I'm not sure that that would have been true, but I draw no comfort from it.
In my view, it would have sparked an inevitable spiral of decline. Though I may be wrong about the actual date where everything would have gone!
My view is that many lines might be able to cover their immediate costs and continue in existence pro tem. However sooner or later a big expenditure will arise (rolling stock will need replacing, a sea wall will collapse, signal wiring will rot - there are lots of options) and then commercially there needs to be a profitable business case for the investment. At that point the network would be subject to contraction. Living off sunk investment from the past is easy, putting hands in current pockets in the hope of future net income streams is another matter. Our first generation tramways often ticked along until re-equipment (new tramcars, rewiring) brought them to their end (a bit of a generalisation, I know).
That illustrates my point perfectly, I think. There was a lot of investment in new commuter stock during the late 1980's and early 1990's which I doubt would have happened had Serpell's most radical proposal gone ahead.
If the railways had also been operated according to the market, then I don't think that there would have been any investment at all. The system that remained would simply have been squeezed for whatever profit it could have supplied, up until it basically fell apart.
No private company would have felt justified in investing billions for a questionable and very small rate of return.
My contention is that a purely commercial railway might tick along without major loss of network until major unavoidable cost issues arise. At those points contraction would be likely to occur. Whilst the weather was playing its game at Dawlish, the Hastings Line was also suffering from major landslip traumas that, under purely commercial criteria, could have been its nemesis.
I think you are correct. I do see it as a best case scenario and I still feel that the loss of a network would have had a significant effect on rail passenger numbers, and that even a line that was thought to be profitable (by whatever definition they wanted to use) could easily end up making an oeprating loss within a year or two.
I'll add - through ticketing would probably disappear, and InterCity ticketing would be compulsory reservation and much more heavily yield managed[1] like airlines.
[1] For instance, Friday evening and Sunday afternoon-evening would be priced far more like morning peaks, I would expect.
I agree. Prices would be far more dynamic than they are now. There would be no government protection of fare increases, and no through ticketing between any operators that remain.
To paraphrase a former government, it would be a very bad deal for passengers. Taxpayers might, like the Treasury, be pleased to see railways having to fend for themselves, until they notice how the roads have become even busier and clogged up.
With loss of many local services could result in more genuine on rail competition on almost all surviving routes
The network is likely to be so diminished even in the short term, that competition will be impractical if not impossible.
A pure economic driven TT would have much less than now - and certainly not in many places and at times taken for granted now.
Absolutely right. This would also lead to a fall in ridership, as those who take a busy, peak hour train in one direction might not be using a busy peak time train the other way. They might be travelling on one of the trains that the market doesn't run.
Inevitably, as with the loss of branches and other secondary routes, the profitable trains will become less profitable and finally unprofitable, maybe even before any major investment is due.
I see no reason to change my view that leaving the railways to the market would be the death knell for them as sure as Saturday follows Friday.