Central European History post World War 2

[mikeg]

I think you mean Communist. There has never been a socialist state. Plenty of states have said they are socialist, but none have actually achieved it.

No, real existing socialist was what was presumably meant. Socialism in the Marxist sense was a stepping stone towards communism rather than an end in itself. It was hypothesised that this would be temporary and that eventually the state and monetary economy could be done away with,then there could be communism. It was this that was never achieved.
Of course this differs greatly from the socialism of for example the Labour party, where a socialist economy within parliamentary structures is an end in itself.

 

[TheEdge]

For many practical purposes, after WW2, countries such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc. were effectively Russian colonies, with no rights to independent policies .

Bar of course Yugoslavia, the little non Soviet state that could.

 

[mikeg]

For many practical purposes, after WW2, countries such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc. were effectively Russian colonies, with no rights to independent policies .

Not strictly true. Romania in particular was wayward, often sticking it to the USSR especially in terms of foreign policy whilst still very much being part of the Eastern bloc. for example they joined the IMF and GATT. Also Romania tended to side and trade more with Israel in the middle East whereas the others favoured the Arab Republics. Hungary was famously that little more liberal on certain internal matters, particularly re culture (western music was widely available in many Eastern bloc countries that was banned in the USSR, for example* and the popular Hungarian band 'Omega' was forbidden in the USSR too). With the exception of Romania foreign policy saw the most alignment, to a lesser extent economic policy too, but on domestic matters the eastern bloc countries did indeed perdue their own policies to fit with their national characters.

* In Hungary moreso, to a good extent in Bulgaria too. Also worthy of honourable mention is the east German pressing of Dark Side of the Moon. It's taken from the quadraphonic studio master rather than the stereo one:. They pressed the quad album for sale in 'Intershops', the stereo version was available in local currency in normal record shops but was too taken from this quad master. Therefore it remains a curiosity among record collectors.

 

[LSWR Cavalier]

For many practical purposes, after WW2, countries such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc. were effectively Russian colonies, with no rights to independent policies .

Jein, yes and no. The DDR and the BRD at least had a lot to do with each other, so that the railway systems could grow together quite easily after 1989. I guess they cooperated as much as they could get away with.

The railway was significant from 1989, there are pictures of people being stuffed into trains at Dresden Hauptbahnhof, to travel via Czechia to Hamburg (?), maybe in 65 hours, not 65 years.
..
As for learning about recent history: The Times is the first draft of history, but an agreed draft takes longer. Not many people learn about ww2 from their grandparents now, time for another draft?

Gave up history at school, I became very interested in it later, is that typical?

 

[daodao]

My understanding is that when the USSR was set up and the borders between Russia and other constituent republics were (eventually) settled, the areas put in the non-Russian republics were (for both political and administrative reasons) treated somewhat expansively. Given that the non-Russian republics were to be officially bilingual in Russian and the local language, and that in many cases there wasn't a sudden switch of language communities at one point on the map (ie there was likely to be a gradual transition from majority-other-language areas to majority-Russian-language areas) then the border was drawn so that most of the minority language speakers were inside the "other" republic, even though that meant including areas which were majority Russian speaking. This meant that almost everyone had their own language as the official language or one of the official languages of the administrative area they lived in, and avoided needing significant bilingual local government within Russia itself. So when the USSR split up, some of the seceding republics ended up including areas which were outside their "traditional" or "historical" boundaries, with lots of Russian speakers inside the new countries. (In the case of Crimea, this was moved from being in the Russian Soviet Republic to being in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic only after the second World war - it wasn't historically part of Ukraine; this puts an interesting spin on its [re-]incorporation into Russia in recent years.)

I accept, of course, that the situation isn't the same for all former Soviet republics; what I've set out here is only part of the story.

The lack of recognition by the EU that the Ukraine (also known as Little Russia) is part of Russia's "near abroad" has been a disaster. EU support of the coup in Kiev in February 2014 resonated with the "Drive to the East" of previous German administrations. It destabilised these borderlands and the result has been war in the Russian-speaking Donbass and Russian re-occupation of Crimea (which has the support of most of its local population).

 

[Cloud Strife]

Then, of course, there is the (almost) unprecedented voluntary withdrawal from Austria by the Soviets in 1955. Moscow certainly seemed to view Austria surprisingly and unchararcteristically less brutally compared to anywhere else - certainly compared to the defeated Germany.

