My sorrow - The disappeared lines...

[coppercapped]

Just for reference... I'm aware that Beeching was just symptomatic of Marples and the gov't at the time, but when I created my profile here, Beeching was the only name I could think of! I hate them all

Welcome to the forum Jimbob_Notts! While I understand your nostalgia, I'm afraid that you are shooting the messenger, rather than understanding the message!

While Marples was a very shady character the roads would have been built anyway. It may be difficult to understand for anyone born in the last twenty or thirty years how few cars were on the road after the war and how quickly the numbers grew:

Year No. of cars registered
1939 2,034,000
1950 1,979,000
1960 4,900,000
1970 9,971,000

In the 10 years from 1950 to 1960 the number of cars doubled and doubled again in the next 10 years. There are now some 30,000,000 cars on the road...

...so, from your point of view, the real villains of the piece are Karl Benz, Herbert Austin, William Morris, Henry Ford, Adam Opel, Louis Renault and others.

Whether run by Richard Beeching or Fred Bloggs, the railways would have had to have adapted to the changes in circumstances.

A pity - they did look nice!

 

[edwin_m]

Welcome to the forum Jimbob_Notts! While I understand your nostalgia, I'm afraid that you are shooting the messenger, rather than understanding the message!

While Marples was a very shady character the roads would have been built anyway. It may be difficult to understand for anyone born in the last twenty or thirty years how few cars were on the road after the war and how quickly the numbers grew:

Year No. of cars registered
1939 2,034,000
1950 1,979,000
1960 4,900,000
1970 9,971,000

In the 10 years from 1950 to 1960 the number of cars doubled and doubled again in the next 10 years. There are now some 30,000,000 cars on the road...

...so, from your point of view, the real villains of the piece are Karl Benz, Herbert Austin, William Morris, Henry Ford, Adam Opel, Louis Renault and others.

Whether run by Richard Beeching or Fred Bloggs, the railways would have had to have adapted to the changes in circumstances.

A pity - they did look nice!

I've quoted this graph before on here but I think it's important:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/489894/tsgb-2015.pdf (page 2).

This shows that there was a huge increase in travel after WW2, nearly all of it accounted for by car, but passenger-km by rail stayed reasonably constant right up until the 1990s when it started to grow. Viewed from this perspective Beeching made very little difference.

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

I've quoted this graph before on here but I think it's important:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/489894/tsgb-2015.pdf (page 2).

That's actually a very useful resource. Of course statistics can be misused rather easily but nevertheless this a handy source of background for many a discussion on here. I would highly recommend it for bookmarking.

This shows that there was a huge increase in travel after WW2, nearly all of it accounted for by car, but passenger-km by rail stayed reasonably constant right up until the 1990s when it started to grow. Viewed from this perspective Beeching made very little difference.

Except of course by having those numbers carried on a much smaller network means a much more efficient use of that network. Or perhaps a reduction in the inefficient fringes, which is the most obvious part of the Beeching outcome. So maybe he was right?!

 

[yorksrob]

I've quoted this graph before on here but I think it's important:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/489894/tsgb-2015.pdf (page 2).

This shows that there was a huge increase in travel after WW2, nearly all of it accounted for by car, but passenger-km by rail stayed reasonably constant right up until the 1990s when it started to grow. Viewed from this perspective Beeching made very little difference.

Interesting that the number of passenger km stayed reasonably constant from 1954. Suggests that the political myth prevalent in the 60's and 70's that the railway was in decline was a fantasy put forward by the motor-centric establishment.

In order to obtain a realistic view of the political situation regarding the contraction of the railways, I would advise the OP to read "Holding The Line: How Britain's Railways Were Saved" by Richard Faulkner and Chris Austin.

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

Interesting that the number of passenger km stayed reasonably constant from 1954. Suggests that the political myth prevalent in the 60's and 70's that the railway was in decline was a fantasy put forward by the motor-centric establishment.

In order to obtain a realistic view of the political situation regarding the contraction of the railways, I would advise the OP to read "Holding The Line: How Britain's Railways Were Saved" by Richard Faulkner and Chris Austin.

