Strathclyder
Established Member
Indeed. 59 are now known to have died that night as per the most recent research, as opposed to the widely perpetuated death toll of 75.
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Accidents in December
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Given that substantial details must have been assembled of the 75, one wonders just who the discrepancy of 16 actually included.
norbitonflyer
Established Member
Most of the bodies were never found - the estimate was based on tickets (collected just before the accident).
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It does seem remarkable that the loco hauling the train (no 224), was salvaged at the third attempt, went back to the works on its own wheels to be sorted out, earned the nickname "The Diver" and then continued in traffic until 1919.
DerekC
Established Member
Of the December accidents noted, the fall of the Tay Bridge had, I think, by far the most far reaching impact. It forced structural design in the UK to be more of a science and less an art form and showed the effects of poor preliminary surveys and poor quality control. it shook the foundations of the Victorian age's assumptions about invincibility. That might be partly because Queen Victoria passed over it (with a good deal of ta-ra) on her way to Balmoral shortly after opening, stopping briefly in Dundee to knight the designer, Thomas Bouch. My grandparents generation (born in the 1880s and 90s) were still talking about it as if had happened quite recently.
Sir Thomas seems to get a certain amount of sympathy these days. I am not sure he deserves it. If you are interested there is a very good paper published quite recently which explains the deficiencies and the probably mechanism of collapse very clearly. Available here:
https://taybridgedisaster.co.uk/index/cms-filesystem-action/iesis paper1.pdf
The paper explains that Sir Thomas designed the bridge on the basis of a wind load of 10 lb/sq ft distributed across the structure, which he acquired from the Astronomer Royal. It was well known by that time that wind pressures could be much higher (up to 40 to 50 ln/sq ft) in gusts and there were known experts in fluid flow whom he could have consulted. It is notable that his assistants used 20 lb/sq ft in their calculations (double what he had told them). The bridge had to be completely redesigned after construction had started because the bedrock under the Firth was much deeper down than the preliminary survey (carried out in a hurry, to a fixed price) had suggested. In redesigning the bridge with iron piers, Sir Thomas reduced the number of vertical columns from his initial intention to save cost, knowing that this would reduce the stability in crosswinds. He made the critical connections between the cross-braces and the cast iron columns forming the tower members out of cast iron to save more money, yet had used wrought iron for very similar connections on the Belah viaduct, designed nearly twenty years before, with machined bearing faces to ensure that the load was distributed evenly at the critical point of the connection.
The mechanism of collapse (according to the paper) was failure of the cast lugs attaching the cross-bracing ties to the columns on one of the piers under the lateral load exerted by a huge gust of wind on the train and the bridge structure, causing the pier to fall over sideways, followed immediately by progressive collapse of the rest of the piers supporting the "high girders" over the shipping channel.
The paper suggests that Bouch was under pressure from the North British Railway, which was paying, to save money but simply doesn't seem to have considered the safety implications of what he was doing.
In modern times you would expect that he would have been prosecuted for manslaughter. In those days it didn't seem to work like that. Drivers could be and were prosecuted, but not, apparently, gentleman designers!
The train was found inside the high girders, the locomotive being presumably protected to some extent by the ironwork.
Sir Thomas seems to get a certain amount of sympathy these days. I am not sure he deserves it. If you are interested there is a very good paper published quite recently which explains the deficiencies and the probably mechanism of collapse very clearly. Available here:
https://taybridgedisaster.co.uk/index/cms-filesystem-action/iesis paper1.pdf
The paper explains that Sir Thomas designed the bridge on the basis of a wind load of 10 lb/sq ft distributed across the structure, which he acquired from the Astronomer Royal. It was well known by that time that wind pressures could be much higher (up to 40 to 50 ln/sq ft) in gusts and there were known experts in fluid flow whom he could have consulted. It is notable that his assistants used 20 lb/sq ft in their calculations (double what he had told them). The bridge had to be completely redesigned after construction had started because the bedrock under the Firth was much deeper down than the preliminary survey (carried out in a hurry, to a fixed price) had suggested. In redesigning the bridge with iron piers, Sir Thomas reduced the number of vertical columns from his initial intention to save cost, knowing that this would reduce the stability in crosswinds. He made the critical connections between the cross-braces and the cast iron columns forming the tower members out of cast iron to save more money, yet had used wrought iron for very similar connections on the Belah viaduct, designed nearly twenty years before, with machined bearing faces to ensure that the load was distributed evenly at the critical point of the connection.
