Colwich junction: could it have been remodelled differently?

[D6130]

Moderator note: Split from

Colwich Resignalling

Morning, There doesn’t appear to be a thread for this so thought I’d start one. A lot of work starting to take place on site now. Some of the new AWS magnets and TPWS grids have been installed. Location bases being installed at the minute. Does anyone know when this is been completed, can’t...

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Slightly OT, but it has always surprised me that Armitage-Colwich has never been remodelled to give two parallel double track lines with the Westernmost pair being the fast lines (to/from Stafford) and the Easternmost pair the slow lines (to/from Stone) and slow or medium speed crossovers at Colwich or Rugeley.

This would possibly require an even higher speed junction at Armitage and Down stopping trains would have to stop on the fast at Rugeley TV, but don't they do that now anyway?

A friend of mine, who is a retired Colwich signaller, has been suggesting this for years and it would eliminate the relatively slow diamond crossing conflictions there.

I suppose the ultimate solution would be to have a grade-separated junction - either at Armitage or Colwich - but that would be massively more expensive.

 

[Bald Rick]

Slightly OT, but it has always surprised me that Armitage-Colwich has never been remodelled to give two parallel double track lines with the Westernmost pair being the fast lines (to/from Stafford) and the Easternmost pair the slow lines (to/from Stone) and slow or medium speed crossovers at Colwich or Rugeley. This would possibly require an even higher speed junction at Armitage and Down stopping trains would have to stop on the fast at Rugeley TV, but don't they do that now anyway? A friend of mine, who is a retired Colwich signaller, has been suggesting this for years and it would eliminate the relatively slow diamond crossing conflictions there. I suppose the ultimate solution would be to have a grade-separated junction - either at Armitage or Colwich - but that would be massively more expensive.

That, and many other options, were looked at by WCRM.

 

[Senex]

That, and many other options, were looked at by WCRM.

Colwich — another of the places where the chickens of cheeseparing decisions at the time of building the line came home to roost as soon as speeds on main lines and through junctions began to rise significantly.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

I suppose the ultimate solution would be to have a grade-separated junction - either at Armitage or Colwich - but that would be massively more expensive.

The solution is surely HS2, routed just to the east of Colwich, taking most current fast line traffic.
When that opens to Crewe there will be fewer conflicts at Colwich, and with only 1tph using the North Staffs.

 

[Bald Rick]

The solution is surely HS2, routed just to the east of Colwich, taking most current fast line traffic.
When that opens to Crewe there will be fewer conflicts at Colwich, and with only 1tph using the North Staffs.

correct. Indeed one of the options WCRM looked at to solve Colwich / Stafford / Norton Bridge was an extra pair of tracks “with a very wide ten foot”. This was known as the Stafford cut off. In a remarkable coincidence, its alignment has been reborn as the southern half of HS2 Ph2a

 

[Dr Hoo]

Colwich — another of the places where the chickens of cheeseparing decisions at the time of building the line came home to roost as soon as speeds on main lines and through junctions began to rise significantly.

I think that it's a bit unfair on the engineers or proprietors of the (nominally independent) Trent Valley Railway, the L&NWR and North Staffordshire Railway in the mid-1840s to accuse them of 'cheeseparing'. Colwich functioned perfectly happily as a rural double junction for around 50 years before any material quadrupling came to the area. It was hardly the only place on the WCML where significant speed restrictions applied.

(Interestingly the opening of the Trent Valley Line and associated acceleration and re-timing of the Irish Mail was the trigger for synchronisation of 'railway time' and 'post office time' and the introduction of Greenwich Mean Time across the UK. The 'Irish chronometer' passed through Colwich every day. Time Lords take this sort of thing very seriously.)

 

[Rescars]

I think that it's a bit unfair on the engineers or proprietors of the (nominally independent) Trent Valley Railway, the L&NWR and North Staffordshire Railway in the mid-1840s to accuse them of 'cheeseparing'. Colwich functioned perfectly happily as a rural double junction for around 50 years before any material quadrupling came to the area. It was hardly the only place on the WCML where significant speed restrictions applied.

