Is the UK 'overdue' a serious rail accident?

[MarkyT]

The key to stopping the big accidents from happening is keeping a strong check on the little ones. A conductor mucking up a dispatch is what it is, but investigate deeper and the cause could be actually something going on in their personal lives which if left unchecked, might have led to them dispatching with someone trapped in a set of doors, for instance. Or a Driver who is caught not following the rules and procedures and doing things in a different way, they'll probably be fine 99 times out of a hundred until they encounter a set of circumstances which their unofficial shortcuts don't control the safety risks for and you end up with a serious incident like a derailment or a collision.

A few key challenges are:

Promoting a fair culture of safety awareness, discussion and reporting
Still too many rail staff across the industry don't report things because of perceived concerns such as their manager never giving them any feedback, it takes too much time to do it, perhaps they don't know how to do it, or worse still perhaps they think that their manager will look to try and find a reason to punish them because of their failings. The reality is that management don't find out about safety issues through reading the tea leaves, they do need buy in from the frontline teams to work together to box off any areas where safety issues are creeping in. Not everything that gets reported by frontline staff as a safety issue may actually be a safety issue but so long as it is reported then that can be decided by the staff the company pay to make that decision and at least if that is happening it shows there is that willingness for staff to report 'just in case'.

Ensuring the next generation of rail managers have sufficient knowledge and experience to manage safety effectively
Traditionally railway management would work their way up from the grades but the reality is now a lot are coming from other industries, and in some cases the grades they were coming from (conductors etc) are being done away with. This means that they need additional training to understand the operational concepts and legal framework the railway industry operates in. The risk is that training is seen as a nice to have rather than a must have in some parts of the industry, which is fine if you have managers with the right knowledge to begin with, less so if they have just joined you from a fast food restaurant.

Ensuring that where restructuring and cuts are to be made that the change is properly managed
Costs do need to be cut from time to time and this is often done by chopping and changing jobs. There's a risk introduced when someone's role is cut or changed, because their responsibilities have to go elsewhere and it may well be the case that the person receiving said responsibilities doesn't fully understand their significance or how to manage that process properly. Good validation of change is essential.

Very well said. While technical safeguards have been expanded greatly, the human element remains, especially in scenarios where technical measures have successfully protected an initial event and manual procedures are required to override controls.

 

[craigybagel]

What a thing to say. You would hope that the lack of accidents is to do with improvements on the railway and the reporting of ‘near misses’ rather than it meaning we’re due one!

I think it's a very fair question. You only have to look at the figures (which were supplied in the first post) to see the current record is unprecedented. Obviously nobody wants it to end, but sooner or later.....

Personally, what I'm worried about is a corner getting cut somewhere, possibly even as a result of how good a record we've had lately. At the risk of touching a dangerous topic, one of the arguments brought up in DOO threads is about the role of a second member of staff in an accident. Because we thankfully haven't had one for a long time, it's hard to quantify how good a job guards can do in these situations. You can bet if there was a serious accident on a DOO train tomorrow and the driver was incapacitated and the passengers left to fend for themselves, there would be many questions asked - but because it hasn't happened, DOO keeps getting expanded.

I'm worried about this happening in other areas too. We've not had an accident in a long time, so we can cut back on training, cut back on route learning, cut back on traincrew assessments and so on. There have been suggestions that certain open access operations have done just that - with the results being the spectacular near miss at Wooten Bassett, and other eye opening incidents like the D&CR SPAD at Stafford Report here . Hopefully they've cleaned up their acts and nobody else will attempt these cut backs, but I still feel like if or when the current record ever does sadly come to an end, there's a good chance it'll be caused by a complacency in itself caused by how good the record has been.

 

[broadgage]

I doubt that fatal accidents can ever be completely eliminated from the railways, but the risks have however been reduced in recent years. Changes to working practices after Clapham junction have reduced the risks of wrong side signalling failures, but as the near miss at Waterloo showed, such risks have not been eliminated. (I doubt that the Waterloo incident could have resulted in fatalities due to the low speeds)
TPWS has greatly reduced the risks of driver error, but I doubt that such risks can be completely eliminated.

IMHO, the main risks these days are, in no particular order;

Careless or deliberate acts external to the railway, another Ufton Nervet could occur at any time. Whether due to suicide, or deliberately jumping the lights at level crossings.

