Alternatives to the Beeching cuts

[Cowley]

Going a bit off the main topic: I have to confess that I had imagined until now, that Tiverton Parkway was on the same site as former Tiverton Junction -- simply renamed. As they're fond of saying on another board which I frequent, which discusses "everything under the sun" and is very keen on getting all facts right: "ignorance fought" !

I didn't realise until recently that it you look over the back of the current westbound platform you can still see the remains of the original Sampford Peverell westbound platform in the weeds (the platforms were on loops).
Found that out on here actually. Lord knows how many times I've stood on that platform over the years and not realised.

 

[davetheguard]

Going a bit off the main topic: I have to confess that I had imagined until now, that Tiverton Parkway was on the same site as former Tiverton Junction -- simply renamed. As they're fond of saying on another board which I frequent, which discusses "everything under the sun" and is very keen on getting all facts right: "ignorance fought" !

The former Tiverton Junction is slightly nearer Exeter. You can still see the disused platforms from a passing train; up and down loops too.

 

[Taunton]

That [Tiverton Parkway] is a Bob Reid I era innovation that has undoubtedly improved the situation from what went before. However, it does seem better geared towards motorists than to those like myself who don't drive.

I would actually give the credit of the innovation to Sir Henry Johnson's era, he was the BR chairman when the first (and undoubtedly most successful) such station was devised, Bristol Parkway. Johnson will have approved the novel investment, probably about 1969 (it opened in 1971). All that followed were just inspired by this to look for further such instances.

 

[coppercapped]

So one experimental lifting boom level crossing was installed, still 23 more to be paid for and installed.[ we are told by another poster that there were 24 crossings on the line]. The conversion of the signalling still to be paid for. I expect the track needed refurbishing as well. All on a line where the Inter-City passengers could be catered for by diverting them to use other lines for the same journey time. The small intermediate market towns had a good bus service that the few passengers could easily transfer to [a situation mirrored in many small market towns across the country]. The closure decision was glaringly obvious. No manufacture or sleight of hand. The sort of decision which would be taken by business today in the same circumstances.

As far as diversion of modernisation money was concerned, you have to consider the politics of the time - road building was seen as a means to break the blackmail of the railway trade unions. There had been a long dispute in 1955 (with the country being brought to a standstill) and several others threatened since. The railways finances had not much improved with the first tranche of spending and the public wanted car ownership and the roads to go with it.

Both management and staff were stuck in their ways (not at all helped by the monopoly position enjoyed during the war) and there was no vision, or what vision there was tended to try and solve yesterdays problems. I am not blaming them; humans do not like change especially when it threatens them. The discussion of the 'Tivvy Bumper' is a prime case in point: the local bus company was pursuing one-man-operation of its buses in Tiverton at this point - so why is it being suggested that a two-man 'bubble car' carrying no more than a bus [ and probably a lot less because Tiverrton-Exeter passengers would have made the through journey without changing by bus on a more frequent and convenient service]' which has to pay a greater proportion of its track cost, would be the financial salvation? And look at the uproar there has been in 2016 to get train drivers to close doors, let alone sell tickets as well! In 1964 this would not even have been attempted.

The fact that modernisation of the York-Beverley line had been started was no reason to save the line - money had been spent uselessly modernising the Banbury-Buckingham line and this was shut before Dr. B publishing his report. No doubt well meaning management action, but hopeless!

While I agree with the main thrust of your argument I disagree with the statement that the country was brought to a standstill by the 1955 ASLEF strike. The whole point about this strike was that it had very little effect. There was inconvenience certainly, but by this time road transport was well developed and there were no shortages of food or other essential supplies.

For the railways the effect was more insidious. The Modernisation Plan had just been published and a few months later the drivers and firemen strike with the intention of maintaining their pay differentials. If the idea was to win friends and influence people then this was not good timing.

The effects on the railway's business was immediate - local parcels traffic to small wayside stations fell off a cliff; the local horticulturist got his flowers and vegetables to market using a road carrier. Factories turned increasingly to road deliveries. And the Government and Civil Service learned that the country could, by and large, get along without railways.

A veritable own goal.

 

[daodao]

RT4038 can argue black is white for as long as he likes about the Market Weighton line, however unfortunately for him it is all debunked in the Beeching report itself because the plain fact is the figures show that there was absolutely no need to close the line whatsoever.

