If you were controlling the Reshaping of the railways, which lines would you shut or save?

[B&I]

What examples are of of this in the West Midlands? Just curious.

Snow Hill to Wolverhampton, Stourbridge Junction to Lichfield, Dudley to Wolverhampton via Sedgley, and passenger services on the King's Norton and Sutton Park lines ?

 

[Gareth Marston]

What examples are of of this in the West Midlands? Just curious.

Snow Hill. 4.5 Million footfall (mainline) not needed according to the report- through services withdrawn 1968, closed completely 1972 reopened 1987.
Midland Metro the replacement for the Snow Hill to Wolverhampton Low Level stopping service closed 1972. Opened 1999 6.2 million users per annum.

Thankfully what is now CENTRO had a very good record on protecting trackbed and looking to reinstate lines/ services in the 70's/80's/90's.
My grandparents lived in Northfield which was recommended for closure by the report. A token service survived of just 4 trains a day from Birmingham to Redditch until the Cross City Line was created in 1978. It now has 6 tph!

 

[Railwaysceptic]

The Bournemouth line electrification scheme seems to me to be more a fruit of the old Southern Railway/Region, continuing the technical skill and efficiency of the Southern Electric system (building on, amongst others, the superb Kent electrification scheme - a product of the much maligned modernisation era), and adding in a bit of good old Southern Railway/Region thrift and ingenuity (in the reconditioning of carriages and the push-pull solution for Weymouth services). It's hard to see exactly what advance the Beeching regime brought to it, other than painting the trains blue, rather than green.

Of course, at around that time, the inexplicable decision to close Uckfield - Lewes route took place, with its ongoing consequences to this day, such as the lack of connectivity in East Sussex, culminating in the eventual loss of a further section of the route through from Tonbridge, the need to support a long dead-end branch line from Oxted and of course the very noticeable lack of resilience of the railway network in Sussex. Yes, railway closures had been happening since the 1920's, but its hard to imagine such a woeful decision being taken before the Beeching era.

Certainly the Southern Region deserve the credit for drawing up the business case for the Bournemouth electrification, preparing the scheme in detail and for carrying out the work quickly and cost-effectively - Network Rail: don't you wish you could do that? - but Dr. Beeching gave them the green light.

Most of the good developments during the Beeching years were schemes that had already been researched before he arrived. He deserves credit for giving such schemes the go-ahead and preventing politicians and civil servants from blocking them.

Lewis to Uckfield was closed in May, 1969, four years after Dr. Beeching had returned to I.C.I. The only withdrawal of service in that part of Sussex during Dr. Beeching's term in office was the short section from Horsted Keynes to Haywards Heath, and that wasn't a closure as such because the route is still intact. East Grinstead to Lewis was closed in 1958, long before Dr. Beeching appeared on the scene.

 

[Harbornite]

Snow Hill to Wolverhampton, Stourbridge Junction to Lichfield, Dudley to Wolverhampton via Sedgley, and passenger services on the King's Norton and Sutton Park lines ?

Thought I'd get an answer like this (i.e, partly incorrect). The Camp Hill line lost its passenger services in 1941 and Snow Hill to Wolverhampton lost them in 1972, 8 years after Beeching went back to ICI. The running down of the ex GWR line was unfortunate but it seems the assumption was made that traffic could be concentrated on the recently electrified ex lnwr route. Of course, I am assuming that the post I responded to was concerned with cuts suggested by Beeching, as opposed to cuts carried out before and after he was at BR.

 

[Harbornite]

Thankfully what is now CENTRO had a very good record on protecting trackbed and looking to reinstate lines/ services in the 70's/80's/90's.
My grandparents lived in Northfield which was recommended for closure by the report. A token service survived of just 4 trains a day from Birmingham to Redditch until the Cross City Line was created in 1978. It now has 6 tph!

That is true, my local station is on this route so I'm familiar with the service frequency.

