Enquiry about the Beeching report

[Taunton]

One thing Beeching could have been expected to address but didn't was the quite inadequate approach to cost reporting. Sure, they had hardly any computers then, but costs of various operations was broadly done by just taking all the costs for large elements of the service, and just dividing them by some convenient figure. Or worse.

The North London line is described above. This was reported as a huge loss maker, considerable costs, not much revenue. The considerable costs arose in part from station staffing, each of which had, each shift, a ticket clerk, and a porter on each platform to do the dispatch, which in those days consisted of collecting arriving passenger tickets and closing slam doors. That was the theory. In practice, even in 1962, there were substantial staff shortages and the station might be down to just one, or even none, staff on duty. But this was never reflected through, the allocated costs were based on the notional staff costs of those grades allocated. Of course, this staff absence led to fare bilking and loss of revenue, so although revenue was now low the costs continued to be reported high.

 

[RT4038]

The second Beeching report, "Development of Major Railway Trunk Routes" was very much a comprehensive policy of what to concentrate on. Much of it was actually drafted by Gerry Fiennes at the end of his time as BR Board Chief Operating Officer in 1963.

Yes; a comprehensive policy on what the Railways as a commercial undertaking should be concentrating on, rather than a comprehensive Transport Policy for all modes, or for socially necessary local passenger transport.

 

[ThirteenArches]

Whatever you say about Beeching and the state of the railways in the early 1960s, these two facts remain:

- The loss incurred by BR, including steam working, overmanning, inefficient practices and basket case lines, and the rest, was £104 million in 1962. According to the Measuring Worth relative values calculator, this corresponds to somewhere between £2.5 billion and £10 billion in 2023. See the website for why comparisons are complicated, but at least this gives a best- case and worst- case.

Measuring Worth website https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/relativevalue.php

- The subsidy given to the (much reduced) railway system in 2023 was £21.1 billion.

Official Statistics Rail Factsheet https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/rail-factsheet-2023/rail-factsheet-2023

 

[RT4038]

Whatever you say about Beeching and the state of the railways in the early 1960s, these two facts remain:

- The loss incurred by BR, including steam working, overmanning, inefficient practices and basket case lines, and the rest, was £104 million in 1962. According to the Measuring Worth relative values calculator, this corresponds to somewhere between £2.5 billion and £10 billion in 2023. See the website for why comparisons are complicated, but at least this gives a best- case and worst- case.



- The subsidy given to the (much reduced) railway system in 2023 was £21.1 billion.

and if all the lines were kept open, the loss today would probably be £50bn per year! (and the rest).

 

[mike57]

How much impact did the 1955 rail stike have? Was it the trigger for further lost business, or was it just another nail in the coffin? Had the strike not happened would there have been the same pressure to cut and close?

I also suspect that major economies in operation of lightly used rural lines would have been unacceptable to the unions of the day, who thought operations could continue in the same way things had for decades. Things like simplification of signalling, and maybe even operating some branches as 'one/unit engine on the branch', maybe more like a tramway. It wouldn't have saved the basket cases, but some routes might have survived long enough to enjoy the recovery in rail travel that happened later.

The report and closure notices also highlighted bus service as the alternative, but with no mention of journey time, convenience or comfort.

At over 60 years later it does feel as if both governments of the day (Conservative, then Labour from 1964) felt that railways were pretty much finished

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Just to be clear, are we still endeavouring to assist the OP with scoping their EPQ (Extended Project Qualification) research project, being part of their 'A' levels, or just having a general reminisce about the time some sixty years or so ago when Dr. Richard Beeching was chairman of British Railways?

 

[Metrolink]

Just to be clear, are we still endeavouring to assist the OP with scoping their EPQ (Extended Project Qualification) research project, being part of their 'A' levels, or just having a general reminisce about the time some sixty years or so ago when Dr. Richard Beeching was chairman of British Railways?

Whilst this is the priority, the conversation is very interesting and will inform how I develop my ideas. Any further points are still valuable, but to reiterate anyone interested in my original request can feel free to message me privately.

 

[eldomtom2]

The second Beeching report, "Development of Major Railway Trunk Routes" was very much a comprehensive policy of what to concentrate on. Much of it was actually drafted by Gerry Fiennes at the end of his time as BR Board Chief Operating Officer in 1963.

Fiennes was not involved with the Trunk Routes report; the lead non-Beeching figure behind the report was British Railways Board member and former Scottish Region general manager James Ness.

Things like simplification of signalling, and maybe even operating some branches as 'one/unit engine on the branch', maybe more like a tramway. It wouldn't have saved the basket cases, but some routes might have survived long enough to enjoy the recovery in rail travel that happened later.

