Derailment near Grange Over Sands (22/03/24)

[ScottGallagher]

Also, although National Rail Enquiries lists "Barrow in Furness", the station is historically just "Barrow" See: https://www.alamy.com/barrow-in-fur...barrow-railway-station-uk-image331096795.html

I've always found the Barrow one a bit odd considering Kirkby In Furness 2 stops up the line is signed as is. However Dalton 2 stops down isn't called Dalton In Furness on signs or Announcements!!

 

[thenorthern]

I've always found the Barrow one a bit odd considering Kirkby In Furness 2 stops up the line is signed as is. However Dalton 2 stops down isn't called Dalton In Furness on signs or Announcements!!

It is announced as Dalton-in-Furness on the 195s although the station itself is just Dalton. Mind you the 195s refer to Cark & Cartmel station as Cark-in-Cartmel which is incorrect.

 

[ScottGallagher]

It is announced as Dalton-in-Furness on the 195s although the station itself is just Dalton. Mind you the 195s refer to Cark & Cartmel station as Cark-in-Cartmel which is incorrect.

Never noticed that, my connections rarely get me a 195 these days As for Cark In Cartmel the station boards just say Cark! Though the previous ones had the full name with & pre Serco northern.

 

[TheEastAnglian]

Are there any Updates on the 195s that were derailed (195104 and 195133)?

Very quiet at work at the moment with progress on the onward movements of the pair of 195s. I passed by yesterday, and security appears to be in the form of the local seagulls.

 

[InkyScrolls]

I assume they mean Bootle (Cumbria). Then why not say so?

Because it's not even slightly ambiguous and that's not the station's name?

 

[Bletchleyite]

It is announced as Dalton-in-Furness on the 195s although the station itself is just Dalton. Mind you the 195s refer to Cark & Cartmel station as Cark-in-Cartmel which is incorrect.

It's not the name of the station, but it is what is on the signs on the road into the village.

 

[Lucy1501]

Very quiet at work at the moment with progress on the onward movements of the pair of 195s. I passed by yesterday, and security appears to be in the form of the local seagulls.

I passed earlier today and got some photos - can concur about the large amount of seagull droppings dried into the top of the trains!

 

[Pinus contorta]

Because it's not even slightly ambiguous and that's not the station's name?

The village is known as Bootle Station. Its a fair way from Bootle on the A595. It was known as Bootle Station in the 1940s when my grandfather was there. Not heard anyone confuse it with any other places.

 

[basfordlad]

The village is known as Bootle Station. Its a fair way from Bootle on the A595. It was known as Bootle Station in the 1940s when my grandfather was there. Not heard anyone confuse it with any other

The station is closer to the village of Hycemoor.
It makes a great costal walk getting the train from silecroft and walking back. Very under rated coast.

 

[PyrahnaRanger]

I've always found the Barrow one a bit odd considering Kirkby In Furness 2 stops up the line is signed as is. However Dalton 2 stops down isn't called Dalton In Furness on signs or Announcements!!

To be fair, the naming down there is quite complex, but I think the town was Barrow, the parish is Barrow In Furness, the constituency is Barrow In Furness, and I’m told the town adopted “in Furness” after the Local Government Reforms, but that could be tittle tattle. (I’ve heard the same about Appleby-in-Westmorland)

The village is known as Bootle Station. It’s a fair way from Bootle on the A595. It was known as Bootle Station in the 1940s when my grandfather was there. Not heard anyone confuse it with any other places.

That’s one I’ve not heard before! Still, you live and learn.

 

[randyrippley]

I've always found the Barrow one a bit odd considering Kirkby In Furness 2 stops up the line is signed as is. However Dalton 2 stops down isn't called Dalton In Furness on signs or Announcements!!

that's because you've got possible confusion with Kirkby (Liverpool), West Kirkby, and (closed) Kirkby Lonsdale.
There's nowhere close named Barrow to be confused

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 25 Apr 2024 ==

It is announced as Dalton-in-Furness on the 195s although the station itself is just Dalton. Mind you the 195s refer to Cark & Cartmel station as Cark-in-Cartmel which is incorrect.

Geographically Cark-in-Cartmel is correct. The station is closest to Cark, and Cark is in the Cartmel peninsula. Cartmel village is a mile or two away.

 

[Cowley]

I think we’re probably done with this thread. Thanks everyone.

 

[ainsworth74]

The RAIB have now released their report into this accident.

