Would The Big Four have survived if No BR?

[Searchlight]

What would have happened if Nationalisation had not happened in 1948? Would LNER have gone into Receivership? What about GWR? Was LMS in a better financial position, or would it also have gone bust? I get the feeling that the SR had better management??

Leaving the politics aside, does anybody know what would have happened?

 

[Monty]

The SR and GWR would probably have been fine (though money would have been tight and both would almost certainly have had to rationalise some lines) but the LMS and LNER would have been in serious trouble. The LNER had always struggled financially and the LMS had a reported an alarming reduction in freight receipts before the war had started.

 

[HSTEd]

The Southern probably would have survived thanks to its normal frugality and reliance on electrified passenger traffic for income. Expanded electrification would have seen it through in all likelyhood.

The outlook for the other three of the Big Four is far bleaker.

 

[blotred]

What are you saying, Southern survives to this day

*gets coat*

 

[TheEdge]

The LNER would have collapsed. Despite its famous fast services away from shiny Pacific's and named expresses of the ECML it was a hodge podge of ancient infrastructure, stock and locos and it was a bottomless money pit.

The Southern never really relied on freight to the extent of the other three so the gradual decline in freight would not of hit it as hard as the LMS and GWR. It was always a predominately passenger company and its constituent parts remain some of the busiest parts of the network.

The GWR and LMS would probably have gone either way. Both had decent passenger networks but both also relied very heavily of coal traffic and would probably have been hit very hard by the downturn in freight. But I'm sure I've read the GWR was still doing very well for itself at nationalisation.

 

[Searchlight]

The LNER would have collapsed. Despite its famous fast services away from shiny Pacific's and named expresses of the ECML it was a hodge podge of ancient infrastructure, stock and locos and it was a bottomless money pit.

The Southern never really relied on freight to the extent of the other three so the gradual decline in freight would not of hit it as hard as the LMS and GWR. It was always a predominately passenger company and its constituent parts remain some of the busiest parts of the network.

The GWR and LMS would probably have gone either way. Both had decent passenger networks but both also relied very heavily of coal traffic and would probably have been hit very hard by the downturn in freight. But I'm sure I've read the GWR was still doing very well for itself at nationalisation.

Yes, I understand the GWR strongly opposed nationalisation, so, presumably believed they could tough it out? If the LMS was really weak financially, maybe, that convinced the government to nationalise?

 

[yorksrob]

I wonder if the big four would have finally been able to persuade the Government to ditch the common carrier commitment.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

None of them (maybe apart from the Southern) had the funds to modernise.
The government would have had to intervene somehow to change the regulatory burden and finance renewal.
The railways were effectively under government control since 1939 anyway.

 

[Taunton]

Given that they dominated separate geographical areas of the country, and that in the late 1940s the railway was the principal carrier of both passengers and freight, it would rapidly have become a government problem anyway. It's generally accepted that the LNER would have gone under first, and probably set the style for any others.

What is surprising, given this dominance of markets, is how the companies had allowed this to happen. The revenue had fallen well away in areas like rural branch lines, but there seems to have been little attempt to manage costs to suit - even major flows seem to have been substantially overstaffed for the income they brought in. The Southern seem to have been the best at managing their costs.

The strange thing is that, 20 or more years after nationalisation, it was also a common belief that the LNER had the best management training programme and their onetime personnel had most influenced the top BR financial decisions. Quite how they can have recruited and trained the best management skills but been the worst financial basket case is difficult to understand.

 

[NSEFAN]

The strange thing is that, 20 or more years after nationalisation, it was also a common belief that the LNER had the best management training programme and their onetime personnel had most influenced the top BR financial decisions. Quite how they can have recruited and trained the best management skills but been the worst financial basket case is difficult to understand.

I suppose when times are tough, it forces you to be extremely careful about the decisions you make.

 

[route:oxford]

Leaving the politics aside, does anybody know what would have happened?

Nobody will truly know. We can consider the options though.


My own view is that:-


Some individual lines/services would, of course, be profitable.