Also possible that gradually increasing affluence was allowing people to afford longer journeys and to make them more often but thanks to increasing car ownership there were fewer people actually choosing rail for those journeys. So one cancels the other in terms of passenger km.

 

[yorksrob]

Also possible that gradually increasing affluence was allowing people to afford longer journeys and to make them more often but thanks to increasing car ownership there were fewer people actually choosing rail for those journeys. So one cancels the other in terms of passenger km.

Possibly true, but given passengers (certainly in those days) tended to pay more for longer journeys than shorter ones, so in this respect income from the passenger sector would have been holding up. It certainly suggests to me that it was a mistake to concentrate on shrinking the passenger network in the way that occurred in the 1960's. Who knows, the steady rate of passenger km's might even have shown an increase, had a wider range of destinations still been available.

It suggests to me that for all it's faults, the modernisation plan of dieselising local routes was a far more sensible strategy than the continual network shrinkage of the 1960's, and might have proved fruitful had the development of the basic railway occurred more quickly.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
In a way, it's hardly surprising that Beeching chose the slash and burn strategy for the passenger railway. Read any of his reports and two thirds of them are about freight with the passenger business as an afterthought.

 

[edwin_m]

Also possible that gradually increasing affluence was allowing people to afford longer journeys and to make them more often but thanks to increasing car ownership there were fewer people actually choosing rail for those journeys. So one cancels the other in terms of passenger km.

Increased car ownership and useage would be a combination of increased affluence and the availability of reasonably reliable and comfortable cars at affordable prices. Also the car made a whole range of journeys possible that were never realistically achievable by train.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Taking the initial premise from the thread, namely that a lot of investment was 'lost', in fact Beeching and others both before and afterwards realised that a great deal of it was in fact at the end of its useful life.
Whilst some earthworks and structures may seem as if they will 'last for ever' in fact most of the railway consists of track, signalling, rolling stock, etc. that very definitely wears out and has to be replaced periodically. Especially after the economic problems of the 1930s and the Second World War much of the equipment was definitely worn out.
Despite the 1955 Modernisation Plan it soon became evident that there wasn't enough capital to restore the whole of a large system, let alone genuinely modernise it. Hence the fact that in the early 1960s most rural and minor routes still had joined track, manual signalling, steam traction and so forth.
Since the development of bus transport and the convenience of lorries, especially in rural areas, ever since the 1930s, around one third of the network only conveyed a tiny proportion of the traffic and generated a negligible amount of revenue. Hence its closure made little difference to the traffic figures.
It is interesting to compare with Britain's tramway systems, many of which began in the 1890s as cutting edge, profitable enterprises. However, by the 1920s they had become worn out and, especially outside major cities, failed to justify re-investment. The original investment hadn't been lost or wasted, it had done its job but all things have to come to an end if circumstances change.

 

[simonw]

Possibly true, but given passengers (certainly in those days) tended to pay more for longer journeys than shorter ones, so in this respect income from the passenger sector would have been holding up. It certainly suggests to me that it was a mistake to concentrate on shrinking the passenger network in the way that occurred in the 1960's. Who knows, the steady rate of passenger km's might even have shown an increase, had a wider range of destinations still been available.

It suggests to me that for all it's faults, the modernisation plan of dieselising local routes was a far more sensible strategy than the continual network shrinkage of the 1960's, and might have proved fruitful had the development of the basic railway occurred more quickly.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
In a way, it's hardly surprising that Beeching chose the slash and burn strategy for the passenger railway. Read any of his reports and two thirds of them are about freight with the passenger business as an afterthought.

It is easy to forget the amount of revenue generated by freight in those days.


Also the number of passengers virtually halved between 1957 and 1982, so those that remained were travelling further. Branch lines and seasonal traffic could not pay their way.

 

[coppercapped]

The railway has been struggling from the end of the Second World War (and in reality for some years before that) to get its costs and income into some sort of balance.