I believe it is worth quoting Beeching's response in the Report to the question of cutting costs in full:

The third suggestion, that rail buses should be substituted for trains, ignores the high cost of providing the route itself, and also ignores the fact that rail buses are more expensive vehicles than road buses. The extent to which the economics remain unsound can readily be seen by inserting a Movement cost of three shillings per mile in the table on page 17. It would still be necessary to have a passenger density of 14,000 per week, to cover the total cost of the service, as compared with 17,000 per week with diesel multiple units. It is not immediately apparent either, why it is thought that rail buses would give a better standard of service than a road bus in most rural areas.
Similarly, consideration of the cost figures will show that thinning out the trains, or thinning out the stations, would not make a service self-supporting even if it had no adverse effect on revenue.
These points have been mentioned, to dispose of any idea that stopping-train services could be preserved, as an economic alternative to buses or private transport, if only some ingenuity were shown by railway operators. This really is not so, and it is obvious that a high proportion of stopping passenger train services ought to be discontinued as soon as possible, and that many of the lightly loaded lines over which they op.erate ought to close as well unless they carry exceptional freight traffic. For this reason, all stopping services have been examined individually, and so have all lengths of lightly loaded route.
So far as the services themselves are concerned, closure proposals have been determined by the inability of the services to produce revenue sufficient to cover the direct costs of operating them. Examples illustrative of this financial test are given in Appendix 2.
There can be no doubt about the financial desirability of closing those services which do not meet this test, and it is the Railways' wish to close them as soon as the procedure permits. Questions of hardships will be considered by the Transport Users Consultative Committees.

 

[Bevan Price]

How much impact did the 1955 rail stike have? Was it the trigger for further lost business, or was it just another nail in the coffin? Had the strike not happened would there have been the same pressure to cut and close?

I also suspect that major economies in operation of lightly used rural lines would have been unacceptable to the unions of the day, who thought operations could continue in the same way things had for decades. Things like simplification of signalling, and maybe even operating some branches as 'one/unit engine on the branch', maybe more like a tramway. It wouldn't have saved the basket cases, but some routes might have survived long enough to enjoy the recovery in rail travel that happened later.

The report and closure notices also highlighted bus service as the alternative, but with no mention of journey time, convenience or comfort.

At over 60 years later it does feel as if both governments of the day (Conservative, then Labour from 1964) felt that railways were pretty much finished

1964 and 2024 had many similarities. Newly elected Labour governments found the UK economy to be a dreadful mess. The Wilson government had insufficient funds to reverse the Maples/Beeching closures. In the event, some lines were reprieved, but no lines closed before the election were reinstated.

 

[RT4038]

How much impact did the 1955 rail stike have? Was it the trigger for further lost business, or was it just another nail in the coffin? Had the strike not happened would there have been the same pressure to cut and close?

Settling the dispute worsened the Railways' financial position. (I'm not suggesting that there was no justification for the dispute - the pay of railway staff was notoriously poor, and really any attempt to satisfactorily deal with this was going to be a serious financial issue). The strike will have forced both passengers and freight to find alternative means of transport where possible and a proportion of this will not have come back, further worsening the Railways' financial position. I suspect that the politicians (and their advisors and influencers, both formal and informal) will have been been stung by being held to ransom by railwaymen and will have vowed to develop alternative means of transport (essentially roads / motorway network) to avoid such an effect again. I think it caused more damage than appears on the surface, but the problem of low pay had to be addressed and all these local and branch line services could not sustain that kind of paybill.

The report and closure notices also highlighted bus service as the alternative, but with no mention of journey time, convenience or comfort.

All they were concerned about was that the bulk of the existing passengers had some kind of alternative passenger transport facility to enable life to go on - convenience and comfort did not come into it - after all, buses were used by most of the population and they weren't coming to any harm; journey time only if it was otherwise unreasonable.

At over 60 years later it does feel as if both governments of the day (Conservative, then Labour from 1964) felt that railways were pretty much finished

I think it was a bit more nuanced than that - urban and suburban commuter trains (but may need subsidy), medium and long distance expresses, bulk goods had a future. Plus the country was not going to be held to ransom by railway staff anymore.

 

[Titfield]

There is a credible argument the 1955 Modernisation Plan was the real villain. Huge amounts of money spent to modernise what existed, rather than thinking about what the future needed to be.

The results of the Modernisation Plan convinced the Treasury that British Railways hadn’t a clue about finance and the Government that the vast majority of senior executives were next to useless and they needed to get successful businessman to advise.

 

[WesternLancer]

Bear in mind that Beeching did not close an inch of railway, Government did. Most of the "Beeching cuts" were implemented by a Labour Government that had campaigned against them.

Would it not be the British Railways Board that did the closure?

 

[Taunton]

The results of the Modernisation Plan convinced ... the Government that the vast majority of senior executives were next to useless and they needed to get successful businessman to advise.

