Restarting HS2a

[Nottingham59]

The cost calculation in the bcr is the cost of construction and operation for 60 years, against the benefits to the economy and return from fares.

Sorry, but it doesn't work that way. The return from fares is already included in the C of the BCR calculation.

See for instance the HS2 Business Case. (table 2.3 p53)

HS2 Phase One full business case

The full business case for the HS2 Phase One route from Birmingham to London.

www.gov.uk

 

[FMerrymon]

Sorry, but it doesn't work that way. The return from fares is already included in the C of the BCR calculation.

See for instance the HS2 Business Case. (table 2.3 p53)

HS2 Phase One full business case

The full business case for the HS2 Phase One route from Birmingham to London.

www.gov.uk

OK, as part of the divisor not the dividend, but the point was that the bcr was still positive.

 

[slowroad]

Could you give us some examples, instead of the nebulous "other things"?

Admittedly it’s a bit dated, but given the slow progress with major transport schemes that probably does not matter. This paper includes average BCRs for around 200 projects (and is an interesting read):

https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/occasional/op053.pdf

 

[FMerrymon]

Admittedly it’s a bit dated, but given the slow progress with major transport schemes that probably does not matter. This paper includes average BCRs for around 200 projects (and is an interesting read):

https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/occasional/op053.pdf

As representatives of the DfT said in the TSC, they don't take a list of schemes and select the ones that have the highest bcrs, they start with a strategic need and the BCR is used to appraise the options. It's all very well going for small schemes with good BCRs but if you have a capacity crunch for long distance north-south journeys, then any number of high bcr tram systems isnt going to resolve it.

In any case, the way we approase currently doesn't fully reflect the benefits of larger schemes, especially in the case of hs2 and the government were working on improving that.

 

[The Ham]

But when those benefits are added up, they are much lower relative to costs than could be obtained by spending the money on other things.

Whilst that could be the case to part way through the building process, there must come a point where that isn't the case.

For example, if there was a project which was going to create benefits of £20,000 yet was going to cost £40,000 but £38,000 had already been spent. Then is it better to spend the £2,000 on a project with benefits of £7,000 or spend the £2,000 to get the £20,000 of benefits from the original project?

 

[slowroad]

As representatives of the DfT said in the TSC, they don't take a list of schemes and select the ones that have the highest bcrs, they start with a strategic need and the BCR is used to appraise the options. It's all very well going for small schemes with good BCRs but if you have a capacity crunch for long distance north-south journeys, then any number of high bcr tram systems isnt going to resolve it.

In any case, the way we approase currently doesn't fully reflect the benefits of larger schemes, especially in the case of hs2 and the government were working on improving that.

If a scheme doesn’t have a decent BCR, it’s unlikely to be delivering on the objective of meeting a strategic need in a cost-effective manner.

BCRs are imperfect. Everything is. But the HS2 BCRs used some very “innovative” methods to bolster the benefits. Costs were clearly underestimated. All alternative options were not fully assessed. And the world has changed, particularly in respect of business travel. It’s a basket case, basically.

 

[FMerrymon]

If a scheme doesn’t have a decent BCR, it’s unlikely to be delivering on the objective of meeting a strategic need in a cost-effective manner.

BCRs are imperfect. Everything is. But the HS2 BCRs used some very “innovative” methods to bolster the benefits. Costs were clearly underestimated. All alternative options were not fully assessed. And the world has changed, particularly in respect of business travel. It’s a basket case, basically.

Tell that to the last govt who cancelled a project for having a bcr greater than 1 in the middle of delivery (therefore far greater than 1 to finish), in favour of one project that had a bcr of 0.4 and others that had not had any calculation and were likely to fail anyway. Anyway... They don't take into account the counter factual of doing nothing and the point is to compare to alternatives - in this way they are looking for the most cost effective solution, not necessarily the cheapest.

You're going to have to justify these "innovative" methods? What exactly were they and how do they defer from green book guidance? In fact, many of the transformational benefits were excluded from the bcr for hs2. Alternatives were very much assessed, what alternatives do you believe weren't? Business traffic is one of the ways the current bcr assessment falls short, they over rely on such calculations but don't sufficiently account for the effect of a rail transport project on housing, for example.