Some lines/services will have been designated as being of national strategic importance and been protected by central government.

Further lines/services would have been designated as having importance by regional goverment/local authorities and would have been sponsored that way.

Finally, some lines/services would have been taken up by local enthusiasts with peak services operated for schools and employment.

The bulk manufacture of steam locos would have been phased out far more quickly with an early focus on rail-buses and DMUS

 

[TheEdge]

The bulk manufacture of steam locos would have been phased out far more quickly with an early focus on rail-buses and DMUS

While its known that they were all investigating an end to steam; the LMS with 10000 and 10001, LNER with its various DC experiments on the Woodhead and GEML and the vast Southern DC network, not sure what the GWR had done I doubt the end of steam would have been quicker.

We know from history that the 1968 cut off led to all sorts of teething problems with new traction that was not tested properly. I think If the Big 4 had left themselves to naturally adopt new traction types there would have been a much much more gradual move towards diesel and electric and steam not the arbitary cut off adopted under the modernisation plan.

 

[Searchlight]

While its known that they were all investigating an end to steam; the LMS with 10000 and 10001, LNER with its various DC experiments on the Woodhead and GEML and the vast Southern DC network, not sure what the GWR had done I doubt the end of steam would have been quicker.

We know from history that the 1968 cut off led to all sorts of teething problems with new traction that was not tested properly. I think If the Big 4 had left themselves to naturally adopt new traction types there would have been a much much more gradual move towards diesel and electric and steam not the arbitary cut off adopted under the modernisation plan.

The GWR had looked into Main Line electrification, West of Exeter, I think? But, had decided it was unaffordable......Or, at least the Capital cost was. They would have had to build a power station in Plymouth. Had this gone ahead, things may have been very different on the GWR regarding steam traction.

 

[coppercapped]

I wonder if the big four would have finally been able to persuade the Government to ditch the common carrier commitment.

I agree, this would have been the key to the survival of the 'Big 4'.

Predicting alternative history is always difficult but my own take on the situation is that the biggest constraint on the railways was, as you mention, the lingering 'Common Carrier' obligation which made it impossible for the railways to compete with road goods transport effectively.

The Victorians were always concerned about monopolies and because railways and canals had an effective monopoly on inland transport they passed the Rail and Canal Traffic Act in 1854. This obliged both the railways and canals to carry any and all goods offered to them (with some minor exceptions) at rates (based on the weight and value of goods carried - rather than the costs of operation) which were government regulated and published - sometimes called the Common Carrier Obligation. Its long term effects were pernicious, it effectively made any effective form of management accounting for freight superfluous. Even if the income was accurately known for each station, terminal and train - reducing costs of operation was difficult as the railway had to carry the traffic presented at each station and terminal. There were some practical limitations - parcels were not collected from oil refineries and day-old-chicks not loaded at coal pits. Each public terminal, i.e., station, was, in effect, general purpose - a jack-of-all-trades and master of none so the daily pick-up goods train was the logical consequence.

One effect was that the only practical way to reduce costs at any point, or to stop accepting a particular traffic which was clearly a loss-maker, would have been to close the local terminal or station. If it's not there, you can't use it.

The railways and canals could propose tariffs for different classes of goods, but rates were approved by the Traffic Commissioners and this could take a long time or a requested increase only partially granted. As long as the railways had effectively a monopoly of inland transport the charges could be set so that they could make a return - but it was marginal. The advantage to the railway was that there was essentially a known incoming cash flow. But (and there is always a 'but'!) as soon as the lorry started taking the remunerative freight traffic, the railways started their slide to financial ruin. Road traffic was also tightly regulated, but the 'C' licenced vehicles - those carrying goods on their own account - had more freedom so the goods that left the factories could be carried in vehicles belonging to the factory's owner. The loss of this siding-to-siding/terminal traffic made a big hole in the railway's finances. The 'Big Four' started campaigning for more flexibility in the late 1930s - the 'Square Deal' campaign - but it was almost too late and was anyway cut-off by the war.

