I think you're misunderstanding my point. My point was not that they should not be done. My point was that you and I may well do the same risk assessment template on the same thing and come up with two different results based on our own views and mindsets. Having more than one person at a meeting to do it would of course help.
To use the example of the person working at height and being required to wear hi-vis, we might have:
Risk: being hit by large vehicle with blind spots e.g. lorry
Mitigation: wear hi-vis when in areas where vehicles move
Or we might have:
Risk: being hit by large vehicle with blind spots e.g. lorry
Mitigation: wear hi-vis at all times when on site
Both of those are valid - though many would plump for the latter because it removes the chance of forgetting to put it back on, though as the other poster mentioned it might in itself introduce other risks.
You've then got the severity and likelihood factors, which might be taken differently by different people. You may well have a set of descriptions, but even they are human - the only one that is absolute is death!
My point overall is that it is *not* an absolute process, though formalising it helps with some level of standardisation and paper trail. Even if score N is defined as acceptable by an employer, it doesn't take much to write it differently so a borderline risk appears on the side the writer wants it to.
To me, the most important thing about RA is therefore not the absolute figures, but the fact that in doing it you have brainstormed and thought about risks, and considered ways to reduce them where appropriate. This is why I take the view that printing a pre-prepared RA and saying "RA done", as is not uncommon, is a bad thing - it creates a mindset *not* to think about it. You should never stop assessing risk just because you have a piece of paper done!
Actually I think we are in agreement. Any fool can be trained to do the mechanics of a RA, even if the acceptance totals are mandated. In the mind of the assessor, that's a management problem then. If the employer (as in my experience) integrates expert review of the assessment with introduction/modification/continuation of the procedures etc., any box ticking becomes fairly obvious, and steps (further training or reassignment) are taken to prevent its continuation. Risk severity and probability is changed as deemed necessary.
My experience was not rail but another industry that prides itself in having low injuries and very low deaths, even though some of the equipment/processes have considerable dangers attached to them if procedures are not followed.
I personally have closed a laboratory where sensors detected a marginal level of a gas, and withdrawn use of equipment where somebody received an electric shock despite the protection offered by the local supply working correctly. There was pressure to find a way (other than reassessing the risks and making appropriate changes) of continuing work there but the safety back-up was always there, traceable to director level, so the safety regime was maintained. Risks were re-rated in terms of severity and probability meaning that design change was mandated.
There is always the 'nanny state' chorus when the impact of poor safety is addressed, usually by those who have no responsibility for safety but feel that the safety of others inconveniences them.
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