 

[slowroad]

Tell that to the last govt who cancelled a project for having a bcr greater than 1 in the middle of delivery (therefore far greater than 1 to finish), in favour of one project that had a bcr of 0.4 and others that had not had any calculation and were likely to fail anyway. Anyway... They don't take into account the counter factual of doing nothing and the point is to compare to alternatives - in this way they are looking for the most cost effective solution, not necessarily the cheapest.

You're going to have to justify these "innovative" methods? What exactly were they and how do they defer from green book guidance? In fact, many of the transformational benefits were excluded from the bcr for hs2. Alternatives were very much assessed, what alternatives do you believe weren't? Business traffic is one of the ways the current bcr assessment falls short, they over rely on such calculations but don't sufficiently account for the effect of a rail transport project on housing, for example.

The innovative methods were the use of a complex black box modelling methodology to assess (and effectively increase) wider economic benefits. An approach not applied to other schemes. It’s true that that affordability matters, not just costs and benefits. But that’s another nail. The alternatives that were assessed were based on the need to deliver all/most of the benefits, rather than more limited capacity enhancement to existing routes without very high speed (perhaps a consequence of the unclear and shifting strategic case). Some potential benefits may have been omitted, but that will also be true of the other projects the money could have been used for.

 

[FMerrymon]

The innovative methods were the use of a complex black box modelling methodology to assess (and effectively increase) wider economic benefits. An approach not applied to other schemes. It’s true that that affordability matters, not just costs and benefits. But that’s another nail. The alternatives that were assessed were based on the need to deliver all/most of the benefits, rather than more limited capacity enhancement to existing routes without very high speed (perhaps a consequence of the unclear and shifting strategic case). Some potential benefits may have been omitted, but that will also be true of the other projects the money could have been used for.

The omitted benefits are substantial and, in many cases like the effects of released capacity, are specific to HS2.

The strategic case has not shifted.

Are you suggesting that the WEI in the BCR wasn't peer reviewed and wasn't in line with webtag guidance?

Its all very well spending on other projects, but it still leaves the question of how to fix capacity issues on wcml, which would have a negative economic impact if not fixed.

 

[Snow1964]

Not strictly HS2a, but new drone video has been posted of HS2 works north of the delta junction through to Hansacre.

Thought it would be better in this thread than the thread on HS2 construction in Birmingham area, as it is more relevant to HS2 continuation north of Birmingham.

Some parts see to be progressing, others seem to almost not really started and on hold. I am baffled by the apparently disjointed construction of the trackbed.

 

[slowroad]

The omitted benefits are substantial and, in many cases like the effects of released capacity, are specific to HS2.

The strategic case has not shifted.

Are you suggesting that the WEI in the BCR wasn't peer reviewed and wasn't in line with webtag guidance?

Its all very well spending on other projects, but it still leaves the question of how to fix capacity issues on wcml, which would have a negative economic impact if not fixed.

The strategic case presented by the advocates has not been clear or consistent about speed v capacity, and the possibility that capacity objectives could be met in whole or in large part much more cheaply has not been properly tested. The strategic benefits of speed alone have not been established and would in any case be threatened by changes in business travel.

I am suggesting only that the WEI are particularly uncertain in this case as they depend on a novel and untested methodology.

 

[NCT]

HS2's Wider Economic Benefits are standard static agglomeration WEIs that are part of TAG's 'Level 2' benefits. These are estimated using a mature set methodology for all major projects. For something like HS2 that is almost sure to substantially change land use and labour markets, static agglomeration is conservative.

If anything HS2's economic case is conservative. The demand cap year was (at least for many years when the business case was being prepared) something like 2037 (i.e. assuming no more demand growth due to background economic growth), a mere handful of years after scheme opening. Classic line services were not optimised so the released capacity benefits were likely undercooked. At the time HS2 had a 'good enough' BCR so they didn't feel they needed to try harder.