BR's income from freight was severely affected by the loss of more highly rated freight traffic to the ever more capable lorry - not helped by the 17 day long 1955 ASLEF strike which essentially wiped out 'sundries' and 'perishables' traffic. The working out of inland sources of suitable iron ore and coal for steel making resulted in the furnaces being relocated to coastal sites and the demand for household coal fell steadily with the spreading of the areas covered by smoke control regulations. Freight traffic fell dramatically.

Plotting passenger traffic, both absolute numbers of passengers and passenger-miles, on a graph with more suitable scales, that is with the 'x' axis as the zero line for both passengers and passenger-miles, shows that there was a falling trend (in the mathematical sense) from 1948 (after the immediate post-war 'de-mob' boom) to 1994/95. In that period passenger-miles fell from 20 billion to some 17 billion, a fall of some 15%. In the same period there was a short-lived peak at the time of the Suez crisis and petrol rationing and a deeper short-lived trough in 1982 as well as some other more minor wrinkles.

One could argue that the railways did well to more-or-less maintain their business - but as personal mobility had exploded in the same period in fact BR was disastrously incompetent in winning even a fraction of this new market. Trains were perceived to be, and often were, old-fashioned and dirty. Many people's memories were still coloured by horrendous journeys during the war years and they decided never to use the train again if they were not forced. And they told their friends. Steam traction got smuts in passengers' eyes. Many coaches were pre-war and frequently taps didn't work or the sliding windows jammed. The upholstery was often caked in dust and dirt. Stations were grimy places - some of them hadn't seen a paint brush since, ooh, 1938. Even the new diesel locomotives were covered in dirt and oil after a few weeks use and scarcely seemed a good advertisement for the Modernisation Plan. They also kept breaking down - including one embarrassing time on the Royal Train.

The bigger problem than the loss of passenger traffic was that BR had totally failed to manage its costs. The last year it covered all its costs was 1952 and from 1955 onwards its income failed to even cover the costs of running trains.

Beeching was all about getting costs under control. As I have written before BR was still running a 1939 railway in 1960 - it was still building steam engines for <insert name of deity>'s sake. :cry: It couldn't get staff at pre-war pay rates to work un-social hours shovelling ash out of smokeboxes and wages were rising sharply because there was essentially full employment in the 1950s and 1960s. The only effective way to reduce costs was to reduce the number of people employed as staff costs were the bulk of the railways' outgoings, but staff reductions came too late on many lines largely because it was easier to close a line and declare the staff redundant than to take on the unions to reduce staff numbers. Remind me - how long did it take to get single manning accepted generally? Even HSTs had to have two crew in the cab - and that was 1976 already.

Beeching was a symptom of the closure of these romantic lines - not the underlying cause.

 

[edwin_m]

staff reductions came too late on many lines largely because it was easier to close a line and declare the staff redundant than to take on the unions to reduce staff numbers.

Not sure I quite agree with this bit - why would the unions be more willing to see all the staff on the line made redundant than to agree a deal that would allow some of them to keep their jobs?

However I do agree with the broader point that operating economies could have been tried more widely as an alternative to closure. Many routes were closed with extensive and fully-staffed stations and numerous signal boxes controlling sidings for local freight that was by then largely non-existent. Couldn't more have had the rationalisation that was meted out to the survivors - unstaffed bus shelters, pay on the train, modernised or reduced signalling to reduce the number of staff needed? I think this would have saved some routes at the margins - but going back to the original point of this thread, it would have destroyed much of their "romance".

The other problem, at least with hindsight, was that nobody realised the developments in motor vehicle technology that led to buses being modern and attractive (and at their height of popularity in the 1950s) would also result in widespread car use in the following decades. The resulting traffic congestion that severely affected many bus services but from which the railways were immune. Perhaps the results would have been different if Buchanan's "Traffic in Towns" report had been a bit earlier than 1963, or its principles adopted more quickly?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traffic_in_Towns

 

[Phil.]

