.

  25. However, in this regard, although the judge did accept Mr Stitt's evidence that it took only about 6-7 secs (paragraph 31 of his judgment), he did not rely only on that evidence. He had evidence from Mr Mottram that this period was typically about 9 secs. The judge was right to say (as he did in paragraphs 13 and 27 of his judgment) that there was no evidence of any delay, or that the train lingered in the platform any longer than usual; and he was entitled to find that the train was dispatched promptly. His essential finding in paragraph 27 of his judgment was that the period between Mr Stitt's final re-entry into his cab and the train moving off was much less than the 23 seconds it would have taken for the Appellant to have walked from the wall to the gap between carriages 4 and 5. On all the evidence, he was entitled to make that finding.


    Ground 26
  26. Ms Rodway criticises the judge for failing to deal with what she refers to as "the obvious conflict in Mr Stitt's evidence" between him saying that he looked out of the closed window to see the platform was clear when he himself accepted that he could see very little of the platform through the closed window. The experts were agreed that he could have seen none of the platform beyond carriage 5. However, there was no inherent inconsistency in Mr Stitt's evidence in this regard: and the judge did deal with this issue in paragraph 32 of his judgment. He said that Mr Stitt's evidence was that he did look out of the closed window, but accepted that he could not see the whole of the platform. I consider below whether Mr Stitt was under any duty to open the window and look out of it (see paragraphs 58 and following); but, if he was not, then I do not consider there is any force in this minor point arising out of Mr Stitt's evidence. Certainly, I do not consider that the judge can properly be criticised for the way in which he dealt with it.

  27. For those reasons, in my judgment, on all of the evidence taken as a whole, Judge Gore was entitled to accept the evidence of Mr Stitt and to find that (i) when Mr Stitt looked down the platform immediately prior to closing his own guard's cab door and signalling to the driver to move away, he saw the Appellant at the wall, giving no indication that he would move away from the wall towards the train; and (ii) between Mr Stitt closing the door and the train moving away, the Appellant walked to, and fell in, the gap between carriages 3 and 4. Those findings were not perverse – as findings no judge could properly make on the evidence – either because they controverted the agreed expert evidence, or because the evidence taken as a whole did not permit such findings. Indeed, in my view, Ms Rodway has fallen some way short of putting a persuasive case that this court is compelled to interfere with the factual findings made by the judge, upon which his conclusion to dismiss the claim was based

  28. That leaves the remnants of the systemic challenge. Ms Rodway submitted that, having checked the platform before re-entering his guard's cab from the platform for the last time, Mr Stitt should have wound down his window and put his head out of it, so that he could see the whole of the platform. Had he done so, he would have seen the Appellant move away from the wall towards the train. Mr Stitt accepted that, had he seen the Appellant move thus, he would have not have dispatched the train. Alternatively, Ms Rodway submitted, Mr Stitt ought to have performed his duties, not from the guard's cab in carriage 6, but from that in carriage 3 in the middle of the train; from the closed window of which he could and would have seen the Appellant move.

  29. Judge Gore was not persuaded by either of these submissions; neither am I.

  30. As I have indicated, the expert engineers agreed that Mr Stitt was bound to comply with the directions in Section 8 of the Rule Book. Section 8 concerns "Starting a train from an unstaffed platform", as Chorley Station was; and paragraph 8.3 concerns "Starting a train with power-operated doors that are operated by a guard", as the relevant train was. The paragraph reads (all emphases in the original):


    "You [i.e. the guard] must close the doors, except the local door from where the train is being worked.After the train doors are closedWhen you have closed the doors, you must:
    • where appropriate, check the door interlock light lit
    • position yourself on the platform so that you can see the whole length of the train.
    From this position, you must carry out the train safety check. If it is safe for the train to start, you must:
    • close the local door
    • where appropriate, check the door interlock is lit
    • give the READY-TO-START signal to the driver
    • make sure the door controls are secured."
  31. Judge Gore found that "that is exactly what Mr Stitt did". On the evidence, he was clearly entitled to make that finding.

  32. Given the restricted scope of the systemic challenge, in my view that is sufficient to dispose of the final ground of appeal. However, it is noteworthy that the judge went on to find that:


    i) Mr Stitt gave a plausible and reasonable explanation as to why he did not put the window down and look out of it, namely that it was dangerous; and, subsequently, there has been a direction prohibiting a guard from putting his or her head out of a cab window.