The Strategic Alternatives had marginally higher BCRs but much lower NPVs (net present value). The released capacity dimension would be far more limited (if there's any at all), and there was never any chance of matching HS2's capacity uplift and journey time step change.

Yes, HS2's costs escalated, but that's not to say any strategic alternative costs wouldn't have similarly escalated either.

HS2's emerging outturn costs are clearly way outside of European norms and that is worth investigating. Some of it is probably engineering over-specification (not output over-specification), but politics must bear a large share of the blame. The politically induced putting the whole thing in a deeper cutting than necessary upsetting the spoil balance and the additional green tunnels, and the hot-and-cold treatment that caused uncertainty for the industry.

 

[The Ham]

The strategic case presented by the advocates has not been clear or consistent about speed v capacity, and the possibility that capacity objectives could be met in whole or in large part much more cheaply has not been properly tested. The strategic benefits of speed alone have not been established and would in any case be threatened by changes in business travel.

I am suggesting only that the WEI are particularly uncertain in this case as they depend on a novel and untested methodology.

There's one useful thing that StopHS2 has done and they had created an archive of related documents.

The following link is to a letter from HS2 Ltd dated February 2009.

On the second page is says:

Passenger capacity: this is the driving consideration, including capacity
released on classic lines.

http://stophs2.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/20090213_letter_to_lord_adonis_re_objectives_for_hs2.pdf

How much earlier did capacity need to be discussed?

Yes the press and MP's have discussed speed and capacity at different times, but that doesn't mean the justification had been changing between them.

Anyway, getting to a point where the railways could carry 200 passengers in 2037 for every 100 in 2009 isn't really the point (the railway was carrying 170 in 2019).

 

[slowroad]

HS2's Wider Economic Benefits are standard static agglomeration WEIs that are part of TAG's 'Level 2' benefits. These are estimated using a mature set methodology for all major projects. For something like HS2 that is almost sure to substantially change land use and labour markets, static agglomeration is conservative.

If anything HS2's economic case is conservative. The demand cap year was (at least for many years when the business case was being prepared) something like 2037 (i.e. assuming no more demand growth due to background economic growth), a mere handful of years after scheme opening. Classic line services were not optimised so the released capacity benefits were likely undercooked. At the time HS2 had a 'good enough' BCR so they didn't feel they needed to try harder.

The Strategic Alternatives had marginally higher BCRs but much lower NPVs (net present value). The released capacity dimension would be far more limited (if there's any at all), and there was never any chance of matching HS2's capacity uplift and journey time step change.

Yes, HS2's costs escalated, but that's not to say any strategic alternative costs wouldn't have similarly escalated either.

HS2's emerging outturn costs are clearly way outside of European norms and that is worth investigating. Some of it is probably engineering over-specification (not output over-specification), but politics must bear a large share of the blame. The politically induced putting the whole thing in a deeper cutting than necessary upsetting the spoil balance and the additional green tunnels, and the hot-and-cold treatment that caused uncertainty for the industry.

Ok. It’s fair enough to point out that in the original business case the wider economic impacts were “conventional”. But in consequence they did not really support the strategic case as they did not address spatial rebalancing across UK. In response to this, and to the erosion of the BCR due to cost increases, a novel approach was adopted to bolster the benefits:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62975547e90e0703983b43f8/220523_HS2_report_FINAL_-_HS2_Ltd_Reviewed.pdf

 

[The Ham]

Ok. It’s fair enough to point out that in the original business case the wider economic impacts were “conventional”. But in consequence they did not really support the strategic case as they did not address spatial rebalancing across UK. In response to this, and to the erosion of the BCR due to cost increases, a novel approach was adopted to bolster the benefits:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62975547e90e0703983b43f8/220523_HS2_report_FINAL_-_HS2_Ltd_Reviewed.pdf

Whilst that's one novel approach, the other novel approach was the loss of ongoing growth in passenger numbers just 4 years after opening.

Personally I'd be happy to have those elements which you are happy with removed if there was ongoing growth for 40 years after opening.

Even at 1% per year for 36 years would mean that rather than carrying 200 passengers per year it would start with 200 and grow to 285.