Possibly true, but given passengers (certainly in those days) tended to pay more for longer journeys than shorter ones, so in this respect income from the passenger sector would have been holding up. It certainly suggests to me that it was a mistake to concentrate on shrinking the passenger network in the way that occurred in the 1960's. Who knows, the steady rate of passenger km's might even have shown an increase, had a wider range of destinations still been available.

It suggests to me that for all it's faults, the modernisation plan of dieselising local routes was a far more sensible strategy than the continual network shrinkage of the 1960's, and might have proved fruitful had the development of the basic railway occurred more quickly.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
In a way, it's hardly surprising that Beeching chose the slash and burn strategy for the passenger railway. Read any of his reports and two thirds of them are about freight with the passenger business as an afterthought.

That's probably because in 1963 there was still a huge amount of freight travelling by train. It was amazing even in 1979/80 when I was but a humble CO2 TOPS clerk in Acton Yard just how much freight that the railway was carrying. As well as extra stone trains from Westbury for the Thames barrier there was the Penzance perishable (the Penzance perisher to us), milk trains to Kensington, Guinness from Park Royal, coal from south Wales, car trains from Dorridge to Dover/Harwich, miscellaneous stuff from anywhere to everywhere and much much more.
Thanks to Beeching we got Merry-go-round and Freightliner.

 

[yorksrob]

Also the number of passengers virtually halved between 1957 and 1982, so those that remained were travelling further. Branch lines and seasonal traffic could not pay their way.

But they might well have been travelling further from the branch and secondary routes. Your assertion that "branch lines and seasonal traffic could not pay their way" is itself based on Beeching's flawed analysis. Flawed because it looked at routes in isolation, rather than as part of wider transport flows, and notoriously only considered station passenger receipts, without taking into account incoming traffic throughout the year.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

That's probably because in 1963 there was still a huge amount of freight travelling by train. It was amazing even in 1979/80 when I was but a humble CO2 TOPS clerk in Acton Yard just how much freight that the railway was carrying. As well as extra stone trains from Westbury for the Thames barrier there was the Penzance perishable (the Penzance perisher to us), milk trains to Kensington, Guinness from Park Royal, coal from south Wales, car trains from Dorridge to Dover/Harwich, miscellaneous stuff from anywhere to everywhere and much much more.
Thanks to Beeching we got Merry-go-round and Freightliner.

That's as may be, however, Beeching's response to the cost of the railway fell disproportionately on the passenger network - disproportionate because as the earlier graph showed, passenger travel was holding up.

 

[simonw]

But they might well have been travelling further from the branch and secondary routes. Your assertion that "branch lines and seasonal traffic could not pay their way" is itself based on Beeching's flawed analysis. Flawed because it looked at routes in isolation, rather than as part of wider transport flows, and notoriously only considered station passenger receipts, without taking into account incoming traffic throughout the year.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---


That's as may be, however, Beeching's response to the cost of the railway fell disproportionately on the passenger network - disproportionate because as the earlier graph showed, passenger travel was holding up.

No it's based on the fact that many branch line trains ran nearly empty and using coaching stock a few weekend each year is never going to pay. Those who think that the Beeching cuts were unnecessary need to explain where the losses were being made and why virtually every developed country has experienced closures.

 

[yorksrob]

No it's based on the fact that many branch line trains ran nearly empty and using coaching stock a few weekend each year is never going to pay. Those who think that the Beeching cuts were unnecessary need to explain where the losses were being made and why virtually every developed country has experienced closures.

The fact is that many rural routes closed during the 1960's and 70's were not running empty. Your very use of the phrase that lines were "never going to pay" once again uses Beeching's flawed analysis which looked at station receipts in isolation, rather than flows to and from the rest of the network.

As for costs, the development of the basic railway showed that it was perfectly possible to reduce costs on secondary services. Both Ashford - Hastings and Alton Winchester experienced this rationalisation. Both could have been useful passenger links today, but only one survived because management at the time had the mind set that closure was the only viable way to control costs.