Indeed so, but that was wholly down to Whitehall, who appointed a succession of amiable (and sometimes not so) Old Buffers, seemingly on the best mates' principle, as BR Chairmen. It's not as if more competence didn't exist - the likes of Lord Stamp or Sir Felix Pole, head of the LMS and GWR respectively, knew what they were about.

 

[Western Lord]

Would it not be the British Railways Board that did the closure?

All closures had to be signed off by the Minister of Transport.

 

[Railwaysceptic]

1964 and 2024 had many similarities. Newly elected Labour governments found the UK economy to be a dreadful mess. The Wilson government had insufficient funds to reverse the Maples/Beeching closures. In the event, some lines were reprieved, but no lines closed before the election were reinstated.

I suggest you take that with a pinch of salt. Harold Wilson was a very wily political operator who won the general election of 1964 with a tiny majority. He knew he would have to call a second election and win with a much bigger majority to get his intended legislation through Parliament. So on winning he made a big hullabaloo about the balance of payments deficit and claimed the Tories had ruined the entire economy. It was all nonsense but it worked. He won a huge majority in 1966. Decades later we know that a balance of payments deficit does not cause an immediate crisis.

In one respect you are quite right: there is a noticeable similarity between Wilson's tactics and Starmer's.

 

[WesternLancer]

All closures had to be signed off by the Minister of Transport.

and the Minister of Transport appointed the chair of the Board. It's semantics to say that the government closed the lines really.

 

[Western Lord]

and the Minister of Transport appointed the chair of the Board. It's semantics to say that the government closed the lines really.

No it isn't. No line closed without Government approval.

 

[WesternLancer]

No it isn't. No line closed without Government approval.

Indeed - but it was a nationalised industry - ultimately nothing happened without government approval even if operationally it was delegated to those running the industry.

 

[Sir Felix Pole]

I suggest you take that with a pinch of salt. Harold Wilson was a very wily political operator who won the general election of 1964 with a tiny majority. He knew he would have to call a second election and win with a much bigger majority to get his intended legislation through Parliament. So on winning he made a big hullabaloo about the balance of payments deficit and claimed the Tories had ruined the entire economy. It was all nonsense but it worked. He won a huge majority in 1966. Decades later we know that a balance of payments deficit does not cause an immediate crisis.

In one respect you are quite right: there is a noticeable similarity between Wilson's tactics and Starmer's.

We're getting off-topic, but I would suggest the main reason Labour won in 1964 and bigly in 1966 was because the voters were sick of the Tories and wanted change, rather like 2024. Tory Chancellor Reggie Maudling famously left a note to his succesor ' 'Sorry about the mess old cock'. Balance of payments were still an important consideration in the days of fixed exchange rates - hence the post WW2 export drive.

 

[Rescars]

And - diving deeper, much further than half an A-level warrants - there is overall railway question, 200 years (more or less) old this year, and still nowhere near answer - are they a public service, to be provided even at a loss, or commercial enterprise, only worth doing for profit? How are these aims to be balanced?

It's been a long-running debate. F B Head sets out some of these considerations rather well in "Stokers and Pokers". This was published in 1849. Facsimile copies are around and it can also be found on Gutenberg.

 

[The exile]

I think his remit was to deal with the Railways' dire financial issue, not to produce a comprehensive transport Policy. Those lines lost money (principally due to high working expenses and low fares) Dr. Beeching specifically discussed the issue of the financing of the urban/suburban railways and this thinking eventually resulted in the establishment of the Passenger Transport Executives a few years later, to take on the funding of such services.

This is in many ways the nub of the problem - “we” don’t go in for comprehensive transport policies in this country (which, being cynical, does save us from one we don’t like!). Along with the Modernisation plan (as discussed above), the other big mistake was the selling off of railway land on the basis of “we don’t need it now”.

 

[A.Macallan]

1964 and 2024 had many similarities. Newly elected Labour governments found the UK economy to be a dreadful mess. The Wilson government had insufficient funds to reverse the Maples/Beeching closures. In the event, some lines were reprieved, but no lines closed before the election were reinstated.

…maybe because the demolition trains couldn’t get in fast enough after the last service trains left, ripping up track & taking out bridges quickstyle ! …was it coincidental that the Minister of Transport also had a day job as a road constructor ?!?

 

[RT4038]

…maybe because the demolition trains couldn’t get in fast enough after the last service trains left, ripping up track & taking out bridges quickstyle ! …was it coincidental that the Minister of Transport also had a day job as a road constructor ?!?

Part of the financial case for closure was the recovery of equipment/track/metal bridges etc for the scrap value. Makes sense to do that quickly and use the money raised for investment in the lines that are to be kept/developed. A good many Local Authorities wanted parts of the track bed or bridges demolished etc for road improvements or other uses. Sale of property at and around stations also raised sums of money to be invested elsewhere. I don't think any of this had anything to do with the Minister of Transport's other interests, however much it might fit in with conspiracy theory.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Part of the financial case for closure was the recovery of equipment/track/metal bridges etc for the scrap value.