 

[NCT]

Ok. It’s fair enough to point out that in the original business case the wider economic impacts were “conventional”. But in consequence they did not really support the strategic case as they did not address spatial rebalancing across UK. In response to this, and to the erosion of the BCR due to cost increases, a novel approach was adopted to bolster the benefits:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62975547e90e0703983b43f8/220523_HS2_report_FINAL_-_HS2_Ltd_Reviewed.pdf

That's a supplementary piece of analysis, not a term in the present value of benefits (PVB) that went into the BCR.

 

[slowroad]

That's a supplementary piece of analysis, not a term in the present value of benefits (PVB) that went into the BCR.

Again, fair enough. But it was an attempt to rescue an eroding economic case. The erosion of the original BCR is described here:

Rethinking HS2

On 4 October 2023, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak confirmed that Phase 2 of High Speed Two (HS2) would not go ahead.1 Was this the right call? How do we make the most of where we…

www.oxera.com

 

[The Ham]

Again, fair enough. But it was an attempt to rescue an eroding economic case. The erosion of the original BCR is described here:

Rethinking HS2

On 4 October 2023, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak confirmed that Phase 2 of High Speed Two (HS2) would not go ahead.1 Was this the right call? How do we make the most of where we…

www.oxera.com

A Lot is made about how business travel is half what it was in 2019.

That's true, however the original assumptions were based on data from 2009.

So how has business travel faired?

In 2019 it was 9.83% of rail travel
In 2023 it was 5.17% of rail travel
However in 2009 it was 8.41% of rail travel

As such compared to 2009 the fall to 2023 is 38.5% not 47.4% which is what you'd see from 2019.

Whilst that's still a noticeable fall, it would be interesting to know how much business travel was in the models.

Also, as I've said before, having a stop on the growth rate when modeling in 2009 could have made sense (it's a long way off and we can't be sure how things will look) however we're now 16 years closer so it's not unreasonable to look at the evidence and evaluate if we could extend the growth in passenger numbers beyond the previously used end date.

 

[Peter Sarf]

A Lot is made about how business travel is half what it was in 2019.

That's true, however the original assumptions were based on data from 2009.

So how has business travel faired?

In 2019 it was 9.83% of rail travel
In 2023 it was 5.17% of rail travel
However in 2009 it was 8.41% of rail travel

As such compared to 2009 the fall to 2023 is 38.5% not 47.4% which is what you'd see from 2019.

Whilst that's still a noticeable fall, it would be interesting to know how much business travel was in the models.

Also, as I've said before, having a stop on the growth rate when modeling in 2009 could have made sense (it's a long way off and we can't be sure how things will look) however we're now 16 years closer so it's not unreasonable to look at the evidence and evaluate if we could extend the growth in passenger numbers beyond the previously used end date.

Given it is all being implemented late I think it is realistic to move the end date for calculating benefits.

I also think we have to be realistic about Covid. Yes Covid has caused a blip, especially in business travel, but the potential for recovery is worth re-evaluating.

Building costs generally have spoilt many building projects, not just railway projects. So it might be worth pausing progress until the building industry has calmed down (gone into its next recession). As you said earlier, it depends whether the money saved by waiting is less than the cost of delay. As a lot of money has been sunk into HS2 already it makes sense to get it done unless the results are expected to be totally hopeless - which they are not.

All in all I wonder - was HS2 too ambitious a project for Great Britain to stomach ?. Perhaps we can only do cheap little projects where we pick at easy bits and do nothing too ambitious. After all compared to Europe, mostly with their newer than GB old railway lines, Britain has hardly got on with building high speed lines. We can look at it two ways - either we need to get on with High Speed lines as a matter of urgency OR more likely we are going to continue coping with our head in the sand. We cannot even electrify our main lines whilst Europe was doing that fifty odd years ago.

Sorry I get realistic/miserable every now and again.
So the question is - are we hoping for too much progress in Great Britain ?.
Should the planners be more "realistic" about what can be achieved ?.

