Lumo overspeed incident at Peterborough (17/04/2022)

[Railsigns]

Maybe non-standard but perhaps G/Y in top position and R/Y (for double Y) in bottom position.

I deleted my comment after realising that the signal appears to be a Dorman head with two apertures. You still wouldn't want the green at the top because that would put it further from the driver's eye level.

 

[Taunton]

You still wouldn't want the green at the top because that would put it further from the driver's eye level.

So in that case why put the key route indicator further up still ?

It is noticeable how many of the recent serious signal misreads (Southall, Ladbroke Grove, now Peterborough twice) were all with signals up among the overhead wires. It would have been good to have a shot in the report from further back, the point when the signal changed.

I do wonder why the RAIB selected the shot of the signal, a nice bright green with a pretty poor set of indicator lights above (they are, look at the picture), for the front cover of the report. They do have form in, with the way that they edit their documents, Sending a Message ...

 

[12LDA28C]

So in that case why put the key route indicator further up still ?

It is noticeable how many of the recent serious signal misreads (Southall, Ladbroke Grove, now Peterborough twice) were all with signals up among the overhead wires. It would have been good to have a shot from further back, the point when the signal changed.

I do wonder why the RAIB selected the shot of the signal, a nice bright green with a pretty poor set of indicator lights above (they are, look at the picture), for the front cover of the report. They do have form in, with the way that they edit their documents, Sending a Message ...

I'm not sure I would describe the signal as being 'up among the overhead wires', it's well below the catenary as can be seen from the (poor) photo so the OHLE is very unlikely to be a contributory factor.

 

[HSTEd]

So from the RAIB summary video.... yet another problem that ETCS would eliminate.

When is ETCS deployment supposed to happen on ECML South? Has it been postponed again?

 

[66701GBRF]

So in that case why put the key route indicator further up still ?

It is noticeable how many of the recent serious signal misreads (Southall, Ladbroke Grove, now Peterborough twice) were all with signals up among the overhead wires. It would have been good to have a shot in the report from further back, the point when the signal changed.

I do wonder why the RAIB selected the shot of the signal, a nice bright green with a pretty poor set of indicator lights above (they are, look at the picture), for the front cover of the report. They do have form in, with the way that they edit their documents, Sending a Message ...

Southall and Ladbroke Grove are not recent, and you cannot compare a poor quality forward facing camera image to what a driver (or anyone) actually sees there and then.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

You still wouldn't want the green at the top because that would put it further from the driver's eye level.

I thought the standard was that the red is always closest to the driver's eye level?

Another thing that strikes me was that it was not necessary to send the train through platform 1 at all. There was no need to path the one running 21 minutes late round it given that both being IETs would have the same performance as each other and the late one was 2 - 3 minutes behind the Lumo.

 

[swt_passenger]

So from the RAIB summary video.... yet another problem that ETCS would eliminate.

When is ETCS deployment supposed to happen on ECML South? Has it been postponed again?

It’s stated in the part of the report dealing with ETCS - 2029.

 

[Railsigns]

I thought the standard was that the red is always closest to the driver's eye level?

It is, but ideally all aspects would be displayed in the same position so they're all close to driver's eye level. This isn't possible on a standard multi-unit signal, but it is on an LED signal that mimics an old 'searchlight' signal by being able to show different colours from the same aperture (with a second aperture provided only for displaying the second yellow of a double yellow aspect, where required).

 

[The North Briton]

I thought the standard was that the red is always closest to the driver's eye level?

Another thing that strikes me was that it was not necessary to send the train through platform 1 at all. There was no need to path the one running 21 minutes late round it given that both being IETs would have the same performance as each other and the late one was 2 - 3 minutes behind the Lumo.

I wondered this too, as 1Y16 was booked to stop at PBO, one would have thought the Lumo service would be approaching Connington by the time the LNER was ready to depart (if the running order had been maintained). The report refers to the signaller deciding to regulate, but I wonder if the source was a misguided request from LNER which should have been declined?

 

[Merle Haggard]

I find it near impossible to believe that a driver didn't/doesn't know what a route indicator is.

I find it impossible to believe that a driver wouldn't know the difference between a Junction Indicator indicating a route set to the left (1,2,3) and one to the right (4,5,6). It would indicate someone doesn't know their left from their right, or possibly their arse from their elbow.