The mechanism of collapse (according to the paper) was failure of the cast lugs attaching the cross-bracing ties to the columns on one of the piers under the lateral load exerted by a huge gust of wind on the train and the bridge structure, causing the pier to fall over sideways, followed immediately by progressive collapse of the rest of the piers supporting the "high girders" over the shipping channel.
The paper suggests that Bouch was under pressure from the North British Railway, which was paying, to save money but simply doesn't seem to have considered the safety implications of what he was doing.
In modern times you would expect that he would have been prosecuted for manslaughter. In those days it didn't seem to work like that. Drivers could be and were prosecuted, but not, apparently, gentleman designers!
The train was found inside the high girders, the locomotive being presumably protected to some extent by the ironwork.
No doubt the engineering analysis in that paper was thoroughly proof-read, but there's a glaring non=technical error near the beginning, when it gives the date of the disaster as 29 November 1879. It was actually 28 December: as McGonagall reminds us,
edwin_m
Veteran Member
Thanks for this, don't have time to read the link right now, but reading the post there is no mention of the wind load on the train. That must have increase the lateral load quite significantly as the train passed over the bridge.
DerekC
Established Member
Yes. Presumably Bouch's assistants took that into account in their calculations, but the base assumptions were wrong. As my post says "The mechanism of collapse (according to the paper) was failure of the cast lugs attaching the cross-bracing ties to the columns on one of the piers under the lateral load exerted by a huge gust of wind on the train and the bridge structure, causing the pier to fall over sideways, followed immediately by progressive collapse of the rest of the piers supporting the "high girders" over the shipping channel."
Important in historical terms, but hardly affecting the technical conclusions! Didn't somebody suggest that McGonagall was the worst ever Scottish poet?
There have been multiple reasoned and plausible technical "assessments" of how the Tay Bridge collapse actually initiated (eg was the train blown off the rails, and struck bridge elements, and started things), and this is another one. I guess we will never know for sure.
It is indeed surprising how the accident has stayed in the public conscience far longer than say collisions with more casualties. Partly, I suspect, because as you cross the replacement bridge today you can look down and see the stumps of all the old bridge columns alongside just sticking out above the water. And recollect ...
It is indeed surprising how the accident has stayed in the public conscience far longer than say collisions with more casualties. Partly, I suspect, because as you cross the replacement bridge today you can look down and see the stumps of all the old bridge columns alongside just sticking out above the water. And recollect ...
Widely regarded as the worst ever poet of any nationality! (But of course that was before the Vogons.)
There's certainly no "McGonagall Night Supper", is there ...
DerekC
Established Member
As an engineer I find this one pretty convincing. It is simple, you can see the primary cause and all the various contributory factors and the explanation doesn't need derailments or showers of fire or anything else to explain the collapse.
As I mentioned in the post above, I think it was a huge shock to the Victorian sense of invincibility and the echoes of that are still with us.
As Sir Herbert Walker is reputedly to have said after the Sevenoaks crash "accidents don't happen by accident". Your point about invincibility is well made. Similar in some ways to the Titanic.
..... but then I am not aware that McGonagall ever wrote in praise of the haggis, fortunately perhaps?There's certainly no "McGonagall Night Supper", is there ...
William McGonagall also performed with friends the scottish play at a theatre in Dundee. The theatre asked for the house money up front as they thought that there would be a situation where it was so bad that the audience would ask for a refund of money they did not have.
