Larissa, Greece: Freight train collides with passenger train (01/03/2023)

[Gag Halfrunt]

The transport minister, Kostas Karamanlis, has resigned.

 

[matchmaker]

Seems some similarity to the Amtrak accident in South Carolina a few years ago, with fully interlocked signalling seemingly installed (photo above) but out of use, and things being done by radio commands which are mishandled somehow along the line.

Norwich Thorpe, 1874? "Stop mail". "Mail left".

 

[jamesontheroad]

The ETR 470s are the only EMUs for long distance services in Greece. Athens-Thessaloniki services were formerly operated with class 520 DMUs, but after the line was electrified they were replaced with locomotive-hauled trains.

Two trains a day in each direction are operated by ETR470, and these have been used in recent months to promote an all-important sub-4hr journey time. The remaining departures are loco-hauled. Below are some photos from Sunday’s trip Thessaloniki - Athens. Compared to the ancient East German diesel set I rode from Strimon/Strymonas earlier in the day it was a modern, comfortable and smooth experience.

I think it departed Tuesday evening from Athens.

Could it have been a later train than 19.30 as the crash happened just before midnight and someone said its about 4 hours from Athens to Thessaloniki and the crash was quite a way before Thessaloniki. Maybe it was running late which might have some bearing on the reason if there had been problems with track/signalling. Just speculation of course.

It was the 19.30 departure from Athens. (The overnight trip has been suspended for some time.) In one of the many reports on the website of the Greek national broadcaster, a parent of someone on the train said they had had a delay of at least an hour en route, so the accident would have happened some time between 22.00 and 23.00 local.

 

[infobleep]

[Giannis Antonoglou] and a handful of other survivors then went to help some of those injured and says ambulances and other emergency personnel didn’t turn up “for at least an hour”.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-europe-64807384?ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter&ns_campaign=bbc_live&ns_linkname=63ff38a18f4dbc302129c2ef%26%27We%20couldn%E2%80%99t%20see%20anything%20but%20flames%20and%20smoke%27%20-%20survivor%262023-03-01T16%3A07%3A21.039Z&ns_fee=0&pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:c64f23d0-14b6-4bc7-a824-fccb510955b3&pinned_post_asset_id=63ff38a18f4dbc302129c2ef&pinned_post_type=share

If true that seems a long tune. Is it fairly remote?

 

[WatcherZero]

Literally no signalling. Instructions by radio/telephone. Someone must have made a mistake for this to happen, but the fact that it was allowed to operate in that condition is a failure of the state, no matter who made the fateful error

Greek railway system basically shut down due to the Greek Debt crisis as there was no money for infrastructure maintenance. They have been trying to gradually reopen lines and restart services again over the last few years.

 

[StoneRoad]

Dreadful tragedy.

Hope the true cause is properly identified and that there are funds to correct the problems - such as with the signalling situation.
[and that they don't find some convenient scapegoat to blame]

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Is it fairly remote?

The accident site appears to be right next to the E75 motorway and the older Larissa-Thessaloniki main road.
It doesn't look remote or inaccessible.

 

[Lawrence18uk]

Wreckage lies just north of the motorway overbridge. Further north still, you can see on the east of the double-track mainline an old single-track railway, abandoned by construction of the new line and a new bridge. The BBC drone footage contains a shot looking south.

 

[DerekC]

Dreadful tragedy.

Hope the true cause is properly identified and that there are funds to correct the problems - such as with the signalling situation.
[and that they don't find some convenient scapegoat to blame]

Even if the local investigation does just that, the European Rail Agency's safety branch also has overview rights. They wrote a pretty damning review (in polite euro-speak) of the Santiago di Compostela accident, critiquing the local Spanish report.

 

[Desiro360]

Awful tragedy. Thoughts are with all involved. Hopefully lessons can be learned to help improve the Greek railway network going forward.

 

[rg177]

Following this, it seems that TrainOSE have pulled services from their entire network this afternoon: https://www.hellenictrain.gr/en/news/132023-cancellations

Hellenic Train's services will be cancelled and after 12 noon no train service will be operated.