Actually, there is one interesting comparison - Finland. Despite the events of WW2, the Soviet Union let Finland keep a neutral (but Western) outlook. Finland's 'neutral' stance was always questionable, and it's come out now that there was significant amounts of quiet cooperation with NATO going on, especially in the 1970s. What is even stranger is that the Soviets won control of the Porkkala Naval Base, yet they renounced the use of it in 1956. The Porkkala territory was close to Helsinki, and I don't think it's ever been adequately explained why the Soviets willingly gave up control of the area early.

Finland was pragmatic in her dealings with the Soviet Union, and it even spawned the word Finlandization - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization

Cold War Finland was quite a strange place in general though. President Kekkonen in particular was remarkably skilled at balancing both the Soviet Union and the West, yet he always maintained a healthy distance from the Soviet Union.

 

[etr221]

Then, of course, there is the (almost) unprecedented voluntary withdrawal from Austria by the Soviets in 1955. Moscow certainly seemed to view Austria surprisingly and unchararcteristically less brutally compared to anywhere else - certainly compared to the defeated Germany.

Actually, there is one interesting comparison - Finland. Despite the events of WW2, the Soviet Union let Finland keep a neutral (but Western) outlook. Finland's 'neutral' stance was always questionable, and it's come out now that there was significant amounts of quiet cooperation with NATO going on, especially in the 1970s. What is even stranger is that the Soviets won control of the Porkkala Naval Base, yet they renounced the use of it in 1956. The Porkkala territory was close to Helsinki, and I don't think it's ever been adequately explained why the Soviets willingly gave up control of the area early.

Finland was pragmatic in her dealings with the Soviet Union, and it even spawned the word Finlandization - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization

Cold War Finland was quite a strange place in general though. President Kekkonen in particular was remarkably skilled at balancing both the Soviet Union and the West, yet he always maintained a healthy distance from the Soviet Union.

My understanding is that, at some point in the 1950s, the Soviets indicated that an 'Austrian' future - i.e. as a neutral, non-aligned and largely disarmed state, without foreign troops or bases - would be an acceptable basis for a peace treaty with Germany. But this was not accepted by the west. And it would be interesting to work out what how the 'Common Market' (ECSC, EEC, etc.) might have developed if it had come to pass.

The lack of recognition by the EU that the Ukraine (also known as Little Russia) is part of Russia's "near abroad" has been a disaster. EU support of the coup in Kiev in February 2014 resonated with the "Drive to the East" of previous German administrations. It destabilised these borderlands and the result has been war in the Russian-speaking Donbass and Russian re-occupation of Crimea (which has the support of most of its local population).

The Russian concept of the 'near abroad' - a sphere of interest that they should dominate - is perhaps one of the great obstacles to peace.

Perhaps the greatest equivalent further west is the British attitude to Ireland: but with the differences that we Brits have (largely) accepted Ireland's right to go its own way, and the lack of an alternative power adjacent to Ireland, whose sphere we have a desire or need to keep Ireland out of.

 

[52290]

One of the (for me) great advantages of being a railway/steam - photographer/enthusiast back at the end of steam in the UK and taking up the quest of chasing steam on the European continent is that it took one to places few others travelled.

Thus it was that I ventured to Nieder Osterreich in 1972-3. It was certainly a long time after Bryan Morgan, of that there is no doubt, but - and I hope I am not allowing historical knowledge gained later to cloud my memories - but even in 1973, that is 18 years after the Soviet withdrawal from the region north of Vienna, one could still feel the presence of this occupation.

The country people were also amazingly friendly: I would be walking down a road into a village after trying to photograph an OBB 2-8-2T (was it the 91 class? Or 93?) on some vague branch line working and some 55-year old local would spend 2 minutes asking who the heck I was before inviting me in for coffee or Spritze - and maybe a sandwich or lunch.

I am sure that today, these areas are mostly absorbed by the Vienna agglomeration and have become immune to the odd stranger, but back then, they retained their provincial roots, and a foreigner wandering into their midst was, once 'cleared' as ok, was very much welcomed.

One of the (for me) great advantages of being a railway/steam - photographer/enthusiast back at the end of steam in the UK and taking up the quest of chasing steam on the European continent is that it took one to places few others travelled.

Thus it was that I ventured to Nieder Osterreich in 1972-3. It was certainly a long time after Bryan Morgan, of that there is no doubt, but - and I hope I am not allowing historical knowledge gained later to cloud my memories - but even in 1973, that is 18 years after the Soviet withdrawal from the region north of Vienna, one could still feel the presence of this occupation.