 

[yorksrob]

Certainly the Southern Region deserve the credit for drawing up the business case for the Bournemouth electrification, preparing the scheme in detail and for carrying out the work quickly and cost-effectively - Network Rail: don't you wish you could do that? - but Dr. Beeching gave them the green light.

Most of the good developments during the Beeching years were schemes that had already been researched before he arrived. He deserves credit for giving such schemes the go-ahead and preventing politicians and civil servants from blocking them.

Lewis to Uckfield was closed in May, 1969, four years after Dr. Beeching had returned to I.C.I. The only withdrawal of service in that part of Sussex during Dr. Beeching's term in office was the short section from Horsted Keynes to Haywards Heath, and that wasn't a closure as such because the route is still intact. East Grinstead to Lewis was closed in 1958, long before Dr. Beeching appeared on the scene.

Well indeed, however my gripe isn't so much with the man himself, rather with the ethos of cutting route mileage for the sake of it, which he seems to have instilled. East Grinstead to Lewes was, by all accounts a very sleepy line, so it's not unreasonable that closure should have been considered.

The same cannot be said of Uckfield - Lewes which was reportedly busy up until the end, and whose withdrawal has had a detrimental effect on the surrounding network ever since.

 

[B&I]

Thought I'd get an answer like this (i.e, partly incorrect). The Camp Hill line lost its passenger services in 1941 and Snow Hill to Wolverhampton lost them in 1972, 8 years after Beeching went back to ICI. The running down of the ex GWR line was unfortunate but it seems the assumption was made that traffic could be concentrated on the recently electrified ex lnwr route. Of course, I am assuming that the post I responded to was concerned with cuts suggested by Beeching, as opposed to cuts carried out before and after he was at BR.

Mea culpa re Camp Hill lines.

Re the rx-GWR line, it was closed withibn7 years of Beeching's resignation atvthe tail end of a nationwide programme of cuts he instigated. If that wasn't his fault, it was the fault of someone else eqully short-sighted.

Top quality deflection, btw, from the other lines within the conurbation closed under Beeching.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Well indeed, however my gripe isn't so much with the man himself, rather with the ethos of cutting route mileage for the sake of it, which he seems to have instilled. East Grinstead to Lewes was, by all accounts a very sleepy line, so it's not unreasonable that closure should have been considered.

The same cannot be said of Uckfield - Lewes which was reportedly busy up until the end, and whose withdrawal has had a detrimental effect on the surrounding network ever since.

Quite as I called it previously "closure psychosis". In World War Two Crete and Greece a German(mainly Austrian in fact) Mountain Infantry Division (not SS) got a brutal reputation for reprisals against partisan attacks. Post War analysis showed that the Division had been ordered by local command to do this in only a few specific circumstances and Division HQ had only ordered local reprisals a few times more yet there were numerous instances of it happening outside of and extending beyond the remit of the higher order. It seems certain sub unit commanders (regiment, battalion, company and platoon level) had taken it on themselves to implement and dole out more than the level of reprisal ordered from above. Other sub unit commanders took a different approach. This was compared with how certain units of the American army behaved in Vietnam in the 1960's. The conclusion was that in part there was an element of what were attempts on the part of sub unit commanders to ingratiate themselves to those higher up the chain of command by implementing orders that they perceived were in line with general policy. There were even instances where sub units seemed to compete with each other to show who was best at doing it.

Theirs elements of this type of behavior in late 1960's/ early 1970's closures and closure policies.

 

[yorksrob]

Quite as I called it previously "closure psychosis". In World War Two Crete and Greece a German(mainly Austrian in fact) Mountain Infantry Division (not SS) got a brutal reputation for reprisals against partisan attacks. Post War analysis showed that the Division had been ordered by local command to do this in only a few specific circumstances and Division HQ had only ordered local reprisals a few times more yet there were numerous instances of it happening outside of and extending beyond the remit of the higher order. It seems certain sub unit commanders (regiment, battalion, company and platoon level) had taken it on themselves to implement and dole out more than the level of reprisal ordered from above. Other sub unit commanders took a different approach. This was compared with how certain units of the American army behaved in Vietnam in the 1960's. The conclusion was that in part there was an element of what were attempts on the part of sub unit commanders to ingratiate themselves to those higher up the chain of command by implementing orders that they perceived were in line with general policy. There were even instances where sub units seemed to compete with each other to show who was best at doing it.