Read the Beeching report itself and you will find a worked example of York - Beverly. This shows clearly how the justification for closure was reliant on there being no economies made to operation, I.e de-staffing stations and rationalising signalling etc, and relied on the routes through passengers transferring to the Selby route.

 

[simonw]

The fact is that many rural routes closed during the 1960's and 70's were not running empty. Your very use of the phrase that lines were "never going to pay" once again uses Beeching's flawed analysis which looked at station receipts in isolation, rather than flows to and from the rest of the network.

As for costs, the development of the basic railway showed that it was perfectly possible to reduce costs on secondary services. Both Ashford - Hastings and Alton Winchester experienced this rationalisation. Both could have been useful passenger links today, but only one survived because management at the time had the mind set that closure was the only viable way to control costs.

Read the Beeching report itself and you will find a worked example of York - Beverly. This shows clearly how the justification for closure was reliant on there being no economies made to operation, I.e de-staffing stations and rationalising signalling etc, and relied on the routes through passengers transferring to the Selby route.

So what was responsible for the losses that BR was making and how would you have dressed those. And why has practically every developed country gone through a closure programme?

 

[coppercapped]

Not sure I quite agree with this bit - why would the unions be more willing to see all the staff on the line made redundant than to agree a deal that would allow some of them to keep their jobs?

SNIP!

In the early 1960s BR's deficit was rising rapidly - £68m in 1960, £87m in 1961 and £104m in 1962 - and economies had to be made quickly. (In 2015 prices the deficits were 1,176 million, £1,455 million and £1,668 million respectively).

Negotiations with the Trades Unions tended to drag on and on. The form of the Machinery for Negotiation dated from 1935 and was very hierarchical and bureaucratic. It sometimes could not reach agreement resulting in judicial enquiries and the like. In the early 1970s the production HSTs were re-designed to accommodate two footplate staff - single manning didn't come in until years later; BR submitted proposals for single manning of the the GN suburban services in November 1979 - agreement was finally reached in October 1986 and went into effect the following Spring. The introduction of the Class 317s on the Bed-Pan service was delayed by a year because of a dispute about DOO.

One thing Beeching did not have was time. A closure proposal could be submitted and the whole process completed in about a year. If it was going to take 7 years to get an agreement to get staff reductions then it was painfully obvious why the choice to close routes was made.

 

[yorksrob]

So what was responsible for the losses that BR was making and how would you have dressed those. And why has practically every developed country gone through a closure programme?

I've given some examples of what might have caused losses on secondary routes. There were probably other sources of losses on other parts of the railway, but why were passengers on secondary routes made the fall guy for losses there ?

Effectively the Beeching (and post Beeching) modus operandi was to base their calculation on station receipts, to the exclusion of incoming traffic and flows from further afield, yet if you read the worked example in the Beeching Report on York - Beverley, it was apparently fine to assume that all through traffic would simply transfer to the alternative route via Selby. There was no logic for considering flows to other parts of the railway as part of the argument to close a railway but not to retain one, other than to support an ideological pre-disposition towards closure.

The ways to stem losses on secondary routes were tried and tested. De-staffing, layout and signalling rationalisation, pay-trains etc. These should have been considered and put into practice earlier on the many marginal routes that were needlessly axed.

 

[simonw]

I've given some examples of what might have caused losses on secondary routes. There were probably other sources of losses on other parts of the railway, but why were passengers on secondary routes made the fall guy for losses there ?

Effectively the Beeching (and post Beeching) modus operandi was to base their calculation on station receipts, to the exclusion of incoming traffic and flows from further afield, yet if you read the worked example in the Beeching Report on York - Beverley, it was apparently fine to assume that all through traffic would simply transfer to the alternative route via Selby. There was no logic for considering flows to other parts of the railway as part of the argument to close a railway but not to retain one, other than to support an ideological pre-disposition towards closure.

The ways to stem losses on secondary routes were tried and tested. De-staffing, layout and signalling rationalisation, pay-trains etc. These should have been considered and put into practice earlier on the many marginal routes that were needlessly axed.

