Quintinshill - Signalling

It would have been "on" - otherwise he wouldn't have been able to use the crossover. What didn't happen was that a collar wasn't put on the lever to prevent the signals being pulled off. It was only pulled off after the troop train was offered, forgetting about the local train sat on the line.

 

I'm a little confused by your suggestion, Chris. The signals for the troop train on the Up - home, starter (and advance starter?), distant - would all be cleared in one operation, and would all be kept 'on' until that time. That certainly wouldn't be done until the train had been accepted from the box in rear (why would you, with no indication of an approaching train?) and offered forward - usually, but not always, when the train passes the box in rear (although I've seen it suggested that trains were offered forward immediately upon receipt on the Up at Quintinshill). By that time, the local had already been shunted across - wasn't the train of coal empties still making its way into the Up Loop at the time too?

A lever collar should have been placed on the protecting signal lever, and the 'blocking back inside home signal' bell signal should have been sent to the box in rear. Either of those would at least have given cause for them to stop and think before signalling the troop train normally.

 

It's usual for the home and distant of the accepting box to be at danger and caution respectively at the time the line clear is given. In modernised block controls in later years this was actually ensured in the circuitry - i.e if the levers for those signals were'nt fully normal nor the arms ON, then a line clear release could not be given at all.

Signal levers are not locked in the reverse position and can be normalised at any time. A distant COULD be left at caution even if all the related stop signals through the box area were cleared. With the high speed of the initial collision, it's unlikely that was the case at Quintishill. I assume the signalman must have obtained line clear for the forward section and pulled off all the signals in the appropriate direction, followed by the distant.

The main issue was the lack of any effective train detection system where the slow train was parked and the interlocking of that with the signal levers. Track circuits had not been introduced anywhere in UK at the time, although there was a system used in some circumstances: the locking bar, used for facing points to prevent their movement whilst a train was approaching a junction. These were not used for plain track sections between junctions however, so the signalmen of the day always had to check visually there was no obstruction for any movement within the station yard before clearing the appropriate signals.

It seems remarkable that an obstruction only around 70 yards away, in clear view of the box, was not observed.

Non track-circuited sections within visibility of the box remained a feature of UK signalling for decades after Quintishill, especially at smaller rural signalboxes, although once available, track circuits were introduced widely at busy main line sites, and the technique was used to expand the control area of boxes allowing one box to take over both ends of a station for example.

 

Curiously, at St Albans South, the first track circuits that were installed there were on the lines within easy view of the signalman. They were installed in December 1915. I wonder if that might have been a reaction to Quintinshill?

ChrisPSR - Mr Meakin was not totally to blame; he made some errors, but it is very clear from all the reports that there was insufficient supervision of him and his colleagues. The result was that they were not detected in their non-compliance with 'The Rules' and reminded of what they should be doing rather than what they were doing. So that was a management failing by the Caledonian Railway which contributed to the accident.

But in mitigation, they were all under extreme pressure to keep the trains running because of the wartime traffic, and it is not surprising that mistakes occurred.

 

I think there's some psychology there. In order to clear the distant clearly you'd have to ask on, get a forward line clear and pull off each stop signal in line of route first, so there's a multi-stage procedure to follow in the station yard, at each stage giving you chance to think again, however once you've convinced yourself there's no obstruction there, or the obstruction is on the other track, then you're not going to re-check and the process isn't cooperative like block release, so it's inherently risky without further safeguards. The safeguard they did have, the reminder collar, was not used habitually and that is definitely a failure of training and supervision.

At St Albans perhaps the fact there were multiple tracks on a very busy route could have been the deciding factor for the first tracks circuits, so yes each track was easily visible from the box but track circuits made it clear which of them was clear or occupied on quick inspection at busy times. Were those first track circuits installed electrically interlocked with signal levers or provided for indication purposes only?