The last services that will operated are the following:

1213 (Αirport-Piraeus), departure time 11:07

1313 (Kiato- Piraeus), departure time 10:59

1214 (Piraeus- Airport), departure time 10:45

1312 (Piraeus - Kiato), departure time 11:15



C10E (Kiato- Patra), departure time 12:05.



12300 (Rio- Ag. Andreas), departure time 11:08

12301 (Ag. Andreas- Rio), departure time 11:30

12350(Αgios Andreas- Kaminia), departure time 11:32

 

[Annetts key]

Norwich Thorpe, 1874? "Stop mail". "Mail left".

In my lifetime, I know of a signaller talking a train past a signal at danger due to a signalling failure. Unfortunately the signaller was talking to the wrong driver, and due to the way the points at the junction happened to be set, when the train pulled away, it ended up going up the down line. This line is not signalled for bidirectional running, hence there were no further signals to stop the train…

Luckily a member of railway staff managed to get the drivers attention, and the train came to a stop, but this was a mile further along the track from the junction points and signal. If a train had been travelling on the down line at the time, I shudder to think what may have happened…

An effective (in terms of safety) signalling system is vital, not optional. If human error did contribute to this, it should not just be the person(s) on the ground that are held to account, but also the management of the companies and the government.

 

[Strathclyder]

Utterly horrendous accident. My heartfelt condolences to the familes of the victims. Hopefully lessons will be learnt from this that will improve Greece's rail network heading into the future.

 

[StephenHunter]

Awful event. My condolences to the families of the victims.

 

[w0033944]

Norwich Thorpe, 1874? "Stop mail". "Mail left".

I thought of that as well, being a local. R.I.P to those lost.

 

[Taunton]

There seems little or no information on the practical side, such as why on a mainstream double track electrified route were trains operating two way on one track. What signalling arrangements were actually in use? Which one was running Wrong Line? Was it in actual fact a head-on, or did one derail into the path of the other? And such like.

In contrast, disappointing and extensive media coverage of what I think they term the "human story" side of things. Multiple mention of the train carrying many students. However as I understand it the formation was locomotive (no concern reported for the two drivers/crew involved), then the first class coaches which were at the north end, and thus very unlikely that students were in the vehicles which have taken the brunt of the casualties.

The extraordinary immediate resignation of the transport minister within hours seems to have ended any prospect of sensible questions being addressed - surely one of the key responsibilities of a major post at such times is to ensure information is passed through the media and thus to the public. Then there were, last night, riots outside the railway HQ building in Athens, with protesters attacking police. And apparently rail staff are going on strike today in protest. All bizarre.

 

[185]

When I heard it was a head on collision, I made the assumption that this would have been in a single track section, however I was surprised that this has occurred in one of the newly built double sections - beyond all comprehension if they've just spend billions upgrading to a two track railway then only use one track. We travelled on this last summer from Thess down to Athens, it was loco hauled then too, I would say it's noticeably faster due to the upgrades, but worrying if the most basic of safety systems aren't being used.

 

[USRailFan]

From what is quoted from the Larissa station master, the passenger train was on the wrong track. Apparently he has claimed that this was due to faulty points, but also admitted letting the passenger train SPAD

 

[150249]

I'm sure it's been mentioned but how much of each train was destroyed?


Also, am I right in saying that locomotives 120 012 and 120 022 were involved?

 

[USRailFan]

Two passenger cars "disintegrated", according to media reports, one is seen in photos overturned and totally burnt. Both locos are obviously total write-offs, going by the photos the loco from the passenger train is almost totally crushed. Several container cars are also obviously heavily damaged.
The Wikipedia article confirms the locomotive numbers - apparently 120 022 in the original white/red/blue livery pulled the passenger train and 120 012 in the new dark blue livery pulled the container train

 

[stuu]

There seems little or no information on the practical side, such as why on a mainstream double track electrified route were trains operating two way on one track. What signalling arrangements were actually in use? Which one was running Wrong Line? Was it in actual fact a head-on, or did one derail into the path of the other? And such like.

In contrast, disappointing and extensive media coverage of what I think they term the "human story" side of things. Multiple mention of the train carrying many students. However as I understand it the formation was locomotive (no concern reported for the two drivers/crew involved), then the first class coaches which were at the north end, and thus very unlikely that students were in the vehicles which have taken the brunt of the casualties.

