In a continuation of my efforts to figure out what was going through the minds of British Railways management before Beeching, I've discovered the following BTC memorandum on their financial position from 1956 - which, understandably, puts a lot of attention onto the railways and the Modernisation Plan.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-83-cp-56-211-11.pdf
Commuter rail services into major conurbations were seen as expensive to provide, but necessary, whilst long-distance services were profitable and car-sleeper services seen as a sign of the future.
Rural and 'feeder' rail services often uneconomic; if more modern ways of working could not make them so, they should be replaced by bus services. In this respect, Beeching was not at all radical! Closures amounting to 2,044 route miles - a little over 10% of the total mileage - since 1948 were noted, with the process expected to be accelerated.
Whilst road transport was seen as more economic for much merchandise traffic, a role for rail was seen, with fully-braked wagons and containerisation seen as necessary to allow 60mph running and reduction in transhipment costs. Little-used goods stations were to be closed and work concentrated in larger depots which could justify regular express goods trains and mechanical handling equipment. Again, definite shades of Beeching here. Looking at the figures, virtually all goods wagons were to be fitted with vacuum brakes, and roller bearings fitted to 150,000 16-ton mineral wagons to allow high speed running.
The intention was to enable average speeds of 75mph on long-distance main line passenger services, not achieved even today on many routes and comparable to the SNCF goal of an average speed of 130 kph (81 mph) to compete with the private car.
As well as relief from 'standard charges' brought about by common-carrier status, the BTC was also seeking relief from other statutory requirements, for example maintaining the road surface on overbridges and broader permission to install unmanned level crossings.
After 1961 (i.e. after completion of the evaluation of the Pilot Scheme diesel locomotives) series production of about 200 diesel locomotives and 200 electric locomotives a year was anticipated. Interestingly, the proposed schedule for electrification was kept to pretty closely, even being beaten in some places (Kent Coast Phase 2, for instance, was completed 6 months ahead of the 1956 schedule). Had it not been cut back on financial grounds, the wires would have reached Ipswich, Harwich and Felixstowe in 1965, and Leeds and York in 1970. Work on the Modernisation Plan's electrification schemes was expected to start declining in 1962, freeing up capacity for follow-on schemes which were being considered.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-83-cp-56-211-11.pdf
Commuter rail services into major conurbations were seen as expensive to provide, but necessary, whilst long-distance services were profitable and car-sleeper services seen as a sign of the future.
Rural and 'feeder' rail services often uneconomic; if more modern ways of working could not make them so, they should be replaced by bus services. In this respect, Beeching was not at all radical! Closures amounting to 2,044 route miles - a little over 10% of the total mileage - since 1948 were noted, with the process expected to be accelerated.
Whilst road transport was seen as more economic for much merchandise traffic, a role for rail was seen, with fully-braked wagons and containerisation seen as necessary to allow 60mph running and reduction in transhipment costs. Little-used goods stations were to be closed and work concentrated in larger depots which could justify regular express goods trains and mechanical handling equipment. Again, definite shades of Beeching here. Looking at the figures, virtually all goods wagons were to be fitted with vacuum brakes, and roller bearings fitted to 150,000 16-ton mineral wagons to allow high speed running.
The intention was to enable average speeds of 75mph on long-distance main line passenger services, not achieved even today on many routes and comparable to the SNCF goal of an average speed of 130 kph (81 mph) to compete with the private car.
As well as relief from 'standard charges' brought about by common-carrier status, the BTC was also seeking relief from other statutory requirements, for example maintaining the road surface on overbridges and broader permission to install unmanned level crossings.
After 1961 (i.e. after completion of the evaluation of the Pilot Scheme diesel locomotives) series production of about 200 diesel locomotives and 200 electric locomotives a year was anticipated. Interestingly, the proposed schedule for electrification was kept to pretty closely, even being beaten in some places (Kent Coast Phase 2, for instance, was completed 6 months ahead of the 1956 schedule). Had it not been cut back on financial grounds, the wires would have reached Ipswich, Harwich and Felixstowe in 1965, and Leeds and York in 1970. Work on the Modernisation Plan's electrification schemes was expected to start declining in 1962, freeing up capacity for follow-on schemes which were being considered.