It was not a mistake to try and economise the line. That is what railway management is supposed to do - manage railways as efficiently as possible, not fabricate hocus pocus economics to close lines at every opportunity possible.

We have every reason to thank those individuals who fought the closures tooth and nail for the railway we have today. They had no more benefit of hindsight or crystal ball power than Beeching and Marples had, however they weren't blinded to reason by the wonder of the motor car and they turned out to be right, whereas Beeching and Marples were wrong.

As for the Tiverton bumper, railways run to a timetable and can connect into the wider network as a feeder. Tiverton could have benefited from just such a service, rather than bus services, which have proved to be ephemeral. Beeching suggested bus services as an alternative for connections, but he and Marples couldn't even manage that properly. Instead of developing an integrated connecting shuttle service they palmed it off to the bus companies with no guarantee that services would integrate or even continue.

Beeching was broadly right, but as with any programme, some of the detail was probably wrong and some closures probably should not have occurred. However, many rural lines remain extant that really should have been closed, such as the routes to the Scottish Highlands beyond Helensburgh and Inverness, and all lines in Wales west and north of Llanelli, apart from the North Wales main line, the short branch to Llandudno and the route from Chester to Shrewsbury via Wrexham.

My local route which I have not used for many years, the ex-CLC line to Chester, only survived (and still survives) because of significant freight traffic. The York-Hull line via Market Weighton was clearly a redundant duplicate route and it was right that it was closed. The main traffic flow from York to Hull was (and is) provided for by an alternative route.

 

[Calthrop]

I didn't realise until recently that it you look over the back of the current westbound platform you can still see the remains of the original Sampford Peverell westbound platform in the weeds (the platforms were on loops).
Found that out on here actually. Lord knows how many times I've stood on that platform over the years and not realised.

The former Tiverton Junction is slightly nearer Exeter. You can still see the disused platforms from a passing train; up and down loops too.

Will keep a good look-out next time I travel by rail between Taunton and Exeter !

 

[RT4038]

RT4038 can argue black is white for as long as he likes about the Market Weighton line, however unfortunately for him it is all debunked in the Beeching report itself because the plain fact is the figures show that there was absolutely no need to close the line whatsoever.

It was not a mistake to try and economise the line. That is what railway management is supposed to do - manage railways as efficiently as possible, not fabricate hocus pocus economics to close lines at every opportunity possible.

We have every reason to thank those individuals who fought the closures tooth and nail for the railway we have today. They had no more benefit of hindsight or crystal ball power than Beeching and Marples had, however they weren't blinded to reason by the wonder of the motor car and they turned out to be right, whereas Beeching and Marples were wrong.

As for the Tiverton bumper, railways run to a timetable and can connect into the wider network as a feeder. Tiverton could have benefited from just such a service, rather than bus services, which have proved to be ephemeral. Beeching suggested bus services as an alternative for connections, but he and Marples couldn't even manage that properly. Instead of developing an integrated connecting shuttle service they palmed it off to the bus companies with no guarantee that services would integrate or even continue.

Sorry that yorksrob has already made his mind up about the Market Weighton line, and there couldn't possibly be an alternative view. [Except there was then, the line closed, and the economic reasoning behind that can still be seen today]. I have taken a look at the Beeching report section on the Market Weighton line and certainly would not come to the conclusion that it is 'plain fact' that the figures show there was no reason to close the line.

You are still missing the point that the 'Tivvy Bumper' was loss-making, and this is why it closed. Most passengers from Tiverton would have wanted to go to Exeter [as mentioned in other posts] and most would have used the frequent direct bus services. This would leave a handful of passengers going north. Often the bus companies did not want the rail replacement services (they couldn't make money out of so few passengers either). I know there is a view held by some that public transport is either railways or nothing, but the reality is that it is railways, buses and taxis/private hire cars. There is a limit to how much non-car drivers can be subsidised in their journeys.

You are right that the size of the railway network today is as a result of individuals fighting to retain some lines and the political will at the time. In 1963 the political will to subsidise the then size of the railway network was simply not there. Hence Beeching. (Do not forget that sizeable chunks of railway were closed 69-72 during various financial crises)

 

[Greybeard33]

Beeching was broadly right, but as with any programme, some of the detail was probably wrong and some closures probably should not have occurred. However, many rural lines remain extant that really should have been closed, such as the routes to the Scottish Highlands beyond Helensburgh and Inverness, and all lines in Wales west and north of Llanelli, apart from the North Wales main line, the short branch to Llandudno and the route from Chester to Shrewsbury via Wrexham.

