Hawes Junction

[Jimbob52]

A reminder that December 24th is the anniversary of the tragic accident in 1910 at Hawes Junction on the Settle to Carlisle line.

In the early hours of Christmas eve, the signalman at Hawes Junction forgot that was holding two light engines on the northbound main line, waiting for a path to return to Carlisle. The enginemen did not remind him that they were waiting an abnormally long time, probably for about twenty minutes. When the signalman cleared the signals for a double-headed overnight sleeping car express from St Pancras to Glasgow, the light engines moved off, only to be overtaken by the express about one and a half miles north of the junction.

There were 12 fatalities.

The Wikipedia reference states that when the driver of the leading engine of the express first saw the tail light of the light engines, ‘the distance between the speeding express and the light engine was only 6 yards’. This is attributed to a contemporary account in The Times but must be a mistake or misprint.

 

[Taunton]

I always also thought it surprising (since reading Rolt's book) that the light engines had only got such a short distance ahead, given that the advanced starter they were waiting at would have to be cleared before the distant, way back, and for the express not to be checked for no reason that would have to be done at least a few minutes before it approached there.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

The Wikipedia reference states that when the driver of the leading engine of the express first saw the tail light of the light engines, ‘the distance between the speeding express and the light engine was only 6 yards’. This is attributed to a contemporary account in The Times but must be a mistake or misprint.

Interesting point, but why do you reckon that the closing distance mentioned might be a mistake or misprint?

Isn't it essentially saying that the driver of the express quite probably only saw the tail light, of the stationary light engine directly in front, at the very last second?

The 1910 Hawes Junction accident took place at 6 a.m., I believe, when it would likely still have been quite dark.

 

[Jimbob52]

Interesting point, but why do you reckon that the closing distance mentioned might be a mistake or misprint?

Isn't it essentially saying that the driver of the express quite probably only saw the tail light, of the stationary light engine directly in front, at the very last second?

The 1910 Hawes Junction accident took place at 6 a.m., I believe, when it would likely still have been quite dark.

According to reports, the express train was travelling at approx. 65 mph; the light engines at 20 mph or a little more. The closing speed was therefore about 45 mph., or 66 feet (22 yards) per second. If the light engines were only seen from a distance of 6 yards, the collision would have been virtually instantaneous.

In fact, I believe the driver of the leading engine had time to apply the brakes, though there was insufficient time for these to take effect.

So far as I am aware, none of the standard works on railway accidents mention this. However, Peter Baughan, in ‘The Midland Railway North of Leeds', says the driver of the express ‘had only about six seconds warning of the two engines ahead’. This suggests the distance between the trains was over 100 yards, time to react and apply the brakes but not sufficient to prevent the collision.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

@Jimbob52. Thanks for the explanation.

 

[yorksrob]

The chimney from one of the stricken locomotives is on display outside Ribblehead station.

 

[Harvester]

According to reports, the express train was travelling at approx. 65 mph; the light engines at 20 mph or a little more. The closing speed was therefore about 45 mph., or 66 feet (22 yards) per second. If the light engines were only seen from a distance of 6 yards, the collision would have been virtually instantaneous.

In fact, I believe the driver of the leading engine had time to apply the brakes, though there was insufficient time for these to take effect.

So far as I am aware, none of the standard works on railway accidents mention this. However, Peter Baughan, in ‘The Midland Railway North of Leeds', says the driver of the express ‘had only about six seconds warning of the two engines ahead’. This suggests the distance between the trains was over 100 yards, time to react and apply the brakes but not sufficient to prevent the collision.

The six seconds warning, equating to about 100 yards appears to be correct and is mentioned in ”Trains to Nowhere” based on J.A.B. Hamilton’s “Railway Accidents of the Twentieth Century”. It was completely dark at 6:00am (Christmas Eve), and there was also rain and a strong wind at the time of the accident.

The Accident Report placed prime responsibility for the accident on Signalman Albert Sutton, but the light engine drivers were held gravely at fault for not carrying out Rule 55.

 

[John Webb]

The Hawes Junction accident nudged the Midland Railway into a greater use of track circuits (TCs) - some 2,000 locations were determined where they might be benificient in avoiding signalmen forgetting about trains or light engines standing on the line. At St Albans City station the first TCs were installed in late 1915; we have displayed in the box on long-term loan the December 1915 diagram showing the location of these TCs.

 

[Ken H]

The six seconds warning, equating to about 100 yards appears to be correct and is mentioned in ”Trains to Nowhere” based on J.A.B. Hamilton’s “Railway Accidents of the Twentieth Century”. It was completely dark at 6:00am (Christmas Eve), and there was also rain and a strong wind at the time of the accident.

The Accident Report placed prime responsibility for the accident on Signalman Albert Sutton, but the light engine drivers were held gravely at fault for not carrying out Rule 55.

I would say failing to carry out rule 55 was a bad an error as Sutton forgetting the train.

I remember the old oil tail lamps. The glimmer they gave out was the last line of defence for a rear ending collision. So much better to see bright red lights at the back of modern trains. But they must have been obscured by the tunnels to the north of Garsdale Station.

 

[30907]

The six seconds warning, equating to about 100 yards appears to be correct and is mentioned in ”Trains to Nowhere” based on J.A.B. Hamilton’s “Railway Accidents of the Twentieth Century”. It was completely dark at 6:00am (Christmas Eve), and there was also rain and a strong wind at the time of the accident.

The estimate is in the Accident Report itself. Interestingly it is not quoted by Rolt in "Red for Danger."