(Interestingly the opening of the Trent Valley Line and associated acceleration and re-timing of the Irish Mail was the trigger for synchronisation of 'railway time' and 'post office time' and the introduction of Greenwich Mean Time across the UK. The 'Irish chronometer' passed through Colwich every day. Time Lords take this sort of thing very seriously.)

IIRC Sir Richard Moon, the Chairman of the LNWR disliked spending money unnecessarily and restricted the maximum speeds of its express trains for reasons of economy.

 

[Dr Hoo]

IIRC Sir Richard Moon, the Chairman of the LNWR disliked spending money unnecessarily and restricted the maximum speeds of its express trains for reasons of economy.

Quite so. To be fair, however, he was only 33 when appointed as a Director of the newly-formed L&NWR in 1847, only becoming Chairman in 1861. I am not sure that his influence would have stretched as far as penny-pinching at Colwich when his feet were barely under the table. Notwithstanding his renowned frugality, a relatively early fruit from his chairmanship was the creation of the Weaver Junction flyover in about 1869. This was the first on the L&NWR and one of the earliest in the UK. Clearly he didn't see the same criticality or urgency at Colwich.

 

[Rescars]

Quite so. To be fair, however, he was only 33 when appointed as a Director of the newly-formed L&NWR in 1847, only becoming Chairman in 1861. I am not sure that his influence would have stretched as far as penny-pinching at Colwich when his feet were barely under the table. Notwithstanding his renowned frugality, a relatively early fruit from his chairmanship was the creation of the Weaver Junction flyover in about 1869. This was the first on the L&NWR and one of the earliest in the UK. Clearly he didn't see the same criticality or urgency at Colwich.

Maybe he had settled into frugality before the potential benefits of developing Colwich became apparent.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Maybe he had settled into frugality before the potential benefits of developing Colwich became apparent.

My perception is that Colwich only became a problem after BR decided to prefer the North Staffs route for Manchester services over the Crewe route, around 1960.
That was because Crewe-Sandbach was bedevilled with subsidence issues (causing long 20/40mph stretches) from brine workings in the area, with the Stoke route then being quicker.
The frequency via Stoke went up from about 4tpd to hourly after electrification, and more recently 2tph.

Two major developments since are that the subsidence problems have been fixed, with speeds raised, and HS2 will put a new fast route on the map (via Crewe).
Colwich-Stone came very close to being abandoned until BR decided to prefer the North Staffs route, building the new Harecastle tunnel on the route as well.
The WCML was also reconfigured between Armitage and Colwich - I can still feel the 50mph lurch onto the Down Manchester line at Armitage.

 

[Bald Rick]

Colwich-Stone came very close to being abandoned

more than once. I did the sums for that in the early 90s. It was a toss up, and with the prospect of the West Coast upgrade it was decided to keep it.

 

[Senex]

My perception is that Colwich only became a problem after BR decided to prefer the North Staffs route for Manchester services over the Crewe route, around 1960.
That was because Crewe-Sandbach was bedevilled with subsidence issues (causing long 20/40mph stretches) from brine workings in the area, with the Stoke route then being quicker.
The frequency via Stoke went up from about 4tpd to hourly after electrification, and more recently 2tph.

Two major developments since are that the subsidence problems have been fixed, with speeds raised, and HS2 will put a new fast route on the map (via Crewe).
Colwich-Stone came very close to being abandoned until BR decided to prefer the North Staffs route, building the new Harecastle tunnel on the route as well.
The WCML was also reconfigured between Armitage and Colwich - I can still feel the 50mph lurch onto the Down Manchester line at Armitage.

Me too! It was a horrible layout, with down Manchesters facing the 50 fast to slow at Armitage and then the severe restriction just a few miles later on to turn out at Colwich. Then Armitage got a 70 turnout, and then they began to run most Manchesters fast line through to Colwich.

Do you remember that when electric working Crewe-Manchester began the permissible speed over the salt area was 60, and then came the apparently completely unexpected resumption of subsidence which led to the years of severe restrictions and more and more concrete for the foundations of the masts? I've always wondered just when the decision to make the Stoke route the principal one was taken, given that so little was down to improve speeds (75 up to 85, but nothing at all to the lower restriction along the line, and only 85 for the new Harecastle alignment).

