Near miss with track workers at Eccles, 22 July 2021

[John Webb]

RAIB have published a Safety Digest today on the above incident - see the Digest here - in summary:

At around 04:12 hrs, during the hours of darkness, two track workers were standing on the westbound track at Eccles station, adjacent to Platform 2, when an empty passenger train approached them from the direction of Manchester. The track workers had been working under the protection of a line blockage that had been taken by the Controller of Site Safety (COSS), who was responsible for ensuring that the track workers were protected from train movements. The track workers had been standing on the track to paint a white line along the edge of Platform 2. They had just been told to stop work and were preparing to leave the track when the train approached. The train involved, reporting number 5C31, was operated by Avanti West Coast Ltd. It consisted of a Class 390 electric multiple unit which was travelling from Longsight depot, in Manchester, to Lancaster. On approaching Eccles and seeing the track workers’ reflective clothing, the train driver sounded the train’s horn and applied the emergency brake. The track workers heard the warning horn and quickly climbed onto the platform. They were clear of the track approximately four seconds before the train passed them while travelling at 69 mph (111 km/h). The train came to a stop and the driver reported the near miss to the signaller. After seeing the train pass and come to a stop, the COSS also called the signaller to notify him of the incident. The signaller instructed the COSS to stop work and sent Network Rail response staff to the station to investigate.

The primary cause is described as:

The incident occurred because the COSS had given up the line blockage before informing the track workers that they had to move clear of the line and making sure that they had done so.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Sunrise in the Manchester area at that time of the year would have been at or around 0509, so it would still have been rather dark almost a full hour earlier, and possibly this may have been a contributory factor.

 

[Spartacus]

The primary cause really beggars belief, although even now it never seems to be all that long before someone decides it's perfectly ok to able across a 4 track main line without so much as informing someone they're there, let alone arranging any sort of protection, no matter how much the safety message is drummed home. It's hard to prevent accidents when there's people about who are practically, and sometime literally, intentionally breaking the rules.

If they'd not just stopped work and instead their minds were on the job we'd likely as not have had another two trackworker fatalities.

 

[AlterEgo]

Yet another near miss. Shocking how many there are.

 

[Bob figgis]

Sunrise in the Manchester area at that time of the year would have been at or around 0509, so it would still have been rather dark almost a full hour earlier, and possibly this may have been a contributory factor.

The safety digest includes this cctv photo. Hats off to the Avanti driver seeing the workers and using the horn. This image is once the workers are back on the platform so god knows what vision the driver had before this ?

Near miss with track workers at Eccles, 22 July 2021

www.gov.uk

 

[Darandio]

So the COSS left his gang on the line, went to the access point where the vehicle was and stayed there for what seems like 40 minutes away from his site. Then contacts the signaller to hand it back before making sure everyone is in a position of safety.

Staggering.

 

[Six Bells]

When I have a COSS giving up a line blockage, I always ask the question:

"Right ho then COSS, with regards to authority number 123, can you confirm that all men, equipment and machinery are clear of the line?"

As a signaller, I want the COSS to confirm that they are all clear before I start to remove any protection; not attaching any blame to the signaller involved, but from a selfish point of view when I do a line block I want it on the tape that I have asked the COSS the question. If the COSS then answers dishonestly or negligently, its on them.

Given the report, the individual in question is the last person I would want in charge of my safety if I was PWay.

 

[Darandio]

When I have a COSS giving up a line blockage, I always ask the question:

"Right ho then COSS, with regards to authority number 123, can you confirm that all men, equipment and machinery are clear of the line?"

As a signaller, I want the COSS to confirm that they are all clear before I start to remove any protection; not attaching any blame to the signaller involved, but from a selfish point of view when I do a line block I want it on the tape that I have asked the COSS the question. If the COSS then answers dishonestly or negligently, its on them.

Given the report, the individual in question is the last person I would want in charge of my safety if I was PWay.

Pretty damning isn't it. Given the blatant disregards already exhibited in this case it wouldn't surprise me if they would have given your confirmation regardless of whether they were still on the line or not. Job and knock seems to take priority for some even if it's only minutes.

 

[XAM2175]

The safety digest includes this cctv photo. Hats off to the Avanti driver seeing the workers and using the horn. This image is once the workers are back on the platform so god knows what vision the driver had before this ?