The Common Carrier obligation was finally abolished by the 1962 Transport Act, at least 40 years too late.

If the Common Carrier obligation had been lifted at the end of the war the railways would have had to have sales teams (rather than just 'Goods Agents') and proper accounts meaning that the railways would have been converted into modern industries 20 years earlier than was in fact the case. These 20 years would have given the railways a fighting chance to have adapted to cope with the changes in the structure of British industry and the moves towards a more mobile society. Although many of the branches and some of the duplicate lines may have still closed, the manner of operation of the rest of the railways is likely to have changed greatly and the costs of operation reduced. Don't forget that pre-war the railways were experimenting with diesel traction and planning electrifications - there is no reason to suppose that operating procedures would not also have changed to improve the service and reduce costs.

 

[Bevan Price]

1. I think that they would all have struggled for finance to invest. The numerous branch line closures of the 1930s would have continued - possibly earlier than some of the Marples- Beeching closures.

2. Whilst there would have been desire to pursue conversion to diesel & electric traction, due to lacks of funds, steam operation would have lasted longer, possibly until the early 1980s.

3. In common with much UK industry, at least some of the Big 4 would have been taken over by foreign companies, so we might have had SNCF Southern Railway, for example.

4. There would not have been a Channel Tunnel.

 

[TheEdge]

1. I think that they would all have struggled for finance to invest. The numerous branch line closures of the 1930s would have continued - possibly earlier than some of the Marples- Beeching closures.

But probably a more natural and considered run down as opposed to the hatchet job as conducted by the good doctor.

2. Whilst there would have been desire to pursue conversion to diesel & electric traction, due to lacks of funds, steam operation would have lasted longer, possibly until the early 1980s.

Which is exactly what happened in Europe without the arbitrary time limit that got imposed in the UK. Both SNCF and DB gradually phased out steam with them both loosing it in the mid to late 1970s. Don't forgot the late built BR Standards had a design life that could have seen them survive into the 1990s.

 

[Searchlight]

But probably a more natural and considered run down as opposed to the hatchet job as conducted by the good doctor.



Which is exactly what happened in Europe without the arbitrary time limit that got imposed in the UK. Both SNCF and DB gradually phased out steam with them both loosing it in the mid to late 1970s. Don't forgot the late built BR Standards had a design life that could have seen them survive into the 1990s.

Yes, one thing is that had some semblance of the "Big Four" survived, we wouldn t have had Dr Beeching, and the companies would have tried harder to boost traffic. SNCF and DB (both foreign nationalised railways)
could have ended up owning much of Britains railways! Hang-on, don t they do just that now?? SNCF did in fact offer to take over rail infrastructure in Britain......

The changeover from steam in Britain was done in a "blind panic", with much waste of public money. Instead of a smooth, thought-out transition to well proven designs of modern traction. Mind you, GWR got it wrong with Gas Turbine locos didn t they?

 

[ilkestonian]

What would have happened if Nationalisation had not happened in 1948? Would LNER have gone into Receivership? What about GWR? Was LMS in a better financial position, or would it also have gone bust? I get the feeling that the SR had better management??

Leaving the politics aside, does anybody know what would have happened?

One key issue that we will never know the answer to is that of the money owed to the companies as a result of the war.

Wasn't one of the reasons for nationalisation that the government was broke and so could not afford to pay what was owed for the work done on behalf of the country during the war?

Surely if the Tories had won the election and they had decided to keep the status quo, there would have to have been some sort of settlement which might have given the cash-strapped companies some breathing space, at least.

The Southern had Walker, who seemed to be able to make the best of a bad job, infrastructure-wise, by taking a pragmatic view of things and using simple solutions rather than the best from an engineering point of view; hence third rail rather than overhead, which the LBSCR had pioneered years earlier.

The LMS also had a far sighted "leader" in Stamp, who pioneered real costing of work and locomotives.

I suspect in adversity, all four companies would have had to adopt the approaches pioneered by the two I mention above and the resulting networks would have evolved over time, rather than the Big Bang approach which proved so expensive and ultimately flawed.

