niggill617@gma
Member
Thanks I will amend.
Statutory instrument 1798 , the text is clear "understand performance calculation"
The understanding of friction or rail adhesion is mu, a coefficient with no units of measurement.
your opinion with no real evidence, in my opinion. No point in protracted debate.Seeing as this is your favourite bit of paperwork ever I thought I'd better have a look at it.
"understand braking systems and performance calculation" in a section titled "In relation to trains, their composition and the technical requirements for traction units, wagons, coaches and other rolling stock". To me reading it and in conjunction with the other points of that section it's nothing to do with the maths of deceleration or any pure physics. It's about a working understand of different brake systems in use and understanding the different performance and behaviours of those systems.
Then the section about "basic principles of physics" and "forces at the wheel". You would no doubt claim I need to be able to understand the whole process and maths behind the wheels turning. I'd understand that as if I apply work to the wheels with adhesion I'll move. If I apply some sort of retardation to those wheels I slow down. And then the rails guide the flanges laterally to keep me upright. What more do I need?
I feel I should point out to you that the colloquial terms "should've" and "could've" are contractions of "should have" and "could have", not "should of" and "could of".The consist took about 31 seconds to slow by 11 mph with about 50 percent selected, it should of [sic] been about 12 seconds simple maths, not "feel the force force the Luke" (inertia). The dynamic brake masking performance; utter folly. I mean 8 carriages of unbraked mass. Could of [sic] been the worst disaster this side of Paddington. The driver was let down by non-compliance of Rail Authorities regards continuation training.
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Remember its knowledge not necessarily a procedure.
yes correct, should be lower case. the two forces being normal reaction and static frictional force. Understand forces at the wheel.
Thank you for being fair. Perhaps you could mark the rest of the forum, good luck.I feel I should point out to you that the colloquial terms "should've" and "could've" are contractions of "should have" and "could have", not "should of" and "could of".
In fairness, it's an easy misapprehension to acquire if you rely on the procedure of using the spelling that sounds 'right' rather than objective knowledge of this aspect of the English language.
Non-compliance regards General Professional Knowledge. No criticism of the driver, only the absence of continuation training. The fact you can do the rope calculation is General Professional Knowledge.Putting aside the Physics discussion for a moment is your case that the driver of the train concerned in the Salisbury Incident required different or additional training on what the brake application would have done in terms of slowing the unit?
Or is it a more general one that drivers are being insufficiently trained in the idea of "my train weighs about this much today when I put in X amount of brake I should slow down by about Y amount in Z seconds?"
The former seems a more pertinent issue and is already being discussed e.g. slow gentle vs emergency. The latter doesn't seem particularly pertinent to the discussion at hand (although I do accept that it is relevant in other accidents or near misses e.g. the Sleeper issue you have mentioned.) As other posters have mentioned as long as you have a good idea of what should occur the precise knowledge of why seems not particularly relevant.
To give an example when I descend on a static rope made to the relevant standard at work I know by the end of the descent my body mass will elongate it about 80cm for that particular length of rope in use. There is a relatively simple rule of thumb for knowing this which serves perfectly well for routine jobs. Can I do the full calculation, yes, but it isn't a necessity or going to cause me or others additional risk if I don't (and its not a requirement of the standards I work to.) It would seem to be the same case here, as long as a driver knows roughly how much they should slow by for a particular brake application and in what time where is the necessity of knowing how to calculate exactly why that occurs?
Putting aside the Physics discussion for a moment is your case that the driver of the train concerned in the Salisbury Incident required different or additional training on what the brake application would have done in terms of slowing the unit?
Or is it a more general one that drivers are being insufficiently trained in the idea of "my train weighs about this much today when I put in X amount of brake I should slow down by about Y amount in Z seconds?"
The former seems a more pertinent issue and is already being discussed e.g. slow gentle vs emergency. The latter doesn't seem particularly pertinent to the discussion at hand (although I do accept that it is relevant in other accidents or near misses e.g. the Sleeper issue you have mentioned.) As other posters have mentioned as long as you have a good idea of what should occur the precise knowledge of why seems not particularly relevant.
To give an example when I descend on a static rope made to the relevant standard at work I know by the end of the descent my body mass will elongate it about 80cm for that particular length of rope in use. There is a relatively simple rule of thumb for knowing this which serves perfectly well for routine jobs. Can I do the full calculation, yes, but it isn't a necessity or going to cause me or others additional risk if I don't (and its not a requirement of the standards I work to.) It would seem to be the same case here, as long as a driver knows roughly how much they should slow by for a particular brake application and in what time where is the necessity of knowing how to calculate exactly why that occurs?
your opinion with no real evidence, in my opinion. No point in protracted debate.
You reminded me that I alluded to this on this forum when the report came out: ( #397 )The Edinburgh sleeper service incident is a classic example amongst others. Running brake test what a farce; the brakes on 99.999999 % of stock are well maintained and designed by very talented people. The time when the brake test should count failed to yield.
For me, and I'm not any railway expert, I wonder about the process of the running brake test here.
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I wonder what the point of the running brake test is, if it's not able to ascertain that the brakes on the entire consist are working as they should, since clearly all it did here was to ascertain that the locomotive's brakes were working.
The report covers this in more detail in paragraphs 80 to 84, but doesn't really go on to say much more than this. Clearly the running brake test did not enable the driver to be sure that the brakes were operating effectively, to paraphrase the Rule Book slightly (paragraph 81).
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I'm just a little surprised that this point isn't made more significant in the report than it is.