Not to diminish the seriousness of the event but that frame is from a fairly low-quality camera. The driver would have been able to see somewhat better than that suggests.

 

[Josie]

The main thing that stood out for me was that the COSS was a fourth-level subcontractor (worked for a staffing agency, who supplied to the safety-critical staff provider, who supplied to the job contractors, who did the work for Northern Trains).

This degree of subcontracting of staff was a significant underlying factor and subject of recommendations in RAIB 07/2019 Stoats Nest Junction, as it makes it so much more difficult to manage competence, fatigue and safe working.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Tea, no biscuits and maybe a P45 for the COSS, I would guess? Could very possibly have been a far, far worse outcome though, presumably they might well have now been facing a gross negligence manslaughter charge?!

 

[Peter Mugridge]

We do seem to be getting more at the moment which all seem to have the same basic root cause: poor communications and administration.

I have to ask if the same subcontractor has been involved in more than one of these incidents?

 

[Cowley]

That’s an absolutely shocking and completely avoidable situation. Made me shudder reading that.

 

[Elecman]

With me after a couple of bad experiences If the COSS is agency then I don’t sign in and abort my job

 

[pdeaves]

I wonder if the COSS was 'caught out' by how soon the signaller let a train through after the hand-back. Was he (erroneously) expecting still a bit of quiet after the phone call ended?

 

[duncanp]

I wonder if the COSS was 'caught out' by how soon the signaller let a train through after the hand-back. Was he (erroneously) expecting still a bit of quiet after the phone call ended?

Two possibilities occur to me:-

• The COSS checked the everything was clear of the track before phoning the signaller, and then the men went back on to the track again without notifying the COSS or without authorisation.
• The COSS did not check that the track was properly clear before phoning the signaller to commence the hand back.

Given the primary cause outlined in the report, it seems that the second possibility is what actually happened, and if this is the case I would imagine disciplinary action will be taken against the COSS.

Once the hand back is complete, it should be safe to send a train through immediately, and you shouldn't expect "a bit of quiet" afterwards, as you don't know what trains are queuing up to enter the affected area.

 

[alxndr]

I wonder if the COSS was 'caught out' by how soon the signaller let a train through after the hand-back. Was he (erroneously) expecting still a bit of quiet after the phone call ended?

I don't think that's an unreasonable explanation. If that was the case, I wonder if having worked at Patricroft earlier that night (where trains would have taken longer to arrive in that direction) influenced this assumption.

(not defending or trying to justify because its absolutely wrong and irresponsible, just understand why they might have thought they could get away with it).

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

The main thing that stood out for me was that the COSS was a fourth-level subcontractor (worked for a staffing agency, who supplied to the safety-critical staff provider, who supplied to the job contractors, who did the work for Northern Trains).

This degree of subcontracting of staff was a significant underlying factor and subject of recommendations in RAIB 07/2019 Stoats Nest Junction, as it makes it so much more difficult to manage competence, fatigue and safe working.

Spot on and surprised RAIB didn't pick up on this here or maybe there was nothing to find but in my experience many workers are on zero hours contracts still and maximise the number of tickets they hold to give themselves best work opportunities. The labour companies are self checking and the level of oversight from NR is minimal to check they are complying with their own safety cases. Furthermore the employing companies don't check themselves just accepting as they are RISQ approved so they are OK. I wonder how much paperwork was involved just to execute this simple job and i bet majority of it was never properly checked.

NR was supposed to be limiting the amount of times you could subcontract as its been shown that teams assembled from the same suppliers will perform better and support each other. The other thing ive observed in sub contract supply staff is the majority just keep their head down and won't challenge anything for fear of being put on a black list. My view is only primary suppliers should be allowed to work on lines that aren't under possession and those staff need to be full time employees who have been invested in and are working in a true open environment yes there is worksafe but how often is that ever invoked.

Finally over the years ive seen far more issues with line blocks than full possessions and you have to wonder whether they offer a level of safety especially where lines are repeatedly given up and taken during the works.

Edit: Thinking about this further I see TMT Commercial Contractors Ltd are Northerns Station works contractor yet aren't able to safely manage their own works in a live railway environment without resorting to subbing out the safety critical elements. So what was Northerns assessment of TMT when they contracted with them as to how they were going to comply with delivering railway safety or was price the main driver.