 

I think the misunderstanding here is that signals are always retained in the ON position unless demanded by a particular approaching train, and then replaced as soon as possible behind it after passing through. Normally a signalman only pulls OFF when the train enters the rear block section, unless that section is very short and to do so would cause delay, such as the case of a fast through train between two station boxes at opposite ends of platforms. At Quintishill, when the down local passenger was backed over the trailing crossover to the up line in the absence of anywhere else to put it, all main line through running signals MUST have been ON which in turn means that distant signals for both directions also must also have been ON. Mechanical interlocking ensured all of this. All the subsequent mistakes leading to the disaster occurred after the shunting move and once the trailing crossover had been restored to its normal through running position, after which mechanical interlocking could no longer offer any protection, and safety relied solely on staff correctly following procedures.
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Quite! They didn't exist at the time on mainline UK railways, although I think London Underground (or a predecessor company) had some in use already. I think John Webb was alluding to the fact they were introduced at many sites very quickly following Quintishill, as is often the case with a new safety system after a major disaster.

 

Chris, you're very welcome. I've not read the book, but I did see the TV documentary recently where I think at least the sequence of train movements was made very clear with the computer animations. I think it's clear that Meakin orchestrated the crossover move and normalised the points again but then failed to collar the relevant signals before actually handing over to Tinsley with all up signals including the distant ON. What I'm not clear about is whether Meakin had already cleared through and pulled off for the down sleeper before handover and possibly even placed the block instrument in train-on-line. If Tinsley had knowledge of the local train but had assumed it to be parked on the down rather than the up line, then himself clearing signals through on both lines is rather inexplicable, but if Meakin had already cleared on the down and Tinsley had made the same assumption about the local (that it was on the down main rather than the up) then he might have made the assumption that the down signal clearance and block state was, in fact, all associated with the local which had merely paused during it's movement and Meakin had neglected to normalise the down signals and rear block behind the train at the handover.

 

When I saw the prog on the tellie it occurred to me could he have put the local into one of the loops with the goods train, one of them must have had a bit of extra room
It seems risky to hold a train wrong line to allow another to pass, or was that done in the days of slow steamers

 

Can I just say that, of all things, this review of the book on Amazon and the associated comments are a mine of information over and above that of the book itself.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/review/R175...ance&nodeID=266239&store=books#wasThisHelpful

 

Chris,

I'm trying very hard to find time to read the accident report properly again so that I can answer with a little more confidence! I would say, however, that the train of coal empties into the Up Loop played a very significant part in events. It was the home signal which would have given access to the loop, and I can't see any problem with making that move with the local standing clear of the crossover on the Up Main. It wouldn't, however, be possible to 'block back' with the coal empties still in section - the correct action would have been to wait until that train had arrived in the Loop, then send 'train out of section' immediately followed by 'blocking back (inside home signal)'. Obviously the latter wasn't sent - but would Meakin have remembered to do so if he'd been able to do it immediately rather than having to wait for the train to clear the section from Kirkpatrick instead? He could have collared the signal protecting the local immediately though - the move into the Up Loop was controlled by a second arm on the Up Home signal (as usual for diverging routes) and a different lever as a result.

Incidentally, in response to 'colchesterken', crossing the local over to the Up Main would probably have been the safest course of action (if it had been protected properly) - no different, really, to a train standing facing in the right direction, say at the section signal. Dropping the local in behind the freight in the Down Loop would have been problematic, not least because of the restrictions (presumably in force at the time, as they are now) on working lines permissively for passenger trains. It'd be a bugger of a job to extract it from the loop afterwards too, requiring an unsignalled move and a 'block back outside home signal' to Gretna - really far from desirable.

 

If it's the one that was on this week it's here:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05vqx7v

 

There are a couple of mysteries in the documentation for me.