The roads in the Highlands have been improved out of all recognition since the Beeching era. Back in the sixties, even the main roads were mostly single track with passing places, twisty and very slow, especially in the holiday season. There were ferries across sea lochs that have since been bridged, with queues hours long at busy times. The train to Oban, Mallaig or the Kyle of Lochalsh was much quicker than driving, the reverse of the situation today. And these railways still carried substantial amounts of freight, e.g. fish from the fishing ports.

 

[yorksrob]

Beeching was broadly right, but as with any programme, some of the detail was probably wrong and some closures probably should not have occurred. However, many rural lines remain extant that really should have been closed, such as the routes to the Scottish Highlands beyond Helensburgh and Inverness, and all lines in Wales west and north of Llanelli, apart from the North Wales main line, the short branch to Llandudno and the route from Chester to Shrewsbury via Wrexham.

My local route which I have not used for many years, the ex-CLC line to Chester, only survived (and still survives) because of significant freight traffic. The York-Hull line via Market Weighton was clearly a redundant duplicate route and it was right that it was closed. The main traffic flow from York to Hull was (and is) provided for by an alternative route.

It boils down to what the railway is for. If purely a commercial concern, then yes, I suppose that any line which:

a) Didn't cover its own costs and
b) Didn't contribute substantial passengers and freight to the core "profitable" network (whatever that is)

would be at risk of closure (Note that Beeching only investigated the first of these). Fortunately the railway is also a public service and has been seen as such for many years.That many lines which would have closed, were they being judged on a commercial basis, survived, is testament to the fact that for some routes at least, politics did its job and tried to balance raw commercialism with the needs of the public. That this was done on a piecemeal basis, rather than strategically across the whole network, probably says more about our flawed electoral system which disenfranchises the three quarters of the country that aren't in marginal constituencies.

In terms of the Market Weighton line, it was not just a "duplicate" line, but also an important local one. However, bear in mind that when this service was withdrawn, it led to a less frequent direct service between the Yorkshire Coast and the mainline, so the through market would have also been damaged.

 

[Helvellyn]

I am not a sentimentalist unlike, perhaps, many here and I try to look at things in a dispassionate fashion. I don't really care if you could once get the train to Little Snoddling via the Pines Express over the S&D. I do care if it was right to shut that line.

Was there an alternative? Costs seem to have been very high and receipts low on many of these lines. Surely they had to go if the railways were to survive? Surely we were long overdue a rationalisation of the often complex and duplicated railway system bequeathed to us by the early railway booms?
That said - Did too many lines go and did lines go that, perhaps, shouldn't have? Of course. Does it look like underhand tactics were used to facilitate closure? Certainly. Would the data used to justify closure stand up to scrutiny? Perhaps not in every case. However, we have to be very careful not to look back using what we know now. We have to look at the case with what was known then.

Railways were old hat, the car was king and car ownership and new motorways were changing the way people lived, worked and moved about. There were 6m+ cars in private ownership in the early 1960’s so why go on a dirty, slow, old (steam?) train when you could zoom there in your own Mini or Cortina filled with cheap petrol. Lorries (free of the common carrier rules) were taking juicy freight contracts from the railways just as bus services took passengers. Decisions based on demographics of 1960’s Britain cannot be compared with Britain of the 21st century. Too often we see people complain that a line was closed in the 60’s which would be useful today based on what we know today. They didn’t know then what we know now and they can’t be criticised for that!

There were thousands of carriages used only a couple of times a year for summer holiday traffic and freight was hugely unprofitable with wagons laying idle for days in private yards and utilisation of the rest low. 50% of the route mileage produced just 1% of receipts and it was clear the railway ( as it was) couldn't compete but we still had the pickup freight trundeling up a remote branch line every day. Part of the change was the introduction of long distance freightliner services and block trainloads over wagon load services. Part of the modernisation was the focus on long distance commuter routes and fast intercity travel – all things we take for granted today.