If you look at the wider angle photos, it's clear that the far ends of both trains which remained on the track are both on the same track. Trains in Greece run on the right so the passenger train was running on the wrong line.

I saw it reported that the second car was a buffet car, so entirely possible that students might want a drink on a very delayed train.

I assume the buffet car is the reason for the fire

 

[357]

but also admitted letting the passenger train SPAD

Many times on heritage lines I've seen a signaller give permission for a driver to pass a red signal, simply because he couldn't get it to clear. No investigation of anything relating to why it wouldn't clear. At least twice it was due to interlocking as a conflicting route was set and once due to a loco being in the platform.

When systems are so unreliable, such as what I hear about Greece, it is dangerous to let people slip into the mindset that their first thought is that the safety system has failed, rather than the safety system is working and stopping you doing what you want to do for a legitimate reason.

 

[Bertiethebobby]

When I heard it was a head on collision, I made the assumption that this would have been in a single track section, however I was surprised that this has occurred in one of the newly built double sections - beyond all comprehension if they've just spend billions upgrading to a two track railway then only use one track. We travelled on this last summer from Thess down to Athens, it was loco hauled then too, I would say it's noticeably faster due to the upgrades, but worrying if the most basic of safety systems aren't being used.

Yes, I wondered about that too. I was assuming that it is normally double track operation and this was during SLW due to some sort of failure. It was reported that the passenger train had been delayed by at least an hour, maybe due to a failure? If, as has been mentioned already, they were only using a basic system of radio/phone train control then I would put money on the likelihood that they've had near misses before with 2 trains in a section, not quite so dangerous when both trains are going in the same direction. It doesn't sound like a good idea if the stationmaster is in charge of the signalling as well as his/her other duties, especially if trains are running late and having to deal with confused/irate passengers. Reminiscent of the Abermule disaster.
It's all too easy for messages to get confused in the heat of the battle so to speak which is why the rule book always says "the signalman must reach a clear understanding with train crew etc" also why we have several layers of interlocking.

I travelled around Greece in the 80's and there was a marked lack of signalling then. We would be bowling along a single line and sometimes diverted into a loop. A guy usually on a bike would flip the hand points over behind us then ride to the other end of the loop. After a few minutes anther train would whizz through in the other direction at line speed, the guy then changes the road and off we trundled, no signals of any kind. My friend and I, both being signalmen at the time often wondered how it was all done but didn't like to dwell on it too much!

Many times on heritage lines I've seen a signaller give permission for a driver to pass a red signal, simply because he couldn't get it to clear. No investigation of anything relating to why it wouldn't clear. At least twice it was due to interlocking as a conflicting route was set and once due to a loco being in the platform.

When systems are so unreliable, such as what I hear about Greece, it is dangerous to let people slip into the mindset that their first thought is that the safety system has failed, rather than the safety system is working and stopping you doing what you want to do for a legitimate reason.

Yes indeed

The rather public derailment of a loco at the Great Central comes to mind.

 

[SmokeAndJoe]

Many times on heritage lines I've seen a signaller give permission for a driver to pass a red signal, simply because he couldn't get it to clear. No investigation of anything relating to why it wouldn't clear. At least twice it was due to interlocking as a conflicting route was set and once due to a loco being in the platform.

When systems are so unreliable, such as what I hear about Greece, it is dangerous to let people slip into the mindset that their first thought is that the safety system has failed, rather than the safety system is working and stopping you doing what you want to do for a legitimate reason.

This is a valid reason as to why you pass a signal at danger, but obviously having a conflicting route set makes that outrageous. The same with the train in section.

Nigh on anyone can run trains on a simple railway in normal operation. It's when things are out of course that you are truly required.

Heritage line signallers on anything other than a single line with one train, I wouldn't trust for a few reasons.

Even if they are an ex signaller, they could be well out of practice.

Even if they are a current signaller, they could well be from somewhere that has no complexity to it and have never had to practice the required skills.

Who's checking their competencies and ensuring their knowledge hasn't lapsed because they haven't done something in years?

You don't know what you don't know as they say.

 

[357]

This is a valid reason as to why you pass a signal at danger, but obviously having a conflicting route set makes that outrageous. The same with the train in section.