Gretna is the box to the south. They had passed the message to Tinsley (the relieving signalman at 0600, who lived in Gretna) that the down local was going to be shunted 'over the road' at Quintinshill, apparently a regular practice, and they knew they had shortly before sent on a goods which had taken the down loop. Subsequently they offered and had accepted the down express, for this was accepted at Quintinshill before the troop train was offered, despite the latter then turning up there first. Yet when Gretna were offered the up troop special they just accepted it. Why did they not question Quintinshill "How can you be offering an up express when you have accepted my down express and the local has therefore been shunted clear onto the up line".

Meanwhile, the fireman of the local came into the box to sign the register, and fail to see the collars placed. The report, and Rolt's account, says that Tinsley offered him the pen to sign the register over his shoulder without looking, because he was preoccupied with completing the late entries. Yet the book the fireman was to sign was the same one that Tinsley was filling in, and the fireman would have to wait until it was all completed to sign the same page at the right place. Nowhere does anything make the point that, when Tinsley wrote up the acceptance of the troop train in the register, that the line above had the fireman signing that they were stopped on the Up line.

 

Was it ever the case that the coal empties were to keep running? How could they, if the local had already been shunted across the road? The mechanical interlocking wouldn't allow the trailing crossover to be reversed for that latter movement unless both Up Distant and Up Home were 'on'.

Whilst the coal train was in the section from the north, it would be protected by the block indicator at 'train on line' (according to the standard mode of signalling) and the section signal at the box in rear - not blocking back (it can't be). Once it's in the loop, it's then protected by the home signal and the loop entry points normal - the latter action, however, bringing the local train, already standing on the Up Main, within the clearing point, hence the need to immediately block back after sending 'train out of section' for the coal empties*.

I think we agree, though, that Meakin should have blocked back and applied a lever collar, but didn't - and thereby failed to protect the local before leaving duty, setting a trap of sorts for Tinsley.

* - the correct action nowadays would be to not send 'train out of section' until the line for which the facing points are set is clear to the clearing point, which wouldn't be possible here until either the local had crossed back to the Down or the coal empties had left the loop. I don't know, without checking, what exactly the regs at the time had to say. The effect, keeping the block indicator at 'train on line' and preventing the box to the north from offering the next train on, would be the same though, so it's perhaps an unnecessary distraction.

 

It is surmised that Meakin sent train out of section for the up coal empties (which could not be accepted by Carlisle Kingmoor Yard) - and he obviously set the crossover road for the local to be shunted (interestingly - reversing a loaded passenger train today like this would probably not be allowed without clipping the points - as it would be on the authority of a shunt signal - however I digress)

So Tinsley has to multi-task - get the traffic update, copy the entries into the train register - fend off some enquiries from one goods guard , get the fireman to sign the
book (apparently in the wrong place !) - whilst absorbing the ongoing train working and block bells.

Almost automatically he pulled off for the special up troop train without thinking - and in his own words , completely forgot the shunted local.

We might surmise that his concentration limits were reached or exceeded - and he may not have eaten / drunk some tea before getting to work. Basically human factors.

After the crash - a track circuit was installed on the up fast line - which had it been there on the morning - might have reminded him - and it may have been linked to the block instrument to prevent a line clear being given.

Whilst this location was exceptionally busy on this morning - with basically 3 extra "Government" trains - normally - it would have been a routine "passing" box with probably only the odd train being looped. Freight s would not have been held too long there I suspect - as a lengthy delay would result in water levels in the tenders being run down ...

 

I would submit that whilst information on the situation post 1915 needs to be used with care, if at all, there is a lot of important and useful information not covered under your two headings.

For example there is criticism of the stock used on the Troop Train, to ignore the context of a nation involved in a major war with rail traffic up by a substantial amount (40% on the route involved) is to give an entirely false picture. The railways would have been short on stock and they either used what they had available or the troops would not have moved - which would have had an impact on military operations, which in turn could (probably would) have cost lives.

We are also talking of a railway where, although conscription had not yet been introduced, staff were increasingly leaving for the forces. Management and staff at all levels would have been under increased pressure due to this and the increased traffic.