It turned out to be so bad that it was good as a comedy. In the scene where a character was killed in a sword fight. He put up such a fight that the result looked as though it would be reversed.
It turned out to be so bad that it was good as a comedy. In the scene where a character was killed in a sword fight. He put up such a fight that the result looked as though it would be reversed.
Now believe it or not ... I also attended a performance of The Scottish Play ** that we were doing., long ago, for GCSE (or what it was called then). Our whole class attended. Mainstream big city theatre. It was probably the best comedy I have ever seen on the stage. It was actually one of the preliminary (cheap) performances, before the official first night of the run.
- In the classic scene, Lady M's candle blew out, so she had to perform the soliloquy to ... nothing.
- B (you know who) is stabbed, and falls with "he has killed me mother". And the interval curtain comes down. Alas, B's foot is still sticking out, which is overcome with a deft flick backwards - and muffled laughter.
- B, as well-known, later returns as a ghostly figure, moving light-as-air across the stage. Alas, the ghost trips and nearly falls over ...
- Very modern, 1970s-style set, abstract columns etc let up and down on ropes in sequence. At one point up went the columns, down went the backcloth - and there was a huge ripping noise as the backcloth was torn, presumably trapped up top by the columns, and hung down in shards for the rest of the performance.
- Our English master, the following day in class, looks to summarise the performance. "Well, there were ... certain challenges for the cast" he says, repressing a smile. Whereupon we are allowed 30 seconds of pantomiming speaking to a non-existent candle, or a range of puns about "trip".
- ... but what he (hopefully) didn't know :
We were up on the top level, in the cheap seats, of course. At the interval we look over the balcony. Directly below is a man with a completely bald head. The most indisciplined of us, Bruce X (yes, you, Brucie) ostentatiously takes aim, and sends his whole ice cream down, accelerating at 1g. I have to say it was a brilliant shot. Half a dozen faces, in full school uniform, very rapidly retreated from the balcony edge before anyone could look upwards.
So sorry to have completely diverted the thread. I'll delete it if you lot wish. But yes, none is made up, and it was all at the same performance.
** : For those unfamiliar, this is a well-known Shakespeare play, where traditionally it is considered very unlucky to say the name. Hence the euphemism. Rowan Atkinson made a whole Blackadder scene out of this.
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Snow1964
Established Member
St Bedes Junction (Jarrow) 17th December 1915
A goods train had been banked, banking engine stopped, signalman didn't know it was there, another train hit it, a third train hit the wreckage. 18 or 19 dead (one died later), 80+ injured. Big fire in gas lit carriages. Could have been worse but another train crew managed to pull some carriages away from the fire.
www.shieldsgazette.com
A goods train had been banked, banking engine stopped, signalman didn't know it was there, another train hit it, a third train hit the wreckage. 18 or 19 dead (one died later), 80+ injured. Big fire in gas lit carriages. Could have been worse but another train crew managed to pull some carriages away from the fire.
The Jarrow rail disaster - a century on from the devastating three-train collision that killed 18 and injured 81
Over a century ago a rail disaster took place at St Bede’s junction, on a stretch of track between where Bede and Jarrow Metro stations stand today.
www.shieldsgazette.com
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Splendid stuff! To keep us on track, check out GWR Saint class no 2905. Not sure she was ever involved in a December accident though!
Although not strictly an accident, 109 years ago today (16/12/1914) just after dawn, the German Battlecruisers Seydlitz and Moltke and the Heavy Cruiser Blucher bombarded the twin towns of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool. The ships fired over 1000 shells, killing almost 130 people of all ages and causing massive damage. West Hartlepool station was damaged, along with the goods yard and track work, and ships in the docks and shipyards. A train full of school children had a lucky escape when stopped by failed signals on an embankment parallel to the coast, as 11 inch shells passed overhead. After Blucher took numerous hits and casualties from the onshore Heugh and Lighthouse Batteries, the ships withdrew southwards and rejoined the rest of the squadron, that had been bombarding undefended Scarborough and Whitby.
