Select Committee report on timetable chaos published

[717001]

The report has been released:

https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-committee/news-parliament-2017/rail-timetable-changes-report-publication-17-19/

In summary

• Immediate priority must be to establish effective oversight of next national rail timetable changes
• Rail timetabling process requires genuinely independent oversight
• Worst-affected 2018 season ticket holders should receive a discount on 2019 season tickets, equivalent to the price rise announced on 30 November
• Effective contingency plans for disabled passengers and stringent enforcement
• Events demonstrate overwhelming case for automated, or automatic compensation schemes

Changes to the national rail timetable occur each May and December and are often relatively minor tweaks. In May 2018, following major infrastructure works, an unprecedented timetable change of around four times the typical scale was planned, involving 43,200 individual changes and affecting 46% of passenger services. The implementation was chaotic and resulted in a prolonged period of intensely inconvenient, costly and potentially dangerous disruption for passengers across the north of England and in London and the south.

(Couldn’t see a better place to post it, but happy for it to be moved)

 

[Spartacus]

Not sure of the need for yet another layer of timetable planning, or what effect it would have other than to increase costs if
A) there’s no engagement with those who know what they’re doing before rediculous timetable requirements are written into franchise requirements.

B) there’s nobody at Network Rail willing or able to tell them where to stick their plans: too many at or near the top just looking after their own and their next move. ‘Oh yes, this will work brilliantly’, then rewarded with a new position, which keeps them sheltered when the proverbial hits the fan, despite it being of their own making.

C) they don’t stop preparing timetables (and other things, ITPS for one) based on everything being rosy, resulting in a thousand small risks being taken, with those at the top ignoring that it creates one massive risk, set up like a house of cards.

 

[DarloRich]

Not sure of the need for yet another layer of timetable planning, or what effect it would have other than to increase costs if
A) there’s no engagement with those who know what they’re doing before rediculous timetable requirements are written into franchise requirements.

B) there’s nobody at Network Rail willing or able to tell them where to stick their plans: too many at or near the top just looking after their own and their next move. ‘Oh yes, this will work brilliantly’, then rewarded with a new position, which keeps them sheltered when the proverbial hits the fan, despite it being of their own making.

C) they don’t stop preparing timetables (and other things, ITPS for one) based on everything being rosy, resulting in a thousand small risks being taken, with those at the top ignoring that it creates one massive risk, set up like a house of cards.

Interesting that you have not picked out the key points on the front page linked above ( perhaps like me you are still reading the full report) and have sought to absolve the TOC's of any blame. To help others:

Published today, Rail timetable changes: May 2018, concludes the crisis was partly due to the ‘astonishing complexity’ of a fragmented railway in which interrelated private train companies, operating on publicly-owned and managed infrastructure, have competing commercial interests. This complex system could not cope with the scale of the changes.

There was a collective, system-wide failure across Network Rail, the privately-owned train operating companies, the Department for Transport and the Office of Road and Rail. Governance and decision-making processes were not fit for purpose, says the Report. The Committee endorses the key conclusion of the inquiry led by the Chair of the Office of Road and Rail, Professor Stephen Glaister, that ‘nobody took charge’.

Only the Secretary of State had the ultimate authority to judge the trade-offs between competing commercial interests and could step in to avert the crisis by halting implementation, but he was not given all the information he required to make that decision. However, the Committee concludes Mr Grayling should have been more proactive and that it is not reasonable for him to absolve himself completely of all responsibility

Who knew that a complex and fragmented railway system of completing commercial interests might lead to trouble? Who knew that an ineffective secretary of state would not be able to "grip" the situation? Amazing!

 

[cuccir]

An interesting line in the conclusiosn and recomendations:

More substantial changes currently planned for 2019 should only go ahead when the industry is confident they can be delivered effectively.

I think that there a lot of planned changes - eg Northern Connect services, TPE extension through Northumberland to Edinburgh - that won't happen in 2019. There's a strong chance that some of them may end up scrapped for good.

 

[Spartacus]

Interesting that you have not picked out the key points on the front page linked above ( perhaps like me you are still reading the full report) and have sought to absolve the TOC's of any blame.

Far from it, I was only trying to say regarding the point: "Rail timetabling process requires genuinely independent oversight" that it would pbe potentially a pointless and expensive excercise, but it seems the quote wasn't included.