The country people were also amazingly friendly: I would be walking down a road into a village after trying to photograph an OBB 2-8-2T (was it the 91 class? Or 93?) on some vague branch line working and some 55-year old local would spend 2 minutes asking who the heck I was before inviting me in for coffee or Spritze - and maybe a sandwich or lunch.

I am sure that today, these areas are mostly absorbed by the Vienna agglomeration and have become immune to the odd stranger, but back then, they retained their provincial roots, and a foreigner wandering into their midst was, once 'cleared' as ok, was very much welcomed.

The 93's were the large 2-8-2 tanks and were quite common on non-electrified secondary lines. The 91's were ancient 2-6-0 tanks which by 1970 when I took this photo were confined to the Neuberg branch because of their light weight.

 

[Calthrop]

The 93's were the large 2-8-2 tanks and were quite common on non-electrified secondary lines. The 91's were ancient 2-6-0 tanks which by 1970 when I took this photo were confined to the Neuberg branch because of their light weight.

With feeling here, of "permission / indulgence" for a bit of what an associate of ours calls "spottery wibble" (as opposed to serious socio-political analysis): fairly closely north-north-east of Vienna -- featuring indeed in strength until late in Austria's steam era, the class 93 2-8-2Ts -- was a wonderful secondary-line system. My only first-hand experience of it was an unforgettable day in summer 1970: for me, utter delight. About the same time as @70014IronDuke's time spent on it: the late lamented Continental Railway Journal wrote of it: "The whole dense network of lightly-trafficked railways in these thinly-populated regions is well worth a visit for its unique branch-line atmosphere. Many trains are mixed, and consist of perhaps two four-wheeled coaches followed by any number of wagons; the schedules are very slow, but often not slow enough to allow for the protracted shunting at wayside stations which gives passengers (never, it seems, more than a handful) rides over quite long sidings, and ample opportunity for photography. The network would probably not survive five minutes if Austria were ever to appoint a Beeching."

The above-prophesied horrid fate came to be at last, in the late 1980s (a long time after the end of steam) -- though with some parts of the system surviving -- including for passenger traffic; to the best of my knowledge, some still active at the present day.

 

[Caboose Class]

Central European History post World War 2​

In WW2 the city of Königsberg (which had been a German city since the 13th Century) was heavily damaged by a British bombing attack in 1944, followed by a massive Soviet siege in the Spring of 1945. At the end of World War II in 1945, the city became part of the Soviet Union (as part of the Russian SFSR) as part of the second "sell out" (after the first 1945 Yalta Conference sell out) by the West, this time at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) when "the Conference agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier". U.S. President Harry Truman and the British PM Clement Attlee declared that they would support the proposal of the Conference. Uncle Joe fully realised at the time that Königsberg / Kaliningrad would make a splendid place for him to build a base for a "Baltic Fleet" (which he did) and so today we have this Russian enclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania (both now EU member states) which is 800 miles distant from Москва.

 

[AlbertBeale]

Central European History post World War 2​

In WW2 the city of Königsberg (which had been a German city since the 13th Century) was heavily damaged by a British bombing attack in 1944, followed by a massive Soviet siege in the Spring of 1945. At the end of World War II in 1945, the city became part of the Soviet Union (as part of the Russian SFSR) as part of the second "sell out" (after the first 1945 Yalta Conference sell out) by the West, this time at the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) when "the Conference agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier". U.S. President Harry Truman and the British PM Clement Attlee declared that they would support the proposal of the Conference. Uncle Joe fully realised at the time that Königsberg / Kaliningrad would make a splendid place for him to build a base for a "Baltic Fleet" (which he did) and so today we have this Russian enclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania (both now EU member states) which is 800 miles distant from Москва.

The German area there (historically, East Prussia) didn't all become part of the Soviet Union after WW2 - the southern half was given to Poland, and only the northern half (which included Königsberg) passed to the SU (it's this part which is now a Russian exclave). (In fact there were bits that ended up as part of Lithuania, rather than Russia; there had already been some German areas that were passed over to Lithuania and to Poland at the end of WW1.) The division of the area between the SU and Poland was originally intended to be provisional, but became fixed.

