50 injured in German collision

zuriblue · 5 Dec 2017

Breaking news just coming in that German police are reporting that 50 people have been injured in a collision between a passenger train and a goods train in Meerbusch, Nordrhein-Westfalen.

The train involved is a RE7 operated by National Express Germany and is a Bombardier Talent 2 EMU.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42246087

More than 40 people have been injured in a train crash near the German city of Düsseldorf, emergency services say.

A passenger train collided with a freight train near the town of Meerbusch, in North Rhine-Westphalia, on Tuesday night.

Of 173 people on board, seven people were badly injured and one suffered serious injuries, the Meerbusch fire department said.

Another 33 people had minor injuries and 132 were unhurt, it added.

The fire department's operation finished at around 02:20 (00:20 GMT).

All passengers had left the train in a rescue operation that at its peak involved 400 people, it said.

Casualty estimates escalated rapidly overnight from an early figure of about five people....

RailUK Forums

Groningen · 5 Dec 2017

On the left you can just see the freighttrain. Looks some kind of coaltrain. The accident happened around 19.30.

duesselmartin · 5 Dec 2017

Iron ore to Dillingen I believe.
Current update 41 light injuries, 3 serious.
One wonders how the passenger train can enter an occupied block.

Bletchleyite · 5 Dec 2017

Quite, it's a mainline so surely Indusi/PZB (similar to TPWS but with fewer overrides and direct speed control) would have kicked in if it was a SPAD.

MarkyT · 5 Dec 2017

Bletchleyite said:
Quite, it's a mainline so surely Indusi/PZB (similar to TPWS but with fewer overrides and direct speed control) would have kicked in if it was a SPAD.

Perhaps another Ersatz signal incident? Or an incorrect axle counter reset?

Bletchleyite · 5 Dec 2017

MarkyT said:
Perhaps another Ersatz signal incident? Or an incorrect axle counter reset?

If it is another Ersatzsignal issue, they really do need to look at abolishing what is a really, really dangerous concept.

IanXC · 5 Dec 2017

MarkyT said:
Perhaps another Ersatz signal incident?

Can someone enlighten me as to what one of these is?

Simon11 · 5 Dec 2017

Has a National Express train ever crashed before (i.e. in the UK?)

fowler9 · 5 Dec 2017

IanXC said:
Can someone enlighten me as to what one of these is?

Ersatz is normally an inferior replacement. I think it is a bit soon to be talking about that.

Bletchleyite · 5 Dec 2017

IanXC said:
Can someone enlighten me as to what one of these is?

In short it allows the signaller to override the interlock without any enforced (other than by human factors) checks and balances.

It displays a different signal to the driver which is not dissimilar in effect to an instruction to pass a signal at danger on a unidirectional line then drive on sight. Fine so far.

The problem occurs, and did the last time, when one is given on a bidirectional or single line. Two trains proceeding towards each other, only one of which knows to drive on sight.

It is incredibly dangerous.

MarkyT · 5 Dec 2017

The Zs1 Ersatzsignal or 'substitute signal' in Germany is a special aspect of three white lights or one flashing white that can be displayed at a main signal to keep trains moving without signallers having to talk to drivers in cases where equipment failure prevents the normal proceed aspects from displaying. The controversy is that in some installations Zs1 bypasses all interlocking controls including opposing route locking, so is totally reliant on the signaller following procedures correctly to ensure the line is clear. Past multi-fatality incidents at Bad Aibling (2016) and at Bruhl (2000) have been associated with misuse of this feature. The UK has comparatively recently introduced a similar PoSA (Proceed on Sight Authority) aspect, but in UK the speed authorised is more limited, and opposing route locking cannot be overridden to display this.

duesselmartin · 6 Dec 2017

Freight train was an empty iron ore from Dillingen (Saar) to Rotterdam.
Meerbusch Fire services say 43 were injured.

edwin_m · 6 Dec 2017

Bletchleyite said:
In short it allows the signaller to override the interlock without any enforced (other than by human factors) checks and balances.

It displays a different signal to the driver which is not dissimilar in effect to an instruction to pass a signal at danger on a unidirectional line then drive on sight. Fine so far.

The problem occurs, and did the last time, when one is given on a bidirectional or single line. Two trains proceeding towards each other, only one of which knows to drive on sight.

It is incredibly dangerous.

However from the photo this would appear to be a tail-ender on a multiple track, so the bidirectional issue is unlikely to be relevant.