 

[FMerrymon]

Again, fair enough. But it was an attempt to rescue an eroding economic case. The erosion of the original BCR is described here:

Rethinking HS2

On 4 October 2023, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak confirmed that Phase 2 of High Speed Two (HS2) would not go ahead.1 Was this the right call? How do we make the most of where we…

www.oxera.com

The problem is the way the govt appraises such schemes. They say that the strategic doesn't match the bcr and they are right, but that is due to the green book guidance which the current government are looking to change. It doesn't accurately reflect what a large rail project can achieve. Bcrs were largely used for assessing alternatives, but have become far more prominent on this project.

The article also fails understand the nature of the cancellation: that phase 2b wasn't actually cancelled; that no one assessed the different bcrs for the options for cancellation; that the bcr for the scheme used in network north did not include the still in scope eastern branch nor golborne/Golborne alternatives. As such, it was manipulated to look lower.

 

[The Ham]

Given it is all being implemented late I think it is realistic to move the end date for calculating benefits.

I also think we have to be realistic about Covid. Yes Covid has caused a blip, especially in business travel, but the potential for recovery is worth re-evaluating.

Building costs generally have spoilt many building projects, not just railway projects. So it might be worth pausing progress until the building industry has calmed down (gone into its next recession). As you said earlier, it depends whether the money saved by waiting is less than the cost of delay. As a lot of money has been sunk into HS2 already it makes sense to get it done unless the results are expected to be totally hopeless - which they are not.

All in all I wonder - was HS2 too ambitious a project for Great Britain to stomach ?. Perhaps we can only do cheap little projects where we pick at easy bits and do nothing too ambitious. After all compared to Europe, mostly with their newer than GB old railway lines, Britain has hardly got on with building high speed lines. We can look at it two ways - either we need to get on with High Speed lines as a matter of urgency OR more likely we are going to continue coping with our head in the sand. We cannot even electrify our main lines whilst Europe was doing that fifty odd years ago.

Sorry I get realistic/miserable every now and again.
So the question is - are we hoping for too much progress in Great Britain ?.
Should the planners be more "realistic" about what can be achieved ?.

The thing is the UK can do large rail projects which are successful (Jubilee Line extension, Elizabeth Line, etc.), the issue is generally they are a one a generation thing, so you have to retrain all the staff involved in them.

This means that things aren't done efficiently. If you have to train people using people who haven't done that job in a while is not going to work out as efficiently. If you've got to train 75% of your workforce it's going to take time to do that and they can't all start on day one. If you have to recruit experience from our side of the local area (which could include from overseas) that's going to add to costs and potentially slow progress (especially if there's a language barrier).

Add to that the sort term of the fact that any politicians announcing a railway project may not even be in power when construction starts let alone when services start, or even 5 years after opening when trains are busy.

Both of these means that unrealistic timelines are expected and are set.

 

[slowroad]

The problem is the way the govt appraises such schemes. They say that the strategic doesn't match the bcr and they are right, but that is due to the green book guidance which the current government are looking to change. It doesn't accurately reflect what a large rail project can achieve. Bcrs were largely used for assessing alternatives, but have become far more prominent on this project.

The article also fails understand the nature of the cancellation: that phase 2b wasn't actually cancelled; that no one assessed the different bcrs for the options for cancellation; that the bcr for the scheme used in network north did not include the still in scope eastern branch nor golborne/Golborne alternatives. As such, it was manipulated to look lower.

The current Green Book implies that a project can only be value for money if it both meets the policy objectives and performs well when overall benefits are compare to costs. So I don’t see why this needs changing. If one strategic objective of HS2 was to promote the catching up of lagging regions, the problem is that as far as I am aware no convincing evidence has been presented that it will achieve this, and certainly not at a scale that would justify the costs. But of course I may have missed it….

 

[Peter Sarf]

The thing is the UK can do large rail projects which are successful (Jubilee Line extension, Elizabeth Line, etc.), the issue is generally they are a one a generation thing, so you have to retrain all the staff involved in them.

Your right and - these are the good examples that we need to shout about.

This means that things aren't done efficiently. If you have to train people using people who haven't done that job in a while is not going to work out as efficiently. If you've got to train 75% of your workforce it's going to take time to do that and they can't all start on day one. If you have to recruit experience from our side of the local area (which could include from overseas) that's going to add to costs and potentially slow progress (especially if there's a language barrier).