    ii) Mr Stitt gave unchallenged evidence as to why he was at the rear of the train, namely to ensure the train was properly aligned to enable passengers at the back of the train to alight. That too was a reasonable explanation.
  33. The judge also found that Mr Stitt complied with paragraph 6.1 of the Rule Book, which requires staff to be "vigilant during train dispatch to make sure that… it is safe to dispatch the train". When he looked down the platform immediately prior to returning to his cab and signalling to the driver to move the train away, he saw the Appellant by the wall, drunk, but making no apparent movement towards the train or away from the wall. I accept – as did Mr Rawlinson – that train staff owe a duty of care to customers and others who may be on a station platform in close proximity to a train. A moving train is an inevitable hazard, particularly when in a station where there may be people on the platform without any barrier between them and the train as it moves away. There is an inherent risk involved, a risk which is increased when those on the platform include children, people who are or may be drunk, and/or others who are more likely to put themselves in danger. The guard (or any other person who is responsible for the train moving away safely) is not required to guarantee the safety of those who are on the platform: he must take a reasonable view of the risk posed to those to whom he owes a duty of care, in all the circumstances. It is important that the courts do not impose too high a duty of care upon those involved in services, such that their jobs become unreasonably difficult and it becomes unreasonably difficult for the provider to maintain an efficient service.

  34. In this case, on the findings of the judge, having seen the Appellant at the wall when all the doors of the train are safely closed and the train is ready to be dispatched, apparently drunk, but displaying no signs of moving towards the train, in my view, Mr Stitt exercised his judgment with patent good care, thereby discharging his duty of care to the Appellant.


    Conclusion
  35. One can but have sympathy for the Appellant, who has, as a result of his terrible accident, suffered substantial injury and disability. However, the Respondent service provider is only liable for those injuries if they resulted from negligence for which it was responsible. For the reasons I have given, I agree with Judge Gore – the Respondent was not negligent, and in particular Mr Stitt (for whom the Respondent was responsible) was not negligent.

  36. I would dismiss this appeal.


    The Vice President (Lady Justice Gloster):
  37. I agree. There is no justification for interfering with the trial judge's findings of fact. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.
Source : http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/4.html
 
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6Gman

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Interesting and well worth reading.

Especially for staff.
 

Y Ddraig Coch

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Seems a correct result with common sense as well as law and railway rules working together helping to find the way to the correct outcome even after appeal.

Good job all round. I hope Mr Stitt walked out head held high, he did what was required of him.
 

TBirdFrank

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A very detailed and considered summation of the incident. The answer in all truth is don't get drunk.
 

gray1404

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Yet another guard is dragged through the court (although I do note it was TPE that was in court, not the guard as an individual) - not fair at all.
 

causton

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It is important that the courts do not impose too high a duty of care upon those involved in services, such that their jobs become unreasonably difficult and it becomes unreasonably difficult for the provider to maintain an efficient service.

A very good result indeed!
 

Bromley boy

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Yet another guard is dragged through the court (although I do note it was TPE that was in court, not the guard as an individual) - not fair at all.

And crucially he was in court as a witness in a civil case, rather than the defendant in a criminal trial.

Given recent events, I’m very glad this guard didn’t end up being spuriously charged with some kind of health and safety at work offence...

Maybe that’s a sign that things have changed for the better after the recent debacles where railstaff have been prosecuted for simply doing their jobs, and drunk/drugged idiots have got themselves killed.
 

jimm

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Yet another guard is dragged through the court (although I do note it was TPE that was in court, not the guard as an individual) - not fair at all.

Not the same kind of court case as others recently - as the original poster said, this action was brought by the passenger, not the Crown Prosecution Service.

Presumably either the police or CPS, or both, had reviewed the evidence and reached the same view as the judges have all the way through - so no criminal or health & safety prosecution was brought.

Instead the passenger lodged a civil claim for damages against TPE. Which is his legal right, like anyone else.

Lord Justice Hickinbottom makes it crystal-clear in his decision that the guard carried out his dispatch duties in an exemplary fashion in this instance. Which was fundamental to the courts rejecting the claim.

And crucially he was in court as a witness in a civil case, rather than the defendant in a criminal trial.

Given recent events, I’m very glad this guard didn’t end up being spuriously charged with some kind of health and safety at work offence...

Maybe that’s a sign that things have changed for the better after the recent debacles where railstaff have been prosecuted for simply doing their jobs, and drunk/drugged idiots have got themselves killed.

Each incident will be considered on its own merits. This doesn't set any kind of precedent for decisions by the CPS on whether to bring a prosecution in the future, should they feel the evidence merits that course of action. Though judges will ccertainly be expected to bear in mind the comments about not imposing too high a duty of care on staff, should a case reach court.

The arrival of ever more new rolling stock fitted with bodyside cameras will no doubt improve the video evidence available but if a member of staff appears not to have acted by the book, then a prosecution is always going to remain an option. Just the same as in any other walk of life.
 

jimm

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Probably covered by their public liability insurance - someone may know if this is what Transportation Claims Limited deals with. It was the actual respondent in the case, not TPE.

