Tangmere SPAD at Wootton Bassett junction 7/3/15

[TheLastMinute]

RAIB have announced they are investigating an incident where Tangmere passed the signal protecting Wootton Bassett junction at danger.

According to the brief details, the driver had failed to respond to a TSR AWS warning just before the pervious signal which had caused a full break application. However, instead of bring the train to a stand and contacting the signaller, the train crew disabled the AWS and TPWS system which cancelled the break application. They then failed to respond to yellow warning aspect and as TPWS had been disabled, it was unable to intervene and they arrived at the signal protecting the junction far too fast to stop.

The link to the invesitgation is here: http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/150307_wootton_bassett.cfm

 

[TDK]

RAIB have announced they are investigating an incident where Tangmere passed the signal protecting Wootton Bassett junction at danger.

According to the brief details, the driver had failed to respond to a TSR AWS warning just before the pervious signal which had caused a full break application. However, instead of bring the train to a stand and contacting the signaller, the train crew disabled the AWS and TPWS system which cancelled the break application. They then failed to respond to yellow warning aspect and as TPWS had been disabled, it was unable to intervene and they arrived at the signal protecting the junction far too stop.

The link to the invesitgation is here: http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/150307_wootton_bassett.cfm

Hmmmm - A driver recently got a 3 year (I think) suspended jail sentence and lost his job for similar incident to this. Is this a case of boys and big toys and people playing trains?

 

[ac6000cw]

This very serious stuff - if luck had gone the other way, this could have been another Southall.....

Wasn't it Tangmere that had the connecting rod failure which only luck prevented becoming a serious derailment ? Feels like the operators and maintainers of the loco are about to have the book thrown at them....

 

[ilkestonian]

It does sound most unfortunate for the crew who apparently turned an initial error into something altogether more serious.

 

[cf111]

Wasn't it Tangmere that had the connecting rod failure which only luck prevented becoming a serious derailment ?

RAIB report here: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploa...ata/file/410628/140616_R132014_Winchfield.pdf

 

[mtbox]

Hmmmm - A driver recently got a 3 year (I think) suspended jail sentence and lost his job for similar incident to this. Is this a case of boys and big toys and people playing trains?

No it is not a case of toys and people playing trains, all steam drivers are fully passed out very experienced mainline drivers.

 

[ilkestonian]

No it is not a case of toys and people playing trains, all steam drivers are fully passed out very experienced mainline drivers.

Quite.

It's operated by West Coast Railway Company, who employ some of the most experienced (often ex-BR) footplate crew there are.

 

[Darandio]

No it is not a case of toys and people playing trains, all steam drivers are fully passed out very experienced mainline drivers.

It's operated by West Coast Railway Company, who employ some of the most experienced (often ex-BR) footplate crew there are.

Which in this case counts for absolutely nothing, what they are reported to have done is completely unacceptable no matter how experienced they apparently are.

This cannot be looked at in a rose tinted manner just because it's a steam train.

 

[daveswest]

Quite.

It's operated by West Coast Railway Company, who employ some of the most experienced (often ex-BR) footplate crew there are.

Who surely should of known better ,looking at the circumstances then ?

 

[evoluzione]

Are main line steam trains fitted with OTDR?

Reset and Go is a massive no no, all professional drivers know this.

 

[ainsworth74]

Are main line steam trains fitted with OTDR?

I believe they have to be in order to be mainline certified. For the same reason they all have to have AWS and TPWS in order to operate on the mainline.

 

[theironroad]

This is pretty serious.

I thought all stock on nr infrastructure had to be otmr fitted by now and the exemptions were only for stock being phased out. I don't know what info a steam loco can give to the otdr, but I wonder if the raib's data has come from the otdr.

This is also more than a 'reset and continue'. R&c is generally when the tpws has intervened and the train has come to a stand, the driver has allowed it to time out and then carried on without following procedure.

This sounds like a full isolation of the aws/ tpws was carried out when the brakes started going in, hence why the raib report mentions only 8 moh of speed was lost. With the full isolation, there was no further aws/tpws protection available.

It's certainly fortunate that the conflicting movement had already gone through.

