Head on collision in Italy

[zuriblue]

Both station masters have been placed under investigation with one admitting that he played a part by letting the train go.

The trains were delayed and the station master said there was confusion

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...rash-two-station-managers-under-investigation

“I let that train go, it was me that gave the signal,” La Stampa quoted Piccarreta as saying.

The stationmaster said that on the day of the crash: “There was confusion, the trains were delayed.”

One investigator quoted by La Repubblica newspaper said the line’s outdated technology had become more dangerous as more trains were added in recent years and there was pressure to avoid delays.

Prosecutor Francesco Giannella said human error was only a part of the story and told La Stampa: “We will absolutely not stop at the obvious elements, at simple solutions. We will look for all the people responsible, including those who are responsible in different ways.”

Being placed under investigation in the Italian legal system doesn't imply guilt, it simply means that the case has been handed over to an Investigating Magistrate who will try to determine what happened.

 

[Flying_Turtle]

A similar case happened 25 years ago on a Portuguese line (it was our 11 of september) involving also a manual level crossing. On first instance one station master and the level crossing guard caught roughly 4 suspended years for manslaughter but were subsequently acquited because the traffic was so heavy that to keep trains running some shortcuts and errors became inevitable.
In that case, besides the error of the station master of sending a train without authorisation (the regulatory post had some blames but not being responsible for the traonrunning itself obviously it couldn t be accused) the level crossing keeper accepted the warnung of incomming trains of opposite directions without quedtion.However, this kind of thing was so usual due to last time crossing alterations that she didn t question.
The irony... 25 years after that line has an estwl ctc and 1/3 of the trains that used to pass thee in telephonic block and still they say it s capacity needs to be improved!

 

[axlecounter]

Not quite... The RFI telephonic block regulations (I don't have access to the ferrotramviaria regulations but assume some pretty decent similarity) are dispersed along the circulation regulation and the page 157, of this , where all dispatch formulas are compiled don't even convene crossing alteration formulas. Believe me, this is fairly simple stuff certainly not intended for heavily used lines and certainly not good for 30 trains a day!

Portuguese regulations were built around telephonic block and still work under that spirit and are way much more complex!
Most things done in Automatic Signalling are specific exceptions to regulations!

Just for you to have an idea, the Italian regulation has roughly 162 pages while the Portuguese has roughly 448 (where each page contains 2/3 of the information of the Italian) out of which, 47 pages are dedicated to telephonic block, plus 100 pages of general regulations, which mostly are telephonic block tailored and the and 30 pages describing the 10 different forms, most of which you only see in telephonic block!

So, please don't compare the regulations of a poor country which had 90% of the network run with telephonic block until the early 90's (and no, they didn't crash every week) with the ones of a country where telephonic block is used on local lines.
BTW, this line (Between Nine and Valença) & this line (the all famous Douro line, between Caíde and Pocinho) work under Telephonic Block, with most stations only having distants... If you have the time & money, go there for a spin and have a look how it works

PS - all recognize that between Caide and Régua & Nine and Viana do Castelo, automatic signalling is loooooooooooonnnnnnggggg due! The irony? this lines have fibre optics all the way and the omnibus line uses the fibre optic!

I'm not trying to say that one is better than the other, but just that it is very similar. I don't think that the number of pages tells everything about it.

Please have a good look at page 27 and 53 (a long article about crossings) of the "RCT". Every possible situation is explained and has his own formulas. They aren't dispersed, it's just a different way of building a rulebook.

The system was used on heav traffic lines until not many decades ago. We could try a 1:1 comparison of the two systems and see what are the differences.

 

[Flying_Turtle]

I'm not trying to say that one is better than the other, but just that it is very similar. I don't think that the number of pages tells everything about it.

Please have a good look at page 27 and 53 (a long article about crossings) of the "RCT". Every possible situation is explained and has his own formulas. They aren't dispersed, it's just a different way of building a rulebook.

The system was used on heav traffic lines until not many decades ago. We could try a 1:1 comparison of the two systems and see what are the differences.

It was late in the evening I might have missed that ! (Might is a nice word )
Indeed it is there but I wonder... if using telephone block and ERMTS on the same paragraph in a regulation, is a good idea
If we go one on one, by what I saw, we would spend weeks comparing it!!!!
The number of pages usually tells a lot about the complexity of regulations as they tend to go straight to the point (obviously you must account for the font type/size)

 

[matchmaker]

Well, it depends the way rules and regulations are layed. I can tell you that the Portuguese telephonic block, at its height handled a very complex mix of trains with perfect safety. Problems happened when due to traffic saturation people got slopy and facilitated.. and accidents like this I can find them in AB or even TCB.
If you have read the regulations and know how it works, I d like to know why do you find them unsafe?
The lack of partial physical interlocking (in fact the Portuguese Telephonic block has almost no signals in order to make it safer) can be sorted by plentiful other measures.