Trees or man made objects foul of the line, Remember the HST that hit a tree at speed at Lavington ? Fortunately without serious consequence, but it could have been much worse. These risks may be increasing, as a budget conscious network rail cuts back on vegetation clearance, protest groups object to cutting down trees, and more people place trampolines and other bulky items in gardens near lines.

A new risk in my view is people being killed by heat stress or related conditions when trapped on board failed or stranded trains. With locked doors and sealed windows, and a less reliable railway, and a warming climate, this risk appears to be increasing. There have been a number of high profile strandings in recent years, and a number of reviews, but the policy still seems to be "keep them on the trains no matter what"
For reasons given elsewhere I don't much like the IETs, but the inclusion of a single diesel engine in the electric version is in my view an excellent idea.

Terrorist attacks on trains or infrastructure, not truly an accident, but could have similar consequences.

Despite these concerns, we must remember that UK railways are a very safe mode of transport. The most dangerous part of a rail trip is said to be the walk or drive to/from the station.
The loss of a handful of lives on the railway is called a disaster and is discussed and enquired into for years. A similar loss of life on the roads is called an accident and is forgotten about by the next day except by those directly affected.

 

[Scotrail314209]

As many other people have said, luck has played a part in it. However, luck always runs out one day.

There have been loads of incidents where even seconds have mattered. Chalfont and Latimer springs to mind, had that Chesham Met train been crossing onto the branch, it could’ve turned out horrific.

Same with the Edinburgh sleeper if it was running late as it could’ve crossed paths with a departing train. Even though the UK has a safe system, it is inevitable that a horrific accident will happen at some point.

Didn’t it happen recently on a modern line in Portugal?

 

[py_megapixel]

In theory this is a common misconception about the way probability works. If something has a 1/3 chance of happening in any given minute it does not mean it is guaranteed to have happened after 3 minutes have elapsed, for example. And if 4 minutes have elapsed then it is nonsensical to say that the event is 'overdue'

However it's quite possible that in the case of a railway accident, the risk does increase with time, simply because people will slip into being less cautious then they otherwise would. But this might be offset by the introduction of stricter protocols, as well as guards such as TPWS and the Driver Reminder Appliance... but not working on a railway myself I can't say how much of an impact these have had.

 

[bramling]

In theory this is a common misconception about the way probability works. If something has a 1/3 chance of happening in any given minute it does not mean it is guaranteed to have happened after 3 minutes have elapsed, for example. And if 4 minutes have elapsed then it is nonsensical to say that the event is 'overdue'

However it's quite possible that in the case of a railway accident, the risk does increase with time, simply because people will slip into being less cautious then they otherwise would. But this might be offset by the introduction of stricter protocols, as well as guards such as TPWS and the Driver Reminder Appliance... but not working on a railway myself I can't say how much of an impact these have had.

I'd say measures like TPWS and DRA have made a big difference, however they are only effective if used correctly. In the former that means no "reset & continue" incidents, and for the latter it requires drivers to be disciplined in setting it. For that to happen there needs to be quality training underpinning a positive safety culture, which to be fair the industry has - though incidents like the Chiltern near-miss show there's always cracks waiting for people to slip through.

 

[507 001]

I’ve noticed a lot of PWay and S&T contractor staff that come onto my patch (usually wearing NR Hi-Vis clothing) can be very complacent about working with traffic still running.

 

[Horizon22]

I’ve noticed a lot of PWay and S&T contractor staff that come onto my patch (usually wearing NR Hi-Vis clothing) can be very complacent about working with traffic still running.

Track work and near misses has made up a considerable amount of RAIB reports in the past 5 years which is concerning. An element of sub-contracting practices and poor site communication are often raised as factors.

 

[najaB]

Don't forget we did have the Croydon Tramlink crash in November 2016 which killed seven and injured dozens.

I excluded that accident since trams are operated quite differently than mainline trains.

 

[najaB]

In theory this is a common misconception about the way probability works.

Noted (I'm aware of the gambler's fallacy), but again that's why 'overdue' was in quotes. If nothing else, the idea that an even is 'overdue' is a way of focusing attention on it.

 

[High Dyke]

Modern rolling stock is much more crash resistant than in the past.

Not if the damage to the Azuma at Leeds is anything to go by...