Money was leeching out of the aged railways at an alarming rate (£140m per year) and modernisation and increased efficiency was needed badly. Did Beeching not just make the decisions that anyone in his position would have had to take? Was there little choice, really, than to cut away the deadwood and save the rest? OF COURSE the cuts did inestimable damage to some communities and left many areas bereft of railway services. I do not think all possible avenues were explored to save money ( reduction of station staff, sale of station buildings, demolition of station buildings, simplification of stations, sale of goods yards, reduced level of mainteance pay trains, reduced servcies, more DMU operations, reduced track layouts and signalling etc) and I don’t think the data collected was always fair and accurate but were there, really, any alternatives? The railway could not go on pouring money away and hope to survive

I also think it is forgotten that we look at this after twenty years of growth on a privatised railway. BR was turning things around in the late 1980s with some good growth figures, but then the recession of the early 1990s really knocked that back.

In addition Beeching really happened before the "Sparks" effect was seen - WCML electrification drove some real growth, but equally that could not be replicated everywhere. Even on InterCity routes it was about how things culd be made better. The first HSTs on the Western Region were really about taking on the M4. Domestic air services were serious competition (look how it took until the 2000s with WCML modernisation and three tph London - Manchester to drive down London - Manchester air traffic).

The other that gets overlooked is just how much planned road building never happened. From the 1970s onwards road building has been constrained, and in the mid-1990s pretty much died after the protests over the Newbury Bypass and the M3 sweeping through Twyford Down. Just visit Pathetic Motorways to see what the UK motorway network could have been. It can be argued that rail is partly enjoying the growth it is now because our road networks are not only so congested but so disjointed.

Now I am not advocating wholesale motorway construction, but the one thing we are really good at in this country is not having an infrastructure strategy. So we have a rail system bursting at the seems that could probably justify some strategic reopenings. We have a road system bursting at the seems that could probably justify some strategic new building, but also better connections with other transport modes. And we have an aviation strategy that relies on our main hub airport being on the wrong side of London, linked by rail into London but not the rest of the country and hemmed in by poor motorway planning (look at Pathetic Motorways to see how Ringway 3 and 4 should have been either side of Heathrow, plus how the missing M31 should have kept traffic between the M4 and the South East away from Heathrow).

 

[30907]

In terms of the Market Weighton line, it was not just a "duplicate" line, but also an important local one. However, bear in mind that when this service was withdrawn, it led to a less frequent direct service between the Yorkshire Coast and the mainline, so the through market would have also been damaged.

Can you clarify which Yorkshire Coast towns were directly served by Beverley-York?

 

[yorksrob]

Can you clarify which Yorkshire Coast towns were directly served by Beverley-York?

Hull directly.

 

[RT4038]

It boils down to what the railway is for. If purely a commercial concern, then yes, I suppose that any line which:

a) Didn't cover its own costs and
b) Didn't contribute substantial passengers and freight to the core "profitable" network (whatever that is)

would be at risk of closure (Note that Beeching only investigated the first of these). Fortunately the railway is also a public service and has been seen as such for many years.That many lines which would have closed, were they being judged on a commercial basis, survived, is testament to the fact that for some routes at least, politics did its job and tried to balance raw commercialism with the needs of the public. That this was done on a piecemeal basis, rather than strategically across the whole network, probably says more about our flawed electoral system which disenfranchises the three quarters of the country that aren't in marginal constituencies.

Quite right. However the railway is only a public service (in the sense of not being 'raw commercial') only up to the amount of money Government is prepared to subsidise it. And this in 1963 was much less than was needed to run the then network.

In terms of the Market Weighton line, it was not just a "duplicate" line, but also an important local one. However, bear in mind that when this service was withdrawn, it led to a less frequent direct service between the Yorkshire Coast and the mainline, so the through market would have also been damaged.

I am sorry, but I just don't buy this line as 'important', except in a purely local sense. The Beeching report states that the 9 trains per day each way (so roughly every 2 hours) carried an average of 57 passengers per train. On the assumption (totally mine) that about 1/3 of the passengers were travelling through from York to Hull (say 20) and the rest of the passengers travelling 50/50 from an intermediate station to either Hull or York, this means that , on average, each train had less than 40 passengers on at any one time. That is about a small single deck bus load. Now I know that averages can be deceptive, but if the peak train had 100 on, then the off peak must have been quite thin indeed.
And if the through passengers only numbered 20 or so per train every 2 hours, it is hardly surprising that the replacement through service was less frequent (although more frequent connections were available by changing at Selby)!
However, I am sure now if the line had remained open loadings would be higher - Pocklington and Market Weighton have grown to being commuter towns and traffic congestion in the cities, and approach to cities, got much worse. But this could not possibly have been foreseen in 1963.