Bletchleyite · 6 Dec 2017

edwin_m said:
However from the photo this would appear to be a tail-ender on a multiple track, so the bidirectional issue is unlikely to be relevant.

Yes, fair point, on a double track it's no different from manually cautioning a UK train past a signal at danger (or the new signal mentioned upthread).

daikilo · 6 Dec 2017

Article on BBC website includes 2 other photos including one (AFP) from above showing 2 freight wagons completely off the track. Unless that happened before the crash, it must have been quite some wack.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42246087
I also note that the Talent cab seems reasonably intact but the car body has bent vertically behind the lead bogie.

LAX54 · 6 Dec 2017

There is a big gap between the front and rear of coal train, possibly derailed, 3 went towards the bank and the passenger train hit the 3 that were off the road, severity of the damage of course all depends on the speed of the impact, I have seen written that is shows how strong new units are, but if that happened at a very low speed, then that would not be true, however if it were 25 / 30 mph that's a different story

Bletchleyite · 6 Dec 2017

One thing that is near unavoidable is that the new generation low floor Euro EMUs won't be as strong as a British small loading gauge, high floor unit simply because the "bog roll tube" is larger. (Try it with rolled up A4).

Groningen · 6 Dec 2017

The second and third last wagons/cars have derailed. There is an areal picture from the Rheinische Post. The cars were empty!

mallard · 6 Dec 2017

Bletchleyite said:
One thing that is near unavoidable is that the new generation low floor Euro EMUs won't be as strong as a British small loading gauge, high floor unit simply because the "bog roll tube" is larger. (Try it with rolled up A4).

While that's true if all other factors are equal, the other factors aren't equal... Trains are built to meet specified strength standards, so the British loading gauge train could be built with lighter materials, less reinforcement, etc. and still reach the same crashworthiness standard.

Groningen · 6 Dec 2017

If those cars were full than the resistance was like driving your car against a concrete wall.

edwin_m · 6 Dec 2017

Looks to me as if the train struck the last wagon, which is still on the track in front of it, and this caused the two wagons in front of it to jackknife. The photos confirm the freight train is empty as someone suggested upthread, which would make it more likely that the wagons would lift off the rails allowing them to then move sideways. I'd say this impact was at quite a speed.

MarkyT · 6 Dec 2017

edwin_m said:
However from the photo this would appear to be a tail-ender on a multiple track, so the bidirectional issue is unlikely to be relevant.

The meaning of the Zs1 signal also leads to risk. Our UK PoSA, the only failure condition type of aspect permitted here, means 'proceed on sight', i.e. at a speed able to stop at any any unknown obstructions encountered within sighting distance. The Zs1 imposes no such caution however, only a 40kph restriction through the 'points zone', thence allowing unlimited line speed beyond to the next signal once on plain track, with no expectation to look out for any obstructions. There IS a German PoSA equivalent however, Zs7, using three small yellow lights in a delta arrangement similar to the Zs1, but inverted. After Bad Aibling I remember comments that Zs7 is preferred for newer installations, but there are no doubt very many historic Zs1s still out there, some as at Bad Aibling with no interlocking controls whatsoever. In passing a Zs1 the procedures mandate the complete bypassing of the Indusi trainstop feature, so although that PZB system is very good in normal operation it provides no mitigation whatsoever in the event of a signaller error relating to use of Zs1.

The following is instructive:
http://www.drivehq.com/file/df.aspx/publish/railreports/intranet/_pdf/deu_signale.pdf

Bletchleyite · 6 Dec 2017

Regardless of whether it is the cause in this case, whoever designed that has blood on their hands. The danger it poses is grave and obvious.

It needs to be immediately withdrawn from use on bidirectional track and changed to mean drive on sight otherwise.

MarkyT · 6 Dec 2017

Bletchleyite said:
Regardless of whether it is the cause in this case, whoever designed that has blood on their hands. The danger it poses is grave and obvious.

It needs to be immediately withdrawn from use on bidirectional track and changed to mean drive on sight otherwise.

I just read in another discussion forum that the Zs1 signal was first introduced in the 1930s, when I speculate relative priorities for passenger safety versus keeping trains (and the supplies and troops they were carrying) moving were rather different! Use of Zs1 increments a counter on the control panel which generates a unique 'release number' that must be recorded in an occurrences book apparently.