However, I agree that sadly it may be about time for a serious incident. Whether it is another Heck style road incursion, a communications error by staff or even a mistake by traincrew. Another possible area of concern is the cost cutting on maintenance inspections, especially on those routes where the inspection trains don't run on a regular basis.

 

[py_megapixel]

Not if the damage to the Azuma at Leeds is anything to go by...

I strongly suspect that they are in fact designed to crumple at the front in a crash, given that the alternative would be transferring the impact to the passengers.

 

[High Dyke]

I strongly suspect that they are in fact designed to crumple at the front in a crash, given that the alternative would be transferring the impact to the passengers.

There is that.

 

[MarkyT]

I excluded that accident since trams are operated quite differently than mainline trains.

Although on that particular section, operating through featureless tunnels on a segregated former railway alignment at significant speed, consideration of some mainline inspired protection measures IS appropriate.

 

[milkinc13]

Just my 2 cents, look at the impeccable safety record of shinkansen. In it's 50plus years of running and NO crashes/fatalities. We in the UK are miles behind when it comes to safety, but it's improving.

 

[43096]

I strongly suspect that they are in fact designed to crumple at the front in a crash, given that the alternative would be transferring the impact to the passengers.

The issue with that incident is not the front end damage, but the damage further back and the fact a low-speed collision caused a derailment further back down the train. The RAIB report will make interesting reading.

 

[edwin_m]

As part of what became the TPWS programme in the mid-90s, all accident reports back to around 1968 were analysed to establish what might have turned out differently had TPWS, or one of various alternative options, existed at the time. The conclusion was that TPWS would have prevented some 70% of the accidents that an ATP system would, mostly SPADs but a few overspeeds (TPWS wasn't being considered for buffer stops at the time). Despite that finding being commented on rather snidely by Uff and Cullen it has been borne out remarkably closely, as demonstrated by Stanley Hall in Modern Railways a few years ago. This also means that energy absorption in the ends of intermediate vehicles, another safety innovation at roughly the same time, probably haven't saved a single life to date, because the end-on accidents they mitigate are generally those caused by SPADs. Energy absorption in unit ends may have had some benefit particularly in collisions with large vehicles on level crossings.

Level crossings are recognized by RSSB as the biggest source of risk. After that I'd say there is a cultural issue particularly with trackworkers. That part of the railway hasn't fully transitioned from a culture where nearly everyone has been in the job since the start of their career and they all "know the ropes", to one where workers flit in and out between rail and other industries and everything is (or should be) clearly defined for that audience. As an example the old railway term "in advance of" means the opposite to a highway engineer.

 

[MarkyT]

Just my 2 cents, look at the impeccable safety record of shinkansen. In it's 50plus years of running and NO crashes/fatalities. We in the UK are miles behind when it comes to safety, but it's improving.

The Shinkansen always had the advantage of being completely new infrastructure with train protection etc. built-in from day one. It was, at least initially, completely segregated from the legacy of the classic network, which hasn't avoided accidents in the same way, although considering the numbers of train movements and passengers, Japanese railways as a whole are very safe. Traits of obedience and attention to detail among staff have had an effect, not always positive with one accident I can recall resulting from a driver taking speeding risks to maintain timing.

 

[83G/84D]

Track work and near misses has made up a considerable amount of RAIB reports in the past 5 years which is concerning. An element of sub-contracting practices and poor site communication are often raised as factors.

Another serious incident involving a near miss with railway staff and a train today. I won’t say any more on here but I expect you will all hear about it in due course via other means as it is investigated.

 

[Taunton]

Some significant accidents were down to, not so much privatisation per se, but the fragmentation of responsibility.

Southall was a classic. They were running at 125mph. They had AWS, ATP, two drivers, and Brunel's straight line where at least one and often two signals were commonly visible ahead.

The two drivers at over 110mph went, in part justified by ATP being fitted, and so you still had all the other protections.

ATP was installed, but it was a cost to maintain on both the train and the crew's training. It wasn't compulsory so it was let slide. But you still had AWS.

AWS was installed but it was faulty on the train. It was allowed to switch it off in this circumstance. It wasn't compulsory in the rules, and anything not compulsory could be done without. Of course there was still ATP on this line, there wasn't any link that the driver didn't know it.

Overhead wires were put in for the Heathrow Express. The previous good signal sighting became the minimum the regulations allowed. At these speeds some signals are only visible for a few seconds. Never mind, there was always AWS, and ATP. I wonder if they thought the fastest trains still had two drivers.