 

[70014IronDuke]

Actually, there is one interesting comparison - Finland. Despite the events of WW2, the Soviet Union let Finland keep a neutral (but Western) outlook. Finland's 'neutral' stance was always questionable, and it's come out now that there was significant amounts of quiet cooperation with NATO going on, especially in the 1970s. What is even stranger is that the Soviets won control of the Porkkala Naval Base, yet they renounced the use of it in 1956. The Porkkala territory was close to Helsinki, and I don't think it's ever been adequately explained why the Soviets willingly gave up control of the area early.

The pull-out from Porkkala is interesting indeed. I shall ask a Finnish friend about this. Nonetheless, Uncle Joe still kept chunks of Finland post WW2 beyond what he'd already taken in the "Winter War" - and forcibly deported the Finnish population (or at least some) to other parts of the USSR.

This is one of the problems of the Russian concept of "near abroad" - it always seems to creep further and further away. Like, how "near" is Vladivostok to Moscow?

 

[Caboose Class]

The pull-out from Porkkala is interesting indeed. I shall ask a Finnish friend about this. Nonetheless, Uncle Joe still kept chunks of Finland post WW2 beyond what he'd already taken in the "Winter War" - and forcibly deported the Finnish population (or at least some) to other parts of the USSR.

Porkkala Naval Base was a Soviet naval base (some 20 miles west of Helsinki) which was operational from 1944–1956. At the end of WW2, the Soviet Union secured the rights of lease to a naval base at Porkkala in accordance with the Moscow Armistice agreement (signed between Finland, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) that ended the Continuation War between Finland and the Soviets on 19 September 1944.

According to the Armistice, the area was leased to the Soviet Union for 50 years. On 10 February 1947, the Paris Peace Treaty reaffirmed the Soviet Union's right to occupy this area until 1994.

No Soviet civilian administration was ever set up, the USSR simply administered it through the military commander of Porkkala. While under Soviet control, Finnish passenger trains running between Helsinki and Turku were allowed to use the line through the area. However all train windows had to be closed with shutters, and photography was prohibited.

Although the Soviet lease for Porkkala had been conceded for 50 years, an agreement was reached to return it earlier. The agreement was signed on 19 September 1955, exactly 11 years after the Armistice, and control of the area was handed back to Finland on 26 January 1956. This may be attributed to the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, the conditions of which made the naval base unnecessary.

 

[eMeS]

After trade training in the UK at RAF Locking, I did my second year of National Service (August 1958-9) in West Germany at a signals unit based at RAF Scharfoldendorf ~20 miles from Hameln (Hamelin). Private travel around West Germany & other western countries was OK & several of us had cars, but we were not permitted to visit West Berlin because of the risk of being "lured" into East Berlin, and then used as a bargaining chip.

 

[70014IronDuke]

Bar of course Yugoslavia, the little non Soviet state that could.

If you'd hitch-hiked and walked more or less the entire length of Yugoslavia from the Greek border in the south-east to the Austrian border in the north-west (I did, more than once) I don't think you could call it a "little" state.

 

[AlbertBeale]

If you'd hitch-hiked and walked more or less the entire length of Yugoslavia from the Greek border in the south-east to the Austrian border in the north-west (I did, more than once) I don't think you could call it a "little" state.

Indeed - I spent part of several summers in the Balkans (many years ago), and there was so much of Yugoslavia (and it was so interesting) that for me Yugoslavia almost was the Balkans.

 

[TheEdge]

If you'd hitch-hiked and walked more or less the entire length of Yugoslavia from the Greek border in the south-east to the Austrian border in the north-west (I did, more than once) I don't think you could call it a "little" state.

Compared to the USSR? It was more a pun on "The Little Engine That Could" book. I'm aware it was a large state as the Baltic States go.

 

[70014IronDuke]

Compared to the USSR? It was more a pun on "The Little Engine That Could" book. I'm aware it was a large state as the Baltic States go.

Well, ok. But Germany is a 'little state' in that context!

 

[TheEdge]

Well, ok. But Germany is a 'little state' in that context!

Yea but for the most part it managed to operate independently of the USSR and Warsaw Pact after the Stalin - Tito split. Something with Germany very much didn't do.

 

[Bevan Price]

Not strictly true. Romania in particular was wayward, often sticking it to the USSR especially in terms of foreign policy whilst still very much being part of the Eastern bloc. for example they joined the IMF and GATT. Also Romania tended to side and trade more with Israel in the middle East whereas the others favoured the Arab Republics. Hungary was famously that little more liberal on certain internal matters, particularly re culture (western music was widely available in many Eastern bloc countries that was banned in the USSR, for example* and the popular Hungarian band 'Omega' was forbidden in the USSR too). With the exception of Romania foreign policy saw the most alignment, to a lesser extent economic policy too, but on domestic matters the eastern bloc countries did indeed perdue their own policies to fit with their national characters.