Definitely a "scorched earth" policy, though, because once the key infrastructure has largely all been removed, it's much more difficult, if not impossible, to subsequently reverse the decision.

 

[Clarence Yard]

Ernest Marples was the “useful idiot” in this whole saga.

Any analysis of Beeching needs to look at the root causes and the real drivers at the Ministry.

In 1955 3 out of the 6 BR regions were in deficit, in 1957 5 out of the 6 BR regions were in deficit and losses were mounting.

Although the Modernisation Plan wasted some money, a lot of it wasn’t but it didn’t reverse the losses quick enough, hence some of the panic moves, such as the rush to end steam by buying diesels quicker than originally anticipated.

One thing neither the Government nor the railway really anticipated was the pace of change in both the rise of motor car/lorry traffic and the start of the process of the centralisation of industry. Both had profound effects on the railway.

The Government were influencing the price increases BR could implement and in one year (1957, iirc) it did a lot of damage when BR badly needed a decent uplift.

The appointment of James Dunnett in April 1959 as the new Permanent-Secretary at the Ministry brought an immediate change in attitude to the railways. He preferred a smaller network. He appointed, from the Treasury, one David Serpell as his Deputy-Secretary. From then on in the die was cast. Marples appeared in late 1959 and wanted to make a difference but it was the civil servants, with their “attitude”, that were driving things.

How this all played out through Stedeford, the appointment of Beeching and the setting up the BRB is best explained in Gourvish (1948-73), the best and most dispassionate history of the railway during those turbulent times.

One thing that the Government did during the 1960’s and 1970’s was to keep all the nationalised industries cash poor. The rush to turn redundant assets into cash to use elsewhere was paramount.

But the Beeching Reshaping report was only an acceleration and deepening of a process that the Modernisation Plan had actually stated was going to happen. The biggest number of stations closed in one scheme was actually done in 1959 (the closure of the M&GN) and the most ex GWR stations were closed in 1962, one year before Reshaping.

 

[RT4038]

Definitely a "scorched earth" policy, though, because once the key infrastructure has largely all been removed, it's much more difficult, if not impossible, to subsequently reverse the decision.

I don't think there was any consideration given to the possibility of reversing any decisions - why would there be when they knew thay were doing the right thing?

 

[A.Macallan]

Part of the financial case for closure was the recovery of equipment/track/metal bridges etc for the scrap value. Makes sense to do that quickly and use the money raised for investment in the lines that are to be kept/developed. A good many Local Authorities wanted parts of the track bed or bridges demolished etc for road improvements or other uses. Sale of property at and around stations also raised sums of money to be invested elsewhere. I don't think any of this had anything to do with the Minister of Transport's other interests, however much it might fit in with conspiracy theory.

…whatever mate, you go along with that little thought !

 

[Clarence Yard]

It had more to do with how the Treasury operated. BR was scratching around for cash and also needed to reduce the liabilities associated with redundant land and structures.

At the time Marples seemed to be more interested in his cross dressing antics involving whips and professional ladies than his (by arrangement, wife's) firm. He liked the money the firm made though! But they didn’t really get any contracts as a result of specific closures.

You really need to look at the Civil Servants as the ones who drove the reduction in the network, not Marples.

 

[anothertyke]

It had more to do with how the Treasury operated. BR was scratching around for cash and also needed to reduce the liabilities associated with redundant land and structures.

At the time Marples seemed to be more interested in his cross dressing antics involving whips and professional ladies than his (by arrangement, wife's) firm. He liked the money the firm made though! But they didn’t really get any contracts as a result of specific closures.

You really need to look at the Civil Servants as the ones who drove the reduction in the network, not Marples.

Reg Dawson, a very brave and determined man

In March 1963, a report The Reshaping of British Railways written by Dr Richard Beeching, Chairman of British Rail, was published by the then British Railways Board. The report identified 2,363 sta…

pocketbookuk.wordpress.com

Of course the civil servants varied quite a bit--see above.

And the civil servants were instrumental in the design of the 68 Act which did create the basis for supporting the social railway.

 

[WesternLancer]

Reg Dawson, a very brave and determined man

In March 1963, a report The Reshaping of British Railways written by Dr Richard Beeching, Chairman of British Rail, was published by the then British Railways Board. The report identified 2,363 sta…

pocketbookuk.wordpress.com

Of course the civil servants varied quite a bit--see above.

And the civil servants were instrumental in the design of the 68 Act which did create the basis for supporting the social railway.

an excellent link well worth a read whatever ones views on the issue. Thanks for posting