 

[IanXC]

Can you clarify which Yorkshire Coast towns were directly served by Beverley-York?

Hull directly.

Interestingly in one report on reopening, the scheme was said to look significantly more attractive (based on demand elasticities) if a north bound chord towards Bridlington was provided.

 

[Lankyline]

Beeching's report was also based on a number of assumptions that he thought would either have little or no impact on the railways, namely

1. People would drive to a mainline station when the branch had been axed, in fact they cut out the mainline station and drove all the way to their destination (not long haul they still used the train for that)

2. Underestimated car usage

2. Assumed that buses would take up the slack left by axing branch line / regional routes. This again didn't prove the success he hoped for, as for example, on some country routes it took longer to go by road, running costs were too high and companies went bang.

3. Axing local/feeder routes had a detrimental impact on mainline station passenger numbers and freight, though local "pickup" freight workings were extremely costly to run.

Beeching didn't sow the seeds for the "social" railway that came about through the 1968 Transport Act and Barbara Castle. The Act was based on a number of reports including the "Blue Book of Maps" and the "Network for Development Plan" the "Railway Feeder System Report" and "Trunk Route Report".

The Network for Development plan raised the idea of "subsidies for loss making lines were a social need was proven"

The Blue Book was based on a 20 year forecast of industry requirements from oil, coal and steel industries, plus major freight flows from docks, heavy industry etc it also included,interestingly,NCB's forecast of which pits would remain open over the short/med/long term.

Decisions taken to close lines ultimately rested with the Minister of Transport, though the work of the TUCC (Transport Users Consultative Committee) helped "speed" the process up as they were tasked to recommend lines slated for closure, to be kept open if there were grounds of hardship!

Another factor was that the rail unions namely ASLEF and the RMT put up little opposition to the cuts, ASLEF, being the larger of the 2 unions, did virtually nothing except for a few token demonstrations, despite the impact the report would make on their members.

 

[Andy873]

Another example by BR on how to close a line.

I have just got hold of a copy of L & Y railway society's book on the Gt Harwood loop line, on the subject of closure it states the following:

In 1956, Mullards new factory at Simonstone was due to open, and it was situated next to the line.

BR were asked if the 6:32 am train from Blackburn could depart ten minutes earlier so that 400 workers could get to work on time at the new factory.

Not only did BR decline, on the very day the factory opened, the 6:32 became the only service to now not stop at Simonstone.

You would have thought that an extra 4000 passengers a week plus existing passengers would have made the line safe, coupled with the fact that there was also a lot of goods as well.

 

[yorksrob]

Sorry that yorksrob has already made his mind up about the Market Weighton line, and there couldn't possibly be an alternative view. [Except there was then, the line closed, and the economic reasoning behind that can still be seen today]. I have taken a look at the Beeching report section on the Market Weighton line and certainly would not come to the conclusion that it is 'plain fact' that the figures show there was no reason to close the line.

You are still missing the point that the 'Tivvy Bumper' was loss-making, and this is why it closed. Most passengers from Tiverton would have wanted to go to Exeter [as mentioned in other posts] and most would have used the frequent direct bus services. This would leave a handful of passengers going north. Often the bus companies did not want the rail replacement services (they couldn't make money out of so few passengers either). I know there is a view held by some that public transport is either railways or nothing, but the reality is that it is railways, buses and taxis/private hire cars. There is a limit to how much non-car drivers can be subsidised in their journeys.

You are right that the size of the railway network today is as a result of individuals fighting to retain some lines and the political will at the time. In 1963 the political will to subsidise the then size of the railway network was simply not there. Hence Beeching. (Do not forget that sizeable chunks of railway were closed 69-72 during various financial crises)

I have indeed already made up my mind because Beeching revisionism does not make it any less the case that the Market Weighton route should have been rationalised and saved.

There is indeed a limit to how much non-car drivers can be subsidised in their journeys, which is why it is imperative for a good railway manager to run their network as efficiently as possible, contrary to your frankly bizarre assertion earlier on that they shouldn't bother and channel all capital to the InterCity network instead.

