The problems of the route centred around the viaduct through Lewes which had been allowed to fall into disrepair. Apparently this led to the line over the viaduct being single tracked, speed restricted and a shuttle train operating whereby a passenger from the coast would have to change trains at Lewes, then Barcombe Mills to make a journey Northwards. According to the Wealden Campaign, even this "service" didn't manage to put off the clientelle. One might have expected BR to just repair enough of the viaduct to single the track over it.
The route is interesting because it is an apt illustration of the litany of failure that characterised all sides of the closure programme:
- Beeching listed the line South of Crowborough, potentially leaving Uckfield isolated.
- Marples approves a £350k grant towards the construction of the pheonix causeway in Lewes, but isn't prepared to pay £135k to bridge the railway. The "Mother of Parliaments" also refuses to grant £95k to divert the route via Hamsey.
- 1966, BR applies to close the whole route from Hurst Green to Lewes.
- At the TUCC, the objectors use the DfT's own cost benefit analysis for (what is incredibly) the first time such analysis has been used to assess a closure. It finds that the route, which apparently generated less than £5k in revenue, if closed would lead to a £570k loss in terms of travel time. The Goverment concludes that this would involve inconvenience rather than hardship, and decides that this is outweighed by the cost of retention.
- A change in minister and a 1968 transport white paper means that BR can apply for a grant to run unrenumerative lines - but this only applies to the "London" area, which only extends as far as Uckfield (apparently), so the section South of there is closed. Quite apart from leaving everyone outside of London to swivel, this means that a potentially useful through route with the coast with an even spread of passengers becomes a commuter heavy branch line to the middle of the countryside.
Anyone who thinks that the closure programme was justified should read this and weep. Travesties like this were happenning all over the country.
Beeching might not have had a crystal ball, however one might have expected him to notice the value of having secondary routes during renewals during the West Coast Mainline electrification for example. He could possibly have borrowed a copy of the DfT's cost benefit analysis, which was apparently used in the construction of the M1. Clearly the Uckfield line objectors had the resources to conduct an analysis.
We've talked a lot about the common carrier obligation etc, perhaps the most outmoded concept was the idea that the railway should pay for itself entirely through the farebox. I wonder whether anybody suggested this on the Stedeford commttee.