 

[HowardGWR]

This cannot be looked at in a rose tinted manner just because it's a steam train.

Who said it was?:roll:

 

[mtbox]

Which in this case counts for absolutely nothing, what they are reported to have done is completely unacceptable no matter how experienced they apparently are.

This cannot be looked at in a rose tinted manner just because it's a steam train.

I never said it should be looked at in a rose tinted manner.
Being a driver, I am fully aware how serious this is.
Reading the preliminary report, they did not isolate the AWS, and being involved with steam, I know exactly what they have done to release the brakes after the initial brake demand which resulted from not cancelling the magnet for the TSR in time, but that is not a matter for this forum. That is not to say they didn't do anything wrong. They did and I'm sure they are aware of it.

 

[Tracky]

No it is not a case of toys and people playing trains, all steam drivers are fully passed out very experienced mainline drivers.

I agree, the boys and toys comment is unnecessary. They are professional, passed, paid drivers operating certified traction on the mainline. That is what makes the apparent and alleged disregard for the rulebook so unbelievable. I await the full report.

The previous mechanical failure of the loco is unconnected.

Having said that...

I have had concerns for some time as to how some of their drivers (the ones who aren't working while employed by other TOCs) maintain vast and varied route knowledge.

West Coast, unlike DB, do not require the fireman to be a qualified driver with route knowledge.

Maintaining the paperwork at West Coast Railways must be as tougher a task as maintaining the vast fleet of MkI and II coaches.

 

[Skutter]

Are main line steam trains fitted with OTDR?.

Almost all, yes - there are only a few lines with exemptions like Whitby-Battersby (45mph with a very simple track layout and few trains).

This will certainly have a lot of people reading the final report - for instance, if TPWS had been able to intervene before the danger signal, would it have stopped the train before the crossing?

 

[EM2]

What is OTDR, I'm guessing something like On Train Data Recording? If so, what does it record? If not, what is it and what does it do?

 

[Rich McLean]

What is OTDR, I'm guessing something like On Train Data Recording? If so, what does it record? If not, what is it and what does it do?

Yep. On Train Data Recorder. Records everything the drivers does, as well as record speeds, breaking curves, break settings, amount of power applied, AWS warnings, pretty much everything apart from visual recording.

 

[GB]

...pretty much everything apart from visual recording.

...And audio recordings.

 

[D1009]

I worry about WCRC's steam operations, particularly after the dispute last year over the issue on LNE route during dry weather.

 

[Jonny]

This will certainly have a lot of people reading the final report - for instance, if TPWS had been able to intervene before the danger signal, would it have stopped the train before the crossing?

TPWS is designed with two levels - one "overspeed" loop that catches trains approaching too fast (fixed distance, if the train reaches the second beacon too quickly with the relevant signal at danger then it forces an emergency application before the signal. There is a second set of "loops" that aims to stop anything that passes the signal at danger. Both are designed to stop trains within the overlap, which one presumes would be short of the junction.

 

[edwin_m]

Group Standard 8272 issue 1 is the current requirement for data recorders (there is an Issue 2 but it is not yet in force). It applies restrospectively to equipment in service before it was introduced, but is subject to test of reasonable practicality.

It mandates that all safety systems are monitored, and I would expect this to be reasaonably practicable on a steam locomotive even where some other functions wouldn't.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

TPWS is designed with two levels - one "overspeed" loop that catches trains approaching too fast (fixed distance, if the train reaches the second beacon too quickly with the relevant signal at danger then it forces an emergency application before the signal. There is a second set of "loops" that aims to stop anything that passes the signal at danger. Both are designed to stop trains within the overlap, which one presumes would be short of the junction.

The single overspeed sensor isn't enough to stop a train approaching at more than about 75mph within the overlap, although it would obviously slow it down so probably make any accident less severe. A second overspeed sensor can be fitted further out (TPWS+).

Also worth noting that a loco-hauled train of tread-braked stock will have longer stopping distances than a more modern passenger train. Does anyone know if steam loco TPWS uses the "freight" timer setting to compensate for this?

