However, three key issues have been identified for urgent resolution:
1. The organisation is imbalanced and too big in some functions. Delivery teams lack the resources they need, while the corporate centre has grown excessively.
2. There are critical capability gaps in commercial, technical, assurance, control and finance functions.
3. There is too little focus on the end railway - on delivering and operating the system for passengers, rather than managing the construction programme.
In addition to these capacity and capability gaps, there are some cultural issues that run deep. The organisation is too bureaucratic, process-driven, and risk-averse. It does not operate like an expert builder of a railway. There is a lack of accountability, with individuals feeling disempowered to make decisions or drive change. Over the coming months, building on steps taken over the last year and a half, HS2 Ltd must become a lean, expert delivery organisation, focused on performance, outcomes, and cost discipline. Crucially, the cost of running the organisation must be reduced. Leadership in the Integrated Project Teams must be strengthened, and the organisation must be reshaped to put delivery first.
We will develop the optimal operating configurations for HS2. It is my assessment that there is a need to simplify the day one railway, and I am looking at all available levers (e.g. opening at slightly reduced running speeds, removing automatic train operation) while protecting the long term agility to deliver the full benefits. This staged approach will reduce risk, improve reliability, allow for more certainty around cost, reduce the delay to the railway’s opening and enable incremental build-up of the service.
That's mental. Who thought that was a good idea? So much of it has been reinventing the wheel and then being surprised it costs a fortuneHS2 has designed a railway with very tight integration between the trains and signalling system.
See the previous example of the automated stop only allowing the train to stop in specified locations, as well as the train's ventilation system altering mode through the journey. That latter one is caused by the tunnels being too small to meet air quality standards if the train ventilation system is allowed to run continuously. The trains "overventilate" before entering the tunnels to reduce the carbon dioxide concentration in the train, before largely recirculating air during the journey through.
I would expect extensive testing of all this equipment and its interactions.
If in eight years they can't deliver 300kmh from the outset there is no point carrying on.So delivering a reduced spec line initially, while retaining eventual full scope capability.
Essentially starting to eat the elephant.
That assumes that the project fails and is cancelled before the whole set of small projects are done? What if it is completed, imagine the positive. It looks to me as they have managed the overall scheme to have no connection orphaned by later work, but the segments are 100mi, not your favoured 50mi. Splitting hairs?The government ends up with considerably less tonnage of white elephant though, because they are free to abort the programme after any one of those phases.
I realise it's a few months old, but I'm surprised the civils are only a third complete when many of the big ticket items (the tunnels and Colne Valley Viaduct) seem to be nearly complete. I wonder if the smaller items are much further behind?My Reading of Mark Wilds letter, and Heidi Alexander's statement (link)
That still doesnt solve the Coventry corridor or Colwich though, what capacity does that release until you build something else?A 50 mile "bypass" segment alongside the southern WCML (possibly higher speed, but not necessarily do) would have been much better way to start IMO.
Then we could have separately considered the best way to increase capacity at Euston/Birmingham/Colwich/Manchester to enable new services.
Then one day maybe we could have joined everything up, but we wouldn't have relied on it.
My Reading of Mark Wilds letter, and Heidi Alexander's statement (link)
![]()
Resetting the High Speed Two (HS2) programme
A statement outlining the future of High Speed Two (HS2), including new management and a bold reset plan.www.gov.uk
Is that the cancelled parts need to be reinstated (but only once they have got to grip with issuing new contracts that are more risk and incentivised, rather than cost plus approach that has failed). Reading between lines there are hints either going to spend a fortune to bodge it into existing lines (and phase1 won't really be properly utilised)or going to have to do add on bits (but not in same uncontrolled cost style).
My own thought is the next stages report (due in Autumn) will be looking at optimal outcomes of moving forward, not just minimising cost and wasting huge amounts by having mismatch between high spec phase 1 and an inadequate what happens north of Birmingham.