 

[edwin_m]

Overhead wires were put in for the Heathrow Express. The previous good signal sighting became the minimum the regulations allowed. At these speeds some signals are only visible for a few seconds. Never mind, there was always AWS, and ATP. I wonder if they thought the fastest trains still had two drivers.

The Thames Turbo never had ATP. Both it and the signal would have had TPWS, which would easily have stopped it in the distance available before the conflict, but the funding was still awaiting John Prescott's sign-off.

 

[Mills444]

The Thames Turbo never had ATP. Both it and the signal would have had TPWS, which would easily have stopped it in the distance available before the conflict, but the funding was still awaiting John Prescott's sign-off.

Wrong crash this was the one with the HST and stone train.

 

[edwin_m]

Wrong crash this was the one with the HST and stone train.

The overhead line sighting issue I was referring to was Ladbroke Grove. The stone train one was Southall, the one where the ATP and AWS were isolated, but nobody make any accusation against the signals (the driver was packing his bag and not looking at them).

 

[Cowley]

Re TPWS - From a layman’s point of view and having lived through an era where multiple casualty railway accidents were fairly frequent, this system seems to have been made an enormous difference in railway safety terms considering it was a relatively cheap solution compared to other systems that were talked about a few years ago.
I know that it has its limitations and we’ll never really know how many lives it’s saved, but it must have saved quite a few over the years?

 

[py_megapixel]

Re TPWS - From a layman’s point of view and having lived through an era where multiple casualty railway accidents were fairly frequent, this system seems to have been made an enormous difference in railway safety terms considering it was a relatively cheap solution compared to other systems that were talked about a few years ago.
I know that it has its limitations and we’ll never really know how many lives it’s saved, but it must have saved quite a few over the years?

One thing I only realised a few months ago is that not all signals are (were?) fitted with TPWS equipment. It's just the most common SPAD spots, as well as traps where a SPAD is likely to occur and signals which if SPADed could result in a particularly catastrophic incident.

If it hasn't already been done since the first implementation of the system, I wonder if TPWS at every signal across the network could reduce fatalities significantly.

Of course it's of no use at all if there is a communication error and the driver believes they have been given authority to pass the signal - though I don't know how many incidents are caused by that!

 

[Eccles1983]

One thing I only realised a few months ago is that not all signals are (were?) fitted with TPWS equipment. It's just the most common SPAD spots, as well as traps where a SPAD is likely to occur and signals which if SPADed could result in a particularly catastrophic incident.

If it hasn't already been done since the first implementation of the system, I wonder if TPWS at every signal across the network could reduce fatalities significantly.

Of course it's of no use at all if there is a communication error and the driver believes they have been given authority to pass the signal - though I don't know how many incidents are caused by that!

I don't know who's told you this but it's not true.

It's not fitted at common (multi) spad signals.

It's fitted where there is a risk of train v train. It's based on the route risk assessment.

If you have miles of track with no likelihood of a conflicting movement (known as plain line in some areas) then what's the point?

The risk of collision is you going into the back of a train, in which case you've missed the signal, and then the tail lights of said train.

 

[Cowley]

One thing I only realised a few months ago is that not all signals are (were?) fitted with TPWS equipment. It's just the most common SPAD spots, as well as traps where a SPAD is likely to occur and signals which if SPADed could result in a particularly catastrophic incident.

If it hasn't already been done since the first implementation of the system, I wonder if TPWS at every signal across the network could reduce fatalities significantly.

Of course it's of no use at all if there is a communication error and the driver believes they have been given authority to pass the signal - though I don't know how many incidents are caused by that!

I mean I’ve always assumed (possibly wrongly) that it’s wiped out a lot the background risks that looking back at it would seem like they were everywhere once you started actually looking for them?
I’m not in the industry though so I’m just curious about what rail staff and people that understand these things think about how successful TPWS has been vs the cost of installing it etc?

 

[craigybagel]

One thing I only realised a few months ago is that not all signals are (were?) fitted with TPWS equipment. It's just the most common SPAD spots, as well as traps where a SPAD is likely to occur and signals which if SPADed could result in a particularly catastrophic incident.

If it hasn't already been done since the first implementation of the system, I wonder if TPWS at every signal across the network could reduce fatalities significantly.