 

[GadgetMan]

I find it worrying that the safety system could be isolated so easily/quickly after being tripped. The train only lost 8 mph before they managed to cancel the brake application.

To me that suggests that the traincrew were fully aware of how to bypass/cancel a brake intervention, and can only hope that it hadn't become something that was routinely done by them or other Drivers of that or other Steam trains.

 

[theironroad]

Well, I guess well have to all wait a couple of years until the full and detailed report is released.

 

[mtbox]

Yep. On Train Data Recorder. Records everything the drivers does, as well as record speeds, breaking curves, break settings, amount of power applied, AWS warnings, pretty much everything apart from visual recording.

Not on a steam loco. This is basically speed, AWS status and brake pipe pressure/vacuum. But that is enough to see what has gone on.

 

[21C101]

I find it worrying that the safety system could be isolated so easily/quickly after being tripped. The train only lost 8 mph before they managed to cancel the brake application.

To me that suggests that the traincrew were fully aware of how to bypass/cancel a brake intervention, and can only hope that it hadn't become something that was routinely done by them or other Drivers of that or other Steam trains.

Especially given recent aviation events. And in the light of that am I right in understanding that pulling the communication cord no longer puts the brakes on automatically with most trains, just sends an alarm to the driver?

 

[Minilad]

Especially given recent aviation events. And in the light of that am I right in understanding that pulling the communication cord no longer puts the brakes on automatically with most trains, just sends an alarm to the driver?

On the traction I drive you receive an alarm in the cab when the cord is pulled. You then have the option of letting the brakes come on or overriding that and stopping where you feel is more appropriate. To do that you must keep you hand, or foot, on a button. As soon as the button is released you have a few seconds time delay before the brakes are applied. You are also able to speak to the person who has pulled the cord. A much better system in my view as it enables you to bring the train to a stand in a more suitable location and with a smoother braking curve. Remember that the vast majority of cord pulls are not emergency situations at all. In fact I have never had one that was up to yet and I must have had 30 or 40 cord pulls in my time

 

[21C101]

On the traction I drive you receive an alarm in the cab when the cord is pulled. You then have the option of letting the brakes come on or overriding that and stopping where you feel is more appropriate. To do that you must keep you hand, or foot, on a button. As soon as the button is released you have a few seconds time delay before the brakes are applied. You are also able to speak to the person who has pulled the cord. A much better system in my view as it enables you to bring the train to a stand in a more suitable location and with a smoother braking curve. Remember that the vast majority of cord pulls are not emergency situations at all. In fact I have never had one that was up to yet and I must have had 30 or 40 cord pulls in my time

For any sane and normal driver I would agree with you, however if Driver Lubitz were in charge and alone in the cab (which if 319s are anything to go by now has a solid metal door and secure mortice lock instead of the old pre 9-11 carriage key with break glass to enter panel), maybe not such a good idea, especially as it seems from others posts above he could also disable TPWS & AWS on the go.

 

[Minilad]

For any sane and normal driver I would agree with you, however if Driver Lubitz were in charge and alone in the cab (which if 319s are anything to go by now has a solid metal door and secure mortice lock instead of the old pre 9-11 carriage key with break glass to enter panel), maybe not such a good idea, especially as it seems from others posts above he could also disable TPWS & AWS on the go.

There are other ways of stopping a train if really necessary. Not that I would suggest what they they are on here. And the cab door could still be opened by a member of staff with the appropriate key. Although obviously not as likely that there would be another member of staff around on a DOO train. But I suppose if a driver really wanted to they could cause quite a serious incident

 

[SpacePhoenix]

For any sane and normal driver I would agree with you, however if Driver Lubitz were in charge and alone in the cab (which if 319s are anything to go by now has a solid metal door and secure mortice lock instead of the old pre 9-11 carriage key with break glass to enter panel), maybe not such a good idea, especially as it seems from others posts above he could also disable TPWS & AWS on the go.

Could the GSM-R be rigged to send an alert/warning to the relevant signalers if a driver disables either the AWS or TPWS (or if either the driver disables the GSM-R or the GSM-R has malfunctioned/failed)?