The political will may not have been there to make the right decisions in the 1960's, which is exactly why the mistakes of the past have to be remembered and exposed, so that a later generation of politicians aren't tempted to make the same mistakes.

 

[yorksrob]

Quite right. However the railway is only a public service (in the sense of not being 'raw commercial') only up to the amount of money Government is prepared to subsidise it. And this in 1963 was much less than was needed to run the then network.



I am sorry, but I just don't buy this line as 'important', except in a purely local sense. The Beeching report states that the 9 trains per day each way (so roughly every 2 hours) carried an average of 57 passengers per train. On the assumption (totally mine) that about 1/3 of the passengers were travelling through from York to Hull (say 20) and the rest of the passengers travelling 50/50 from an intermediate station to either Hull or York, this means that , on average, each train had less than 40 passengers on at any one time. That is about a small single deck bus load. Now I know that averages can be deceptive, but if the peak train had 100 on, then the off peak must have been quite thin indeed.
And if the through passengers only numbered 20 or so per train every 2 hours, it is hardly surprising that the replacement through service was less frequent (although more frequent connections were available by changing at Selby)!
However, I am sure now if the line had remained open loadings would be higher - Pocklington and Market Weighton have grown to being commuter towns and traffic congestion in the cities, and approach to cities, got much worse. But this could not possibly have been foreseen in 1963.

I'm sorry but I have no interest in you pulling figures out of your hat as to what you think a reasonable number of passenger for a train is, particularly as you seem determined to carry on the folly of ignoring through passengers. The key issue here is how much it cost to run the route and whether with rationalisation, that subsidy could be sufficiently reduced. The worked example clearly shows that the route was perfectly capable of operating with minimal subsidy, and this is lesson that Beeching should have taken from it. Infact, if Beeching had adopted that as a worked example of how a marginal line could be rationalised and costs controlled, I'm sure his legacy would have been a lot less controversial.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I'm sorry but I have no interest in you pulling figures out of your hat as to what you think a reasonable number of passenger for a train is, particularly as you seem determined to carry on the folly of ignoring through passengers. The key issue here is how much it cost to run the route and whether with rationalisation, that subsidy could be sufficiently reduced. The worked example clearly shows that the route was perfectly capable of operating with minimal subsidy, and this is lesson that Beeching should have taken from it. Infact, if Beeching had adopted that as a worked example of how a marginal line could be rationalised and costs controlled, I'm sure his legacy would have been a lot less controversial.

There are plenty of figures in the Reshaping Report that mean that there is no need to pull figures out of a hat when considering the York to Hull service. Dr Beeching accepted that the nine trains per day, with revenue of £90,400 per year covered their direct movement costs of £84,400. However, once terminal costs (i.e. Stations) of £23,100 and avoidable track costs of £43,300 were taken into account the service was losing money hand over fist. (A shortfall of around two-fifths of total direct expenses.)

The service was quite greedy in resource terms. There were four diagrams in circuit during the morning peak (although paradoxically several times during the day when not a train was moving on the line). Given that the route was mainly operated with DMUs, arguably with the 'best service ever' and with several 'no hope' intermediate stations already closed, things weren't likely to get much better.

Even better, if the line was closed, as has been explained repeatedly above, well over a quarter of the revenue (£25,600) would be retained because of the existence of alternative services via Selby.

It may be hard to appreciate it now but BR in the early 1960s was desperately short of cash to do anything. With vital investment in doing things like completing electrification of the WCML, building new Freightliner terminals, re-equipping the coal fleet with merry-go-round wagons and so on, burning money on rural branch lines to the likes of Market Weighton was simply unaffordable. The supposed CTC scheme seems to have got precisely nowhere and there were no longer funds available to undertake it even if there had been originally.

It is also easy to forget how many steam locomotives were still in use in the early 1960. Modern DMUs released from closures could quickly be applied to reduce costs on other lines.

There was also the small matter of implementing the Guillebaud recommendations on railway pay, which was having the effect of increasing staff wages by around 9% along with a reduced working week and even a small extra amount of holiday. Although not a Beeching initiative it is ironic that on his watch most railway staff who kept a job actually became materially better off in real terms. There is no doubt that these improvements were necessary to deal with major recruitment problems but they didn't favours to the economics of rural stopping services.

 

[30907]

Hull directly.

A splendid city, but on the Coast?

 

[yorksrob]

A splendid city, but on the Coast?