Of course it's of no use at all if there is a communication error and the driver believes they have been given authority to pass the signal - though I don't know how many incidents are caused by that!

Still lots of signals not fitted with TPWS - I believe it's only about 1 in 3 around the country. Those that are fitted are ones that protect junctions and other places where trains may come into conflict. The only place I'm aware of where all signals are fitted and not just those protecting conflict areas is the section of line shared by National Rail and the Tyne and Wear metro between Newcastle and Sunderland; this extra protection (along with double blocking) helps make up for the vast difference in crash worthiness between heavy and light rail vehicles.

 

[moggie]

Another recent one not yet mentioned where lady luck was the only thing that saved the day was that at Bromsgrove where the 66 ploughed through the holding siding buffer stop and lay foul of the main line. The passing 170 passenger side swiped the 66 but relatively minor damage to the 170 and no injuries resulted. A few inches more and it could have been so very different.

The current record is one to be proud of but along with the various high risk parts of the system already mentioned my personal fear is how long are past lessons learned held in the collective and corporate mindset of those in the wider industry calling the shots? There's inevitably going to be a period of cost savings. There always is pressure on expenditures but now these will become particularly acute. How long before those seeking them turn their attention to areas which seem to offer scope for savings (or 'efficiencies') but are fundamental to discharging good safety controls - e.g. training, knowledge & experience, quality products designed for durability and reliability.

Effective management of the lineside environment is another area which presents its own challenges. Not aided by those noisy neighbours. There's been no shortage of incidents where failures of the infrastructure and / or flora growing in it during weather events has lead to derailments (Watford Tunnel comes to mind) where luck was on the side of the industry. There have been others. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests NR continue to struggle in getting on top of the problems. The lineside looks mismanaged. Which prompts another thought. There's an awful lot of infrastructure litter present - cut out rail sections, sleepers, old concrete cable trough in addition to what the great British public dump. Whatever happened to the threat posed by this from numbskulls roaming the lineside unseen? Focus on systems and safety behaviours are well and good but there's a few fundamentals that still don't appear to happen as frequently as they perhaps should.

Whether a major incident is overdue or not is moot. But no one with executive responsibility for rail safety can pretend that the job's done. far from it.

Oh, and then there's the PTI and the predilection to remove the person with the responsibility for ensuring public safety and transfer it to the person remaining, already loaded up with responsibilities for safe movement of the train and the growing realisation that if you don't cut the trees, carriage door mounted cameras which is the only thing left for the person up front to ensure public safety no longer work very well.

 

[MarkyT]

I mean I’ve always assumed (possibly wrongly) that it’s wiped out a lot the background risks that looking back at it would seem like they were everywhere once you started actually looking for them?
I’m not in the industry though so I’m just curious about what rail staff and people that understand these things think about how successful TPWS has been vs the cost of installing it etc?

Still lots of signals not fitted with TPWS - I believe it's only about 1 in 3 around the country. Those that are fitted are ones that protect junctions and other places where trains may come into conflict. The only place I'm aware of where all signals are fitted and not just those protecting conflict areas is the section of line shared by National Rail and the Tyne and Wear metro between Newcastle and Sunderland; this extra protection (along with double blocking) helps make up for the vast difference in crash worthiness between heavy and light rail vehicles.

Each and every signal on the passenger network was systematically analysed and awarded a risk score intended to gauge the likelihood and consequences of any potential collision if a train passed it at danger. For each possible conflict, the scoring system took into account train frequency, speed, loading, types of rolling stock, the type of conflict (facing, crossing, merging, rear-end), speed and a number of other factors. Those signals whose risk score exceded a threshold were provided with vanilla TPWS. The threshold was set such that all signals protecting a junction conflict justified equipping, including those controlling access to single and other bi-directional lines. Sometimes signals protecting platforms with a mixture of stopping and non-stopping services also exceded the threshold and justified fitment. Overspeed traps approaching major speed restrictions followed later, along with buffer stop approaches. A subsequent stage, known as TPWS+, applied additional overspeed protection on higher speed lines where the basic system couldn't guarantee to stop a train going at full speed before the junction conflict. Together, these measures have since all but eliminated train on train collisions following a SPAD. Concentrating on equipping the highest risk locations rather than every signal not only reduced the overall cost of the programme but allowed the protection to be provided where most justified more quickly. As such it has proved to be a very worthwhile project, undoubtedly saving many lives and injuries.