Theirs elements of this type of behavior in late 1960's/ early 1970's closures and closure policies.

Oh, I suspect that there was probably an element of some senior management signalling how "on message" they were by cutting as much route mileage as possible.

It would certainly help to explain blunders like Uckfield - Lewes.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Oh, I suspect that there was probably an element of some senior management signalling how "on message" they were by cutting as much route mileage as possible.

It would certainly help to explain blunders like Uckfield - Lewes.

or Birmingham Snow Hill to Wolverhampton Low Level where they deliberately forced traffic off a well used commuter route.

If you look at the reopenings that have happened or have realistic campaigns to reopen them theirs as many/more from the "closure psychosis" phase than from the report itself.

 

[whitrope69]

Oh, I suspect that there was probably an element of some senior management signalling how "on message" they were by cutting as much route mileage as possible.

It would certainly help to explain blunders like Uckfield - Lewes.

I was always led to believe this is why the line to St Andrews was closed. Not as a result of Beeching but from somebody taking a personal scalp in the closure programme.

 

[Dr Hoo]

or Birmingham Snow Hill to Wolverhampton Low Level where they deliberately forced traffic off a well used commuter route.

If you look at the reopenings that have happened or have realistic campaigns to reopen them theirs as many/more from the "closure psychosis" phase than from the report itself.

It is only fair to point out that after Barbara Castle had seen the wisdom of Beeching’s recommendation for integrated transport planning in provincial conurbations and created the West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive under the Transport Act 1968 things got worse.
The new body was initially very unsympathetic to rail, decided not to subsidise the GWR route and introduced a new Birmingham to Wolverhampton bus route through the area instead. (The PTE also decided to dump Walsall’s trolley buses. This was truly the era of roads and the internal combustion engine.)

 

[B&I]

I am still struggling to see how 1 line in the report makes Beeching the father of the PTEs, particularly when he had recommended closure of many of the lines which ended up under PTE jurisdiction

 

[coppercapped]

I am still struggling to see how 1 line in the report makes Beeching the father of the PTEs, particularly when he had recommended closure of many of the lines which ended up under PTE jurisdiction

Possibly because there is more than one line...?

The report discusses the issues regarding train services in the conurbations on page 20. It clearly states that the pattern of life in the larger cities (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham and Cardiff - with London being treated as a special case) would be unthinkable without railways but that is no reason why the services should be supplied below cost.

In 1961 the suburban services as a whole earned £39.8 million of which London alone made up £33 million. London services nearly covered their costs, the implication being that the other services lost some £25 million - on an income of £6.8 million!

On page 22 the Report states:

No city other than London is nearly so predominantly dependent upon suburban train services. All of them are served by public road transport which carries a high proportion of the total daily flow, and the movement and parking of private transport is still sufficiently free to make it a possible alternative to rail. Also none of these services is loaded as heavily as many London services.

As in the case of London, fares on these services feeding other cities are low, sometimes very low, and none of them pays its way. There is no possibility of a solution being found, however, merely by increasing or reducing fares. Increases in fares on rail services alone would drive traffic to available alternative modes of travel and yield little increase in revenue, if any.

The Report concludes:

The right solution is most likely to be found by 'Total Social Benefit Studies' of the kind now being explored by the Ministry of Transport and British Railways jointly. In cases of the type under consideration it may be cheaper to subsidise the railways than to bear the other cost burdens which will arise if they are closed.

My emphasis.