A few lines might have been saved but not the majority which were closed.
See other posts from others above on why the changes youthink possible couldn't be achieved in the timescales.

 

[yorksrob]

A few lines might have been saved but not the majority which were closed.
See other posts from others above on why the changes youthink possible couldn't be achieved in the timescales.

A decent proportion could have been saved - admittedly not all by any stretch, but some that would have been useful, had the railway management and Government had the right mindset. It's not hard to see when looking at the York - Beverley example how marginal cases could have been turned around. Work on the East Suffolk line should have been replicated.

The problem was the agreement between railway management, Government and the civil service who had pre-decided the solution in advance. Beeching + Marples + Serpell (who managed to hang around damaging the railway for decades more than the other two).

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

A decent proportion could have been saved - admittedly not all by any stretch, but some that would have been useful, had the railway management and Government had the right mindset. It's not hard to see when looking at the York - Beverley example how marginal cases could have been turned around. Work on the East Suffolk line should have been replicated.

I don't know about "decent proportion". York - Beverley is often quoted as a marginal case that was certainly capable of being saved but I suspect that in reality it was the worst case of the "close and be damned" attitude held by some local/regional managers. Not that many lines like it though Skipton - Colne is probably another. In truth most of the dead end branches were absolute no-hopers. And the cost of reinstatement of even the best cases is generally way more than we as a country are prepared to spend. Don't forget the lines which survived for political reasons (marginal constituencies) and continue to be a drain on the railway's finances to this day (HOWL, Kyle).

The problem was the agreement between railway management, Government and the civil service who had pre-decided the solution in advance. Beeching + Marples + Serpell (who managed to hang around damaging the railway for decades more than the other two).

Why mention Serpell? It was effectively ignored and so had no impact, other than leading to the eventual privatisation of BR being a Majorite project rather than Thatcherite.

 

[yorksrob]

I don't know about "decent proportion". York - Beverley is often quoted as a marginal case that was certainly capable of being saved but I suspect that in reality it was the worst case of the "close and be damned" attitude held by some local/regional managers. Not that many lines like it though Skipton - Colne is probably another. In truth most of the dead end branches were absolute no-hopers. And the cost of reinstatement of even the best cases is generally way more than we as a country are prepared to spend. Don't forget the lines which survived for political reasons (marginal constituencies) and continue to be a drain on the railway's finances to this day (HOWL, Kyle).



Why mention Serpell? It was effectively ignored and so had no impact, other than leading to the eventual privatisation of BR being a Majorite project rather than Thatcherite.

Actually, I suspect that there were quite a few that were marginal. Brighton - Tonbridge, Alton - Winchester, Exeter - Plymouth via Tavistock to name but a few. I've read that a local manager on the Southern worked out a plan to make savings and Keep the Swanage line open, only to be told that that it wasn't his job to save railways (I wish I could remember where I'd read it - perhaps another forum member could help out ?). Certainly if York - Beverley was a worse case scenario of a 'close and be damned' attitude, why did it end up as a case study in the major policy document ?

As for Serpell, he has a lot longer history than just the report that bears his name. He was instrumental in organising the Stedeford committee as well as getting Beeching appointed as chairman of BR over more moderate voices on the committee. He also presided over the DfT's generally poisonous attitude to railway transport in the 60's and 70's (the book Holding the Line' I mentioned earlier is very informative.

 

[simonw]

Actually, I suspect that there were quite a few that were marginal. Brighton - Tonbridge, Alton - Winchester, Exeter - Plymouth via Tavistock to name but a few. I've read that a local manager on the Southern worked out a plan to make savings and Keep the Swanage line open, only to be told that that it wasn't his job to save railways (I wish I could remember where I'd read it - perhaps another forum member could help out ?). Certainly if York - Beverley was a worse case scenario of a 'close and be damned' attitude, why did it end up as a case study in the major policy document ?

As for Serpell, he has a lot longer history than just the report that bears his name. He was instrumental in organising the Stedeford committee as well as getting Beeching appointed as chairman of BR over more moderate voices on the committee. He also presided over the DfT's generally poisonous attitude to railway transport in the 60's and 70's (the book Holding the Line' I mentioned earlier is very informative.