Yes, well it's on an estuary, so I'm sure that counts !

 

[yorksrob]

There are plenty of figures in the Reshaping Report that mean that there is no need to pull figures out of a hat when considering the York to Hull service. Dr Beeching accepted that the nine trains per day, with revenue of £90,400 per year covered their direct movement costs of £84,400. However, once terminal costs (i.e. Stations) of £23,100 and avoidable track costs of £43,300 were taken into account the service was losing money hand over fist. (A shortfall of around two-fifths of total direct expenses.)

The service was quite greedy in resource terms. There were four diagrams in circuit during the morning peak (although paradoxically several times during the day when not a train was moving on the line). Given that the route was mainly operated with DMUs, arguably with the 'best service ever' and with several 'no hope' intermediate stations already closed, things weren't likely to get much better.

Even better, if the line was closed, as has been explained repeatedly above, well over a quarter of the revenue (£25,600) would be retained because of the existence of alternative services via Selby.

It may be hard to appreciate it now but BR in the early 1960s was desperately short of cash to do anything. With vital investment in doing things like completing electrification of the WCML, building new Freightliner terminals, re-equipping the coal fleet with merry-go-round wagons and so on, burning money on rural branch lines to the likes of Market Weighton was simply unaffordable. The supposed CTC scheme seems to have got precisely nowhere and there were no longer funds available to undertake it even if there had been originally.

It is also easy to forget how many steam locomotives were still in use in the early 1960. Modern DMUs released from closures could quickly be applied to reduce costs on other lines.

There was also the small matter of implementing the Guillebaud recommendations on railway pay, which was having the effect of increasing staff wages by around 9% along with a reduced working week and even a small extra amount of holiday. Although not a Beeching initiative it is ironic that on his watch most railway staff who kept a job actually became materially better off in real terms. There is no doubt that these improvements were necessary to deal with major recruitment problems but they didn't favours to the economics of rural stopping services.

Well, terminal costs, i.e. stations were precisely the sort of thing that could have been controlled by rationalisation (i.e. the paytrain concept). Similarly with track costs through singling etc. Even if one accepts Beeching's cost model (which as other posters on here have pointed out, that was far from universally accepted even at the time) there was no reason for the route to be losing money hand over fist. To say that the route was "unaffordable" is simply not true. It may be more realistic to say that it was an opportunistic closure in the hope that some capital resources could be re-allocated elsewhere, but even that was probably limited by how quickly track needed to be actually renewed etc.

Your arguments have some merit with basket case lines, however in a marginal route like this which covered its revenue costs, to blithely accept closure on the basis that DMU's could be used to cut costs on other marginal lines was akin to robbing Peter to pay Paul. Admittedly cloth-eared politicians were also to blame.

 

[Lankyline]

The following set of figures gives some idea of what statistics were being gathered by Beeching's team,

Density of Passenger Traffic
This was sectioned into Passenger miles, Route Miles (Actual & % of total) and Percentage of total passenger miles.
The table showed that a total of 6056 route miles made up 36% of the system but only carried 1% of passengers

The same table was done for freight and showed that 7221 route miles which made up 42% of route miles carried just 3% of freight.

Evaluation in 1961 of income and costs for providing the routes only was £110 million, this did not include sidings, marshalling yards or stations and depots! Revenue from the 50% of least used stations was £6.5 million where the total cost of providing these stations was £9 million.

So Beeching's route study, carried out over the weekend of April 23 1961, effectively condemned routes on the basis of a 2 day operation !

 

[Bevan Price]

Pathetic Motorways[/URL] to see what the UK motorway network could have been. It can be argued that rail is partly enjoying the growth it is now because our road networks are not only so congested but so disjointed.

Now I am not advocating wholesale motorway construction, but the one thing we are really good at in this country is not having an infrastructure strategy. So we have a rail system bursting at the seems that could probably justify some strategic reopenings. We have a road system bursting at the seems that could probably justify some strategic new building, but also better connections with other transport modes.

The problem about building new roads is that experience has shown that "traffic expands to fill the available road space". It takes a couple of years or so, but all you do is move the congestion zone from one location to another.

 

[Dr Hoo]

The following set of figures gives some idea of what statistics were being gathered by Beeching's team,

Density of Passenger Traffic
This was sectioned into Passenger miles, Route Miles (Actual & % of total) and Percentage of total passenger miles.
The table showed that a total of 6056 route miles made up 36% of the system but only carried 1% of passengers

The same table was done for freight and showed that 7221 route miles which made up 42% of route miles carried just 3% of freight.