It is true that, because they were loss making, many suburban lines serving the cities mentioned were recommended for closure. Beeching offered an alternative - that these lines be kept open by public subsidy - however if the Government of the day did not come up with the cash then that is not a decision which can be laid at Beeching's door.

 

[B&I]

Ok, so he made a suggestion: 'you might want to ignore my recommendations to destroy the urban rail networks around our mahor provincal cities'. A few years later, after he had destroyed to greater or lesser extent most of those networks, a government minister decided not to wreck them any further.

 

[RT4038]

Ok, so he made a suggestion: 'you might want to ignore my recommendations to destroy the urban rail networks around our mahor provincal cities'. A few years later, after he had destroyed to greater or lesser extent most of those networks, a government minister decided not to wreck them any further.

You are being selective!

I have a remit to eliminate the railway losses. The urban rail networks around our major provincial cities all make large losses. I cannot see any way of turning these losses into profits. Therefore I am recommending their closure in order to eliminate these losses. 'you might want to ignore my recommendations to destroy the urban rail networks around our mahor provincal cities'. (for social reasons, nothing to do with my remit and not for me to be judged on).

My report and recommendations were debated in Parliament, voted on and accepted by the politicians of the day.

A few years later, a government minister saw the effect of the implementation of some of my recommendations (predicted by me) decided not to close any more of these networks. [and later on re-open some, but not with a view of making profits, which was my remit!]

Such is the nature of politics.

 

[yorksrob]

You are being selective!

I have a remit to eliminate the railway losses. The urban rail networks around our major provincial cities all make large losses. I cannot see any way of turning these losses into profits. Therefore I am recommending their closure in order to eliminate these losses. 'you might want to ignore my recommendations to destroy the urban rail networks around our mahor provincal cities'. (for social reasons, nothing to do with my remit and not for me to be judged on).

My report and recommendations were debated in Parliament, voted on and accepted by the politicians of the day.

A few years later, a government minister saw the effect of the implementation of some of my recommendations (predicted by me) decided not to close any more of these networks. [and later on re-open some, but not with a view of making profits, which was my remit!]

Such is the nature of politics.

Except for the fact that the good Doctor was a very hawkish member of the Stedeford Committee, so played a large part in setting that remit.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Ok, so he made a suggestion: 'you might want to ignore my recommendations to destroy the urban rail networks around our mahor provincal cities'. A few years later, after he had destroyed to greater or lesser extent most of those networks, a government minister decided not to wreck them any further.

But we need to remember that it wasn't Dr B who took the decisions to close. Those lay with government ministers.

Terry Gourvish's weighty and definitive history of British Railways notes the following in Appendix J:

Marples approved 141 Reshaping proposals (some with modifications) that led to the closure of 1,436 miles (on top of earlier 'background'/'business as usual' cases).

Fraser managed 88 in his short tenure.
Castle beat him with 91 over a longer time frame.
Marsh followed up with 47.
Mulley rounded it off for Labour with 15 (clearly starting to reach the bottom of the barrel).
The Labour closures added up to 2,071 miles.

Most of the closures weren't in provincial conurbations, of course. But this does show how slowly and belatedly the 'halting "major" closures', subsidy and PTE integration concepts took to take root.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Ok, so he made a suggestion: 'you might want to ignore my recommendations to destroy the urban rail networks around our mahor provincal cities'. A few years later, after he had destroyed to greater or lesser extent most of those networks, a government minister decided not to wreck them any further.

of course it was details like this burried in the text of the report that received all the attention at the time - and helped form political and public opinion and policy about the railways for the next 4 to 5 decades.....

The acolytes need a heavy dose of reality check here - it was the headline of rail closures, the inference that the railways weren't needed anymore that was the message of the report.

Dr Hoo/Darlo Rich etc may have got their copy of the report and eagerly read and re read it highlighting the passages they digged but 99.99% of the UK didn't.

 

[yorksrob]

But we need to remember that it wasn't Dr B who took the decisions to close. Those lay with government ministers.