Indeed, we have never even moved on to a rolling programme of electrification. So frustrating.

Add to that the sort term of the fact that any politicians announcing a railway project may not even be in power when construction starts let alone when services start, or even 5 years after opening when trains are busy.

Yes. Is decision making done differently in Europe ?. Why do they seem to be immune to the ebbing and flowing of politics and/or policies ?.

Both of these means that unrealistic timelines are expected and are set.

We do seem to talk our way into a corner just to try to get something done.

Perhaps more honesty around politics would allow one party to accept the successful start of some long term policy from another party.
There is an opener here for another thread. Big projects take so long that they straddle opposing promises/policies/politics.
A non railway example is look how long it is taking to get Brexit done (I am biased in favour of EEC and will always say told you so....).

 

[Mikey C]

The thing is the UK can do large rail projects which are successful (Jubilee Line extension, Elizabeth Line, etc.).

Though very late and overbudget in the case of the latter, which has massively dented the chance of Crossrail 2 being built in the near future.

 

[InTheEastMids]

The thing is the UK can do large rail projects which are successful (Jubilee Line extension, Elizabeth Line, etc.), the issue is generally they are a one a generation thing, so you have to retrain all the staff involved in them.

This means that things aren't done efficiently.

Agree, the supply chain will quite quickly unlearn what it has learned.
However the budget/schedule difficulties get forgotten by the general public and now London is unimaginable without these links.
I wonder why people think it'll be different for HS2? Perhaps it's because some people are very confident that it will underperform, however:

If anything HS2's economic case is conservative.

Business cases for rail lines appear to systematically underestimate ridership. HS2 isn't directly comparable to Borders/Northumberland/Okehampton/Xrail, but there is obviously a decent chance the business case not only under-estimates direct ridership, but may also have a double whammy on released capacity on the existing network. i.e. It can be true that both the legacy growth is not properly accounted for, but also, it has been under-estimated.

was HS2 too ambitious a project for Great Britain to stomach ?

It clearly has been shown to be. It's been done to death that there was a lack of robust political willpower/consensus, so there was a rush to get past the point of no return before it could be cancelled (which to be fair it managed to do). But this meant immature designs and a supply chain that lacked the experience/capacity leading accounting for at least some of the cost/schedule over-runs.
Network Rail made some similar errors with GW electrification within a few years of these key HS2 decisions being made.

Coming back to Ph2a. Have the issues it was designed to address gone away?
Network North sort of implied they had (due to pandemic) but really ignored it and drew attention to other issues by proposing a shopping list of schemes.

If they have not, the options seem quite limited, although doing nothing is always an option.
Adding capacity to the M6 will be very hard (politically and technically) - it's mostly all-lane running so adding a new running lane might even mean building 2 lanes each way to reinstate the hard shoulder. This, or building a new or heavily upgraded A34 is probably something beloved of crayonistas on the road forums.

 

[Technologist]

Given it is all being implemented late I think it is realistic to move the end date for calculating benefits.

I also think we have to be realistic about Covid. Yes Covid has caused a blip, especially in business travel, but the potential for recovery is worth re-evaluating.

Building costs generally have spoilt many building projects, not just railway projects. So it might be worth pausing progress until the building industry has calmed down (gone into its next recession). As you said earlier, it depends whether the money saved by waiting is less than the cost of delay. As a lot of money has been sunk into HS2 already it makes sense to get it done unless the results are expected to be totally hopeless - which they are not.

All in all I wonder - was HS2 too ambitious a project for Great Britain to stomach ?. Perhaps we can only do cheap little projects where we pick at easy bits and do nothing too ambitious. After all compared to Europe, mostly with their newer than GB old railway lines, Britain has hardly got on with building high speed lines. We can look at it two ways - either we need to get on with High Speed lines as a matter of urgency OR more likely we are going to continue coping with our head in the sand. We cannot even electrify our main lines whilst Europe was doing that fifty odd years ago.