The Swanage branch didn't close until the early 1970s by which time it was pretty much a basic railway. I'm not sure what further cost cutting could have been achieved.

 

[a_c_skinner]

You found Bennerley viaduct and the line through Ilkeston North to Derby? I remember trains on Bennerley looking from my grandparents house in Cotmanhay.

http://www.sabre-roads.org.uk/maps/ leads to a lot of old OS maps

 

[30907]

The Swanage branch didn't close until the early 1970s by which time it was pretty much a basic railway. I'm not sure what further cost cutting could have been achieved.

Swanage BO was still open, not unreasonably. Corfe was still a crossing point (but IIRC only one person each turn). Worgret Jn could have been controlled from Wareham but that would have required investment.

 

[Bevan Price]

It is now over 50 years since Marples-Beeching, and I think people will still diasgree about the rail closures in another 50 years. So, just a few comments.

1. Some branch lines were always basket cases and should never have been built. Closure was inevitable - indeed lines had been closing steadily from WW1 onwards.

2. Other branch lines had some potential, but due to incompetent management, they were saddled with unattractive timetables, owing more to operator convenience than being useful to potential customers. On many lines, it had become almost impossible to commute to work by rail, or to make sensible leisure trips.

3. As the BR deficit started to increase, services were even pruned on urban & suburban lines, making some timetables increasingly unattractive.

4. Car ownership was increasing, and the long ASLEF strike in 1955 induced more people to desert the railway; the effect was not immediate, as it could take people a few years to afford a car.

5. Marples-Beeching went too far, favouring closure in preference to trying to attract more passengers by selective improvement of services. There was also an obsession for removal of what were viewed as duplicate routes - usually meaning only duplicate routes to London, and totally neglecting potentially large intermediate markets (e.g. Manchester / East Midlands) when Manchester/ Chinley to Matlock/Derby was closed.

6. Beeching had assumed that when branch lines were closed, long distance passengers would drive to main line railheads. He was wrong, many of them chose to drive the full trip, and were lost to rail. Indeed, despite the Marples-Beeching closures, there was little or no reduction in the annual BR deficit.

7. Increased frequencies on surviving lines has been shown to attract new passengers, although again, this is not instantaneous, and it can take 10 to 20 years to achieve maximum potential - and growth has probably been hindered somewhat by use of toy-sized trains and ever-increasing "walk-on" fares. If higher train frequencies had been tried in the early 1960s, numerous lines might have been saved rather than closed.

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

Actually, I suspect that there were quite a few that were marginal. Brighton - Tonbridge, Alton - Winchester, Exeter - Plymouth via Tavistock to name but a few. I've read that a local manager on the Southern worked out a plan to make savings and Keep the Swanage line open, only to be told that that it wasn't his job to save railways (I wish I could remember where I'd read it - perhaps another forum member could help out ?). Certainly if York - Beverley was a worse case scenario of a 'close and be damned' attitude, why did it end up as a case study in the major policy document ?

That, clearly, is politics. Sad is it may seem railway closures were very much the direction in which the winds were blowing. There is little doubt that many BR managers, at Regional and Area level, hoped to further their careers by jumping on the obvious bandwagon. Hence the passenger surveys taken in mid-February! By making out that even the most hopeful of marginal cases was not worth saving it would make it easier to justify all the rest. With hindsight we may feel ourselves to be justified in calling such machinations as corrupt but that's how things were at the time.

As for Serpell, he has a lot longer history than just the report that bears his name. He was instrumental in organising the Stedeford committee as well as getting Beeching appointed as chairman of BR over more moderate voices on the committee. He also presided over the DfT's generally poisonous attitude to railway transport in the 60's and 70's (the book Holding the Line' I mentioned earlier is very informative.