That sounds almost unbelievable - and is probably on a par with the logic behind the "bat-cave" tunnel entrance. You give contractors (and designers with no rail or building design or environment experience whatsoever) a "cost-plus" contract and then wonder why everything is gold-plated! I would love to see the justification for this design criterion. Might it be in the public domain? I would hope that the individuals or committee who signed it off would be chased personally for the wasted millions of pounds it must have cost too......the train's ventilation system altering mode through the journey. That latter one is caused by the tunnels being too small to meet air quality standards if the train ventilation system is allowed to run continuously. The trains "overventilate" before entering the tunnels to reduce the carbon dioxide concentration in the train, before largely recirculating air during the journey through.
I read the following on page 62 as the key reason for this disaster which will result in the very necessary big increase in railway capacity being delivered many years later and at vastly greater cost than could and should have been achieved.The Stewart review (Major Transport schemes, Governance and Assurance) is now published
131 pages so not going to quote it.
7.1 The culture of cost control and affordability
F36. A culture of driving down cost to manage affordability has been absent from the Programme.
Most people I have spoken to have blamed the original vision for HS2 and the resultant requirements and scope for the high costs. A railway that was originally intended to increase capacity became a vision to build the best and fastest highspeed railway in the world. This effectively ruled out the cost savings expected from utilising HS1 design, which was tried and tested, and a completely new design was required.
It always struck me as unnecessary to build it for speeds above 300 or 320kmh. The very early drawings I saw seemed to be for a 400kmh alignment, which I suppose is ok in itself as future proofing, but I would have actually built for 320.I read the following on page 62 as the key reason for this disaster which will result in the very necessary big increase in railway capacity being delivered many years later and at vastly greater cost than could and should have been achieved.
It always struck me as unnecessary to build it for speeds above 300 or 320kmh. The very early drawings I saw seemed to be for a 400kmh alignment, which I suppose is ok in itself as future proofing, but I would have actually built for 320.
Would be interesting to know if the 360kmh speed was truly a cost driver or if it was the wider culture of gold plating and attempting to reinvent the wheel at every possible opportunity.It always struck me as unnecessary to build it for speeds above 300 or 320kmh. The very early drawings I saw seemed to be for a 400kmh alignment, which I suppose is ok in itself as future proofing, but I would have actually built for 320.
This, the project was both unambitious and over ambitious at the same time!Given HS2's track record, there's no guarantee spending more money would actually deliver the project faster. It might just waste money faster....
In my cynical (and uninformed) opinion, HS2 Ltd has saught to make the whole project "too big to fail" from the start. Governments should have insisted on a phased approach which may have allowed lessons to be learnt along the way. We now risk having a white-elephant, delivered years late and many times over budget, which in turn destroys the case for any future investment in high-speed rail.
See above point, for a fraction of the money spent we could have increased the domestic capability to actually design and build infrastructure before actually going away and practicing building lines/systems. The whole point about technology is that it's essentially magic, it's not about making trade offs. Our fundamental issue is that we must be governed by lawyers advised by economists both backwards looking profession with low or no tolerance for uncertainty.With the amount of time & money spent it would have been better to increase the frequency of the current services & electrify other lines. HS2 at this rate is nothing more than a rather expensive shuttle service
Sadly pointing to the low impact that HS1 has had on the environment did not persuade the NIMBYs on HS2!The opening project should have been something smaller and cheaper that was explicitly there to build competence in the organisation/industry and was not expected to pass a cost benefit analysis on it's own. It should have gone somewhere where NIMBYs were less organised maybe York - shin Middlesborough - shin Sunderland - Newcastle and it should have been built like Chinese/Japanese high speed rail mostly on a modularised concrete viaduct. This could have then been used to ally fears of visual intrusion and noise in other places. Then we go do something like Northern Powerhouse Rail in about half the time because we know what we are doing and we change planning law.