Terry Gourvish's weighty and definitive history of British Railways notes the following in Appendix J:

Marples approved 141 Reshaping proposals (some with modifications) that led to the closure of 1,436 miles (on top of earlier 'background'/'business as usual' cases).

Fraser managed 88 in his short tenure.
Castle beat him with 91 over a longer time frame.
Marsh followed up with 47.
Mulley rounded it off for Labour with 15 (clearly starting to reach the bottom of the barrel).
The Labour closures added up to 2,071 miles.

Most of the closures weren't in provincial conurbations, of course. But this does show how slowly and belatedly the 'halting "major" closures', subsidy and PTE integration concepts took to take root.

Every one of those closures had to be proposed by BR. This would have been an operational, not a political decision. To try and play the "a minister had to sign it off" card, doesn't negate the fact that BR shouldn't have been offering up routes such as Uckfield - Lewes and many more for closure, in the first place.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Every one of those closures had to be proposed by BR. This would have been an operational, not a political decision. To try and play the "a minister had to sign it off" card, doesn't negate the fact that BR shouldn't have been offering up routes such as Uckfield - Lewes and many more for closure, in the first place.

And therein lies the heart of the argument. Right from nationalisation through until at least the Transport Act 1968 the BTC and BR were expected to at least break even with no real statutory basis for either subsidy or borrowing money (even for investment).

Gareth Marston in particular has explained well how the obligations and restrictions placed on the railways were dated and inappropriate. There were other restrictions on freedom of action in terms of holding down fares/freight rates increases and also in boosting rail staff pay (following the Guillebaud investigations). These factors were down to government decisions under both main parties.

So Dr B was faced with a mixture of rising costs, falling traffic, inability to raise prices (even where this might have been commercially sustainable) and no access to further funds for investment in efficiency.

May I enquire what BR 'should' have been doing, rather than proposing a retreat from chronically loss-making activities (besides pressing on with attempts to boost the more positive prospects that I have listed on numerous previous occasions, with what little money was available)?

Could you also clarify under what statutory obligation BR 'shouldn't' have proposed closures (noting that had been going on ever since 1948)?

 

[RT4038]

Every one of those closures had to be proposed by BR. This would have been an operational, not a political decision. To try and play the "a minister had to sign it off" card, doesn't negate the fact that BR shouldn't have been offering up routes such as Uckfield - Lewes and many more for closure, in the first place.

And you were there in the decision seat at the time, trying to cope with Government demands to reduce the subsidy bill?

 

[Gareth Marston]

Every one of those closures had to be proposed by BR. This would have been an operational, not a political decision. To try and play the "a minister had to sign it off" card, doesn't negate the fact that BR shouldn't have been offering up routes such as Uckfield - Lewes and many more for closure, in the first place.

Ironically later when Minister and Civil Servants tried to persuade BR to close specific lines or bustitute specific services BR mainly resisted. British Rail (allegedly ) leaked the Serpell Report in advance and the Ministry was getting it in the neck from constituency MP's before the Minister had even read it.

 

[yorksrob]

And therein lies the heart of the argument. Right from nationalisation through until at least the Transport 1968 the BTC and BR were expected to at least break even with no real statutory basis for either subsidy or borrowing money (even for investment).

Gareth Marston in particular has explained well how the obligations and restrictions placed on the railways were dated and inappropriate. There were other restrictions on freedom of action in terms of holding down fares/freight rates increases and also in boosting rail staff pay (following the Guillebaud investigations). These factors were down to government decisions under both main parties.

So Dr B was faced with a mixture of rising costs, falling traffic, inability to raise prices (even where this might have been commercially sustainable) and no access to further funds for investment in efficiency.

May I enquire what BR 'should' have been doing, rather than proposing a retreat from chronically loss-making activities (besides pressing on with attempts to boost the more positive prospects that I have listed on numerous previous occasions, with what little money was available)?