However I can agree to you but for other reasons. Telephonic block has become rarer and the heads that think have gathered the idea that some small measures have become useless and thry have serious slacked on staff training
And there, i can tell you that it has become unsafe. As a concept and properly implemented it is perfectly safe!

Not in the UK!

 

[Flying_Turtle]

Of course not, the UK, as usual, is different from Continental Europe and has its very own ways of wrecking trains !

 

[edwin_m]

Of course not, the UK, as usual, is different from Continental Europe and has its very own ways of wrecking trains !

But less often than most other countries. See the link I posted somewhere further back.

 

[Taunton]

Not in the UK!

Well that is very true for traditional single lines with interlocked tokens and such like, I cannot recollect a single head-on with these, although someone may come along with an example.

Then some brilliant thinker devised Single Lead Junctions (you may notice that until about 1970 none of these had ever been installed), which are in all but name a length of two-way single line. No tokens or anything. They are apparently a bit cheaper. Just a bit, because they still seem to need four points, but throw away flank protection of the single line section. How many head-ons have we had with these? I recall just off the top of my head two freights near Nottingham, both Bellgrove and then Newton near Glasgow, Southall (had there been a traditional double crossover the HST would have been flank diverted onto the Reliefs), etc.

Then we had fully tokenless single lines, where the only protection is a single red light. And so we had the Cowden head-on.

 

[headshot119]

Well that is very true for traditional single lines with interlocked tokens and such like, I cannot recollect a single head-on with these, although someone may come along with an example.

Then some brilliant thinker devised Single Lead Junctions (you may notice that until about 1970 none of these had ever been installed), which are in all but name a length of two-way single line. No tokens or anything. They are apparently a bit cheaper. Just a bit, because they still seem to need four points, but throw away flank protection of the single line section. How many head-ons have we had with these? I recall just off the top of my head two freights near Nottingham, both Bellgrove and then Newton near Glasgow, Southall (had there been a traditional double crossover the HST would have been flank diverted onto the Reliefs), etc.

Then we had fully tokenless single lines, where the only protection is a single red light. And so we had the Cowden head-on.

Single line and interlocked tokens and a head on ? Abermule...

 

[MarkyT]

Single line and interlocked tokens and a head on ? Abermule...

At Abermule I don't believe there was any effective release of the section signal by withdrawal of the tablet. Afterwards that became a standard feature of token working: In order to clear the signal to enter the section a token must have been withdrawn from the machine at the correct end. In modernised installations the release only worked for one clearance of the signal and if the token was subsequently replaced into the machine at the same end before being used for a release that also cancelled the signal release.

 

[Taunton]

And Abermule was 100 years ago. This litany of Single Lead Junction head-ons are all within recent times.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

And Abermule was 100 years ago. This litany of Single Lead Junction head-ons are all within recent times.

A reversible single ladder junction has just been installed at Norton Bridge (replacing the previous double junction towards Stone), under the control of Rugby ROC.
Are you saying this is unsafe?
Traffic will be very limited now the flyover route is available.

 

[edwin_m]

Then some brilliant thinker devised Single Lead Junctions (you may notice that until about 1970 none of these had ever been installed), which are in all but name a length of two-way single line. No tokens or anything. They are apparently a bit cheaper. Just a bit, because they still seem to need four points, but throw away flank protection of the single line section. How many head-ons have we had with these? I recall just off the top of my head two freights near Nottingham, both Bellgrove and then Newton near Glasgow, Southall (had there been a traditional double crossover the HST would have been flank diverted onto the Reliefs), etc.

Then we had fully tokenless single lines, where the only protection is a single red light. And so we had the Cowden head-on.

Most of these would have been averted had TPWS been in use at the time.

I agree single lead junctions are a false economy, and they also constrain capacity at the very places (junctions) where it is most critical. Fortunately they are very rarely installed these days and existing ones are usually doubled next time the line is re-signalled.

 

[Taunton]

It is notable that US single lines developed a notably competent system for single lines without signals ("dark territory"), and I cannot recall any recent accident over there due to an operating blunder. There have been a number of head-ons in recent times, but these all seem to have been on more mainstream fully signalled routes, where one of the trains has overshot the signal at the passing point.

The US style appears overly bureaucratic but seems pretty bullet-proof, where a single dispatcher, rather than separate staff at different stations, determines which trains will operate, and sends messages (once upon a time by paper notes handed up, now by radio), all to a pattern where restrictive messages have to be read back to the dispatcher before another train can be given priority, very precise wording, crew have to read messages to each other, etc. It was actually the basis of the first aviation air traffic control messages which started in the US in the 1920s.

 

[MarkyT]

It is notable that US single lines developed a notably competent system for single lines without signals ("dark territory"), and I cannot recall any recent accident over there due to an operating blunder. There have been a number of head-ons in recent times, but these all seem to have been on more mainstream fully signalled routes, where one of the trains has overshot the signal at the passing point.