The opening project should have been something smaller and cheaper that was explicitly there to build competence in the organisation/industry and was not expected to pass a cost benefit analysis on it's own. It should have gone somewhere where NIMBYs were less organised maybe York - shin Middlesborough - shin Sunderland - Newcastle and it should have been built like Chinese/Japanese high speed rail mostly on a modularised concrete viaduct.
I've added clarification to my earlier post, its not clear if it was actually adopted.That's mental. Who thought that was a good idea? So much of it has been reinventing the wheel and then being surprised it costs a fortune
Intervention shafts with emergency ventilation equipment are provided in the long tunnels, but there will be no pressure relief function since bypass shafts exhausting to atmosphere were predicted to exceed noise limits for the noise-sensitive areas in which most of the shafts are located. Furthermore, eliminating the bypass enabled cost savings by reducing the size of the shafts. Track isolation dampers will be closed during normal operation, and the shafts will have no influence on aerodynamics in the tunnels.
As noted above, it is not clear it was actually adopted.That sounds almost unbelievable - and is probably on a par with the logic behind the "bat-cave" tunnel entrance. You give contractors (and designers with no rail or building design or environment experience whatsoever) a "cost-plus" contract and then wonder why everything is gold-plated! I would love to see the justification for this design criterion. Might it be in the public domain? I would hope that the individuals or committee who signed it off would be chased personally for the wasted millions of pounds it must have cost too...
I would (from my professional experience in exactly this field) bet that there is no risk whatsoever that saloon CO2 levels could ever become unacceptable in an electric train running through a tunnel on an exclusively electric railway. It has never been mentioned to my knowledge in relation to Channel Tunnel trains, for example.
...Now if you were asking me about the acid gases (NOx and SOx) that passengers are subjected to in Standedge Tunnel I could easily make a case for it being closed to passenger trains immediately pending electrification...
Why? That means more cost and more visual impact.and it should have been built like Chinese/Japanese high speed rail mostly on a modularised concrete viaduct.
City centre approaches are an unavoidable scope item of HS2 - the whole point of HS2 was that existing city centre approaches are full. How do the Northolt tunnels compare in unit costs against Crossrail tunnels?
Yes slab tracks are more expensive than ballast tracks, but the Germans have built plenty of them and I'm willing to bet my house that their unit costs were nowhere near as high as HS2's.
I believe poor ground conditions and the depth of cuttings has meant more piling required. The NAO reported that the railway was lowered in response to complaints about possible noise levels as a result of using slab. There was discussion at a TSC session that the depth of piling was being gold-plated.
If there was capacity on the WCML for more services, HS2 wouldn't have been built. It'd likely cost billions, if not tens of billions to upgrade the WCML for an additional hourly path or two. HS2 construction has been an absolute mess but phase 1 is still going to create allow for somewhere around an additional 10tph. Further smaller and more manageable phases could do similar for other lines and cities.With the amount of time & money spent it would have been better to increase the frequency of the current services & electrify other lines. HS2 at this rate is nothing more than a rather expensive shuttle service
The Guadarrama tunnel in Spain is even longer yet is 0.5m narrower and doesn't, as far as I can tell, have any of this nonsense. They really do seem to have reinvented the wheelI've added clarification to my earlier post, its not clear if it was actually adopted.
It was on the list of things that HS2 said would be needed ot mitigate the long Chiltern tunnel in 2015, but its not in the issued train technical spec circa 2019. See my original post for clarification and link.
They may have got out of it.
However, the aerodynamic design of Chiltern tunnels also means all the tunnel ventilation shafts are closed with dampers in normal operation to prevent tunnel booms.
Where do they mention three years of testing? I couldn't see it in the statement or the letterThree years of testing seems quite an outlier, for what will be a very straightforward railway with no interfaces with anything else
Second page of Wild's letter, the second point of the schedule sectionWhere do they mention three years of testing? I couldn't see it in the statement or the letter