I suspect you are finding Serpell guilty by association. Having read through his various obituaries it's clear that opinions of him seemed to depend almost entirely on the political leanings of the writers. He was in fact a career civil servant whose most obvious trait was as a stickler for rules and instructions. He was also known to like railways but any "poisonous attitude" is more likely a realistic expectation of the financial realities for the DoT following his 15 years in the Treasury, a well-known bunker of scepticism when it comes to railways even to this day.

As for the Stedeford Committee, this was led by Ivan Stedeford, a successful industrialist, and Beeching was appointed to serve on it by Marples but only as a replacement for ICI's deputy chairman (Frank Smith) had who turned down the role and recommended Beeching, a close colleague. Stedeford and Beeching did not get on; it seems unlikely that as a civil servant Serpell would have taken sides! The appointment of Beeching to BR was everything to do with a government desire to bring in outside talent: as such ICI was a very suitable source and Beeching had a decent record, including his wartime spell with the Ministry of Supply.

IMHO the villains of the Beeching era are surely Marples and Barbara Castle. The other candidates were doing no more than what had been asked of them by their political masters. This also highlights how nationalised operations of any sort are rather vulnerable to poor political guidance.

 

[yorksrob]

That, clearly, is politics. Sad is it may seem railway closures were very much the direction in which the winds were blowing. There is little doubt that many BR managers, at Regional and Area level, hoped to further their careers by jumping on the obvious bandwagon. Hence the passenger surveys taken in mid-February! By making out that even the most hopeful of marginal cases was not worth saving it would make it easier to justify all the rest. With hindsight we may feel ourselves to be justified in calling such machinations as corrupt but that's how things were at the time.

This is true. Although we shouldn't forget that there were those prepared to speak out about these machinations at the time. I think one thing we should respect the Doctor for was that he was open and honest about his intentions and methodology which to this day enables a certain amount of scrutiny.

I suspect you are finding Serpell guilty by association. Having read through his various obituaries it's clear that opinions of him seemed to depend almost entirely on the political leanings of the writers. He was in fact a career civil servant whose most obvious trait was as a stickler for rules and instructions. He was also known to like railways but any "poisonous attitude" is more likely a realistic expectation of the financial realities for the DoT following his 15 years in the Treasury, a well-known bunker of scepticism when it comes to railways even to this day.

As for the Stedeford Committee, this was led by Ivan Stedeford, a successful industrialist, and Beeching was appointed to serve on it by Marples but only as a replacement for ICI's deputy chairman (Frank Smith) had who turned down the role and recommended Beeching, a close colleague. Stedeford and Beeching did not get on; it seems unlikely that as a civil servant Serpell would have taken sides! The appointment of Beeching to BR was everything to do with a government desire to bring in outside talent: as such ICI was a very suitable source and Beeching had a decent record, including his wartime spell with the Ministry of Supply.

IMHO the villains of the Beeching era are surely Marples and Barbara Castle. The other candidates were doing no more than what had been asked of them by their political masters. This also highlights how nationalised operations of any sort are rather vulnerable to poor political guidance.

I think it's a cop out to lay all the blame on politicians, although they bear a lot of responsibility for the political direction of travel. Nevertheless, one shouldn't discount the contributions made by others towards policy development.

In 1970 The Daily Express ran an expose on a plan being developed by 20 civil servants behind their ministers backs to close 50% of the then network. The shenanigans around the authorities attempts to keep these plans from the public are interesting, including threats of court action and police raids on the premises of the Railway Gazette. However the truth prevailed and The Times scuppered the plans with a more successful expose in 1972. One shouldn't assume that the civil service is a blank sheet to be written on by politicians. It's members have their own prejudices and ideological beliefs as this episode demonstrates.

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

One shouldn't assume that the civil service is a blank sheet to be written on by politicians. It's members have their own prejudices and ideological beliefs as this episode demonstrates.

Very true. But remember that the Treasury always holds the whip hand; there may be times when the machinations are about what happens purely within Whitehall and "sucking up" will inevitably happen from time to time!

 

[Cowley]

Interesting stuff guys. Enjoyed (if that's the right word considering the losses) reading your last few posts.