Had I not, by chance, been standing next to the driver when the conversation took place I would have thought the same. All I can say is that I heard the conversation clearly; to be fair, the driver pointed at the signal (which I think, from memory, was showing a calling-on aspect with 3-bulb feather) and said to the platform person 'what do I do now?' which I accept is not 'what do those feathers mean?' but has the same implication. When the platform staff member said "you cross over' the driver then pointed to the trailing crossover and said something like 'through there?', clearly pointing at that crossover rather than the siding connection (from where we were standing, it was clear which he was pointing at - the siding connection is further away and more to the left).

The whole thing seemed strange, not least because of who the driver choose to ask. It was staggeringly memorable, etched into my memory. It was late 2018.

I did seriously consider reporting it to the whistle-blowing safety organisation but, being retired from the industry, wasn't sure how (or whether) I could do that.

 

[skyhigh]

Had I not, by chance, been standing next to the driver when the conversation took place I would have thought the same. All I can say is that I heard the conversation clearly; to be fair, the driver pointed at the signal (which I think, from memory, was showing a calling-on aspect with 3-bulb feather) and said to the platform person 'what do I do now?' which I accept is not 'what do those feathers mean?' but has the same implication. When the platform staff member said "you cross over' the driver then pointed to the trailing crossover and said something like 'through there?', clearly pointing at that crossover rather than the siding connection (from where we were standing, it was clear which he was pointing at - the siding connection is further away and more to the left).

The whole thing seemed strange, not least because of who the driver choose to ask. It was staggeringly memorable, etched into my memory. It was late 2018.

I did seriously consider reporting it to the whistle-blowing safety organisation but, being retired from the industry, wasn't sure how (or whether) I could do that.

Are you sure they were a driver?

 

[TheBigD]

I wondered this too, as 1Y16 was booked to stop at PBO, one would have thought the Lumo service would be approaching Connington by the time the LNER was ready to depart (if the running order had been maintained). The report refers to the signaller deciding to regulate, but I wonder if the source was a misguided request from LNER which should have been declined?

On the day, the Lumo service was booked in to Kings Cross just after another service left the platform, (and the platform was then used for another service before the Lumo departed). Double iccupancy of a platform is often necessary at Kings Cross. The Lumo service was running a few minutes early so letting it run through to London early would have only seen it stood outside Kings Cross*. A decision was made to regulate it at Peterborough to allow the late running LNER service to proceed ahead of it, and to ensure the correct presentation of trains in to London.
You can argue with hindsight whether that was the correct decision.

* looking at this Sunday, the Lumo service is booked to use platform 0 and goes on top of the 1057 LNER arrival/1222 departure, with the Lumo occupying the country end of the platform 1103 to 1213.

 

[800001]

I wondered this too, as 1Y16 was booked to stop at PBO, one would have thought the Lumo service would be approaching Connington by the time the LNER was ready to depart (if the running order had been maintained). The report refers to the signaller deciding to regulate, but I wonder if the source was a misguided request from LNER which should have been declined?

LNER would not look to have the Lumo regulated when they are running 21 minutes late.

LNER would have nothing to gain in this instance, as they would still fail PPM, and as others above had stated above, it was a choice by the signaller based on the platform occupancy at Kings Cross.

 

[Lucan]

the driver pointed at the signal (which I think, from memory, was showing a calling-on aspect with 3-bulb feather) and said to the platform person 'what do I do now?' which I accept is not 'what do those feathers mean?' but has the same implication. When the platform staff member said "you cross over' the driver then pointed to the trailing crossover and said something like 'through there?', clearly pointing at that crossover rather than the siding connection

I suggest that the driver was merely letting off steam at the nearest member of staff in frustration at the signaller's variation from the normal movement. Pehaps the driver had got out of the wrong side of the bed that morning, and maybe the stopover in the up siding would leave him further to walk to the mess room for tea. As for pointing at the trailing crossover, as this was not the normal reversing movement it may be that the driver had never had particular reason to look at it before, and now was just looking more intently and thinking out loud.

 

[falcon]

From the report.

97.
The driver’s awareness of the signal conditions that could be presented at
this junction was not sufficient to overcome their expectation that the train
was to be routed on the Up Fast line.

That's just laughable. It translated into the Train Driver did not know that they had to obey the signals.

After that massive report here is the unabridged version.... The driver was not paying attention.

People could have been killed.

 

[185]

I have to admit, in defence of the driver the signal is an unusual one set directly behind a bridge which on a bright day sunlight would illuminate both above and below the bridge (time of day, mid morning, SE facing) potentially washing out the view of the signal, making the feather harder to see too. But these are the risks you learn when you sign a route, especially diverging junctions with much lower speeds.

 

[DoubleO]

From the report.