And the claim was probably being brought on a 'no win, no fee' basis. Though you have to wonder why the instructing solicitors thought there was a chance of winning when the CPS had decided there was no negligence involved and had taken no further action.
 

causton

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Probably covered by their public liability insurance - someone may know if this is what Transportation Claims Limited deals with. It was the actual respondent in the case, not TPE.

Intrigued, a couple of minutes of quick research shows that they are part of FirstGroup (the previous company name being Badgerline, a name I am not overly familar with but which seems to have been sold off to FirstGroup or somehow related to it), more commonly dealing with small claims of bus crashes (their one Google review saying that someone got a cheque from this company when their car was hit by a bus and their mirror knocked off)! They seem to keep a low profile... but Companies House shows on their last annual report that they are an "insurance administration company for FirstGroup"
 

dgl

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Intrigued, a couple of minutes of quick research shows that they are part of FirstGroup (the previous company name being Badgerline, a name I am not overly familar with but which seems to have been sold off to FirstGroup or somehow related to it), more commonly dealing with small claims of bus crashes (their one Google review saying that someone got a cheque from this company when their car was hit by a bus and their mirror knocked off)! They seem to keep a low profile... but Companies House shows on their last annual report that they are an "insurance administration company for FirstGroup"

Badgerline were a bus company that merged with GRT to form first group and hence why that name crops up in first group dealings.
 

BestWestern

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Intrigued, a couple of minutes of quick research implies that they are part of FirstGroup (the previous company name being Badgerline, a name I am not overly familar with but which seems to have been sold off to FirstGroup or somehow related to it), more commonly dealing with small claims of bus crashes (their one Google review saying that someone got a cheque from this company when their car was hit by a bus and their mirror knocked off)! They seem to keep a low profile...

That is interesting. First, as with most large operators, are self-insured, so I suppose there is some degree of logic in having a stand-alone division to deal with the inevitable claims. Perhaps there is an element of illusion involved, in that third parties feel more comfortable dealing with what they in all probability might feel is an independent outfit.
 

yorkie

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I particularly like this bit:
It is important that the courts do not impose too high a duty of care upon those involved in services, such that their jobs become unreasonably difficult and it becomes unreasonably difficult for the provider to maintain an efficient service.
A dose of common sense!

Sadly some people will never learn to stop themselves getting into such a drunken state, nor to stop blaming others for the consequences of their own actions. Yes, of course I have sympathy for them, but blaming others is not the answer.

From this Lancashire Post article we learn that:
At trial, the court heard he had downed five pints and four cans of Guinness, a shot of spirits and some Cava wine.
 

FordFocus

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I particularly like this bit:

A dose of common sense!

Sadly some people will never learn to stop themselves getting into such a drunken state, nor to stop blaming others for the consequences of their own actions. Yes, of course I have sympathy for them, but blaming others is not the answer.

From this Lancashire Post article we learn that:

Agreed Yorkie. Perhaps it was a no win-no fee case for the applicant? I have sympathy with the life changing injuries and wish him well for the future. There is no need to try and blame TPE or the member of traincrew in charge of dispatch for their own drunken mistake though.
 

Bromley boy

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I particularly like this bit:

A dose of common sense!

Sadly some people will never learn to stop themselves getting into such a drunken state, nor to stop blaming others for the consequences of their own actions. Yes, of course I have sympathy for them, but blaming others is not the answer.

From this Lancashire Post article we learn that:

We need a like button on here - fully agreed!
 

TEW

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Though you have to wonder why the instructing solicitors thought there was a chance of winning when the CPS had decided there was no negligence involved and had taken no further action.
The burden of proof in civil cases is much lower than in a criminal case, so it is not necessarily that surprising that a civil case has been brought but not a criminal one. The CPS is a criminal case would be required to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, in a civil case it is only required to prove liability on the balance of probabilities.
 

jimm

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I"m well aware of that, but it is clear from the written decision that the evidence presented in court was overwhelming when it came to determining who was at fault in the incident. Mr Whiting's lawyers would have had access to all the relevant material when preparing the case.
 

TEW

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Not at all, there was definitely an arguable case there. It all came down to the position at which Mr Whiting fell between the train and the platform. Their argument being that his injuries were such that he could only have fell between coaches 4 and 5, not 3 and 4, and that because of the time taken for Mr Whiting to walk from his position against the wall to a position between coaches 4 and 5, the guard either saw him in a dangerous position and started the train regardless, or should have seen him but failed to for some reason. They had expert witnesses at trial to assert that these were the facts too. This was far from a hopeless case, the evidence was not overwhelming. In fact, the whole reason the decision was appealed was because the evidence was not at all overwhelming. I am pleased with the result, and I believe that it was the correct one, but I can see why Mr Whiting's lawyers felt they stood a chance.
 
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