I have engaged no end. Having spears thrown on grammar, and non-applicable measurement of fluid dynamics, well best not to engage, in the name of economy of effort.Ah yes, the ultimate answer when trying to discuss an issue, refuse to engage with those who disagree.
I have engaged no end. Having spears thrown on grammar, and non-applicable measurement of fluid dynamics, well best not to engage, in the name of economy of effort.
Edinburgh is not the only event, I cite non-compliance of elementary principles of motion as a contributing factor. This is not criticism of the unfortunate drivers concerned, I believe they have been let down and than blamed.You reminded me that I alluded to this on this forum when the report came out: ( #397 )
See upload from former ORR (Regulation).Where did I do that?
What I questioned is that you are reading a few select lines in your document and equating them to the requirement for drivers to be taught, understand and calculate all these braking parameters and performances in the style of theoretical physics. But when these few points you are reading are read in conjunction with the entire document they read far more like a basic practical understanding is all that's needed as opposed to being able to calculate and present the expected deceleration in m/s/s.
See upload from former ORR (Regulation).
I think the point has been lost here.Problem with this friction calculation whilst driving is that I know that each carriage is 44 tons thereabouts. What I don't know is the weight of the passengers and their luggage and how that will affect the change in mass of the train hence how much kinetic energy there is. I don't know how much extra brake pressure is being supplied via the variable load valve and how this affects the breaking power per brake step in meters per second and whether there is enough friction to sustain this. The other snag is I don't know how much sand is in each hopper and whether each sander is sanding correctly which can of course modify the friction available to assist in slowing down.
Listen to the podcast by Tim Davies Fast Jet Performance.com re Shoreham. The pilot Andy Hill was never going to calculate energy, but I bet he could. Unfortunately in this case due to cognitive impairment, he failed to appreciate the energy state of the Hunter, both kinetic speed, and potential height. The same is true when landing, 5 knots fast and 40 ft high on approach could put the jet through the fence at the end of the runway.Problem with this friction calculation whilst driving is that I know that each carriage is 44 tons thereabouts. What I don't know is the weight of the passengers and their luggage and how that will affect the change in mass of the train hence how much kinetic energy there is. I don't know how much extra brake pressure is being supplied via the variable load valve and how this affects the breaking power per brake step in meters per second and whether there is enough friction to sustain this. The other snag is I don't know how much sand is in each hopper and whether each sander is sanding correctly which can of course modify the friction available to assist in slowing down.
Non-compliance regards General Professional Knowledge. No criticism of the driver, only the absence of continuation training. The fact you can do the rope calculation is General Professional Knowledge.
Which is akin to car drivers knowing that when wet they should allow 3x the stopping distance and when icy 10x the stopping distance.
Some take it onboard, as typically when the roads are wet cars are recorded as being 2 to 3mph slower (85th percentile free flow speed), which reduces their stopping distance a little from maintaining their normal speed.
Can I do the full calculation, yes, but it isn't a necessity or going to cause me or others additional risk if I don't (and its not a requirement of the standards I work to.) It would seem to be the same case here, as long as a driver knows roughly how much they should slow by for a particular brake application and in what time where is the necessity of knowing how to calculate exactly why that occurs?
General Professional Knowledge. No criticism of the driver, only the absence of continuation training.
Unfortunately in this case due to cognitive impairment, he failed to appreciate the energy state of the Hunter, both kinetic speed, and potential height.
The sleeper incident running brake test is a special case. The dynamic brake operates by initially applying the friction brake on the whole train and when the dynamic brake takes effect to slow the train the friction brake is backed off to a very light application to allow the dynamic brake to be the means of slowing the train. This means that the coaches can have a braking shock as they start to push the locomotive.You reminded me that I alluded to this on this forum when the report came out: ( #397 )
RAIB’s draft investigation report into this accident is currently being reviewed prior to the start of the consultation. RAIB expects to publish the final investigation report before the end of the year. RAIB issued an interim report in February 2022, which discussed our initial findings, and has continued to liaise with stakeholders, including the rail industry, as the investigation has progressed.
RAIB’s draft investigation report into this accident is currently being reviewed prior to the start of consultation. RAIB expects to formally consult the parties involved in March 2023 and to publish the final investigation report in the Spring. RAIB issued an interim report in February 2022 and continues to liaise with stakeholders on our findings and any arising safety issues.
RAIB’s draft investigation report into this accident has now been sent to interested parties as part of the statutory consultation process. RAIB expects to publish the final report shortly after the consultation process is completed.
Thread will remain locked until the final investigation report is published.
RAIB has today released its report into a collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, Wiltshire, 31 October 2021.
Exacerbated by some frankly strange logic and decision making by the driver.Final RAIB report released, no surprises -
"The level of wheel/rail adhesion was very low due to leaf contamination on the railhead, and had been made worse by a band of drizzle that occurred immediately before the passage of train 1L53. This leaf contamination resulted from the weather conditions on the day of the accident, coupled with an increased density of vegetation in the area which had not been effectively managed by Network Rail’s Wessex route. Network Rail’s Wessex route had also not effectively managed the contamination on the railhead with either proactive or reactive measures."
Report 12/2023: Collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction
Collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, Wiltshire, 31 October 2021.www.gov.uk
The causes of the accident were that wheel/rail adhesion was very low in the area
where the driver of train 1L53 applied the train’s brakes, that the driver did not apply
the train’s brakes sufficiently early on approach to the signal protecting the junction to
avoid running on to it, given the prevailing low level of adhesion, and that the braking
systems of train 1L53 were unable to mitigate this very low adhesion.