How they would have fared is, of course, impossible to say, but interesting to debate!

 

[krus_aragon]

None of them (maybe apart from the Southern) had the funds to modernise.
The government would have had to intervene somehow to change the regulatory burden and finance renewal.
The railways were effectively under government control since 1939 anyway.

Did the government not owe the big four significant amounts of money for the wartime service and deferred maintainance? (Meaning forced nationalisation instead was financially appealing.)

Edit: ah yes, se post above.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Mind you, GWR got it wrong with Gas Turbine locos didn t they?

Equally, BR later got it wrong with a gas-turbine APT...

 

[ChiefPlanner]

The Big 4 Senior Directors were very much against state control and the formation of British Railways - and managers such as James Milne of the GWR made it very clear they were not prepared to continue as "state" employees.

The condition of the system was battered by the war in all respects - not just damage but overwork and a paucity of track renewals etc - so had not WW2 happened - there might have been a degree of life extension into the 1950's , but most of Western Europe had effectively been nationalised pre War , (the SNCF notably in 1937) . In many respects - apart from 1939-45 , the Government was very hands off - with some fiscal assistance on tax allowances etc - but certainly did not specify train services as they do today down to fist and last trains and so on.

 

[coppercapped]

From my understanding of the period the suggestion that the Attlee government nationalised the railways because it couldn’t afford the payments to the railway companies for their war work is not borne out by the evidence.

The Labour Party won a landslide victory in the 1945 General Election on a manifesto which called for the taking into public ownership the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy. This manifesto pledge was based on Clause IV of the Labour Party’s constitution which stated, in part

To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service.

In 1942 the annual Labour Party Conference, with an eye on its constitution, passed a resolution urging the Government to coordinate road, rail and canal transport under national ownership - with the aim of aiding the war effort. National ownership remained the Labour Party’s policy after the 1945 election and the Attlee government then nationalised about a fifth of the economy - coal, railways, road transport, the Bank of England, civil aviation, external telecommunications, electricity, gas and steel. It created the Welfare State by setting up the NHS, thereby nationalising the hospitals, setting up National Insurance in 1946 and created a safety net by the National Assistance Act of 1948.

The nationalisation programme was led by Herbert Morrison who in 1930 had proposed uniting London's buses and underground into a centralised system under public ownership. (There had been discussions for years previously about consolidating London’s transport, but into a private company so the idea didn’t come out of the blue). The London Passenger Transport Board was created in 1933. Post-war, Morrison started with nationalising the Bank of England in April 1946 compensating stockholders with Government bonds yielding, IIRC, 3%.

Further industries followed: civil aviation in 1946, railways and telecommunications in 1947 and the National Coal Board. By 1951 the iron, steel and gas industries had also been brought into public ownership. For all of these the existing shareholders received Government paper in return which essentially guaranteed a dividend.

So, the Labour Party had committed itself to nationalising the railways by 1942 before the extent of the excessive wear and tear due to the war effort could have been known. In addition, paying compensation to the shareholders of all these industries cost a lot of money - so the idea that the Government could have saved money by not paying compensation to the railway companies doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.

There is a curious twist to this story. In the event, the Attlee government had no money (for reasons which could fill a book!) and had to go cap-in-hand to the Americans in 1946 for an emergency loan of $3.75 billion (in then dollars). The Canadians chipped in a further billion. Nominally the loan was to cover post-war overseas expenditures, but as the Government could only have afforded the nationalisation and the welfare reforms if it withdrew from all of its overseas commitments immediately, essentially these were funded by the Americans. The final repayment of the loan was made in 2006.

 

[oldman]

We know from history that the 1968 cut off led to all sorts of teething problems with new traction that was not tested properly.

I wonder about the chronology here. Can someone tell me when the decision to end steam in 1968 was taken? My understanding was that the teething troubles began pre-Beeching and the 1968 end of steam was made possible by the downsizing of the service post-Beeching, so it was not cause-and-effect.

 

[edwin_m]

Equally, BR later got it wrong with a gas-turbine APT...

