There's another aspect: the failure of the court in issuing a summons where the facts alleged don't add up to the offence.
"When determining an application for a summons a magistrate must ascertain whether the allegation is of an offence known to law, and if so whether the essential ingredients of the offence are prima facie present (R (DPP) v Sunderland MC [2014] EWHC 613 (Admin) ("Sunderland"))."
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2019/1709.html
For me, a mangled reference – this should work correctly:
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2019/1709.html.
The Sunderland case referred to in that judgment is helpful in fleshing out the extent of a magistrate's duty to scrutinise an information and to establish whether it is vexatious.
A prosecution must be supported initially by a statement of facts. In this case, the relevant part of that statement is as follows:
“At Moorfields station,when asked by an officer or servant of the railway company, you failed either to produce, and if so requested deliver up, a ticket showing your fare was paid.”
The problem with this is it alleges a failure to follow only one of the three ways specified in Section 5(1) RoRA in which a passenger can respond to such a request. The alternatives of paying the fare or giving name and address are not mentioned, and that results in a statement of facts that is misleading by omission.
You might hope that a conscientious (and knowledgeable!) justices' clerk scrutinising such a statement of facts would say “Well, what about the two other ways the accused might have responded to a Section 5(1) request? There's no mention of those, and since Merseyrail seem to be in possession of the accused's name and address I'm not satisfied that the essential ingredients of this offence can be proved – I'm not going to approve issue of a summons until Merseyrail have satisfied me that it may be able to do so.” That would provide a degree of protection from vexatious prosecution, but
- it requires an alert justice's clerk to spot such abuse; and
- it is easily evaded (initially at least) by a prosecutor who wrongfully uses the SJP to begin the prosecution.
So, when a justice's clerk first receives details of a prosecution begun by SJP it is highly desirable that he satisfies himself that the prosecutor has authority to make use of that procedure. That would be a first step towards ensuring that the SJP is not abused, as it has been here.
Edited to add that the following passage from the
Sunderland judgment appears highly apposite:
"When considering whether to issue a summons, the magistrate should at the very least ascertain (a) whether the allegation is of an offence known to law and if so whether the essential ingredients of the offence are prima facie present, (b) if the offence alleged is not out of time (c) that the court has jurisdiction (d) whether the informant has the necessary authority to prosecute
R v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Klahn [1979] 1 WLR 933"