Summary
At around 06:05 on 22 March 2024, a passenger train travelling at 56 mph (90 km/h) derailed on the approach to Grange-over-Sands station. The derailment occurred because a void had opened in the embankment on which the train was travelling, leading to the rails under the train losing support. The train was carrying four train crew and four passengers when it derailed. Nobody was injured, but significant damage was caused to both the train and the railway infrastructure.

RAIB’s investigation found that the void had been created because water had dislodged embankment material and carried it away. The water came from a pipe partially buried beneath the railway, which had been damaged during routine maintenance around 2 days before the derailment.

The damage to the pipe had been reported immediately to the railway control room by the maintenance staff involved. However, as a result of ineffective communications, no action was taken to stop the consequent leak. The pipe had been installed by Network Rail in 2016 as a temporary measure to assist in managing flood water in the surrounding areas, but on-call engineering staff were unaware that it was in use and carrying water at the time it was damaged.

Underlying factors to the accident were that those responsible for managing flood water at this location had not done so effectively, leading to the prolonged need to rely on temporary pumping arrangements. RAIB also identified that staffing levels at Network Rail’s Carnforth maintenance delivery unit did not provide sufficient resilience and had allowed non-compliance with the standards relating to the management of tamping to become normalised. In addition, Network Rail had allowed a temporary pumping arrangement to become permanent without applying the relevant asset management procedures.

Recommendations
As a result of its investigation, RAIB has made five recommendations. The first three recommendations are made to Network Rail. The first of these aims to reduce the risk associated with temporary drainage solutions which remain in place for longer than anticipated. The second asks Network Rail to review how it can improve the ability of tamper operators to detect buried services. The third aims to reduce the likelihood that buried services are struck during maintenance by ensuring staffing levels are adequate to comply with Network Rail’s own procedures. The fourth recommendation is made to the Environment Agency, and other local stakeholders, and aims to encourage timely decision-making in relation to the future of this area so that the management of flood water does not manifest in another risk to the railway. The final recommendation is addressed to Eversholt Rail Leasing Limited, the owner of the train involved, and aims to reduce the risk of a derailed train being struck by a train on the adjacent line due to a failure of communications and warning systems.

Additionally, RAIB has identified three learning points. The first of these reminds track workers of the importance of completing required site visits ahead of planned work to mark up obstructions. The second reminds staff of the importance of being readily contactable when on call, and the final learning point encourages railway controllers to escalate issues where the first line on-call staff are not available.

Report 02/2025: Derailment of a passenger train at Grange-over-Sands

Derailment of a passenger train at Grange-over-Sands, Cumbria, 22 March 2024.

www.gov.uk

 

[InkyScrolls]

The RAIB have now released their report into this accident.

Report 02/2025: Derailment of a passenger train at Grange-over-Sands

Derailment of a passenger train at Grange-over-Sands, Cumbria, 22 March 2024.

www.gov.uk

Thank you for posting this. One of the big points for me as a driver was the total failure of the GSM-R.

 

[Bletchleyite]

An excellent sum up and well articulated and reasoned set of outcomes. The RAIB really does earn its keep, doesn't it?

 

[Crossover]

An excellent sum up and well articulated and reasoned set of outcomes. The RAIB really does earn its keep, doesn't it?

I will read it later, but I was struck by how (relatively) quick this report has been released - 10 months or so is pretty good going!

 

[jfowkes]

NR should just put out a press release says "We told you so" in 64-point font.

Network Rail says infrastructure will get less reliable

The railway infrastructure in England and Wales is likely to become less reliable over the next five years, the body responsible for its upkeep has said.

In its new business plan, external it says a sharp rise in extreme weather events has damaged ageing infrastructure.

Investment in tackling climate change and trying to make the railway more resilient - for example, improving drainage and earthworks - will double under the new plan, to £1.6bn.

Network Rail said it had sought to prioritise investment in weather resilience where possible, but keeping up the pace with available funding would be a "continued risk".

As a result of these factors Network Rail expects a "decrease in asset reliability" over the period of the plan.

Network Rail said it was balancing its expenditure and interventions in order to protect safety, but it expected "a small impact on train performance". Network Rail is looking to make "efficiencies" of £3.4bn over the next five years and the strategic plan said parts of the network which generate less revenue would not be prioritised for investment, as part of "difficult choices and trade-offs".

 

[TheGrew]

If you don't want to read the full report but want the summary the RAIB has put out a Youtube video:

 

[BrianW]

An excellent sum up and well articulated and reasoned set of outcomes. The RAIB really does earn its keep, doesn't it?