97.
The driver’s awareness of the signal conditions that could be presented at
this junction was not sufficient to overcome their expectation that the train
was to be routed on the Up Fast line.

That's just laughable. It translated into the Train Driver did not know that they had to obey the signals.

After that massive report here is the unabridged version.... The driver was not paying attention.

People could have been killed.

I'm sorry but it doesn't translate into that at all. It's saying that the drivers knowledge of the signal options wasn't enough to overcome the expectation bias that was occuring due to the fact that he had been routed on the UF on the vast majority of times at that location. EB is well proven to have strong influences and consequences on a person's behaviour or actions.

 

[Dieseldriver]

From the report.

97.
The driver’s awareness of the signal conditions that could be presented at
this junction was not sufficient to overcome their expectation that the train
was to be routed on the Up Fast line.

That's just laughable. It translated into the Train Driver did not know that they had to obey the signals.

After that massive report here is the unabridged version.... The driver was not paying attention.

People could have been killed.

Luckily we have much better informed, competent people working in the RAIB to look at the underlying issues of incidents such as this and make serious grown up recommendations to try and prevent them happening again.
If the people that matter in this industry had as basic an attitude as you do we’d still be running unfitted trains on inadequately signalled lines with regular multi fatality incidents.

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

It’s an interesting report but I must admit my immediate reaction was also ‘why can the junction signal display a green aspect for a diverging route normally supported by the flashing approach sequence even when this hasn’t been encountered, as was the case here?’ Having discussed it with someone who is familiar with signalling principles, the problem potentially created is a SPAD risk at the next signal immediately after the junction (in this case, the platform starter.) In essence, only receiving a single yellow approaching a platform, even if not stopping, can result in drivers developing an expectation that the platform starter will clear on approach.

This might seem somewhat unlikely at Peterborough but consider the relative likelihood of an Up freight train being diverted onto the Up Slow to Fletton in the same manner as 1Y80; always receive a single yellow at P486 and get clear aspect on the platform 2 starting signal, you‘ll get used to it until that one day when the platform starter remains at red, and you end up SPADing it.

Presumably this risk is why NR’s current mitigation is only temporary, as it is theoretically creating a building risk elsewhere.

 

[Winthorpe]

Luckily we have much better informed, competent people working in the RAIB to look at the underlying issues of incidents such as this and make serious grown up recommendations to try and prevent them happening again.
If the people that matter in this industry had as basic an attitude as you do we’d still be running unfitted trains on inadequately signalled lines with regular multi fatality incidents.

Yes the culture is rightly about trying to understand and learn and improve. Rather than unnecessarily blame.

Understand what happened. And make it less likely to happen again.

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

And thus I'm also aware that, in semaphore days, the distant would never be pulled to clear when the route was set for a 25mph turnout, just because all the subsequent signals happened to be off.

The difference in absolute block areas is/was that drivers are specifically trained to expect board-to-board running after receiving a distant at caution. That being said, a junction signal with a diverging route could quite legitimately have a distant arm beneath the stop signal if there was a further junction ahead; the diverging signal acting as both starter for the first junction and distant for the second. So in theory you could still have a layout that could engender the risk of acceleration towards a diverging route with a low speed limit, although the performance of heritage rolling stock would usually mean that a dangerous speed could not be reached before the pointwork.

 

[trebor79]

I'm sorry but it doesn't translate into that at all. It's saying that the drivers knowledge of the signal options wasn't enough to overcome the expectation bias that was occuring due to the fact that he had been routed on the UF on the vast majority of times at that location. EB is well proven to have strong influences and consequences on a person's behaviour or actions.

Indeed, EB can be very strong. I fly light aeroplanes from time to time. I remember talking to my local airfield, made a slightly abridged approach from a local landmark due to approaching rain. Called final.
As I'm coming down the approach, I think it looks a bit different to usual. Oh no, that's the maintenance hangars there, and that isn't really 3 runways, it's a trick of the light and ground/crop scarring of the 2 runways that were dug up decades ago.
Everything's fine. Continue approach.
Oh that's odd, I don't remember a copse there. Hang on, why is the clubhouse a different shape? No, it's always been that shape, it's the right colour and on the correct side of the runway....
Why is there a glider on the runway? Why is there a winch... Oh!. Nope, that's not Old Buckenham, that's Tibenham!
That was a good 5 minutes I was totally happy I was approaching Old Buckenham, despite my subconscious realising something wasn't quite right. Your concious brain makes what you see fit what you're expecting. This is also why a lot of people struggle to read maps. I was perhaps 30 seconds from touchdown when I realised my error, which was totally obvious in hindsight.

