Were tighter headways allowed in the 1980s compared to now?

[eastwestdivide]

Perhaps we can point to any collision as a result - that's right. None.

Perhaps not conclusively, but the report on the 1984 Wembley collision at

Report on the Collision that occurred on 11th October 1984 near Wembley Central in the London Midland Region British Railways :: The Railways Archive

Archive of UK railways documents

www.railwaysarchive.co.uk

at item 49 says (my bold)

It is entirely possible that Driver Armstrong allowed his mind to wander or otherwise lost concentration, cancelled the AWS warnings, and continued to hold down the 'dead mnan's handle' without realising what he was doing. There have been other cases, rare but well documented, in which driver, running under repetitive cautionary signals (as when closely following another train) have similarly cancelled the AWS warnings and have passed signals at Danger.

And at item 55

Finally, the fact that neither the automatic warning system (AWS) nor the drivers safety device (the 'deadman's handle') was able to prevent this accident has important implications for safety. It has been apparent for some time that, whilst AWS has proved a most important aid to drivers and has undoubtedly helped to reduce the number of collisions, it does not guard against incorrect cancellation of the kind that can arise when drivers are running under a sequence of cautionary signals still less against 'unconscious' cancellation of the kind that apparently happened at Wembley Central. In the case of the DSD, vigilance devices can guard to some extent against the possibility that the DSD nlisht be inadvertently held down when it should be released, but there must be sensible time intervals hetuwn demands that the vigilance device be acknowledged, and at Wembley the duration of Driver Armstrong's apparent incapacity was short. The Inspectorate was discussing with the Board, before the Wembley accident, the question of AWS and other aids to drivers and these discussions have continued. The Board is currently examining ways in which the present AWS might be made more cffective, and is developing more advanced systems of information in the cab. The Inspcctorate is being kept fully informed of thecc developments.

 

[Taunton]

Perhaps not conclusively, but the report on the 1984 Wembley collision at

Report on the Collision that occurred on 11th October 1984 near Wembley Central in the London Midland Region British Railways :: The Railways Archive

Archive of UK railways documents

www.railwaysarchive.co.uk

at item 49 says (my bold)

And at item 55

Yet another report which misses the point. It earlier states quite explicitly that the accident train had been running under green signals from South Hampstead out to Wembley, where it encountered a quite normal G-YY-Y-R sequence. Quite how "running under a sequence of cautionary signals" comes into it, goodness knows.

 

[DerekC]

Might be misremembering, but I seem to recall from reading the Clapham accident report that drivers of preceding trains had observed the signal going to red in front of them and then back to green, and thought nothing of it, as they were used to following preceding trains closely and having the signaller put the road back ahead of them for the route into Platform 7/8.

I don’t know, but whatever the underlying issues, a driver went past a red signal and into another train.

Not so - read the Hidden Report. There is no doubt that WF138 was showing clear when Driver Rolls passed it. It was showing clear despite the section ahead being occupied, because of a wiring fault.

 

[Ianno87]

Not so - read the Hidden Report. There is no doubt that WF138 was showing clear when Driver Rolls passed it. It was showing clear despite the section ahead being occupied, because of a wiring fault.

My point was that (from the Hidden report IIRC) drivers were so used to driving on restricted signals that drivers of previous trains (in front of the accident train) did not report the signal going to a restrictive aspect in front of them and back to green (caused by the wiring fault), because they were so used to this happening with the tight headways.

So the wrong-side fault was not reported until, for the accident train, it was too late.

 

[Bald Rick]

Not so - read the Hidden Report. There is no doubt that WF138 was showing clear when Driver Rolls passed it. It was showing clear despite the section ahead being occupied, because of a wiring fault.

I wasn’t talking about Clapham, I was talking about Hampton Court.

 

[DerekC]

I wasn’t talking about Clapham, I was talking about Hampton Court.

OK having read again I see you were. Apologies. I was a bit surprised!

My point was that (from the Hidden report IIRC) drivers were so used to driving on restricted signals that drivers of previous trains (in front of the accident train) did not report the signal going to a restrictive aspect in front of them and back to green (caused by the wiring fault), because they were so used to this happening with the tight headways.

So the wrong-side fault was not reported until, for the accident train, it was too late.

Driver McClymont on the Basingstoke train that was rear-ended had WF138 change directly from green to red in front of him and was unable to stop at it, so he stopped at the next signal to report, thereby unwittingly (and blamelessly) completing the set of circumstances which led to the accident. The preceding drivers saw various irregular changes from green to single or double yellow, which they put down to the signaller changing the route in front of them. That obviously isn't directly related to running on restrictive aspects, although there might be an indirect relationship.