Absolutely, but I'm a mainline driver and have had a signaller say to me before "it's likely I'll call you back and you'll be passing it at danger, but we need to run some checks first"

I'd assume those checks are for things like conflicting routes, train in section etc.

In my mind, declaring the signal failed should be the bottom thing on the list once all other reasons for it not clearing are exhausted.

 

[ac6000cw]

I travelled around Greece in the 80's and there was a marked lack of signalling then. We would be bowling along a single line and sometimes diverted into a loop.

In the same timeframe I remember travelling on a somewhat secondary (but electrified) route in Italy, sitting at the front of an old single-car unit and watching as we speeding past stations which appeared to have hand-thrown mainline switches and very little or no signals. It was much the same when I travelled around the Peloponnese (Greece) metre-gauge network in 2003 - which extended into Athens back then - eventually they got EU money to put in proper signalling, only to later mostly abandon the Peloponnese network in the financial crisis...

But there's absolutely no excuse for operating the - expensively upgraded & electrified - premier mainline in Greece day-to-day using methods like that...while I would sincerely hope that the people on-the-ground are doing the best they can to operate things safely, further up the management tree there surely ought to be more heads rolling than just the Transport Minister's?

Seems some similarity to the Amtrak accident in South Carolina a few years ago, with fully interlocked signalling seemingly installed (photo above) but out of use, and things being done by radio commands which are mishandled somehow along the line.

The very unfortunate irony there was that the signal system was temporarily out-of-use during upgrading work to support PTC (Positive Train Control), the primary purpose of which is to prevent collisions... (if I remember correctly, the cause of the collision was a mainline switch left open to a siding by a freight train crew and not or incorrectly reported to the controlling dispatcher).

 

[Taunton]

Very common across Europe for the "stationmaster" outside major areas to be responsible for signalling and control. The equipment is often sited in their office, on the principal platform.

 

[USRailFan]

I don't know the source, but the Larissa stationmaster had apparently had the job for less than a month

 

[MarkyT]

The very unfortunate irony there was that the signal system was temporarily out-of-use during upgrading work to support PTC (Positive Train Control), the primary purpose of which is to prevent collisions... (if I remember correctly, the cause of the collision was a mainline switch left open to a siding by a freight train crew and not or incorrectly reported to the controlling dispatcher).

I wonder if that's the case in Greece. I'm pretty sure the line is fully signalled conventionally. Some former colleagues at BR's Reading signal drawing office were employed for years on this work soon after that organisation's privatisation, in ADtranz days I think. Greece never had any legacy form of train protection, so more recently elected to equip the entire network with ETCS level 1, which retains all the conventional signalling and provides a fully protective ATP overlay using standard ETCS components. It's possible parts of the interlocking and control systems may have been isolated to allow such work to be carried out. Alternatively, the need for manual block methods may have been because of equipment failure, or trackwork closing a line where there's no bi-di facility on the open line.

 

[Fragezeichnen]

Heritage line signallers on anything other than a single line with one train, I wouldn't trust for a few reasons.

Even if they are an ex signaller, they could be well out of practice.

Even if they are a current signaller, they could well be from somewhere that has no complexity to it and have never had to practice the required skills.

Who's checking their competencies and ensuring their knowledge hasn't lapsed because they haven't done something in years?

You don't know what you don't know as they say.

Frankly this rather parcohial view of "hobby signalmen" only shows you don't really know what you are talking about.

I am a signalman on a major heritage line and we have the following procedures:

• All signalmen are formally re-examined on their rules knowledge every 2 years
• All signalman must work at least 10 turns per year, if not they have to re-do their practical exam
• All signalmen will be observed every year in each signalbox they work by an examiner
• There are additional requirements for more extensive recent experience in a box that must be satisifed before a signalman can work a non-standard timetable.

A couple of times I was able to observe the large box at Kidderminster SVR with 55 working levers controlling two platforms with loops, a short section of double track and a large yard, on a busy day the signalman there has to combine continous shunting moves with running the train service and has a job vastly more complex that plenty of Network Rail signalmen. Even working at a smaller box I regularly have 3 seperate signalled moves underway simultaneously. So... don't trust me I guess.