* In Hungary moreso, to a good extent in Bulgaria too. Also worthy of honourable mention is the east German pressing of Dark Side of the Moon. It's taken from the quadraphonic studio master rather than the stereo one:. They pressed the quad album for sale in 'Intershops', the stereo version was available in local currency in normal record shops but was too taken from this quad master. Therefore it remains a curiosity among record collectors.

Yes, but, in particular, Romania and Yugoslavia (under Tito) had nasty regimes that ruthlessly supressed any attempts to seek changes to the basically communist system. Attempts to stray too far from regulation communist doctrine tended to be squashed by Russian military agression. e.g. Hungary, 1956 (leader Mr Nagy was "murdered" on behalf of Russia), and Czechoslovakia (1968/69, leader Mr Dubcek survived but was exiled.)

 

[Ediswan]

Yea but for the most part it managed to operate independently of the USSR and Warsaw Pact after the Stalin - Tito split. Something with Germany very much didn't do.

Yugoslavia was a founder member of the 'non-aligned' movement. In the 1970s we were on a family holiday in Bled when the 'heads of' arrived for a meeting in Tito's palace. Apart from a few somewhat more posh than usual cars moving around, you would barely have noticed.

 

[Cloud Strife]

Yes, but, in particular, Romania and Yugoslavia (under Tito) had nasty regimes that ruthlessly supressed any attempts to seek changes to the basically communist system. Attempts to stray too far from regulation communist doctrine tended to be squashed by Russian military agression. e.g. Hungary, 1956 (leader Mr Nagy was "murdered" on behalf of Russia), and Czechoslovakia (1968/69, leader Mr Dubcek survived but was exiled.)

I wouldn't say ruthless when it came to Yugoslavia after the decisive break with Moscow. There was plenty of internal debate, and Yugoslavia after the early 50s wasn't really an oppressive regime. There was plenty of room for discussion and debate, and most people did accept Tito for his immense achievements during WW2 and afterwards. The one thing that they really didn't tolerate was nationalism - but given what happened before and during WW2, it's understandable. There was also an understanding among the Yugoslav people that the pre-war nationalist politics had led the country into ruin, so Titoism was far preferable. It's worth pointing out that not all nationalism was crushed as well - the Bosniaks (or as they were called then - Muslims by nationality) were able to get recognition as a separate ethnic group, for instance.

If you look at the political trials in socialist Yugoslavia, they were almost always connected to people promoting nationalist causes, or in some cases, promoting hardline Marxism-Leninism or Soviet agendas. The one genuine black mark on Yugoslavia's record after the early 50s was the role of the UDBA, which was assassinating people abroad for trying to stir up opposition among emigre circles.

In general however, Yugoslavia wasn't a ruthless regime. Titoism wasn't an absolute orthodoxy in the sense of Stalinism, and Titoism explicitly accepted that socialism could be adapted according to local conditions. You could see this even within Yugoslavia - Slovenia was well run and wealthy, Kosovo was an absolute dive, all based on their domestic policies.

Yes, of course, it wasn't free compared to the standards of the West. But the government could be criticised, and censorship was not absolute. I'd say that all things considered, Titoism was the best of a very bad situation there. That's also why they clung to Titoism after his death, as it was really the only thing holding Yugoslavia together. The difference between Ljubljana and Pristina in the 1980s is just staggering, as Ljubjlana was clean and well organised, whereas Pristina was really not very pleasant at all, with a lot of money having been wasted on vanity projects.

Romania was far, far worse in comparison.

 

[oldman]

That's also why they clung to Titoism after his death, as it was really the only thing holding Yugoslavia together.

I don't recognise that. After Tito, 'Titoism' replaced a single authority figure who could crack heads together if he chose to with government by inter-republic committee. It totally failed to hold Yugoslavia together, with republics increasingly ignoring federal decisions, and growing grievance nationalism in Croatia and Serbia.

Slovenia was well run and wealthy, Kosovo was an absolute dive, all based on their domestic policies.