Sorry I get realistic/miserable every now and again.
So the question is - are we hoping for too much progress in Great Britain ?.
Should the planners be more "realistic" about what can be achieved ?.

Most government and public endeavours in general are stuck in what I might term a "stasis fallacy" which comes from using BCR. This fallacy is that we go out and try to capture reality and then base policy on this. In practice the reality captured is a conservative and uncreative reality.

If you look at how tech companies work they generally make strategy on an observation of a general principle and a direction of travel (lot's of people are getting smart phones, the cameras keep on improving), then they produce a grand plan for a product that will change the world, then they work out how to demonstrate this observation at a smaller scale without expecting it to break even at that stage, then the scale it up if it works. The key point is that at every stage the company gets more capable and understands it's product better and the technology gets better over time.

Applying this to Hight Speed Rail:

1. Design a final state ambitious high speed network for the whole UK, personally I suspect that something along the line of a "national metro" would be the optimum end point where you have no mixed running, (very) fast accelerating high speed trains stopping at multiple intermediate stops with high frequency and short dwell times. We change land use around the stops to essentially allow us to make high density linear cities along the lines. Essentially the UK becomes functionally one large city pushing average productivity up to above London levels.
2. You do a benefit review and work out how much you would be willing to spend to make this happen. Then you look from a first principle basis how much this would cost comparing against the best international examples with improved technology. This likely produces a no brainer BCR, the side benefit of doing it is that the argument goes from "do we want high speed rail" to "why aren't we able to build it cheaper" as the new plan actually catches the imagination of many people. (e.g. being able to take a tap and go train from Leicester to Manchester in 35min which goes every 3 minutes is transformational)
3. You identify a number of relatively cheap sections to build and have at them, you phase then so that lessons can be incorporated and potentially even laws changed between the sections. At no point shall these schemes be assessed on the basis of BCR.
4. Once you have building high speed rail down you start building the core routes at costs more akin to doing it in Japan or Spain.

Rory Sutherland puts this argument more eloquently than I can as to why attempting to do everything via a BCR results in you never being able to do anything new.

 

[eldomtom2]

If you look at how tech companies work they generally make strategy on an observation of a general principle and a direction of travel (lot's of people are getting smart phones, the cameras keep on improving), then they produce a grand plan for a product that will change the world, then they work out how to demonstrate this observation at a smaller scale without expecting it to break even at that stage, then the scale it up if it works. The key point is that at every stage the company gets more capable and understands it's product better and the technology gets better over time

Of course a) there are a lot of tech companies that do good business making workaday products that aren't intended to change the world, and b) a lot of those tech companies that do set out to change the world go bust because it turns out their idea isn't practical or sellable.

 

[FMerrymon]

The current Green Book implies that a project can only be value for money if it both meets the policy objectives and performs well when overall benefits are compare to costs. So I don’t see why this needs changing. If one strategic objective of HS2 was to promote the catching up of lagging regions, the problem is that as far as I am aware no convincing evidence has been presented that it will achieve this, and certainly not at a scale that would justify the costs. But of course I may have missed it….

The problem with the green book methodology is well documented https://assets.publishing.service.g...3/Green_Book_Review_final_report_241120v2.pdf and it covers items such as transformational impacts.

The reports regarding land use impact for Birmingham and OOC are based on data driven, based on current trends in the areas and the values are not present within the BCR appraisal.

 

[NCT]

The simple point is that, in the 2010s even at costs already high by European standards, HS2 had a good economic case based on conventional benefits alone.

The problem of HS2 isn't that its business case has had to be cooked, but why costs have become so abnormally high.

 

[slowroad]

The problem with the green book methodology is well documented https://assets.publishing.service.g...3/Green_Book_Review_final_report_241120v2.pdf and it covers items such as transformational impacts.

The reports regarding land use impact for Birmingham and OOC are based on data driven, based on current trends in the areas and the values are not present within the BCR appraisal.

The Green Book was revised based on those findings. Hence my comments on the importance of BOTH meeting strategic policy objectives and having benefits in excess of costs. Again, unless I have missed it, no credible evidence has been provided of transformational impacts from HS2 on the relevant strategic policy objectives.