So do places exist where if a Driver mistakenly passes the last signal at red and at the maximum allowed track speed is there then not enough room for the train protection system to stop the train before reaching the fouling point?
Yes and no. Every signal on the railway was assessed when TPWS was introduced, and generally any signal protecting a a conflicting movement was fitted (so not ones just protecting another signal) as were many high-risk reductions in permissible speed. However, this round of fitment only gauranteed protection where the approach speed was 75mph or less (e.g. the driver was trying to stop but had got it wrong).
TPWS+ raised the protected speed to something like 90 (my memory is incomplete on this one) and TPWS mini was introduced to manage low-speed but high risk approaches to buffer-stops.
New schemes obviously include TPWS as an integral part of the layout design, but the wide range of system reaction times and braking rates can lead to some deep thinking; for instance:
Let's assume a 100mph railway carrying a mix of traffic ranging from state-of-the-art 125mph EMUs all the way down to 75mph loco-hauled freightliner trains. One one particular line the signals are four aspect and are named A, B, C and D. Signal D protects a major conflict (say a trailing and facing connection in rapid succession).
With D at Stop, C will be single yellow, B at double yellow and A at green. A probably wouldn't be fitted with TPWS at all as it wouldn't do any good to test the train speed here.
B (double yellow) similarly wouldn't have TPWS as this signal is the first point a driver should brake, so the train speed wouldn't be reducing anyway.
C would have an TPWS+ overspeed sensor (OSS) to test that the train speed is actually reducing, but because it is roughly half way through the braking run it is likely to be set to something like 75mph (if the train is going faster than this the brakes come on automatically)
D would have an OSS on the approach (set to something like 25mph) and train stop sensor (TSS) as a last resort, leaving 200m of overlap to stop the train in.
This is all well and good for our 12%g EMU, but consider our 75mph freight.
Our inattentive class 60 driver passes A at green (no issue), B at double yellow (again, no test applied but he should now brake) and C at single yellow. Unfortunately, the OSS here is set to 75mph, the speed he is doing anway, so it doesn't trigger an application. The first check is the OSS at A (25mph) which triggers an appication. After a princely 30 second delay the 6%g brakes apply and the freight train sails over the TSS at well over 25mph, straight into the conflict (and possibly all the way through the junction).
The only way to cure this is move all the controls back one signal. We now hold signal C at Red, so that signal B (now Y) gets an OSS. we can use timers to test how fast the train is travelling from B to C, releasing C to single yellow if all is well.
This kind of thing is the yes and no part, because there probably are places where the risks are higher and no because they're as well managed as possible.