Strathclyder
Established Member
One of those echos of course being the Forth Bridge; Bouch had been contracted to design and build a suspension bridge across the Forth in the 1860s, but the bankruptcy of the North British Railway in 1867 delayed the start of construction until at least 1878. Needless to say, all work on this design was halted after the fall of the Tay Bridge the following year.
Another tidbit relating to No.224: it didn't cross the second bridge until the 29th anniversary of the disaster - 28th December 1908 - while working a evening mail train to Dundee, as the engine crews flat out refused to take it across.
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AIUI No 224 had a couple of other claims to fame. It was the first inside cylinder 4-4-0 to run in Britain. It was also, once salvaged, rebuilt as a tandem compound loco, one of only three such locos ever to run in Britain. As such it was not particularly successful and was reconverted into a simple expansion machine quite quickly - and long before it crossed the Tay again.
The four train pile-up in thick fog on the ECML near Huntingdon on 15th December 1961 has not been mentioned. A southbound ecs train hauled by Deltic D9012 ran into the rear of a stationary freight on the up goods line, and the derailment fouled the up main. In rapid succession V2 60977 on an up meat train, and then A3 60078 on a down freight collided with the wreckage and along with D9012 were badly damaged, but fortunately all the crews survived. The Deltic and A3 were repaired, but the V2 was written off!
Strathclyder
Established Member
Further to the Tay Bridge, these galleries of the original bridge under construction and after completion (titled 'High Girders'), the disaster and it's aftermath (titled 'Lamb Collection' and consisting of illustrations and headlines from newpapers of the period alongside actual photos) and the construction of the second bridge should all be of interest. Found on the Leisure And Culture Dundee site.
Plainly evident in several photos of the original bridge are the 12 brick piers closest to the south/Fife bank of the Tay. As detailed by @DerekC above in post #35, prior to the discovery that the riverbed wasn't quite as 'rock' and 'solid' as the initial surveys had suggested, the original plan to have brick piers from end to end was scrapped in favour of the cast iron colunms. Image that best illustrates this is attached below:
Really emphasises the slap-dash, cost-cutting nature of the entire project and the disaster really was a case of when, not if when taking all contributing factors into consideration.
She ended up being the last of her small class (6 locos total, two 224s and four 420s) to be withdrawn in 1919, nearly 40 years after the disaster (she was about 8 years old in December 1879). As such, they were the only class of NBR 4-4-0s not to make it to the Grouping in 1923.
Last I remember, the numberplate for 224's tender survives at a museum in, of all places, Selkirk.
Virtual Gallery: “High Girders” | Leisure & Culture Dundee
www.leisureandculturedundee.com
Virtual Gallery: Lamb Collection | Leisure & Culture Dundee
www.leisureandculturedundee.com
Virtual Gallery: New Bridge 1887 | Leisure & Culture Dundee
www.leisureandculturedundee.com
Plainly evident in several photos of the original bridge are the 12 brick piers closest to the south/Fife bank of the Tay. As detailed by @DerekC above in post #35, prior to the discovery that the riverbed wasn't quite as 'rock' and 'solid' as the initial surveys had suggested, the original plan to have brick piers from end to end was scrapped in favour of the cast iron colunms. Image that best illustrates this is attached below:
Really emphasises the slap-dash, cost-cutting nature of the entire project and the disaster really was a case of when, not if when taking all contributing factors into consideration.
Quite the storied history to say the least. A few more tidbits:
She ended up being the last of her small class (6 locos total, two 224s and four 420s) to be withdrawn in 1919, nearly 40 years after the disaster (she was about 8 years old in December 1879). As such, they were the only class of NBR 4-4-0s not to make it to the Grouping in 1923.
Last I remember, the numberplate for 224's tender survives at a museum in, of all places, Selkirk.
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