They weren't the only ones. SNCF and several North American railways introduced significant fleets with gas turbine power in the 60s and early 70s, probably because of the better power to weight ratio and the assumption at the time that aeronautical technology had all the answers. They turned out to be much more fuel-hungry, at least on the variable duty cycle needed for rail use, and the 1974 oil price rises put an end to any ideas of further production.

My best guess is that the GWR would have gone for diesel hydraulics just as their successors in the Western Region did, and dieselised their branch lines in the 50s with more railcars rather than waiting for DMUs at the end of that decade. I'm not sure whether they would also have rationalised the infrastructure, but both were probably necessary if more of the network was to survive than actually did. The post-war LMS investment in new designs of small steam locomotive seems particularly short-sighted in this respect.

 

[TheEdge]

I wonder about the chronology here. Can someone tell me when the decision to end steam in 1968 was taken? My understanding was that the teething troubles began pre-Beeching and the 1968 end of steam was made possible by the downsizing of the service post-Beeching, so it was not cause-and-effect.

Beeching and the end of steam were separate. The end of steam was ushered in by "Modernisation and Re-Equipment of British Railways" published in 1955 which covered a whole raft of things including the removal of steam traction. Without reading it is full it doesn't seem to cover route closures at all.

Beeching obviously came about after "The Reshaping of British Railways" of 1963 by which time the decline of steam was well underway.

Not sure where the actual date of 1968 came from honestly.

 

[Searchlight]

I wonder about the chronology here. Can someone tell me when the decision to end steam in 1968 was taken? My understanding was that the teething troubles began pre-Beeching and the 1968 end of steam was made possible by the downsizing of the service post-Beeching, so it was not cause-and-effect.

Also made possible by the fact (in theory!) that a diesel loco could replace 3 steam locos........What was not bargained for, was the fact that diesels were more expensive to build (Because more complicated), and would typically have a life of 15 years (possibly more if you replace the power unit at that stage, ie. re-engine). English Electric Ltd had a lot of experience building locos for export, so, had some good designs for BR.......Other makers were new to the game....But all diesel traction inevitably has higher maintenance costs that straight electric traction.......Not many diesel-electric tramways were built in the 20th century!:

 

[oldman]

Not sure where the actual date of 1968 came from honestly.

That's why I wondered about your statement 'We know from history that the 1968 cut off led to all sorts of teething problems with new traction that was not tested properly.'

I don't see any connection between the teething problems and the end of steam. With the contraction of the railway post-Beeching, there was an excess of traction and it made sense to withdraw useable steam rather than useable diesel locos. If the NBL type 2s had been fit for purpose, steam might have ended even sooner.

 

[Bevan Price]

But probably a more natural and considered run down as opposed to the hatchet job as conducted by the good doctor.



Which is exactly what happened in Europe without the arbitrary time limit that got imposed in the UK. Both SNCF and DB gradually phased out steam with them both loosing it in the mid to late 1970s. Don't forgot the late built BR Standards had a design life that could have seen them survive into the 1990s.

But without nationalisation, there would not have been any BR Standards.

The LMSR would have probably rebuilt all the Patriots and many of the Jubilees to Class 7P rating. With detail improvements, Stanier Black 5s & 8Fs, plus more existing Ivatt & Fairburn designs would have met almost all the foreseeable steam requirements until diesels & electrics took over. They might have considered building the equivalent of 9F 2-10-0s for some of the heavier & faster freight duties - but no need for Britannias, Standard 5s, etc.

Likewise, the LNER & GWR would have continued building their most recent steam designs - or rebuilding some older classes to improve efficiency. So more B1s, Modified Halls & Castles, etc.

The SR already had almost enough steam locos to meet future requirements by 1948, apart maybe for a medium-sized tank loco for secondary services for which electrification could not yet be afforded.

 

[Searchlight]

But without nationalisation, there would not have been any BR Standards.