 

[Trackman]

I don't think that's an unreasonable explanation. If that was the case, I wonder if having worked at Patricroft earlier that night (where trains would have taken longer to arrive in that direction) influenced this assumption.

(not defending or trying to justify because its absolutely wrong and irresponsible, just understand why they might have thought they could get away with it).

It's just not worth the risk, well in fact it's daft when the COSS knew (as evidence says) that the workers were still on the track and had yet to be informed.
He knew a train was due as this was a pre-arranged time as work was scheduled to stop at 05:00.
Maybe he assumed it was coming in a different direction, but everyone knows on the railways that assumption can be deadly.
What happens if both mobiles packed up, or something happened to the COSS?
Why would you say something has been done when it hasn't in safety critical situation?

Tea, no biscuits and maybe a P45 for the COSS, I would guess?

Indeed.

 

[alxndr]

It's just not worth the risk, well in fact it's daft when the COSS knew (as evidence says) that the workers were still on the track and had yet to be informed.
He knew a train was due as this was a pre-arranged time as work was scheduled to stop at 05:00.
Maybe he assumed it was coming in a different direction, but everyone knows on the railways that assumption can be deadly.
What happens if both mobiles packed up, or something happened to the COSS?
Why would you say something has been done when it hasn't in safety critical situation?

As I said, I’m not trying to defend at all, I am also a COSS and wouldn’t dream of abandoning my team let alone handing the line back without knowing they’re all safe and clear. I’m just trying to understand how he might have justified his actions to himself prior to doing them. Understanding how people come to the conclusions they do is a step to avoiding them happening again.

The sensible thing to do would have been just to call the signaller, advise them of the change of contact number, and let the original phone die.

 

[Class 170101]

Another job for green zone working I'm afraid. Why this is even being undertaken red zone is beyond me. This report is also why red zone is and needs to be phased out because people can no longer or are unwilling to manage it properly.

 

[Elecman]

It was Green Zone under line blockage(s)

 

[Towers]

You have to wonder what it will take before NR reach the same realisation that their predecessor did a generation earlier, that you cannot safely maintain a railway by subbing everything out to whatever obscure outfit puts in the lowest bid, with mimimal supervision from the infrastructure owner.

The sheer volume of annonymous-sounding contractors whose vehicles and staff you see out on the lineside is mind boggling. With incidents of blatant failures to follow fundamental safety procedures being alarmingly frequent, you can't help but wonder what the quality is of the work being carried out.

 

[dmncf]

Tea, no biscuits and maybe a P45 for the COSS, I would guess? Could very possibly have been a far, far worse outcome though, presumably they might well have now been facing a gross negligence manslaughter charge?!

Can the COSS just move to a new employer / new agency to escape any record of their poor performance in this incident?

 

[Elecman]

Can the COSS just move to a new employer / new agency to escape any record of their poor performance in this incident?

Not if his sentinel card has the competency withdrawn

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Not if his sentinel card has the competency withdrawn

Thats at the discretion of the employer that sponsors the individual although in my experience companies readily offer up their employees as sacrificial lambs to ensure they don't lose contracts. In this case its pretty cut and dried but it isn't always.

 

[Wolfie]

The safety digest includes this cctv photo. Hats off to the Avanti driver seeing the workers and using the horn. This image is once the workers are back on the platform so god knows what vision the driver had before this ?

Near miss with track workers at Eccles, 22 July 2021

www.gov.uk

Indeed, a driver wide awake despite the time and darkness has probably saved two lives.

So the COSS left his gang on the line, went to the access point where the vehicle was and stayed there for what seems like 40 minutes away from his site. Then contacts the signaller to hand it back before making sure everyone is in a position of safety.

Staggering.

Should never be allowed to work on the railway again - utterly scandalous.

When I have a COSS giving up a line blockage, I always ask the question:

"Right ho then COSS, with regards to authority number 123, can you confirm that all men, equipment and machinery are clear of the line?"

As a signaller, I want the COSS to confirm that they are all clear before I start to remove any protection; not attaching any blame to the signaller involved, but from a selfish point of view when I do a line block I want it on the tape that I have asked the COSS the question. If the COSS then answers dishonestly or negligently, its on them.

Given the report, the individual in question is the last person I would want in charge of my safety if I was PWay.

All seems eminently sensible both for safety reasons and also covering your rear.