As for Colwich itself, what I was referring to above was the difference between the originally-authorised NS line, which would have joined the Trent Valley line a bit further towards Rugeley and with a much better alignment (one of the routes examined indeed for the West Coast upgrade) and the deviation then authorised and built with its severe curvature.

 

[Dr Hoo]

As for Colwich itself, what I was referring to above was the difference between the originally-authorised NS line, which would have joined the Trent Valley line a bit further towards Rugeley and with a much better alignment (one of the routes examined indeed for the West Coast upgrade) and the deviation then authorised and built with its severe curvature.

Well, thanks for that. I'd never heard that about the proto-North Staffordshire Railway (NSR) before. As I understood it the original Act was approved on 26 June 1846 and the line linking to the Trent Valley (which had opened a couple of years earlier) opened in 1849. Not a lot of time for new legislation and construction.

The extant NSR alignment closely follows the River Trent and Trent & Mersey Canal with very modest engineering works. A more easterly route would have involved passing through (or round) ground up to 40 metres higher for minimal benefit, especially given the locomotive power of the day.

Do you have a source or reference for details of the deviation, please?

 

[Senex]

The North Staffordshire Railway Act 1846 which you cite was the Act authorising the NS line with the originally-planned route at Colwich. The change in plan was authorised by the NSR Act 1847 (Section 51), which you'll find at https://digitalarchive.parliament.uk/File/Index/68135bab-0ca9-4a86-91ad-4d9b626a9e2b. (It's really good that the Parliamentary Archives are now making more and more of these Local Acts available on line.)

The whole question of planned lines south from Manchester, spectacular viaducts at Congleton, branches to Crewe, junctions at Chebsey (Norton Bridge) and Colwich, and the change in the design of a line through the Trent Valley that led to those curves between Colwich and Stafford is something I find one of the more interesting stories of the "planning" of the early main lines in this country. How different from France!

 

[Dr Hoo]

Thank you muchly. Every day is a schoolday on these Forums.

Definitely some stuff there that I haven't seen in the history books.

 

[AndrewE]

Quite so. To be fair, however, he was only 33 when appointed as a Director of the newly-formed L&NWR in 1847, only becoming Chairman in 1861. I am not sure that his influence would have stretched as far as penny-pinching at Colwich when his feet were barely under the table. Notwithstanding his renowned frugality, a relatively early fruit from his chairmanship was the creation of the Weaver Junction flyover in about 1869. This was the first on the L&NWR and one of the earliest in the UK. Clearly he didn't see the same criticality or urgency at Colwich.

and the surviving layout and the signalling was the direct cause of a really bad smash in 1986.

Colwich railway accident - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[jfollows]

and the surviving layout and the signalling was the direct cause of a really bad smash in 1986.

If you mean that the signalling is unchanged at Colwich from prior to the 1986 accident then, no, you're wrong. See https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/colwich-junction-in-the-1980s-vs-today.221018/#post-5260641 for more discussion. The signals and their numbers may well be the same today as they were then, but the way in which flashing yellows and flashing double yellows are implemented has been changed there and everywhere as a result of that accident.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I'd hardly refer to the "surviving layout" in the context of decisions and designs in the first half of the nineteenth century (before what we recognise today as 'signalling principles' had even been developed).

In the Down direction Colwich was still recognisable as a conventional double junction with flank protection until the WCML electrification programme of the 1960s. That brought four tracks in an unusual configuration for the first time and even that layout, speeds and signalling was further altered by BR before the 1986 collision.

[Edit: As noted by @jfollows , who has just beaten me to it, above.]

 

[AndrewE]

No, I meant that the (flat) layout had survived from ancient times and the BR signalling and layout (lack of flank protection) caused the crash.

 

[MarkyT]

No, I meant that the (flat) layout had survived from ancient times and the BR signalling and layout (lack of flank protection) caused the crash.

The down train driver's confusion over the correct meaning of a fairly recently introduced signal aspect sequence incorporating flashing yellows approaching the junction was the main cause ISTR. Yes consequences were exacerbated by there being no flank protection, and that era's complete lack of any train protection systems.