Bletchleyite · 6 Dec 2017

MarkyT said:
I just read in another discussion forum that the Zs1 signal was first introduced in the 1930s, when I speculate relative priorities for passenger safety versus keeping trains (and the supplies and troops they were carrying) moving were rather different! Use of Zs1 increments a counter on the control panel which generates a unique 'release number' that must be recorded in an occurrences book apparently.

Recording something in a book doesn't stop human error, of course. That's why it is so dangerous. It allows one human to override a safety system, thus making that safety system utterly worthless. Telling someone off afterwards for using it when they shouldn't doesn't bring people back to life.

OK, if introduced in the 1930s I can see why it was. But the mind boggles as to why it is allowed to continue in use when it has been the direct cause of a number of deaths and there is a simple change to it (a requirement to drive on sight, at a maximum of 40km/h until the next correct signal, and removal from single lines) that could be introduced near overnight.

duesselmartin · 6 Dec 2017

So the new KS Signals have something similar to Zs1 with similar weakness?
I agree that Zs1 really had its day and with old signal systems failures it seems to be used too often just to keep the system running.

Bletchleyite · 6 Dec 2017

duesselmartin said:
So the new KS Signals have something similar to Zs1 with similar weakness?

They have two major differences that make them much safer;
1. They cannot override the interlocking on a single or bidirectional line, therefore a train cannot be signalled onto a line in such a way that they would be running towards another train that would be running at linespeed completely unaware of their presence.
2. The driver must run "on sight" and under 25mph until the next correct signal.

(1) would have prevented the Meridian collision. (2) would prevent (to negligible levels) a rear ending on a double track.

EAD · 6 Dec 2017

I have sat this out so far as I knew we would dive into the practice of Zs signals versus the UK.

However a couple of factual points here - Zs1 is limited to 40Km/h until the next signal if it is a block signal as here - the in point area only applies to Ausfahrsignale (exit signals) as in German practice of speed signalling that is the standard over points in a station area. It originally replaced written orders Befehl (Befehl A - hence the white triangle). Orders are still regularly given by signallers given use of GSM-R (replacing Bahnfunk). As has been touched on it is only to be given if the defect preventing a route being set is located and procedures (yes relying on a human) followed. It dates from a time when you could visibly see the area under control, hence shift to Zs7 as that changes to centralised control. Re PZB - you have to pull the Befehl button as you pass the signal at danger as this prevents the emergency break. From memory (admit I need to check) that this restricts you to 40Km/h.

It is all speculative here given it was on a standard double track mainline and one train has run into the back of another - a scenario that should never occur. The investigating authority has already confirmed the Regional Express run by NX should not have been there (which is of course obvious). So the question here is what happened to lead the passenger train to continue and how fast - eye witnesses from on board say it stopped (at the signal before one assumes) and then continued wit driver having announced the section in front was occupied, then braked sharply no doubt when the freight in front came into view. One point here - if it is a simple block signal (not red and white plate but yellow and white) then there is a procedure to pass on sight.

Anyhow let us see how the facts emerge. Thankfully the freight was empties.

Groningen · 6 Dec 2017

Yesterday they (the media) said that the passengertrain was not allowed to be there and that the freighttrain had a valid reason to be there. I see a passengertrain at Meerbusch-Osterath at 19.12. Maybe this train was delayed?! Now they think that the passengertrain had to be on the other track and that the traindriver is not to blaim. In the article i get my information from is very technical about signals and those kind of things! Shortly before the accident something went wrong.

http://www.rp-online.de/nrw/staedte...ahrdienstleitung-verantwortlich-aid-1.7250001

MarkyT · 6 Dec 2017

Groningen said:
http://www.rp-online.de/nrw/staedte...ahrdienstleitung-verantwortlich-aid-1.7250001

A Google translation of part of the article above:

From an internal protocol of the dispatching service, which is available to our editors, it appears that shortly before the accident at 19:27 for the track section an initial report on a so-called red illumination has been received. This means that the track is busy and the dispatcher has to do a so-called eviction check. "The service then usually arranges 'driving on sight'," the insider said. That does not seem to have happened. "Instead, the dispatcher could have completed an eviction check on the wrong train.

Well-informed railway circles said it with reference to the previous investigation, that the train driver probably therefore no guilt. "He seems to have been fatally ordered to drive into the occupied section where the goods train was," the insider explained.

So looks like the passenger driver was given an incorrect authority to move, perhaps (my speculation) by means of a Zs1.

50 injured in German collision

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