The enormous North-South divide, cultural and economic, pre-existed Yugoslavia and although there was post-war investment in basic infrastructure e.g. electricity supply, education and healthcare, attempts at levelling up were resisted in the North, often on nationalist lines - why should WE support THEM. Demographics was a amajor factor - massive population growth in the South outstripped any economic growth bureaucratic socialism could generate.

 

[70014IronDuke]

Jein, yes and no. The DDR and the BRD at least had a lot to do with each other, so that the railway systems could grow together quite easily after 1989. I guess they cooperated as much as they could get away with.

A lot changed between 1945 - 1990 in most of the countries of E Europe, and they were processes. In some cases laws/policies were changed or enacted, in other cases things drifted and laws became less applied. I think the reality was that by c 1970, almost nobody really believed in the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, and this included party members and leaders. Many pretended to, of course, and they needed to do so to maintain their positions, but they could plainly see the west was delivering more and better living standards.

This was why it all collapsed so quickly in 1988-91. Once the different national leaders realised that with Gorbachov in charge, the Red Army et al were no longer going to intervene, they had to do some quick thinking - do we maitain the repression ourselves (and risk being brought before a court if it all goes wrong for us in any new system) or do we try to keep what we can and release things slowly?

.....

Gave up history at school, I became very interested in it later, is that typical?

It was for me, and I'm sure it is for many. A bit like languages too, I suspect.

I remember going to a History Society meeting after school one day aged about 13. It was a talk entitled "The origins of WW1", given by a sixth former, IIRC. I mean, I was interested, but trying to understand Serbian national feelings in Bosnia and Austro-Hungarian policies from 1,500 miles and 50 years distant - never having been outside the UK - it was all a bit of a knowledge overload.

Once you go to Sarajevo, or understand, for example, how incredibly close Turkey* was (and still is) to that area, things start to fall into place better.

* Actually, despite travelling by train and hitch-hiking to Turkey a dozen times, this was only brought home to me c 2009 when I realised the travel time by air from Vienna was that much less to Istanbul than to London.

 

[etr221]

I don't recognise that. After Tito, 'Titoism' replaced a single authority figure who could crack heads together if he chose to with government by inter-republic committee. It totally failed to hold Yugoslavia together, with republics increasingly ignoring federal decisions, and growing grievance nationalism in Croatia and Serbia.


The enormous North-South divide, cultural and economic, pre-existed Yugoslavia and although there was post-war investment in basic infrastructure e.g. electricity supply, education and healthcare, attempts at levelling up were resisted in the North, often on nationalist lines - why should WE support THEM. Demographics was a amajor factor - massive population growth in the South outstripped any economic growth bureaucratic socialism could generate.

I remember going to a History Society meeting after school one day aged about 13. It was a talk entitled "The origins of WW1", given by a sixth former, IIRC. I mean, I was interested, but trying to understand Serbian national feelings in Bosnia and Austro-Hungarian policies from 1,500 miles and 50 years distant - never having been outside the UK - it was all a bit of a knowledge overload.

Once you go to Sarajevo, or understand, for example, how incredibly close Turkey* was (and still is) to that area, things start to fall into place better.

* Actually, despite travelling by train and hitch-hiking to Turkey a dozen times, this was only brought home to me c 2009 when I realised the travel time by air from Vienna was that much less to Istanbul than to London.

If I understand correctly (which I probably don't), the Serb-Croat border/divide goes back to the 4th century division of the Roman Empire into Eastern and Western halves.

Much of what became Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia) was part of the Ottoman Empire into the 19th century - a significant part until 1913.

A lot changed between 1945 - 1990 in most of the countries of E Europe, and they were processes. In some cases laws/policies were changed or enacted, in other cases things drifted and laws became less applied. I think the reality was that by c 1970, almost nobody really believed in the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, and this included party members and leaders. Many pretended to, of course, and they needed to do so to maintain their positions, but they could plainly see the west was delivering more and better living standards.

This was why it all collapsed so quickly in 1988-91. Once the different national leaders realised that with Gorbachov in charge, the Red Army et al were no longer going to intervene, they had to do some quick thinking - do we maitain the repression ourselves (and risk being brought before a court if it all goes wrong for us in any new system) or do we try to keep what we can and release things slowly?

One of the things leading to the breakdown of the Soviet bloc was the after effect of Chernobyl: which gave the various governments a lever against Moscow.

I think the country where the regime did try maintaining the repression (Rumania) didn't pay more than lipservice to a court, when it came to it, before finding a convenient wall...