The LMSR would have probably rebuilt all the Patriots and many of the Jubilees to Class 7P rating. With detail improvements, Stanier Black 5s & 8Fs, plus more existing Ivatt & Fairburn designs would have met almost all the foreseeable steam requirements until diesels & electrics took over. They might have considered building the equivalent of 9F 2-10-0s for some of the heavier & faster freight duties - but no need for Britannias, Standard 5s, etc.

Likewise, the LNER & GWR would have continued building their most recent steam designs - or rebuilding some older classes to improve efficiency. So more B1s, Modified Halls & Castles, etc.

The SR already had almost enough steam locos to meet future requirements by 1948, apart maybe for a medium-sized tank loco for secondary services for which electrification could not yet be afforded.

The LMS DID have the two locos, 10000 & 10001......Maybe they would have bought more of them? Possibly for freight use as well?

Likewise the SR had 10200, 10201......So, were looking into diesel - Electric traction.......
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

That's why I wondered about your statement 'We know from history that the 1968 cut off led to all sorts of teething problems with new traction that was not tested properly.'

I don't see any connection between the teething problems and the end of steam. With the contraction of the railway post-Beeching, there was an excess of traction and it made sense to withdraw useable steam rather than useable diesel locos. If the NBL type 2s had been fit for purpose, steam might have ended even sooner.

I don t think they had any definate "plan" to end steam in 1968, The whole thing was just too chaotic for that! Its just that they got to the stage when they had sufficient diesel and electric traction to run the remaining services.

 

[coppercapped]

Beeching and the end of steam were separate. The end of steam was ushered in by "Modernisation and Re-Equipment of British Railways" published in 1955 which covered a whole raft of things including the removal of steam traction. Without reading it is full it doesn't seem to cover route closures at all.

Beeching obviously came about after "The Reshaping of British Railways" of 1963 by which time the decline of steam was well underway.

Not sure where the actual date of 1968 came from honestly.

As I understand it while the actual date was fixed by timetable and train planners, the proximate date was fixed by the factors such as the availability of diesel power, crew and maintenance facilities and staff training and so on. From my memory of the time the date was known about six months to a year in advance.

If a decision can be identified that fixed this date it was that made by the British Transport Commission in May 1957, in response to the continually deteriorating financial position, to accelerate the provision of diesel power and the withdrawal of steam. This decision was made before even the first of the Pilot Scheme locomotives had been delivered and the BTC stated that it took this decision in spite of the risk of unsatisfactory performance in the early stages.

It is also certainly true that most of the line closures resulting from the recommendations of the Beeching report had occurred by 1968 and the bulk of the diesel locomotive building programme had been completed (the last Brush Type 4s aka Class 47 being delivered in that year) so reshuffling of motive power made sufficient stock available to permit the withdrawal of the last steam engines.

 

[Bevan Price]

As I understand it while the actual date was fixed by timetable and train planners, the proximate date was fixed by the factors such as the availability of diesel power, crew and maintenance facilities and staff training and so on. From my memory of the time the date was known about six months to a year in advance.

If a decision can be identified that fixed this date it was that made by the British Transport Commission in May 1957, in response to the continually deteriorating financial position, to accelerate the provision of diesel power and the withdrawal of steam. This decision was made before even the first of the Pilot Scheme locomotives had been delivered and the BTC stated that it took this decision in spite of the risk of unsatisfactory performance in the early stages.

It is also certainly true that most of the line closures resulting from the recommendations of the Beeching report had occurred by 1968 and the bulk of the diesel locomotive building programme had been completed (the last Brush Type 4s aka Class 47 being delivered in that year) so reshuffling of motive power made sufficient stock available to permit the withdrawal of the last steam engines.

Yes, that last paragraph is true. Even if it did lead to a lot of dmus being inflicted on services for which they were not really suitable. Units with 3+2 seating layout, designed mainly for shortish distance suburban services and branch lines, were put on various longish-distance services, such as Birmingham - Norwich, and Manchester - North Wales Coast. And. in some cases, that probably contributed to loss of lots of passengers. One afternoon peak service from Manchester to North Wales went from being a fairly-well loaded loco hauled set to a half-filled 2 car dmu within a couple of years.