I agree. It would be better still however if it could require its recommendations be implemented.

eg in this case attention to the shortcomings of the GSM-R installations (connecting leads too short; and battery in lead car knocked off) and provision to crew of mobiles and numbers for emergency calls- as 'advised' ten years ago.

The lack of adherence to standards and knowing of these without being addressed due to staff shortages and staff not welcoming being disturbed, are also matters of concern with possibly fatal consequences.

 

[martin2345uk]

Do Northern not give their drivers mobile phones then..?

 

[Bletchleyite]

Do Northern not give their drivers mobile phones then..?

I seem to recall from having used that line a fair bit that on its more rural parts the signal is best described as rather patchy, particularly since the 3G switchoff.

 

[JammyBluebird]

Do Northern not give their drivers mobile phones then..?

Nope

 

[DanNCL]

One of the recommendations in the report is to Eversholt regarding the battery isolation switches on the 195s. The battery isolation switch was knocked off by the impact with the parapet which is what caused the loss of all power to the leading cab.

Do 196s and 197s have the same design/location of battery isolation switch or is it unique to the 195s?

 

[RooseWithAZed]

Do Northern not give their drivers mobile phones then..?

There is, without hyperbole, no phone signal to be had in Grange, especially on that bit of the track.

 

[BrianW]

Nope

Paragraphs 78 and 79 0f the report Refer

78 Immediately following the accident, the two drivers attempted to contact the
signaller using the GSM-R radio in the front cab to protect the line and ensure
that no trains passed on the adjacent track. Because of the loss of power in the
leading vehicle, the drivers were unable to contact the signaller.
79 After unsuccessfully attempting to turn the leading cab back on, the drivers
decided to go back through the train to attempt to use a GSM-R radio in one of
the other cabs. Internal CCTV from train 2C37 shows them arriving in the rear cab
of the first unit at around 06:07. Recorded voice communications indicate that the
driver instructor made a REC to the Arnside signaller shortly after arriving in the
rear cab. This REC was also broadcast at Manchester ROC, allowing controllers
to start the incident response and call the emergency services.

In other circumstances the time delay could have been significant.

 

[HSTEd]

Aren't GSM-R handsets available from manufacturers?

Could these not be provided to train crew?

EDIT:
Am reading the report now, so apologise if this is covered in the document.

EDIT #2:
Have completed the report, what a mess.
The lack of a proper drainage board is a serious problem it seems.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

NR should just put out a press release says "We told you so" in 64-point font.

Network Rail says infrastructure will get less reliable

This isn't a relevant issue in this accident its a failure of internal communication.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 28 Jan 2025 ==

I agree. It would be better still however if it could require its recommendations be implemented.

eg in this case attention to the shortcomings of the GSM-R installations (connecting leads too short; and battery in lead car knocked off) and provision to crew of mobiles and numbers for emergency calls- as 'advised' ten years ago.

The lack of adherence to standards and knowing of these without being addressed due to staff shortages and staff not welcoming being disturbed, are also matters of concern with possibly fatal consequences.

RAIB don't say the train wasn't built to standards it says

As the vehicles derailed to the left, the lateral displacement exceeded design tolerances and caused the power cable to be stretched beyond its limit.

The GSM-R had two separate supply sources one from the leading vehicle and another supply from the next vehicle. You could say it was freak accident that both supplies were lost but have to say im surprised the GSM-R handset doesn't have an internal power source for say 30m backup.

 

[PyrahnaRanger]

I seem to recall from having used that line a fair bit that on its more rural parts the signal is best described as rather patchy, particularly since the 3G switchoff.

It's incredibly patchy, even with roaming SIM cards. The mobile phone companies give some pathetic excuses about mountains and not being able to put masts in the sea...

I go to Manchester that way every so often, and I download stuff to listen to because there's no way I can reliably keep streaming it anywhere between Carnforth and Carlisle. Although the WCML isn't much better.

I hate to mention Switzerland, but even going up Jungfrau on the train they had 5G, even in the tunnels.

 

[pokemonsuper9]

The mobile phone companies give some pathetic excuses about mountains and not being able to put masts in the sea...

It's profitability, rather than practicality, preventing signal being in more places.

A 4g or 5g antenna can be put pretty much anywhere.

 

[jfowkes]

This isn't a relevant issue in this accident its a failure of internal communication.

I mean, yeah as a first approximation. But if you keep pushing for people to do more with less and try and sweat your assets (which includes people) more, this kind of communication and process failure is going to be more likely.

Maybe I'm reading too much into it. But in the same way that you can't point at a single landslip and say "this was the result of climate change", you can't point at a single incident and say "this was a result of funding and staffing cuts". And yet..