Evaluation in 1961 of income and costs for providing the routes only was £110 million, this did not include sidings, marshalling yards or stations and depots! Revenue from the 50% of least used stations was £6.5 million where the total cost of providing these stations was £9 million.

So Beeching's route study, carried out over the weekend of April 23 1961, effectively condemned routes on the basis of a 2 day operation !

This is a somewhat over-abbreviated description of the process!

To be quite clear, Dr Beeching took the reins in March 1961 and there was a *full week* of data capture for both passenger and freight traffic in late April 1961.

There were then nearly two years of statistical and other analysis and writing up before the Reshaping report was published in March 1963. Any suggestion that the process was rushed through is ridiculous.

In understanding the "Route costs" of £110m it can clearly be seen (e.g. from Page 6 of the Report) that this covers "Track and signalling". There is no mystery about sidings, depots and so forth given other headings, such as "Terminal handling and facilities". At service level costs were commonly split into Movement, Terminals and Track & Signalling.

 

[Taunton]

The problem about building new roads is that experience has shown that "traffic expands to fill the available road space".

Nobody ever seems to get upset with the same happening on new railways; nobody has suggested we should not build Crossrail, just because it will be full within a couple of years.

Well, terminal costs, i.e. stations were precisely the sort of thing that could have been controlled by rationalisation (i.e. the paytrain concept).

Some regions were more into this than others. The Eastern was of course the pioneer, it having been driven along by Gerry Fiennes, who called it "the basic railway".

I believe there was both management and union opposition to the concept, feeling it would extend from the loss-makers (it only seems to be suggested for these) to the mainstream network.

 

[edwin_m]

Nobody ever seems to get upset with the same happening on new railways; nobody has suggested we should not build Crossrail, just because it will be full within a couple of years.

New train passengers tend to be making new journeys, likely resulting in extra economic activity, or transferring from road where they are potentially reducing environmental damage or at least making room for someone else to use the road and generate more economic activity. This is seen as a good thing by all except those with a deeply green viewpoint.

The extra drivers generated by new roads have often transferred from public transport, resulting in extra environmental disbenefit and worsening the economics of the buses and trains.

 

[yorksrob]

And even where both the new driver and the new rail passenger generate new economic activity, the new passenger will be doing so at less environmental cost.

 

[yorksrob]

Nobody ever seems to get upset with the same happening on new railways; nobody has suggested we should not build Crossrail, just because it will be full within a couple of years.

Some regions were more into this than others. The Eastern was of course the pioneer, it having been driven along by Gerry Fiennes, who called it "the basic railway".

I believe there was both management and union opposition to the concept, feeling it would extend from the loss-makers (it only seems to be suggested for these) to the mainstream network.

I can see that might have been a source of opposition from Management and Unions. Ultimately misguided and futile as the closure programme helped to fuel the decline of the railway in the minds of the public which would have been more of a risk to jobs beyond just loss making lines.

That said, if it was trialled successfully in one place, I've no doubt an effective Chairman with the belief in the concept could have introduced it to others.

 

[Gareth Marston]

Core elements of what we call "Beeching" were little better than guesses based on false assumptions.

They concluded without any available evidence that people would railhead in much larger quantity's than they actually did therefore many of the savings anticipated by line closure failed to materialize as the long distance contributory revenue dropped. Oswestry- Gobowen is a prime example of a closure that actually ended up increasing the losses. Even today's footfall for Gobowen nominally the railhead for c 35,000 people in NW Shropshire is lower than the figure using the Oswestry shuttle in the Reshaping report.

They put nothing in place to ensure that branch lines connection users would continue to travel by train. Through ticketing on dedicated bus links - entirely absent. People just didn't magically turn up at the railhead they disappeared.

Combine this with the inaccurate snapshot traffic surveys. The deliberately set inaccurate high bar for passenger train viability and the refusal to even do basic rationalization and you realize that a lot of lines/stations caught up in the closure programme were harshly and unfairly dealt with.

Shouting Beeching was a jolly good chap and introduced InterCity and Liner trains misses the point. His remedy failed as the closures failed to stem the losses and just encouraged more traffic loss as the railways were labelled as old and unwanted.