The US style appears overly bureaucratic but seems pretty bullet-proof, where a single dispatcher, rather than separate staff at different stations, determines which trains will operate, and sends messages (once upon a time by paper notes handed up, now by radio), all to a pattern where restrictive messages have to be read back to the dispatcher before another train can be given priority, very precise wording, crew have to read messages to each other, etc. It was actually the basis of the first aviation air traffic control messages which started in the US in the 1920s.

'Dark territory' is becoming much rarer in the US today and what remains is confined to quieter parts of the network, not so much on the trunk main lines where the most of the traffic growth in recent decades has been concentrated. that is not too different to Europe and our Portuguese correspondent suggests that on telephone block routes in Europe there is also usually a 'regulator' equating to the US dispatcher position, who oversees and coordinates the actions of local operators or stationmasters at the stations, and special orders are issued, just as in US, whenever the timetable has to be deviated from. I think in US the timetable was also the source of 'primary orders' historically, with only deviations specially authorised, but today, with the large scale abandonment of scheduled passenger services there is no such master document so freight all runs as specials as required, hence all movements require individual train orders issued by the dispatcher.

Going a bit off topic, the evolution and history of junction design is complex. Traditional double track junctions often contained fixed diamond crossings which fell out of favour post WW2. The problem was that double lead parallel junctions often wouldn't fit in the space available so if there was to be no fixed diamond a single lead was often the only alternative, as a switched diamond was also highly undesirable. With single lead, lengthening of junctions was also possible sometimes within the space available, which allowed turnout speeds to be raised. Today the tide has turned as far as fixed diamonds are concerned. They are once more in favour and with new geometry possible with the modern heavier rail section, slightly higher speeds are permissible in the same turnout lengths, so in some cases it is possible to replace single lead and double switched diamond junctions with new double fixed diamond designs that maintain turnout speed yet result in reduction of the switched turnout count from four to two 'ends'. Modern double lead fixed diamond junctions can thus claim to be safer and cheaper whilst maintaining junction turnout speed as well as increasing capacity and flexibility in crucial junction conflict zones. Result! http://www.townend.me/files/Junctions.pdf

 

[urbophile]

Less of the post-Brexit jingoism please folks! Italian railways in general are among the safest in Europe. This is the first collision of such magnitude in 9 years, and 50 times as many people are killed on the roads. As it's been pointed out, this line is not run by Ferrovie Statale (national rail) but as a concession as many local networks in Italy are.

But worrying nevertheless that such a high proportion of Italian railways are single track. Corriere della Sera has published the statistics; in total, 9,161 km out of 16,674 are single; in Puglia, there are 419 km of single track which is 49.8% of the total. (The tiny Valle d'Aosta holds the record for 100% single, all 81 km of it). Even Lazio, the region around Rome, has 28.7% single. Where these are run by FS it seems that security systems are more foolproof; what appears to be the case in this instance (and is liable to happen on similar concessionary operations) is that the bureaucracy and hence oversight of security is more complex and less direct.

 

[Flying_Turtle]

Corruption is the word and as further south you go the worst it gets

 

[LAX54]

It is notable that US single lines developed a notably competent system for single lines without signals ("dark territory"), and I cannot recall any recent accident over there due to an operating blunder. There have been a number of head-ons in recent times, but these all seem to have been on more mainstream fully signalled routes, where one of the trains has overshot the signal at the passing point.

The US style appears overly bureaucratic but seems pretty bullet-proof, where a single dispatcher, rather than separate staff at different stations, determines which trains will operate, and sends messages (once upon a time by paper notes handed up, now by radio), all to a pattern where restrictive messages have to be read back to the dispatcher before another train can be given priority, very precise wording, crew have to read messages to each other, etc. It was actually the basis of the first aviation air traffic control messages which started in the US in the 1920s.

Post deleted

 

[GMT]

Corruption is the word and as further south you go the worst it gets

I suppose you are right, although I wouldn't generalise. I'm Italian, from the south, but I left long ago as I was fed up with the mentality of most (not all) of people over there. Bureaucracy, nepotism, need of connections in order to progress in life...it is common. And in the northern part too, although with a somewhat lower magnitude. But the country is beautiful, I must admit.

However, as to the collision, it had to happen sooner or later. The EU gave the money to double the line some time ago, but apparently they have been working on the tendering and contracts, which in Italy takes ages. I read that although other regions of the country have also single tracks, they don't rely so much on telephone block, they have better automatic systems.

The line is managed by a private company. Allegedly, somebody said that they kept the telephone block for so long because the installation of a better system would have cost dearly.

Furthermore, apparently that line is as straight as an arrow, but unfortunately the crash happened just where there was a bend, through an olive grove, where a man who was working in it was also killed by a flying debris. When your day has to come...