So you're talking about pricing strategies. You might want to go into a shop - they too have pricing strategies. No doubt they are making nothing on Swinton to Manchester but you're pinning your hopes on something relatively minimal. Pricing strategies are, in the main, much more to do with ENCTS remuneration, irrespective of whether GM is marginally more generous than Cheshire or anywhere else. It is still a fundamentally flawed scheme that drives a behaviour in bus companies that rewards regular ridership and effectively penalises the occasional traveller because of the "average fare forgone". These are industry wide issues, not particular to Greater Manchester.
The idea that there's some "exploitation of the masses" to fund a parochial bus skirmish (it can hardly be described as a war) and that's why headways have been cut etc.... Were it to be a singular example, you might have a point. However, it's a picture across the country where the pattern of life is changing. To try and compare today with 1998 (let alone 1988) is futile. A refusal to admit to the changing world is exactly why House of Fraser and other retailers are in the clart!!
ENCTS is a seperate argument.
Part of the trouble is the way that the Dereg market has developed over the last 32 years - certainly in GM and I daresay in many other parts of the country.
On 26th October 1986, services were slashed at all times of the day/week except shopping hours.
At the same time, competition appeared on many routes - again at the most profitable times, though not necessarilly on the routes justifying extra capacity. These were largely run by newly formed firms run by exPTE/NBC managers often "with an axe to grind" and motivated by revenge rather than by giving a better service to the customers. Thus fare reductions (and don't forget GMPTE already charged the highest fares of the PTE areas) and genuine timetable increases were extremely rare - as were new innovative services.
This pattern continued well into the mid-noughties when presumably, some independants were hit by the global recession. Nevertheless, some of the worst Operators survived. I won't name them, but I'm sure most enthusiasts and many passengers in the eastern half of GM especially know exactly which three were the worst.
In the meantime, First Manchester had got a deserved reputation for poor reliability, high fares and poor driver attitude - although the latter wasn't of course universal, and could be partly blamed on poor, arrogant management.
Stagecoach were despised in some quarters simply because of the belief that buses should be a public service and not a source of profit for shareholders, the largest of which had no connection with the communities they were profiting from. Nevertheless, operationally Stagecoach were far better than First. Their fares were significantly lower than First (typically 30% ish), services were more reliable, especially in the evenings and away from major corridors and their drivers had a better attitude. Note though, that Driver attitude/reliabiity was largely inherited through continuity of middle management and Inspectorate working with Drivers day to day. I worked at both Stagecoach and First depots before privatisation. I also worked briefly at First in the late 90s and kept in regular contact with people at Stagecoach (mainly Hyde Road) right up to 2013. And I can tell you that even before privatisation, drivers at such as Hyde Road were treated with much more respect than those at GMN/First depots, and this obviously translated on to the road.
Additionally, Stagecoach investment was always reasonable (some years more than reasonable!) and from about 2005 they saw that it was the right time to go head to head with the poorest Operators. Yes, there were operational decisions made on the hoof by Supervisors, but they resourced these "Bus wars" through continued investment and using reserve vehicles from within the fleet. They did NOT slash heavy loading services in high density, low car ownership areas to fight these wars. They probably dropped fares but in the secure knowledge that they would win the "war" and probably in a matter of months not years. Also, because the competition were operating at the edge of the law (eg. drivers that couldn't speak English; buses with loose wheel nuts; passengers thrown off mid route so the driver could do a U-turn in the middle of a busy road; services registered at frequent intervals but simply failing to run at all in the morning peak on schooldays; staff mock wrestling at bus termini scattering 100+ bemused passengers waiting for buses not directly involved in the bus war; blocking same stands etc etc), they probably saw an oppurtunity to enhance their reputation and that of the bus industry as a whole.
Then around 2012, First finally accepted that their fares were too high and reduced most to just above Stagecoach's equivalents (and even below in some instances of single fares). I have also noticed an improvement in driver attitude, but don't use First enough to judge whether reliability has improved.
The next big "twin" development (I'm not sure how close the two are linked) was Stagecoach re-organising their Head Office staff/management (and NOT for the better) and EYMS selling Finglands. Bluebird also sold up a few months earlier, but that was on the cards for years. Stagecoach had competed with Finglands for years on Wilmslow Road and the unique operating environment here meant a completely different fare structure for decades. The Bluebird sale marked an obvious oppurtunity to compete with First and this has largely been achieved with little detriment to passengers elsewhere. The real problem is the 38 route initially from Rusholme to Little Hulton which charges single fares FAR cheaper than anywhere else, but more importantly was resourced through cutting 19 PVRs worth of services on long established, heavy loading corridors mainly (but not solely) in Stockport MBC. This happened in the Winter of 2014/5 but it took nearly three years to address resultant late running due to capacity issues at various times but especially Mon-Fri and Sunday mornings.
Of course, the whole point is - at what point does carlessness for an individual (or family) become UNaffordable? You've pointed out how expensive it is to (legally) acquire a car, but how cheap it is to run it. And with the gap widening, something fundamental has to change. If we have the current level of congestion with barely 75% of households having a car (and many adults within those households who don't drive) imagine what would happen if every adult physically able to drive, did so. And don't forget, a taxi with 1 or two passengers takes up the same roadspace as a private car with 2 or 3 people.