Finally there is the issue that later knowledge regarding Human Factors illuminates events on that day in a way that sticking just to the information presented at the time cannot do.

 

I understand that the 'conspiracy' book has an extract from the train register published - would it be possible for you to post some edited highlights, Chris? That should show whether 'train out of section' has been sent (or at least whether it had been booked). If it hadn't, though, the box in rear wouldn't have offered the troop train, without giving both chaps cause to step back and work out what was going on.

It seems generally accepted that the coal empties were recessed at Quintinshill because they couldn't be dealt with at Carlisle. Even if it was a local regulating decision, it seems unlikely that Meakin would ever have pulled off straight up the main - but, even if he had, both the Up Distant and Up Home (to the Main) must have been replaced (enforced by the mechanical locking) before the loop entry points could have been reversed. Whether it was to run up the Main or into the loop, there's also little doubt that it would have been protected by the block at T.O.L. (and, in turn, the section signal in rear) - that's the basic mode of signalling. I can't see any other likely course of events, then, other than Meakin sending 'train out of section' and leaving a clear block for the troop train to be offered.

 

There is a BBC Documentary about it presented by Neil what's-his-pus which goes into this.

In summary, the suggestion is that the signalmen were under pressure to keep the trains running while the Quintinshill loops were used as stabling points. Also the suggestion that some Companies were discouraging use of lever collars while having the rule requiring them. Plus of course the death-knell of safety - a blame culture.

I Couldn't understand Neil Oliver is seen walking towards Ribblehead viaduct near the beginning, but that is explained: Blea Moor used as model for Quintinshill 1915.

There was a published accident report into the Quintinshill event.

There were further accidents at Quintinshill in 1973 and 2002.
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I have put the link in another post. It is at: http://bbc.in/1Lcf7Mr

 

Reversing trains 'over the road' onto the opposite direction track was a common practice, pretty much died away nowadays but still being done in the 1970s in places. Accidents along the same lines were also not unknown.

At Taunton there was one in 1890, just 25 years before Quintinshill, where a down local goods was put over onto the up line at Norton Fitzwarren to allow a faster train to pass, the signalman forgot it, those instructed to carry out reminder actions didn't do them properly, and a special up passenger not in the normal timetable, an ocean liner boat train from Plymouth, came down the hill under clear signals and struck the local head on. Sound familiar ? The official report recommended the introduction of Collars, so they were not in use then, and said that some signalman informally were putting flag sticks into home signal lever slides as a reminder that a train was standing.

Those who remembered this accident were long gone by the time I knew the railway there, but it was still regularly spoken about, and the grandchildren of those involved worked on the railway at that time.

 

No problem Chris, I've located a copy of the book which should be with me soon!

Reading the accident report, however, it's clear that both Tinsley and Meakin denied sending 'train out of section' for the coal empties, but that someone (surely one of them, rather than anyone else in the box) did. Both mentioedn 'blocking back' - Meakin stated (correctly) that he was unable to send 2-4 as the coal empties were still in section, and Tinsley stated that it didn't occur to him to send it after taking duty as he'd already forgotten about the local standing on the Up Main. It's impossible to know who should have sent 2-4 without knowing who cleared back for the coal empties though! Failing to do so was one of the greatest failings though.

On lever collars, Tinsley stated that he did not use them for trains standing on the main lines, only for those in the loops (the former directly contravening the Regulations, as stated in the accident report), and Meakin merely states that he didn't consider it necessary whilst he had charge of the box. Misplaced confidence? Either way, the other great failing, and one that perhaps both chaps should have been held responsible for.

Finally, the suggestion that the loops were being used as sidings - I see nothing to substantiate this. The train in the Down Loop arrived at 6.14, and that in the Up Loop around 6.34, with the collision occurring at around 6.50. That doesn't point to them being used for anything other than routine traffic purposes.