Could you also clarify under what statutory obligation BR 'shouldn't' have proposed closures (noting that had been going on ever since 1948)?

Well, for a start, considering Dr Beeching seemed to have a plan for every dog eared wagon and moth eaten carriage laying around in the sidings, I find it very strange that he didn't have time to consider and propose how costs on a route couldn't have been reduced. He could even have used the famous "Reshaping of British Railways" to outline how this could be done, and used one of the worked examples such as York to Beverley to propose those changes.

At least that way, he might have instilled a more balanced ethos amongst his senior management that economies didn't necessarily mean the chop.

He had plenty of able managers, some of whom did manage to do this (only after a political decision to reject closure).

 

[yorksrob]

Ironically later when Minister and Civil Servants tried to persuade BR to close specific lines or bustitute specific services BR mainly resisted. British Rail (allegedly ) leaked the Serpell Report in advance and the Ministry was getting it in the neck from constituency MP's before the Minister had even read it.

Indeed. We can thank Sir Peter Parker for managing to stop the rot.

 

[RT4038]

Ironically later when Minister and Civil Servants tried to persuade BR to close specific lines or bustitute specific services BR mainly resisted. .

But no doubt had to deliver up other means of achieving the savings required. This sort of horse trading is possible when considering small scale savings, but certainly not with the state of the railway finances in 1963

 

[RT4038]

Well, for a start, considering Dr Beeching seemed to have a plan for every dog eared wagon and moth eaten carriage laying around in the sidings, I find it very strange that he didn't have time to consider and propose how costs on a route couldn't have been reduced. He could even have used the famous "Reshaping of British Railways" to outline how this could be done, and used one of the worked examples such as York to Beverley to propose those changes.

At least that way, he might have instilled a more balanced ethos amongst his senior management that economies didn't necessarily mean the chop.

He had plenty of able managers, some of whom did manage to do this (only after a political decision to reject closure).

No time for that, and no money to pay for any investment required to achieve the savings. Perhaps you could suggest how this could have been done on your beloved York-Beverley route?

 

[yorksrob]

No time for that, and no money to pay for any investment required to achieve the savings. Perhaps you could suggest how this could have been done on your beloved York-Beverley route?

The "no time" excuse is often trotted out, however there were one and a half years between Dr B becoming Chairman and the publication of the report, which would have been more than enough time to appoint a manager to rationalise a rural-ish double track route and record how costs could be reduced.

Given his position on the Stedeford committee, we can safely assume that the issues of quieter secondary routes wouldn't have been out of the blue for him. Such a move would have been very worthwhile in informing the reshaping report

 

[RT4038]

The "no time" excuse is often trotted out, however there were one and a half years between Dr B becoming Chairman and the publication of the report, which would have been more than enough time to appoint a manager to rationalise a rural-ish double track route and record how costs could be reduced.

Given his position on the Stedeford committee, we can safely assume that the issues of quieter secondary routes wouldn't have been out of the blue for him. Such a move would have been very worthwhile in informing the reshaping report

But all of that time, effort and money was to be taken up on rationalisation of the routes that were to be retained, not wasted on the no-hope quiet secondary routes.

 

[yorksrob]

But all of that time, effort and money was to be taken up on rationalisation of the routes that were to be retained, not wasted on the no-hope quiet secondary routes.

If he'd investigated and costed what sort of savings could be made before the reshaping report was published, he would have been in a much better position to judge from the various studies of ticket receipts and passenger surveys exactly which lines were "no hopers" and which should have been rationalised.

Ok, this wouldn't have solved the problems of not taking into account incoming traffic and underestimating seasonal flows (those are other things that he should have done differently) but it would have helped to create a more balanced and informed view of the regional railway.

If he then went on to say that "even if this route can be made to cover it's costs, we should still divert traffic away to save money overall" then that would underline a flawed ideological position which underestimates the importance of a comprehensive network for providing a public transport system.