 

[43066]

It’s an interesting report but I must admit my immediate reaction was also ‘why can the junction signal display a green aspect for a diverging route normally supported by the flashing approach sequence even when this hasn’t been encountered, as was the case here?’ Having discussed it with someone who is familiar with signalling principles, the problem potentially created is a SPAD risk at the next signal immediately after the junction (in this case, the platform starter.) In essence, only receiving a single yellow approaching a platform, even if not stopping, can result in drivers developing an expectation that the platform starter will clear on approach.

Not really. Approach release (ie brought down to a red that steps up) is more restrictive than flashing aspects, which mean you’re taking the highest speed diverging route. There are good reasons why you might encounter steady yellows down to a red vice flashing, for instance if a conflicting move is taking place.

We are all aware of approach controlled signals, but no driver should be expecting any signal to come off. Lack of route knowledge was the clear cause here.

Another issue is long signal sections on high speed lines, combined with the rapid acceleration of modern traction.

 

[dk1]

The issue is long signal sections on high speed lines, and the rapid acceleration of modern traction. Lack of route knowledge was the clear cause here.

Totally as I have seen & understood it all along. Many of the comments on this thread are quite baffling.

 

[43066]

Plenty of operators recruit drivers with no driving experience at all and put them straight into high speed driving upon qualification. The important part is the quality of the training. Also, this incident wasn't really anything to to with high speed driving.

Agree. As an ex former southern region metro driver, who went to IC work, those of us who cut our teeth driving short signal sections at lower speeds know how to throw the brake in, and seem to have fewer TPWS type incidents than those who go straight onto high speed.

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

Not really. Approach release (ie brought down to a red that steps up) is more restrictive than flashing aspects, which mean you’re taking the highest speed diverging route. There are good reasons why you might encounter steady yellows down to a red vice flashing, for instance if a conflicting move is taking place.

We are all aware of approach controlled signals, but no driver should be expecting any signal to come off. Lack of route knowledge was the clear cause here.

Another issue is long signal sections on high speed lines, combined with the rapid acceleration of modern traction.

No driver should expect any signal to come off and yet SPADs happen in those exact circumstances. Expectation bias is a real thing and the industry has identified that suppressing signal aspects at junctions in a manner that creates a likelihood of a less restrictive aspect at the first signal after the junction is one of those scenarios it seems.

 

[DoubleO]

Totally as I have seen & understood it all along. Many of the comments on this thread are quite baffling.

Nearly as baffling as people who seem to know better than the 50+ page RAIB report and feel they can condense it into one sentence.....

 

[800001]

I have to admit, in defence of the driver the signal is an unusual one set directly behind a bridge which on a bright day sunlight would illuminate both above and below the bridge (time of day, mid morning, SE facing) potentially washing out the view of the signal, making the feather harder to see too. But these are the risks you learn when you sign a route, especially diverging junctions with much lower speeds.

Knowing that signal, they are extreme bright, extremely visible and actually helps having bridge being it to make it even more visible.
To not notice the junction indicator clearly shows driving not paying attention up the signal.

 

[43066]

Indeed, EB can be very strong. I fly light aeroplanes from time to time. I remember talking to my local airfield, made a slightly abridged approach from a local landmark due to approaching rain. Called final.
As I'm coming down the approach, I think it looks a bit different to usual. Oh no, that's the maintenance hangars there, and that isn't really 3 runways, it's a trick of the light and ground/crop scarring of the 2 runways that were dug up decades ago.
Everything's fine. Continue approach.
Oh that's odd, I don't remember a copse there. Hang on, why is the clubhouse a different shape? No, it's always been that shape, it's the right colour and on the correct side of the runway....
Why is there a glider on the runway? Why is there a winch... Oh!. Nope, that's not Old Buckenham, that's Tibenham!
That was a good 5 minutes I was totally happy I was approaching Old Buckenham, despite my subconscious realising something wasn't quite right. Your concious brain makes what you see fit what you're expecting. This is also why a lot of people struggle to read maps. I was perhaps 30 seconds from touchdown when I realised my error, which was totally obvious in hindsight. l

Almost a Harrison Ford moment! Having been into both airfields myself I can relate. So many airfields almost overlapping in that part of the world, you need eyes in the back (and side) of your head!

 

[dk1]

Nearly as baffling as people who seem to know better than the 50+ page RAIB report and feel they can condense it into one sentence.....

Some of these reports do string it out.